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Abstract
This thesis examines the relationship between religion and politics in post-communist Poland. 
Its focus is on how religion continues to maintain high salience and visibility in Polish public 
life despite falling individual religiosity. The study draws on theories o f secularisation and 
republicisation, and aims to assess their applicability to the Polish case study. Based on an 
analysis of the relationship between religion and politics in Poland, this thesis argues that the 
continued public presence o f religion is due to historical factors, notably the legacy o f the 
communist era, which enabled the institutionalisation o f a position o f influence for the Polish 
Roman Catholic Church that was consolidated during the early post-communist period (1989- 
1993). I t is the historical legacy of the Catholic Church acting as a critic o f the government and 
a symbolic representative o f the nation as well as institutional interests o f both the Church and 
key political actors that preserve the status quo. The research material that this thesis analyses 
consists of Polish sources concerning the Church, religion and politics in Poland, including 
primary sources such as Church and government documents and press, as well as secondary 
sources such as academic journals and interviews with key Polish academics. The main aim o f 
the research is to investigate the connections between the communist-era past and 
contemporary institutional interests and the links between religious and political groups in 
modern democratic Poland.
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Introduction
The aim o f this thesis is to analyse the changes in the relationship between religion, politics and 
society in post-1989 Poland, and assess the continued public presence o f religion in Polish 
society. This enquiry is set in the context o f decreasing individual religious vitality, and the social 
as well as political transformation o f the country after the collapse o f communism. The thesis 
will be critically re-examining the history o f religion and politics in communist and post­
communist Poland in the light o f secularisation theories, bringing together sociological and 
political science approaches to suggest a new republicisation perspective.1
Although public religion has become an increasingly popular object o f research in the 
social sciences (Berger 1999; Casanova 2008; Norris and Inglehart 2004), scholarly approaches 
to religious change have often neglected the study of religious authority and religious actors and 
their relationship with the polity. Mainstream theories of secularisation focus on the modern 
sociological phenomena underpinning the process, such as modernisation, differentiation, 
rationalisation, individualisation and societalisation, with less regard for the cultural specificity 
o f the countries in question (Tschannen 1991). Those theories also refer mostly to individual 
religiosity indicators, such as church attendance or declining religious belief, with much less 
attention paid to the role of religious actors and institutions—which is arguably more important 
in assessing the social significance o f religion. I aim to redress both o f those imbalances, critically 
examining the role o f religion in the public life o f contemporary Poland through the lens o f 
secularisation theories, balancing attention to individual level factors with consideration o f 
institutional and collective influences on actors.
This thesis argues that understanding the role o f religion in today’s Poland can only be 
achieved through an analysis of the interests and behaviour o f the main actors, and the
1 See Herbert and Fras (2009).
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institutional and political framework within which they operate. Due consideration also needs 
to be paid to the historical and cultural background that largely defines the social and political 
landscape in post-communist Poland, particularly the heritage o f the communist era and the last 
years o f the old regime.
My interest in this subject began with the study of the high visibility of religion and 
religious issues in Poland’s public life two decades after the collapse o f communism, and the 
beginning o f democratic transformation, modernisation and Euro-Atlantic integration.2 
Contemporary Poland has undergone significant socio-political changes, including changes in 
the religious context. Although Poland was historically a multi-religious and multicultural 
country, since the Second World War it has been dominated by Roman Catholicism. 95% of 
Poles now declare themselves as Catholic (RAS 2010), and the largest minority religious 
community, Christian Orthodoxy, accounts for only 2% of the population (WVS 2012).
Religion and national identity have been closely related in Poland’s history, particularly 
since the late-18th century partition period. A major change occurred once Poland became a 
Soviet satellite state in 1945. Religion, although controlled and driven from the public sphere by 
the communist authorities, remained vibrant at the level of individual religiosity, both in terms 
o f belief and practice, making religious practice integral to the resistance to post-war Soviet 
hegemony. Although the activities o f the Polish Roman Catholic Church (PRCC), the largest 
religious institution in the country, were restricted by communist authorities, the Church 
enjoyed much more freedom than religious organisations in the Soviet Union (where they were 
virtually abolished).
Indeed, the PRCC played a significant political role in Poland before 1989. The Church’s 
relative autonomy allowed it to become a hub for different anti-government initiatives. Since
2 Entering the European Union and NATO were seen as the two most important steps in shedding the communist 
legacy for Poland; they have been portrayed as one process, referred to as Euro-Atlantic integration.
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the end o f the Stalinist period, PRCC gradually become politicised and acted as a mediation 
channel between social groups in process referred to as praetorianism (Huntington 1968).
This became particularly relevant in the 1980s, the decade o f Solidarity, martial law and 
democratic revolution in Poland. The PRCC supported Solidarity in a number o f ways. 
Following the strikes in Gdansk and other cities on the Baltic coast in 1980, the Church provided 
logistical support to opposition groups and individuals. This was only possible for two reasons: 
power and independence. The Church was the biggest non-state social institution in the People’s 
Republic o f Poland; it was relatively independent from the communist authorities and largely 
opposed to its main policies—especially those relating to the exclusive status o f the communist 
party, separation o f Church and state and the suppression of religion in the public realm.
It is in this context that the PRCC fiercely defended its institutional rights and privileges. 
Perhaps surprisingly, this necessitated a certain level o f co-operation with the communist 
authorities. As I aim to show, the Church, even though often identified with the opposition, 
actually sided with the government on a number o f crucial issues, and used all possible 
opportunities to secure its interests (see Chapter 3). And it was by walking this very fine line 
between collusion and opposition that the PRCC was able to form a vital part o f Polish politics 
after the first democratic elections in 1989. The collapse o f state structures and the dramatic 
ideological shift in Polish political life during this period, combined with the stability o f the 
PRCC’s policies and leadership, further fuelled this growing assertiveness.
Polish post-communist politics—i.e. following the 1989 elections—thus provide an 
intriguing case study of the interaction between religion and politics within the wider processes 
o f social, economic, cultural and political modernisation. The PRCC, as the biggest religious 
organisation, remained—and remains—at the centre o f public life. Fierce conflicts between those 
seeking to extend the Church’s authority and those seeking to limit it have emerged since 1989; 
consequently, the key public debates o f the 1990s were largely influenced by religious rhetoric 
and Church involvement.
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During the first phase of transformation, between 1989 and 1993, the Church managed 
to push through a number of their policies. Even debates on supposedly ‘secular’ legal issues, 
such as the creation o f the post o f the Citizens’ Ombudsman, have also been influenced by the 
Catholic Church, its social doctrine and actions. Controversial issues such as prenatal 
examinations, the right to abortion and the return o f Catholic theology to public schools have 
stirred social conflict and fervent discussions in recent years. The debate on the new Polish 
constitution in the early 1990s was largely influenced by the question of the place o f religious 
values in the polity and whether Catholicism should be recognised as the leading religious 
denomination in Poland. All o f those debates were characterised by organised and structured 
PRCC lobbying and /o r campaigning on the one hand, and uncertain policy responses from the 
weak, reforming state institutions coming to terms with a shift from communism to liberal 
democracy on the other. Through an analysis of the Church’s actions and the response o f state 
and political institutions in the first years o f transformation, this thesis aims to demonstrate that 
this period (1989-1993) was crucial for sustaining the republicisation o f religion in the country 
for years to come.
Right-wing political parties, most o f which had their roots in the Solidarity movement, 
formed governments throughout the 1990s. Their close relationship with the PRCC guaranteed 
the status quo in church-state relations and the continued republicisation o f religion (see 
Chapter 5). With the coming to power o f a left-wing coalition o f the Democratic Left Alliance 
(‘Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej’, SLD, heir to the communist Polish United Workers Party) 
and Polish Peasants’ Party (‘Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe’, PSL) with roots in the communist 
peasant movement) between 2000 and 2005, however, Polish politics were less exposed to 
religious arguments and Church intervention. O n the other hand, the post-communist Miller 
government (2001-2004) entered into an unwritten alliance with the Church over abortion and 
European integration matters, assuring the PRCC that the government would not reform
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abortion laws, in exchange for the Church’s support for European enlargement (Janicki and 
Wladyka 2009).
Religion continued to dominate Polish political discourse on a number o f matters at the 
beginning of the new century. European integration remains one of the most contentious issues 
in Polish political life, largely thanks to the opposition o f right-wing and Church-related groups 
and organisations towards the European Union. The EU enlargement process, completed in 
2004, proved a major challenge to Poland, as a conservative Catholic country attempting to 
negotiate its entry and to establish bidding power within the largely secular European Union.3 
Bishop Pieronek, provost o f the influential Papal Theological Academy in Cracow, called the 
Polish EU accession a ‘great apostolic assignment’ for Poland and Polish Catholics (Pieronek 
1997). Debates on the European Constitution, particularly the role o f Christianity and Christian 
rhetoric (the so-called ‘God clause’) and references to the Christian heritage o f Europe, have 
recently become a controversial aspect o f Polish representation in the European Convention, 
leading to a significant dispute within the EU regarding references to God and Christianity in 
the Constitution text (Casanova 2004).
The 2005 Polish general and presidential elections again raised the issue o f the secular 
character o f the state and the idea o f religious neutrality in public life; Polish politics were never 
entirely secular, and the 2005 elections only reinforced this state o f affairs. The triumphant party, 
Law and Justice (‘Prawo i Sprawiedliwosc’, PiS), in coalition with the pro-Catholic League of 
Polish Families (‘Liga Polskich Rodzin’, LPR), went against the moderately secular trend that 
had gradually developed in Polish public life in the early 2000s. Plans for further restrictions on 
abortion, the subsidising o f Church investment projects and the inclusion o f religion on the list 
o f A-level exams, amongst other initiatives, seemed to drive the seemingly unlikely coalition
3 Although European integration processes were influenced by the Christian Democrats (see Kaiser 2007), today’s 
EU member states are largely secular, and so is the politics o f  the EU as an organisation. For the PRCC’s policy 
towards the EU, see also Chapter 5.
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forward for almost two years. Lech Kaczynski, having been elected president in 2005 on a 
conservative and non-modernisation ticket, signalled his intention to effect a swift return to a 
more religiously influenced state through the use o f religious symbols and reliance on Church 
support in politics by choosing the Vatican as the destination of his first foreign visit 
(Rzeczpospolita 2007). My analysis o f the Law and Justice government’s actions and attitudes 
towards church-state relations and the role o f religion in public life (Chapter 5) shows how 
religion was republicised even further within a short period o f time all due to the activities of 
state and political actors.
And yet, at the same time, rates o f individual religious practice in Poland have fallen 
almost continuously over the last 20 years. On the one hand, Poland remains one o f the most 
religious societies in Europe in terms o f religious practice and belief. Religion remains important 
for a majority of Polish citizens—a very high rate in comparison with Western European 
countries considered to be highly secularised, such as the United Kingdom or the Netherlands 
(see Table 1). O n the other hand the main indicators of religious practice and belief in Poland 
are in steady decline (Marianski 2004). Between 1990 and 2005, the number o f people who 
regularly (at least once a month) attended church services dropped from 85.6% to 75.5%. In 
the case o f those attending church at least once a week, the drop was even more marked—down 
from 60% to 40% (see Table 1). The change is even greater for the younger generations: between 
1988 and 2005, the number o f young people practising regularly (i.e. aged 13-25) dropped from 
50% to 36%, while the number o f those practising only infrequently rose from 10% to 19%, 
and those not practising religion at all increased from 4% to 10% (WVS 2010; Przeciszewski 
2009; see also Table 4).
These numbers and tendencies reflect an important shift in the place of religion in 
modern Poland. The PRCC certainly remains the most important religious organisation in the 
country, as an overwhelming majority o f Poles still declare that they belong to the Catholic 
Church (WVS 2012). Its authority, however, is suffering on numerous fronts. The moral
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influence o f the PRCC, for instance, is diminishing rapidly. In 1990, 80.1% of respondents 
believed that the Church could provide answers to their moral problems. By 2005, this number 
had dropped to 66.1%. When it comes to the Church’s authority in the social sphere, there has 
been a marked change as well. In 1990, 52% of Poles thought that churches can give answers 
to social problems, whereas 48% disagreed with this statement. By 1999, the numbers changed 
to 39% and 61%, respectively (WVS 2012; see Table 1). Consequently, Poles no longer tend to 
follow the social teachings o f the Church: in a recent poll, 60% of respondents supported the 
use o f IVF treatment, despite the Church’s opposition to it, with only 25% siding with the 
PRCC. The same proportion o f respondents supported the idea of state-financed contraception. 
Almost 40% of respondents agreed that there should be a liberalisation o f the abortion law 
(Szostkiewicz 2009). Among young people, the influence o f the social teachings o f the Church 
is even lower: 80% o f urban youth approve of pre-marital sex, whereas the Church still staunchly 
opposes it (Pawlina 2006). W hat is more, an overwhelming majority of Poles oppose Church 
leaders’ influence on government and voting behaviour (80% and 85%, respectively) (WVS 
2012; see Table 1). The PRCC’s own ranks are decreasing alongside its social standing. Between 
1994 and 2008, the number o f priestly vocations has decreased by 15%; the number o f nuns is 
also in steady decline (Solarczyk 2013; see also Table 3).
Religiosity statistics from 1988-2008 suggest that Poland’s individual religiosity, 
including church attendance and moral authority among community members, shows no sign 
of bottoming out. W hat is more, younger generations are much more eager to abandon religious 
rituals and defy the PRCC’s moral guidance (D^bowski 2008). Polish Catholicism’s social base 
is shrinking, and the link between national and religious identity is gradually weakening.
But here there is a paradox. Despite this dwindling significance in people’s personal 
lives, the Church maintains a strong presence in the public sphere. Consequently, the popular 
perception is that the Church has far too much influence on Polish politics (Wi^kszosc Polakow 
2007). Here again, there appears to be a stark difference with Western European countries.
While in the UK and Netherlands, 20-30% of respondents strongly disagree with religious 
leaders’ influence on voting patterns, the Poland the rate of strong disapproval is twice as high. 
The same pattern can be observed when it comes to assessing religious leaders’ influence on 
government—here again Poles are twice as likely to strongly disagree with it as British or Dutch 
respondents (see Table 1).
While rates o f religious observance in Poland continue fall, and while more and more 
people are turning away from Church teachings, the PRCC continues to dominate Polish public 
life. A key aim of this study is to seek to explain why this discrepancy exists.
Table 1. Religion, religious institutions, politics and society in Poland, UK and the 
Netherlands (1990-1999). Source: WVS.
Poland 1990 1999
How important is God in your life 54.5 % very important 52.1 % very important
How often do you attend religious 
services
53.4 % once a week 
18.0 % once a month 
5.9 % holidays only
49.0 % once a week 
17.7 % once a month 
13.6 % holidays only
Churches give answers: the social 
problems
48.1 % no 
51.9 % yes
60.7 % no 
39.3 % yes
Religious leaders should not influence 
government
48.9% agree strongly 
32.0% agree
Religious leaders should not influence 
how people vote
53.9 % agree strongly 
31.8 % agree
United Kingdom
How important is God in your life 16.0 % very important 14.4 % very important
How often do you attend religious 
services
9.0 % once a week 
10.4 % one a month 
8.2 % holidays only
8.6 % once a week 
4.5 % once a month
7.7 % holidays only
Churches give answers: the social 
problems
70.8 % 
29.2 %
73.0 % no
27.0 % yes
Religious leaders should not influence 
government
20.4 % agree strongly 
44.9 % agree
Religious leaders should not influence 
how people vote
25.4 % agree strongly 
44.2 % agree
The Netherlands
How important is God in your life 12.4 % very important 11.7 % very important
How often do you attend religious 
services
16.3 % once a week
9.7 % once a month
8.7 % once holidays
9.6 % once a week 
11.3 % once a month 
7.5 % only holidays
Churches give answers: the social 
problems
68.9 % no 
31.1 % yes
63.2 % no 
36.8 % yes
Religious leaders should not influence 
government
22.1 % strongly agree 
37.8 % agree
Religious leaders should not influence 
how people vote
28.3 % strongly agree
37.4 % agree
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Table 2. Church attendance rates in Poland. Source: ISKK SAC.
Year 1980 1999 2008
Regular (weekly) church 
attendance as percentage 
o f population
51% 46.9% 40.4%
Table 3. Catholic Seminary graduation rates in Poland. Source: ISKK SAC.
1994 2001 2008
Number o f graduates 7180 6917 6236
Table 4. Youth religiosity in Poland. Source: ISKK SAC, Pawlina 2006, Zariba 2007.
1988 1998 2005
Deeply religious 17.9 10.1 9.5
Religious 61.8 57.7 52.1
Regular (weekly) church 
attendance
50.0 % n /a 36%
D o not attend church 
services
4% n /a 10%
Responding to the above questions requires an analysis of the place o f religion in 
Poland’s public life, not only within the first two decades o f transformation, but also the 
historical background, which continues to influence matters to this day. This, in turn, requires 
an understanding o f key definitions, including o f religion and secularisation. In most general 
terms, religion is commonly taken to refer to matters of the transcendent, supernatural or divine, 
but this thesis draws mostly from sociological and political science theories, and so it focuses 
on the social dimension of religion, including its values, practices and institutions. The Polish 
case study shows that religion’s social and institutional influence outweighs the individual and 
spiritual aspect o f religion in contemporary Poland.
Secularisation, on the other hand, implies a diminishment in the influence or control o f 
religion over social life. Broader definitions o f the term (Dobbelaere 2001) suggest that 
secularisation can be defined on three levels: societal, institutional and individual. Whereas all 
are crucial to understanding the secularisation phenomenon, this thesis mosdy examines the 
first two dimensions, because, as will become evident as the analysis develops, religion can
remain relevant in a society independendy of individual religiosity levels.
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As secularisation is a complex and lengthy process, the second important dimension of 
secularisation (besides its reach within the society) is its temporal development. Moyser (1991) 
proposes a five-step model of political secularisation, which can be applied to the analysis of 
social and institutional secularisation in contemporary Poland. The first stage of political 
secularisation refers to the constitutional sphere. It is expressed through the lack o f legal 
recognition and support for religion and any particular religious institution or group. The 
following stage, policy secularisation, can be identified as a consequence o f the entry o f state 
institutions into policy domains previously assigned to, or reserved for, religious bodies. 
Institutional secularisation, the third stage of political secularisation, occurs when religious 
institutions and structures lose their lobbying power and influence on political organisations. 
Agenda secularisation, the fourth expression of the secularisation process, can be observed 
when political society has no overtly religious content. And finally, ideological secularisation 
occurs when values and belief systems that function within the political realm are no longer 
phrased in religious terms (Moyser 1991:14-15). All o f the above-mentioned stages will be 
referred to in the research chapters of this thesis (chapters 3-5). The research conducted in the 
key chapters o f this thesis indicates that socio-institutional secularisation can develop 
independendy o f individual-level secularisation. Furthermore, the post-1989 political history of 
democratic Poland suggests that political secularisation can be stopped or even reversed due to 
the activities o f key actors representing key pillars of the polity—state as well as political and civil 
society—notably due to the co-operation between governments and the PRCC.
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Research question
The main question to be explained in this thesis is why, despite evidence o f substantial individual 
secularisation, religion has maintained its high relevance in Polish public life after the fall of 
communism in 1989. The three most relevant issues under scrutiny are: how did religion retain 
such a prominent place in Polish public life after communism? Under what conditions does 
religion remain politically salient and publicly visible, even in the face o f falling individual 
religiosity and rapid social modernisation? Why is the trend towards secularisation not occurring 
in the Polish public sphere?
Despite falling individual religiosity rates and rapid social transformation, religion—and 
particularly the PRCC as the main religious institution in the country—has preserved an 
authoritative role in Polish society, notably in the public sphere. In line with most predictions 
o f sociologists and political scientists, religion returned to the public sphere after the fall o f 
communism (see Ost 2005)—a process referred to as republicisation—a re-emergence in the 
public realm without a necessary causal link to individual religiosity (Herbert 2007). Since then, 
however, the course o f secularisation in Poland has not followed the predictions o f mainstream 
secularisation theories (outlined by Moyser, above). Early theories o f secularisation developed 
in the 1960s and 1970s (Berger 1969; Luckmann 1970; Wilson 1966), and dominated the study 
of religious change over the following decades, suggesting that modernisation leads to a decline 
o f religion—both on the social and individual levels (Berger 1999:3). Those first secularisation 
theories, although distinct from one another, share a number of concepts seen as pre-conditions 
for secularisation: differentiation, rationalisation, individualisation and societalisation, as 
systematised by Olivier Tschannen (1991) within the ‘secularization paradigm’.
All o f the above concepts can be identified in contemporary Poland. Post-communist 
Poland embarked upon a journey of modernisation even before the first democratic elections 
in June 1989: from the mid-1980s, the authorities experimented with licensing private economic
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activity and cautiously allowing more civic freedoms, for example. After the collapse of 
communism, institutional changes were almost all-encompassing. Almost all state institutions 
have been reformed through very significant staff changes, policy changes and new institutional 
mechanisms (Regulska 2009). The whole political system was reshaped. The economy switched 
from central management to free-market capitalism. The crumbling welfare network o f the 
previous regime had largely collapsed, leading to a steep rise in unemployment and exacerbating 
social tensions. Over the next two decades, Poland changed beyond recognition. Between 1992 
and 2002 alone, Poland’s GDP more than trebled (CSIOZ 2008). Poland affirmed its integration 
with the West by entering NATO in 1998 and the European Union in 2004. As a major recipient 
o f EU funds and its emergence as a strong capitalist economy, it developed faster than its 
Western neighbours. In 2010, Poland overtook the Netherlands to become the EU ’s sixth- 
largest economy, and continued to defy the global economic crisis (Sikorski 2011).
The second pre-condition o f secularisation—differentiation—takes place within a domain 
o f meaning, such as education or medicine, in which religiously derived principles have been 
the dominant governing logic; this becomes contested by other, rival logics, that may in turn 
become dominant (Heelas 1998:2). Even though some o f the aforementioned domains o f public 
and political life may not have been entirely religious, the official Church was dominant within 
them; however, as part o f the differentiation process, it is assumed that it would cease to be so. 
As religion comes to be defined in terms o f individual conscience, the differentiation process 
accelerates the division between the public and private realms—one being the world of public 
activity; the other the world of private life—contributing to a distinction between public and 
private behaviour in the religious sphere. However, in the differentiation process in Poland this 
did not happen; instead, religion fragmented and split between other spheres, retaining some 
influence on economics, politics, culture and ethics (although no longer controlling any of 
them).
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The third term, rationalisation, refers to the process through which logic and scientific 
explanations replace those that refer to customs, tradition and supernatural agency. This is a 
process of great significance to the secularisation processes, as it limits the explanatory powers 
o f religious groups and institutions. In a ‘rationalised’ society, religious arguments lose their 
saliency, which in turn leads to decreased potential for religion to interfere with politics and 
other spheres o f social life. Post-1989 Poland, undergoing rapid westernisation and 
modernisation, focusing on increasing material wealth and catching up with Western Europe, 
provided a fertile ground for rationalisation. Although religious arguments have more saliency 
than in Western Europe in areas such as politics, public policy or morality (see Chapter 4), the 
overall trend is towards rationalisation o f the public sphere.
The co-existence o f modernisation, rationalisation, differentiation and falling levels of 
individual religiosity with a stable presence of religion in public life runs contrary to most 
secularisation theories. The secularisation thesis predicts that modernising European societies 
become more and more secular in the modernisation process, witnessing the waning influence 
of religion accompanied by the parallel development of differentiation, rationalisation and other 
processes (see Chapter 2).
This thesis makes an attempt to explain this anomalous development. Alternatives to 
secularisation theories that link secularisation with cultural and historical study, such as Bruce’s 
cultural defence/transition theory (1998 and 2009), Pickel’s contextual secularisation theory 
(2009) and Smith’s concept o f ‘secular revolution’ (2003) offer some assistance in understanding 
the unusual course o f secularisation in Poland.
Cultural defence is thought to be a reaction o f religious institutions/organisations to 
secularisation: in other words, strengthened religious identity that develops as a defensive 
measure in a fight with a hostile force, whether an actor (occupant) or ideology (secular or 
religious doctrine)—a process noticeable in communist Poland, where a secular communist 
identity, aimed at eroding the religious identity of the society, actually provoked the opposite
reaction in some social groups and actors. Cultural transition occurs when the ‘hostile force’ is 
not an external actor or ideology but rather a cultural process, such as modernisation or 
migration. According to Bruce (2009), religious identity and religious organisations provide a 
source o f stability in a changing environment, where they grow in power and importance. 
Bruce’s theory has limited relevance to the Polish case, however. Although cultural defence was 
a driving mechanism that sustained Polish religiosity during the communist years, in the absence 
o f a hostile force in post-1989 Poland this argument loses its relevance. The religious identity 
o f the Catholic majority of Poles has weakened gradually over the last two decades (Marianski 
2004). As for cultural transition: despite some attempts made by the Polish Church to portray 
modernising forces as the enemy o f faith, particularly in the early 1990s, no cultural mobilisation 
mechanism could be observed in post-communist Poland. Paradoxically, a party campaigning 
for religious-cultural mobilisation and defence (Law and Justice) won the general election in 
2005, at the height o f Poland’s economic growth, and when the transition to a functioning free 
market economy had been completed.
Christian Smith (2003) proposes to ‘move agency, interests, power, resources, 
mobilization, strategy, and conflict to the foreground’ (2003:vii) in analysing the social 
dimension o f secularisation. Smith claims that secularisation in the US was an outcome o f a 
struggle between conflicting interest groups attempting to control society. This claim is backed 
by a number o f examples from the fields o f education, science, public morality and human 
rights, and the patterns they have followed in 19th- and 20th-century America. Smith’s account 
is helpful in identifying certain causal factors shaping the relationship between religion and 
public life in contemporary Poland. This thesis argues that it is institutional factors, such as 
relations between state and religious actors, historical and cultural patterns and the institutional 
interests o f both religious and political actors, which shape the state of religious affairs in 
Poland’s public life. Therefore, the main body o f research-material presented (see below) 
pertains to the history o f Polish religiosity and its influence on contemporary state o f affairs, as
well as relations between religion, notably the biggest religious actor—the PRCC—and the polity 
in today’s Poland. Particular attention is paid to the position o f the Polish Roman Catholic 
Church as the biggest religious institution in the country with regard to the main pillars o f the 
modern polity, including the state, political society and civil society. Pickel (2009) adds to this 
discussion by calling for a more contextualised approach to the study o f secularisation, 
combining the process-related approach with the study of history and institutions as proposed 
by Smith.
David Herbert’s republicisation thesis (2007, 2011) argues in a similar fashion that 
traditional process-oriented approaches to secularisation do not account for a rapid return of 
religion to the public sphere. According to the republicisation thesis, it is mainly the 
functionalisation o f religion, combined with the protest character o f religion and a breakdown 
in confidence in various forms o f secularisation, which sustains the presence o f religion in public 
life. Herbert also suggests that social differentiation processes can have an opposite effect on 
religious discourses to that predicted by secularisation theory, and that a wider dissemination of 
religious content facilitated by the media contributes to the intensification o f religious presence 
in both private and public life. Herbert also contends that the republicisation o f religions is not 
conditional upon religious actors’ work in the field of a ‘narrow religious sphere’, but also in 
secular spheres such as law, politics and media (Herbert 2011:626). Arguments raised by Herbert 
are relevant in today’s Poland, where individual religiosity rates are falling, but where the 
prevalence o f religious content in mainstream politics and the strength of radical religious media 
multiply the presence of religion in society.
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Applicability beyond the case study
The relevance o f the case study presented is both specific to the Polish case and the broader 
study o f religion, politics and religious change. The research into the place o f religion in Polish 
public life, the role of the Church and the links between religion and politics presented in 
chapters 3-5 is largely restricted to the case study. All o f the analysed phenomena are incredibly 
complex, and I do not aim to present a full picture of the place religion played—and plays—in 
post-communist Poland. My focus is on a number o f interrelated processes that caused Polish 
public life to become largely non-secular through religious republicisation, allowing religion to 
emerge from the shadows of communist rule, when public displays o f religious observance were 
restricted. Many conclusions from this study are country-specific, and so it is the mediation of 
secularisation processes through history, culture and institutions that has an important role in 
the analysis o f Polish public life conducted in this thesis.
However, my conclusions have wider applicability, and they can contribute to the study 
o f religion and politics in Central and Eastern Europe. The thesis reinterprets the role of religion 
in communist-era Poland, shedding new light on church-state relations in an authoritarian 
regime, and the secretive character o f such relations. Furthermore, the thesis analyses the rapid 
transformation o f the Polish state and society in the post-1989 period, and the role religion and 
the Church played in the process, notably in the first years of transformation (1989-1993). 
Research presented in chapters 3-5 brings together the analysis o f two historical periods (the 
late years o f the communist era and the first years of the democratic period) that have so far 
mostly been considered in isolation. A number of conclusions drawn from this study have wider 
applicability to the study o f secularisation in post-communist and other transition countries. 
The role that religion can and does play in the political culture o f developing and rapidly 
changing social systems, particularly in the post-communist world, has been neglected. This 
thesis suggests that greater attention should be paid to institutions, and to state, political and
civil society actors, and the role o f institutionalisation in sustaining the republicisation of 
religion. Furthermore, this thesis argues that historical and cultural factors, such as path 
dependence and the links between religion and identity, should be considered in depth when 
analysing the course o f secularisation.
Methods
This thesis is based on a critical-realist approach to social sciences. The main ontological and 
epistemological premises are that social reality is objectively existent, and our knowledge o f it is 
mediated by concepts (theories). In social sciences, objects of research are socially produced 
and socially defined; thus, knowledge is fallible—but not all kinds o f knowledge are fallible to the 
same extent (Danemark et al. 2002:30-36). This thesis refers to a number o f established theories 
o f secularisation and religious change as ways of interpreting social reality and analysing the 
relationship between religion and politics in Poland.
As reality exists independently of human concepts o f it, it cannot be accessed through 
empirical observation alone. Science, as a practical, social activity, influences reality, provoking 
a double hermeneutics o f social research. Its outcomes are further limited by a double reduction, 
as the researcher’s knowledge o f reality is reduced to knowledge o f particular events, which in 
turn is reduced to empirical observations thereof (Danemark et al. 2002:160). This thesis draws 
on a number o f primary sources, including Church and government documents, as well as 
documents o f Polish political parties, religious organisations and other political and civil society 
actors, to analyse the course o f events and interests o f actors. This is complemented by a number 
o f secondary sources, including research material into Polish politics and religiosity which are 
used both as primary and secondary sources (as many sources are reinterpreted through 
abduction—see below). The critical, comparative examination o f a variety o f primary and
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secondary sources assists in a reconstruction of statements and actions of polity actors 
(including state, political society and civil society groups as well as the PRCC) from different 
perspectives.
Although science’s explanatory potential is limited by all of the above, critical realism 
assumes that the research process can be organised in such a way that will help the 
understanding o f the relationship between the real world and our concepts about it (Danemark 
et al. 2002:41). These concepts can be formulated as theories, including metatheories 
(foundational assumptions), normative theories and descriptive theories (Sayer 1992:50). This 
thesis attempts to contribute to the latter, by abstracting and isolating fundamental qualities of 
the relationship between religion and politics and the course of religious change in post-1989 
Poland. This is achieved through the use o f two modes of inference used in critical realism— 
abduction and retroduction.
The first method—abduction—is a form of redescription and recontextualisation of 
research, starting from studying an empirical phenomenon (such as the behaviour o f religious 
and political actors and institutions in Poland) and relating a rule to it, leading to a new 
supposition about the event. Through abduction, individual phenomena are recontextualised 
with the help o f general concepts and categories (Jensen 1995:148). This thesis recontextualises 
the relationship between religion and politics in Poland, looking at the interests of and co­
operation between religious actors, notably the PRCC, and Polish governments, both during 
the communist era and during the democratic transformation process. This is done to 
demonstrate that both key institutions in this process—the PRCC and the government—have a 
long track record o f co-operation and bypassing other actors and institutions of the policy, 
including other political and civil society actors (see chapters 3 and 4). This thesis also 
redescribes the behaviour o f the PRCC in post-communist Poland in terms o f its instrumental 
approach to politics and state institutions, and its ability to implement its agenda through short­
term alliances with a range o f actors within the polity (see Chapter 5).
The second method used—retroduction—is a way o f advancing from an empirical 
observation o f events and arriving at a ‘conceptualisation of transfactual conditions’ (Danemark 
et al. 2002:96). Retroduction seeks the basic conditions for the phenomena under study, looking 
at social structures and relations. Through retroduction, accidental circumstances are abstracted 
in order to arrive at the general and universal. This thesis is focused on the phenomenon o f 
religious change and its trajectory in post-communist Poland, using retroduction to explore 
social structures and relations between actors to understand why is there a disjunction between 
the levels o f public presence o f religion and individual religiosity. Through an analysis o f the 
behaviour and statements o f the main actors—notably the PRCC and other religious 
organisations affiliated to the Church (e.g. Catholic media), the government and political 
parties—this thesis tries to abstract the norms governing the relationship between main actors in 
Poland’s public life.
Sources
This thesis is based on a range o f primary and secondary Polish and English sources. Research 
material presented in chapters 3-5 is based mostly on primary and secondary Polish sources.4 
Those sources include official PRCC documents, such as circulars, Episcopal statements and 
press releases, as well as documents and statements issued by other religious actors, including 
Catholic media (notably the Radio Maryja Group, RMG). The sources also include Polish 
government documents, mostly pertaining to the policy areas examined in chapters 4 and 5. In 
addition to analysing Church documents and statements, I spent a substantial part o f my 
research in Poland, gaining an in-depth understanding o f the social and political situation in the
4 English-language resources on the topic are very scarce.
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country. As the Polish literature on secularisation and religious change in contemporary Poland 
is scarce, I decided to interview researchers working in the field. The interviews I conducted 
while in Poland with political scientists and sociologists o f religion covered a range o f issues 
pertaining to religion, the Catholic Church and politics and public life in contemporary Poland, 
with particular reference to the transformation period (1989-1993) and the importance of 
religion two decades after the transformation.5 My interviewees included Irena Borowik, 
Katarzyna Zielinska, Katarzyna Leszczynska, Tomasz D^bowski and Jozef Baniak. Irena 
Borowik, o f the Jagiellonian University in Cracow, is a leading sociologist o f religion in Poland, 
who has written extensively on the privatisation o f religion and religion in Polish public life. 
Katarzyna Zielinska (Jagiellonian) wrote her PhD on secularisation theories, and has written 
about secularisation as well as freedom o f religion and belief in contemporary Poland. Katarzyna 
Leszczynska, of the AGH University o f Science and Technology in Cracow, researched the 
Polish Church’s role in public life, particularly its attitude towards European integration. 
Tomasz D^bowski, from the University of Wroclaw, is a political scientist, and a key expert on 
minority religions in Poland, notably Protestant churches and the dialogue between Christianity 
and Judaism in contemporary Poland. Jozef Baniak, from the Adam Mickiewicz University in 
Poznan, is one o f the leading researchers in the field of individual religiosity o f Poles, having 
published on morality and religion, Polish clergy, laity in the Church, youth religiosity and 
religious values.
As my planned interviewees among political and Church leaders either ignored my 
request or refused to be interviewed, I had to rely on press and archives for their statements 
and opinions. In my research I focused on the most popular Polish daily newspapers; in order
5 In my initial research plan I also included politicians, Church and media figures among the proposed interviewees.
I asked to interview key political leaders from right-wing parties, including Jaroslaw Kaczynski, Marek Jurek and 
Zbigniew Ziobro, and left-wing politicians such as Jozef Pinior. None o f the right-wing politicians responded to 
my request. J. Pinior initially agreed to an interview, but later cancelled it due to lack o f  time (European Parliament 
campaign o f  2009). I also requested an interview with Adam Michnik, the editor-in-chief o f Ga^eta Wyborc^a, but 
he refused on the grounds o f ‘not having the expertise to comment on matters o f  religion and politics’. I also tried 
to arrange interviews with PRCC leaders in Warsaw and Krakow, but received no response.
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to obtain a balance of information and opinion, I looked at titles from across the political 
spectrum. Most o f the material I use comes from the two largest dailies: the liberal Ga^eta 
Wyborc^a and the conservative R^ec^pospolita. I also researched the archives o f the most 
influential weekly magazines, including the left-wing Polityka (Poland’s most popular weekly 
magazine) and the right-wing Wprost and Newsweek Polska. I also use Catholic press sources, 
notably the liberal Tjgodnik Pows^echny, as well as the right-wing Nas% D^iennik (published by 
RMG) and Go sc Niedsqelwy (the latter published by PRCC). I also referred to a small number o f 
non-academic journals dealing with political and social issues, such as Res Publica Nova and W i^  
as they covered the PRCC’s public activities extensively and often interviewed PRCC officials. 
Press sources were used primarily as sources of the statements o f Church authorities and 
political leaders, as well as sources o f opinion on the relationship between religious and political 
actors. The latter category is particularly relevant in the case of the Catholic press and magazines, 
which remain low in circulation figures but are highly relevant because o f their readership among 
the Catholic clergy. I have triangulated the primary material used to cross-examine the behaviour 
and discourse o f political and religious actors (both individual and institutional) in the 
communist period and during the transformation years in order to get as accurate as possible 
insight into the motivation and interests of the actors studied.
The secondary literature used pertains mostly to current debates on religion, politics and 
secularisation and religious change (material presented in chapters 1 and 2). As Polish sources 
on secularisation are scarce, the sources used are mostly British and American publications from 
the fields o f sociology o f religion, political science and international relations. During the key 
period in the development o f sociology o f religion and theories o f secularisation, Poland was 
part of the Soviet bloc. Sociology o f religion was constrained by communist ideology, and 
thereby heavily politicised. A number o f scholars working for state research institutions 
followed the guidelines o f the official ideology by interpreting religion solely through the lens 
o f Marxism-Leninism. This type of research aimed at supporting and legitimising the official
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anti-religious policies o f the state (Baniak 1981:V). O n the other hand, a small pool o f 
researchers linked to the Catholic Church oriented their research in opposition to the'findings 
o f the pro-government group, and their main agenda was to counter any arguments suggesting 
that Polish society is secularising (Borowik 2000:213). This dichotomy has a bearing on the 
research into religion and politics in Poland today, where many debates on the role of religion 
in society have political underpinnings (Marianski 2006). Sociology of religion remains a niche 
within the Polish academia, and the number o f works published, particularly on the 
contemporary links between religion and politics, remains low. All o f the above reasons 
contribute to the original character of this thesis. Although a number of (mostly Polish) authors 
have published in English on church-state relations and religion and politics in Poland after the 
fall o f communism (Burdziej 2005; Borowik 1999 and 2010), none o f the published work 
combines research into both communist era and the transformation years. As for studies of 
communist Poland, there is plenty mostly historical research on the topic in Polish (Dudek 1995; 
Gowin 1995; Zaryn 2003), but it focuses mostly on the Church’s role as an opposition force, 
and often omits the PRCC’s co-operation with communist authorities—thus limiting their 
relevance to this thesis.6 One English monograph on the issue published in the early Solidarity 
years (Pomian-Srzednicki 1982) is used in Chapter 3 to illustrate the historical significance of 
religion in Poland.
6 All o f  the authors quoted are active in politics and government—Gowin is the serving Justice Minister, Dudek 
and Zaryn worked for the government-affiliated Institute o f National Remembrance.
Plan o f the thesis
This thesis is divided into three main parts. In the first part, comprising chapters 1 and 2, I 
review the theoretical frameworks that underpin my research on the case study. In  Chapter 1 ,1 
deal with the body o f literature focused on the liberal democratic polity, religion and politics 
and the relationship between Church and state. In Chapter 2 ,1 review a range o f secularisation 
theories and current debates in this field, and apply them to the case study. The theoretical 
frameworks I set out allow me then to turn to the specific analysis o f the role o f religion in 
Poland.
The second part o f the thesis, comprising Chapter 3, turns from the theoretical basis of 
the preceding chapters to look at the actual role o f religious institutions, and the interactions 
between religion, statehood and national identity in Poland throughout history. I pay particular 
attention to the legacy o f the communist era, and its importance both for contemporary church- 
state relations and the place o f religion in Polish public life today. My main argument is that, 
particularly in the last years o f the communist period, the Church increased its co-operation 
with the communist authorities, setting the background for its return to public life.
The third block o f the dissertation, divided between chapters 4 and 5, deals with the 
contemporary situation o f religion and public life in Poland. The former chapter deals with the 
first period of transition and systemic change, when state and political society were at their 
weakest and the whole socio-political structure o f the country was reshaped. I argue that the 
four years o f transition (1989-1993) were crucial for the shaping o f relations between religion 
and politics, and notably between the PRCC and political organisations and governments. The 
following chapter deals with the aftermath o f the first period o f transformation, after a new 
constitution and Concordat were signed. It spans almost fifteen years o f Polish democracy 
(1993-2007), and deals with the dynamics o f religio-political relations during that period, as well 
as the course of secularisation.
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The final two chapters are divided into thematic sub-sections dealing with the key issues 
that have arisen in relation to religion and politics in post-communist Poland, such as the 
abortion debate, religion in public education, European integration and religious pluralism.
The Conclusion offers answers to the research questions and summarises the research 
findings, including those pertaining to the relationship between religion and politics in 
contemporary Poland, as well as assessing the contribution o f  the thesis to the study of 
secularisation and religious change and offering directions for future research in the field.
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Chapter 1: Religion and Politics
This thesis is concerned with the relationship between religion and politics in contemporary 
Poland, and the influence o f this relationship on secularisation and the republicisation o f religion 
after the fall o f communism. In this chapter, I introduce the basic terms and categories that will 
inform the study o f religion and politics in Poland in the following chapters (3, 4 and 5).
This chapter argues that the relationship between religion and politics is crucial to 
understanding religious change in contemporary Poland, notably in relation to the secularisation 
processes. One o f the key assumptions is that secularisation processes can be split between 
public and private spheres—and that the developments in both spheres can be independent of 
each other. In the Polish case study, this means that secularisation at an individual level can 
develop alongside the sustained republicisation o f religion in the social sphere. A nother premise 
is that certain secularisation mechanisms can be halted or even reversed promptly by key actors 
o f the democratic polity (state, political society and civil society—see page 47 for details of 
Stepan’s polity model). Furthermore, this chapter intends to show that the particular conditions 
o f democratic transformation and the legacy o f communist rule, such as the praetorian 
syndrome, the instability o f state and political institutions in relation to religious actors (notably, 
the PRCC) and path dependency are key for the understanding o f the place o f religion in Polish 
society after 1989.
First, the two principal research objects, religion and politics, are introduced and 
defined. Then, the characteristics of liberal democratic regimes are presented together with the 
central features of contemporary politics in Poland: post-communist transformation and 
democratisation. The three aforementioned pillars of a modern democratic polity are 
subsequently set out, and the intersection of these pillars with religion, as well as current 
transformation processes in Poland, are analysed. Pertinent case studies and a short historical 
perspective on the relationship between religion and politics are also introduced. Finally, the
35
issue o f decisive factors in mobilising religion in politics are examined and a particular theoretical 
framework for analysis is presented.
D efining religion
Although religion is the object of intense study in many academic disciplines, including 
anthropology, psychology, sociology and political science, it is nearly impossible to come up 
with a single comprehensive definition that would suit all contexts. In the most general terms, 
religion refers to anything concerning the transcendent, supernatural and divine. As this thesis 
draws mostly from sociological and political science theories, however, it is mostly concerned 
with the social dimension o f religion, characterised by phenomena, processes and organisations 
involving large groups of people, rather than these mystical features. Analysing religion as a 
social phenomenon allows it to be explained through scientific research into the natural and 
human world. The thesis focuses mainly on the social and public dimensions of religion, then, 
but references will also be made to all three o f the most commonly distinguished dimensions of 
religion as: (1) a system o f beliefs and values framed in a theory, doctrine or ideology usually 
expressed in the form o f (2) practice and worship and pursued by (3) a community, movement 
or institution (Moyser 1991; Stark and Bainbridge 1987; Fox 2008). The first dimension is 
relevant to the Polish case study, as it concerns personal beliefs and values that prescribe the 
behavioural norms o f individuals. O n a global scale, Poland scores very low in terms o f the 
importance o f secular values, whereas the high importance o f traditional (i.e. religious) values 
places the country in the same group as many Asian and African countries (Inglehart 2010). 
Almost 97% of Poles say they believe in God, and almost 95% describe themselves as religious, 
making Poland one of the most religious countries in Europe (RAS 2010).
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The second dimension o f religion, referring to religious practice and worship, is equally 
important in this thesis, particularly in terms o f the religiosity of the Poles, which has frequendy 
been described as ‘belonging without believing’ (Borowik 2010). This means that, although an 
overwhelming majority o f Poles describe themselves as Roman Catholic and regularly 
participate in religious events and rituals, the level o f personal involvement does not translate 
into following the precepts of the Catholic Church. Patterns of religious practice and worship, 
particularly within the dominant Roman Catholic community, are highly visible and important 
for Poland’s social life: three-quarters o f Poles attend religious services at least once a month, 
and 40% regularly attend Sunday Mass. As many as 90% of Poles pray regularly, 70% doing so 
at least once a week. It must be noted that church attendance has fallen regularly since the late 
1980s—in the case o f those attending church services weekly, it dropped from almost 60% to 
just over 40% in three decades (Przeciszewski 2009). Moreover, despite the high numbers of 
those attending religious services and praying, only 46% of Polish Catholics believe the Church 
can offer answers to social problems (RAS 2010). Statistics differ gready by age group, showing 
that young people in Poland are much less likely to attend church services and pray (Borowik 
2008). Baniak’s (2008) research on religious practices and religious holidays has also shown that, 
paradoxically, the strong religiosity o f Poles is now largely ‘secular’, and many holidays and 
religious rituals are now devoid of religious content and are merely secular in character. A good 
example of this may be the celebrations of the first Communion—an important rite o f passage 
in the Catholic Church, whereby young people aged five to seven accept their first Holy 
Communion during a special Sunday service. In today’s Poland it is largely seen as an occasion 
for a family gathering and buying expensive, flashy gifts for the young people involved, with 
little or no reflection on the religious character o f the event (Baniak 2011).
The last dimension o f religion that will be addressed refers to the communal and 
institutional levels of religious life. In this case, the specificity of Poland’s dominant religion is 
o f crucial importance. Roman Catholicism, professed by over 90% of Poles, is one o f the most
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highly organised and hierarchical religious denominations in the world. I t is also the biggest 
actor in Poland’s religious life; the Polish Roman Catholic Church (PRCC) is one o f the more 
conservative and highly clericalised branches o f the global Catholic communion. The clericalism 
o f the Polish Church means that the institution is central to the life o f the community, and the 
clergy and other Church officials are much more important than lay Catholics in decision­
making and managing the everyday functioning o f the Church (Makowski 2000). It must be 
noted that not only is the PRCC the largest religious institution, but it is also one o f the most 
important social and economic institutions, and the biggest private landowner in Poland (Gowin 
1999).
Most of the references and case-study materials presented in chapters 3 to 5 pertain to 
the PRCC and Roman Catholicism in general. This includes Catholic media, organisations and 
institutions drawing from the teachings of the Church, as well as individuals and informal groups 
declaring their allegiance to it. This is not a result o f a deliberately selective choice of research 
material, but a consequence of the dominant place Catholicism and the PRCC play in both 
Poland’s history and its contemporary reality. W hat is more, since the PRCC is part o f the global 
Catholic community, the activities undertaken by the Holy See and the policies devised by the 
Vatican have important consequences for the Polish Church. The internal dynamics o f the 
Catholic Church and the relationship between the Vatican and the Polish Church are not within 
the scope o f this thesis, and will not be explored in any depth; they will be referred to only 
insofar as they are relevant to the place of religion in Poland’s public life. In this context, the 
figure o f John Paul II and his papacy’s influence on both the democratic transformation and 
the post-1989 changes in the Polish Church are of particular relevance (see chapters 3 and 4).
I t must also be noted that many actors in Poland’s public life use the term ‘religion’ and 
‘Cathohcism’/ ‘Church’/ ’PRCC’ interchangeably and instrumentally. Their usage of the terms is 
not always compatible with the academic notions of ‘religion’ and ‘Church’. This is for a number 
o f reasons. The PRCC often uses the term ‘religion’ instead of ‘Catholicism’ when it attempts
38
to portray itself as merely one o f religious groups or denominations, and when referring to 
matters that may affect all religions (see abortion debate in Chapter 4). In a similar fashion, some 
politicians use the word ‘Catholicism’ or ‘Church’ when referring to religion, thus suggesting, 
explicitly or implicidy, that Catholicism and PRCC are the main, or only religious denomination 
in Poland that is worthy o f public mention as a ‘national’ religion (see Chapter 5).
D efining politics
In the simplest terms, politics refers to all relationships and activities o f authority and power. In 
the study o f political science, the term is most often used in the context o f state and government. 
Moyser (1991) defines it as a process o f collective decision-making, ‘whereby a group o f people 
whose opinions or interests are initially divergent reach collective decisions which are generally 
regarded as binding on the group and enforced as common policy’ (Moyser 1991:3).
Both key elements o f Moyser’s definition—collective decision-making and common 
policy—are essential to this thesis. The collective character o f politics is o f central significance 
here. Decisions are made within large groups inhabiting a given territory. Decision-making 
structures and the definition o f territorial boundaries combine in the formation o f a state, the 
basic unit within which political decisions are made. Currently, most competences and power 
lie with nation states, usually defined as geopolitical units inhabited by ethnic or cultural groups 
sharing a common history. Collective decision-making can take different forms, varying from 
peaceful ones, such as elections and referenda, to direct participation through coercion, mass 
violence, authoritarian rule or war. As this thesis is mostly concerned with post-1989 Poland, 
most attention will be paid to the current political regime—parliamentary democracy—and the 
political institutions and processes built after the collapse o f communism. This period in 
Poland’s political life was marked, rather uniquely in contemporary Europe, by significant
temporary weakening and deep reform of state institutions (1989-1993) as well as a continuous 
close relationship between Church and state both in decision- and policy-making.
Liberal democracy, democratisation, post-com m unism
Liberal democracy has been the desired form of polity for subsequent Polish governments since 
the collapse o f the Polish communist state in 1989 (Bunce 1990). The transition process was 
based on two interlinked developments: democratisation and the establishment o f a liberal- 
democratic political order. These two processes have had profound implications for shaping the 
country’s political system and the relationship between religion and polity.
Liberal democracy is a form of indirect, representative democratic rule characterised by 
free and fair elections, involving universal voting rights combined with constitutional 
government and the protection of individual rights (Riley 2007). The primary component o f a 
liberal democracy is that government is elected. In liberal democracies, elections should fulfil 
three basic criteria: they should be free, fair and competitive. This means that in a liberal, 
democratic state all citizens should have the right to vote, run for public office and enjoy 
freedom of speech and assembly, as well as enjoy a just election process and freedom of media 
covering all aspects of social life.
The liberal character o f this type o f polity also calls for the protection of individual 
rights, including the right o f citizens to be protected from the state, the right o f the majority to 
decide the outcome of democratic elections and the right o f minorities to be protected from 
discrimination and persecution. One o f the most important premises of liberalism involves 
deriving social choices from individual choices; this entails a strong insistence on the rights of 
the individual and protection from state intervention, particularly in the private sphere (Levine 
1978).
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Other key features o f liberal democratic systems include institutionalised fragmentation, 
and a system of checks and balances assuring fairness and equality within the state apparatus, as 
well as the independence of organised groups and interests from government and the protection 
o f human rights, including equality before the law and freedom o f speech (Hague and Harrop 
2007:9). Religious freedoms, including the right to practice, change, leave and join any religion 
are seen as an essential part o f contemporary human rights (Davis 2006).
The last feature o f liberal democratic systems, and one which is highly important to this 
thesis, refers to the core principle o f democracy: political equality. It stems from the conviction 
that ‘all human beings are o f equal intrinsic worth, that no person is intrinsically superior to 
another, and that the good or interest o f each person must be given equal consideration’ (Dahl 
2006:4). This term concerns the equal distribution o f power and influence within a political 
system. Each individual member o f the community should be given an equal say in the political 
processes and institutions o f a liberal democracy.
Quite importantly, political equality assumes the active contribution o f all citizens 
through political participation, which ‘provides the mechanism by which citizens can 
communicate information about their interests, preferences, and needs and generate pressure 
to respond’ (Verba 2001). The issue o f active participation will be addressed further in this 
chapter with reference to civil society (see below). A broader approach to political equality 
assumes that it cannot be restricted to voting rights and the possibility o f standing for public 
office. This approach calls for extending political equality to issues o f social and economic 
equality and allowing access to means o f mass communication (De Luca 2007).
The relationship between religion and all three pillars o f the democratic polity (state, 
political society and civil society) in post-1989 Poland had important implications for all areas 
of liberal democracy-building, mentioned above. First o f all, the Church was actively involved 
in the first democratic elections in 1989-1993 (see Chapter 4), thus influencing the construction 
o f the first wave o f representative democracy in Poland. Second, the Church actively lobbied
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for the implementation o f its key policy pledges in the area o f education, morality and church- 
state relations, purportedly representing all Polish Catholics in its dealings with state institutions 
(government and parliament). The Church also acted as an important stakeholder in a number 
o f policy-making debates, often side-lining or ignoring other social actors, including minority 
churches and secular groups. Furthermore, state and political institutions were undergoing 
significant reforms in the first years of transformation (1989-1993) and in many cases could not 
adequately respond to or counter PRCC’s lobbying and campaigning efforts. In addition, the 
newly formed democratic institutions had not developed appropriate consultation mechanisms 
that would include smaller actors, which reinforced exclusion o f smaller stakeholders in policy­
making (see Chapter 4).
As mentioned previously, liberal democracies are the dominant system o f government 
for most European countries. According to Freedom House, an American non-governmental 
organisation that publishes an annual global review of democratic freedoms, almost ninety 
countries around the world are governed by liberal democratic regimes, including the USA, 
Canada, all European Union member states, Australia and Japan. O ther types o f regime include 
illiberal democracies, such as Russia and Malaysia, which hold regular elections and safeguard 
certain individual liberties, but suffer from inadequate human rights protection and do not 
assure a free and fair electoral process (Freedom in the World 2009).
Central and Eastern European states formerly belonging to the Soviet bloc, including 
Poland, started pursuing democratic reforms in 1989 and have stayed on this path ever since, 
although the transformation in different countries and in varying aspects of social and political 
life have proceeded at different speeds.
W effort (1989:329-330) argues that there are significant differences in democratic 
transformation between countries that have experienced a revolution, or had previously 
experienced democratic rule (or both), and those that have not. A  brief period of democratic 
rule between the wars (1918-1939) and the peaceful revolution o f 1989 placed Poland in a
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favourable position to build a democratic order. Conversely, as Poland was subject to Soviet 
communist mle between 1944 and 1989, and communist rule fell rapidly and rather 
unexpectedly, the reform process initiated in 1989 has been long and complex.
The most important challenge for the political order in Poland was its democratisation, 
as the communist system was thoroughly undemocratic, and one-party rule had dominated the 
public life o f the country for almost half a century before the reform. The democratisation 
process, initiated with the first free elections in June 1989, had profound implications for the 
current shape o f Poland’s political landscape. According to Przeworski (1991), every 
democratisation process consists o f three main stages: breakdown o f the old regime, democratic 
transition and democratic consolidation. All three stages can be identified in Poland’s post-1989 
transformation. The PRCC played a unique and very active role in the first two stages o f the 
democratisation process. I t was an official partner in talks with the government and opposition 
groups during the talks on the handover o f power from communists to opposition in late 1980s 
(see Chapter 3). The Church also played an active part in shaping the relations between different 
state institutions, such as president, government and parliament, in the first period o f the 
democratic transition (1989-1993).
The first stage of the democratisation process in Poland—the collapse o f the communist 
regime-is relatively easy to place in time, and can be narrowed down to a few months in 1989, 
between the first ‘Round Table’ talks (involving the communist government and its opposition) 
in February—when the communist party agreed to allow other parties to run in parliamentary 
elections—and the first democratic elections themselves, which took place in June o f the same 
year (Wiatr 1997). Before and during the ‘Round Table’ talks, the Church acted as a broker 
between Solidarity and the Polish United Workers’ Party (see Chapter 3). Once the communist 
party allowed for political pluralism, and the first democratically elected parliament took office, 
the scene was set for the second phase o f the democratisation process.
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The democratic transition stage usually involves the construction o f new liberal- 
democratic structures and processes—mainly in government, but also in wider political terms 
and within civil society. Linz and Stepan list four basic requirements for the democratic 
transition to be complete: sufficient agreement about procedures for holding democratic 
elections, a government direcdy elected in a free popular vote, authority o f the government to 
formulate public policy and the concentration o f power within three branches o f the state 
(executive, legislative and judiciary) (Linz and Stepan 1996:3-4). The transition period is not as 
easy to distinguish as the first phase, and often overlaps both the first and the third stages. In 
the case of Poland, the transition period can be considered complete as of 1992, when both the 
president and a fully democratic parliament were elected and a new (albeit temporary) 
constitution was set in place. Here again, the Church played an active role in both the electoral 
process and policy-making (see Chapter 4).
It could be argued that the last o f Linz and Stepan’s conditions, the concentration of 
power, was not fully met, as the military was still in the process o f reforming and switching to 
civilian control and Soviet troops were still stationed in the country, but this is not quite right: 
political power was now concentrated almost totally in the hands of the parliament and the 
newly elected president, Lech Walesa. When it came to agreement on democratic procedures 
and elections, the balance o f power was firmly in place, but it did not translate into universal 
acceptance for liberal democracy within Polish society. O n the one hand, overall support for 
the post-1989 transformation had a strong (over 50%) base throughout the 1990s, and most 
Poles accepted democracy as a permanent feature o f the political system (Strzeszewski and 
Zagorski 2000). O n the other hand, Poles remained critical o f the quality and future o f Polish 
democracy; between 1991 and 2001, 37%-63% were dissatisfied with the course of democratic 
transformation and only 20%-49% were satisfied with it (Opinie 2008). These ambivalent 
attitudes towards democracy were a good illustration o f the third, most contentious and least 
defined phase o f democratisation outlined by Przeworski.
According to Przeworski, democratic consolidation can only be considered complete 
once the new liberal-democratic structures and processes become so integrated both in the 
political system and in the consciousness o f the elites and the general population that removing 
them is unconceivable. Linz and Stepan (1996:6) add that furthermore, all governmental and 
non-governmental forces need to agree that political conflict can be resolved within the legal 
and institutional framework o f the new regime.
Consequently, the completeness o f democratic consolidation in Poland remains the subject 
of debate. As Freedom House’s recent reports suggest, a number o f post-communist CEE states 
(particularly those that joined the European Union between 2004 and 2007) can now be 
considered liberal democracies, but they fail to match their Western neighbours in terms o f the 
quality and sustainability o f their democratic institutions and procedures. Although significant 
differences also exist between Western liberal democracies, these democracies have more in 
common in with each other than with CEE states. Some of the differences are due to the 
different historical experiences o f those countries in developing a liberal democratic order; 
others are attributable to more contemporary phenomena, such as the behaviour o f political 
groups and organisations. In the case o f Poland, most of the differences seem to be a 
consequence o f the relatively short transformation period, as well as certain emergent features 
of Poland’s democratisation process following the collapse o f communism. A  number o f 
authors (Sakwa 1999; Lanczi 2007) argue that democratisation processes in CEE states are 
mostly conditioned by the fact that countries like Poland had a common point o f departure for 
their democratisation, notably Soviet-enforced communism. Sakwa (1999) argues that the 
specific nature of post-communist transformation changes the course o f the democratisation 
process. Post-communism is a relatively new term in political science, as it only appeared after 
the unexpected (at least to political scientists) collapse o f the Soviet bloc that started in 1989 
and finished in 1991. Sakwa (1999:3) asserts that post-communism refers to the political, social, 
economic and cultural reality of those Central and Eastern European states that were part o f
the Soviet bloc until the late 1980s and early 1990s. Sakwa further claims that post-communism 
is a negative concept, as it ‘defines the present in terms o f its past’. Lanczi (2007:69) takes a 
similar view, noting that for most writers on post-communism, it is considered a universally 
negative notion, assuming that for post-communist countries it equates to a healing process: 
‘the sick person on the way to recovery’.
Lanczi’s view was widely adopted by most political and social groups in post-1989 
Poland. Since the first years o f rapid transformation, however, new rifts have arisen, and there 
is now much disagreement about the direction and character of reforms. Lanczi (2007) divides 
approaches to post-communism into two major categories: the internalist/self-understanding 
view and the externalist/progressive view. The latter stresses the linear character o f post­
communist reforms and the imminent modernisation of post-communist societies. I t focuses 
particularly on the ways that CEE states catch up with the West by copying their institutional 
solutions and procedures; it also underlines the historical necessity o f the transformation. The 
progressive category is particularly relevant in relation to the position o f the Church and other 
social actors in post-communist Poland towards modernisation and reforms in the newly 
democratised society (see Chapter 4). The linear and progressive character of the democratic 
transformation was subject to intense debate both within politics and in wider society. As 
mentioned earlier in this chapter, liberal democracy, although based on institutions and 
procedures, also represents a certain type o f political culture. Although the Freedom House 
‘Nations in Transit’ report shows that post-communist CEE states have adopted democratic 
rules, built democratic institutions and followed certain democratic standards over the last 20 
years, they are still lagging behind their Western European neighbours in terms of democratic 
culture. Certain indicators within the ‘Nations in Transit’ report confirm that the changes which 
have occurred between 1989 and 2010 are not universally linear or progressive in character. On 
the Freedom House scale, one stands for a fully developed/democratic civil society, and seven 
equals the worst/non-democratic score. In Poland the civil society index has actually gone up
from 1.25 in 2005 to 1.5 in 2009. The 2009 Freedom House report stated that ‘Poland’s civil 
society rating worsens (...) due to the decline in the vibrancy o f the civil society and slight 
reductions o f the state’s funding o f N G O s caused by the economic crisis’. The National 
Democratic Governance indicator stood at 2.50 in 2005 and at 2.75 in 2010—explained by the 
‘tendency to concentrate power in the executive branch, which is dominating the political process’ (Freedom 
House 2011).
Lanczi (2007) suggests that, despite a long period of transformation, CEE states are still 
stuck in a post-communist reality essentially different from Western European political orders, 
and that this situation will continue. The main particularities of the post-communist world that 
hamper the establishment of a democratic culture and preserve the post-communist order are 
lack o f respect for political pluralism, the dominant role of the state and the level o f corruption 
in public life. Inglehart (2010) adds that, because o f the low score on the scale o f survival values 
vs. self-expression values,7 which has not changed much since 1990, Polish society is not well- 
disposed to the flourishing o f a consolidated (completely developed) democracy.
The issue of a lack of support for political pluralism, often expressed in terms of moral 
superiority and inferiority, is linked to political culture and competition between political parties 
and factions (see below for more details on political actors and political society). Even though 
political equality is widely perceived to be a founding principle o f liberal democracies, political 
groups and parties in Poland do not see their rivals as equals. The rifts in Polish politics are 
growing—in the early 1990s they included the post-Solidarity and post-communist party lines 
(during the 1993,1997 and 2001 parliamentary elections) (Szczerbiak 1998), only then to move 
to a conflict between a strong welfare state versus a more liberal and civic version during the
7 One o f the two major dimensions o f cross-cultural variation in the world (the second one being traditional vs. 
secular values) according to a World Value Survey. Survival values refer to physical and economic security o f  
societies, whereas self-expression values refer to equality, participation in democratic life and environmental 
protection (see Inglehart and Welzel 2010).
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2005 and 2007 election campaigns. Despite the changing focus o f the political clashes, the 
relations between political opponents are still antagonistic in nature, and religious actors, such 
as the PRCC, are often in the eye of the storm (see Chapter 5). Subsequent electoral campaigns 
confirm that there is no evidence of these antagonistic processes declining. O n the contrary, the 
two recent parliamentary elections o f2005 and 2007 were characterised by an intense ideological 
debate between the two main contenders and their allies (including the PRCC on the side of 
Law and Justice and other right-wing parties), which was filled with mutual accusations o f a 
serious character. This has been a permanent feature o f all electoral campaigns since 1989, but 
the process has intensified and deepened the inter-party divide to such an extent that even 
parties on the same side of the political scene (right or left) fail to agree on basic policy issues. 
There is a tendency to move away from policy issues and party manifestos towards larger scale, 
unifying concepts and slogans (e.g. Law and Justice’s Catholic-based ‘Fourth Republic’—see 
Chapter 5) that exacerbate the political struggle and mostly target political opponents 
(Szczerbiak 2008; Guerra and Bil 2009). W hat is more, despite a long period o f democratic 
transformation, the Polish state still has not developed appropriate consultation mechanisms 
that would include all relevant stakeholders. Makowski (2010:126) contends that 20 years after 
the first democratic elections, Polish government still relies on ‘traditional’ social partners such 
as trade unions, employers and PRCC, significantly weakening the democratic legitimacy of 
many policy-making processes.
It must be noted that most o f the problems—and in particular most of the controversies— 
surrounding the Polish post-communist transformation pertain to political processes and 
institutions (and to some extent the social aspects o f reforms) rather than to the economics of 
the transformation, which was initially one o f the biggest challenges. Today’s Poland enjoys a 
liberal, free-market economy that has largely surpassed the communist, centralised socialist 
model. Poland joined the European Union and World Trade Organisation, thereby entering a 
globalised economy and completely reorienting its own economic policy both internally and
externally. The free-market economy has produced high growth rates for over two decades, and 
the largest part o f the Gross Domestic Product is now produced by private enterprise—a total 
reversal o f the communist economic model. Household incomes have more than doubled in 
the last two decades, and the economy is now amongst Europe’s most stable (Rapacki 2008). 
The main challenges o f Polish post-communist transformation pertain to its political and social 
institutions, notably the so-called polity triangle: state, political society and civil society. It is the 
relations between the three o f them, and the role o f religious actors, notably the Polish Roman 
Catholic Church, that shape the place and role o f religion in Polish public life.
The polity: state, political society, civil society
Stepan (1988:5) suggests that Tor a modern polity in the midst o f a democratisation effort, it is 
conceptually and politically useful to distinguish three important arenas o f the polity: civil 
society, political society, and the state’. In post-1989 Poland, the relevance o f this distinction is 
underlined by the legacy o f its communist past. The Marxist-Leninist Soviet rule, dominant in 
the political life o f the country between 1944 and 1989, effectively merged the all-encompassing 
state apparatus with political and civil society. The socialist state was much larger than today’s 
liberal democratic state. I t was the biggest employer and the provider o f the most services and, 
in the face of a merger with political society (see below) and a practically non-existent civil 
society, it enjoyed unchallenged authority. Political society under Soviet communism was limited 
to a party apparatus that was largely equivalent to the state’s structures and the dominance o f a 
single party. The Polish United Workers’ Party (Polska Zjednoczona Partia Robotnicza, PZPR) 
was the main source o f power during the entire communist period. The function o f the two 
minor, non-communist parties was limited to serving as PZPR’s reach-out institutions to certain
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groups within society (small businesses and farmers). The emergence o f independent political 
and civil societies was, therefore, one o f the main challenges to Poland’s transition.
The role o f civil society was reduced to near non-existence during the early communist 
period. During the most restrictive Stalinist era, almost all forms of civic activity were 
suppressed by the state and the Party. Later on, a certain level o f non-Party activity was allowed, 
particularly during the last decades o f communist rule, but there was still little scope for an 
independent civil society. Even during the glory days o f Solidarity, supported by the Catholic 
Church in the 1980s, civil society organisations were largely restricted or controlled by the state 
(see Chapter 3). Analysing the course o f secularisation processes in contemporary Poland 
requires an insight into the developments within all three spheres.
State
Stepan defines a state as ‘something more than government’—it is ‘the continuous administrative, 
legal, bureaucratic and coercive system that attempts not only to manage the state apparatus but 
to structure relations between civil and public power and to structure many crucial relationships 
within civil and political society’ (Stepan 1988:4). The dominant model o f state institutions, 
devised by Montesquieu, divides them into three principal branches: executive, legislative and 
judiciary. Moyser (1991:7) adds the administrative and bureaucratic apparatus (civil service) to 
this list as a separate category, but linked together with the law-enforcement arms o f the state, 
such as the police, army and secret services. The state is the most clear-cut part o f the tripartite 
division presented above, and remains relatively easy to define in terms o f its constituent parts 
and processes. It interacts with both political society and civil society in a number of ways, 
positioned at the apex o f this triangle as the main source o f political power. In contemporary 
Poland, the state and its apparatus are easy to distinguish from other areas of the polity in terms 
o f structures and internal order. However, the Polish state is subject to much criticism for its 
lack o f transparency and efficiency in delivering policy, as well as for the imbalance in relations
within political society (O’Dwyer 2004). Furthermore, the Polish state was subject to major 
reforms as a result o f the collapse o f the communist system and throughout the transformation 
process. The first months o f transformation (1989-1993) and the process o f abolishing five 
critical power monopolies o f the communist state, notably administrative, financial and in 
property matters (Regulska 2009:538), were particularly turbulent and allowed non-state actors, 
including the Church, to gain an important foothold in state matters.
Political society
The second pillar of a modern democratic polity, political society, is an area o f the polity that 
constantly ‘surrounds’ the state and contests for political power through democratic elections, 
lobbying and all other forms at its disposal. Power and authority over the state and its population 
are the ultimate goals o f political society, whatever the methods used. They do not always have 
to lead to the direct participation o f political society’s actors in state structures. Sometimes, 
indirect forms o f influence, pressure and control are preferred. Main actors o f political societies 
in modern democratic states include political parties, groups, leaders and alliances between 
parties. The most important process underpinning political society is the electoral process: 
deciding who will enter the state apparatus and on what terms; this is o f crucial importance in 
young democracies, particularly those in a state o f transition, such as post-1989 Poland, as the 
rules and course of elections are constantly being re-evaluated and are subject to change, unlike 
in established democracies (Linz and Stepan 1996).
According to Hyden, Court and Mease (2003), the five most important features o f any 
political society are: representation, competitiveness, efficiency o f aggregation, influence o f 
legislature and accountability. All of the five features listed will be assessed in the study o f the 
Polish case (particularly in chapters 4 and 5) in conjunction with the analysis o f the relationship 
between religion and politics with regard to the secularisation process. In particular, issues o f 
representation o f political society at large and the place of religious pressure groups within it,
and the accountability o f officials that pursue the PRCC’s agenda, will be relevant to 
understanding the relationship between politics and religion. The Church’s activities in post­
communist Poland are directly relevant to all five features of political society. Quite importantly, 
PRCC remained a stable institution throughout the communist and post-communist era, 
whereas the Polish political scene changed completely in 1989, and remained volatile throughout 
the first decades o f the transformation process (see chapters 4 and 5). Many political parties and 
groups in Poland, whether declared right- or left-wing (the divisions along traditional right-left 
lines are not easy to pin down) have been known to co-operate actively with the PRCC on a 
number o f issues in post-communist Poland, thus making the Church an important influence 
with regards to representation and aggregation within political society. Furthermore, PRCC had 
an important role to play in the legislative processes, notably in 1989-1993 (see Chapter 4).
Civil society and the public sphere
Whereas the first two pillars of a democratic polity (state and political society) are intrinsically 
linked, and their boundaries, although hody debated, are clearly marked, the concept o f civil 
society is subject to much discussion. Both its definition and place in the polity triangle (state, 
political society, civil society) remain contentious, particularly in the context of democratic 
transformation.
In  their classic work on civil society and political theory, Cohen and Arato (1992:ix) 
define civil society as ‘a sphere of social interaction between economy and state, composed 
above all o f the intimate sphere (especially the family), the sphere o f associations (especially 
voluntary associations), social movements, and forms o f public communication’. Douglass and 
Friedmann (1998:1) list the constituent elements o f civil society rather similarly, seeing it as a 
‘society o f households, family networks, civic and religious organisations and communities that 
are bound to each other primarily by shared histories, collective memories and cultural norms 
o f reciprocity’. Both definitions show that civil society can be interpreted negatively (i.e. through
what it is not): there are clear references to its being separate from the state, political society and 
economic realms. Civil society should be distinguished from the totality o f political 
organisations, state apparatus and wider political bodies (such as parliaments), and from the 
economic society composed o f organisations involved in production, services and distribution. 
It also needs to be distinguished from the totality o f sociocultural life. Civil society refers to 
structures o f socialisation, association and communication between individuals and groups, but 
only when they are institutionalised or in the process of institutionalisation. It does not refer to 
all forms o f social life, even if those forms are voluntary (and particularly if they are informal 
and not organised).
The notion o f independence from the state and the concept o f political and economic 
realms as defining features o f civil society are underlined in theories o f democratisation. Civil 
society is commonly seen as a critical element o f democratic regimes and an important 
contributing factor in democratisation processes (Douglass and Friedmann 1998; Herbert 
2003). In view o f the importance of active citizenship and political equality in democratic 
regimes, civil society is essential to ensure the balance between state and society (Hefner 2002). 
Voluntary organisations and other forms o f social activity, protected by a set o f rights, separate 
the private or family sphere from the space occupied by state institutions, thus ensuring the 
smooth functioning o f democratic states. It is important that the division between civil society 
and the economy/state is not that o f opposition. Civil society is a dimension o f society 
expressed through conscious association-building and associational life, and, as such, although 
it can gain influence over political-administrative and economic processes, there is no inherent 
conflict with them (Cohen and Arato 1992:x).
All three pillars of the democratic polity are constantly subject to change and 
renegotiation. Even though liberal democracy favours a division between all three, there is a 
certain level of flexibility in the relationship between them; furthermore, the ongoing 
democratisation process blurs the distinction between the three pillars. As explained above, the
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Marxist-Leninist ideology that dominated in Poland between 1944 and 1989 favoured a forced 
merger o f all three structures under the banner of proletarian communism. There were no totally 
independent civil society organisations in communist Poland. Virtually all associations, trade 
unions and other non-state institutions were either controlled or incorporated into the state 
apparatus.
Civil society is often placed somewhere in the middle between state and political society. 
N ot only does it mediate between the state and political society, but the origins of the latter can 
be traced back to civil society. The mediating role of civil society in a democratic polity lies in 
finding a middle ground between two phenomena: overpoliticisation and depoliticisation. The 
first term describes a situation where the political is assigned to the state (like in communist 
Poland); the second describes the opposite, where all dimensions o f civil society are political. 
And so in post-communist Poland civil society had to create a bridge between these two 
opposing forces.
The legacy of the communist past meant that Poland’s emerging civil society had to 
fight the legacy o f massive overpoliticisation. Huntington (1968) states that in a situation where 
the state is weak (not in terms o f its power structures, but in its authority within society), and 
where no mediation channels between social groups exist, politicisation o f all social institutions 
is unavoidable: a process called praetorianism. Both of these conditions—a weak state and a lack 
o f mediation channels—were prevalent in communist Poland’s politics, particularly in the early 
Stalinist period, when the communist regime was seen as usurper, and when opposition groups 
and parties still existed. The forced closure o f non-communist political parties and civil society 
groups and the persecution o f religious organisations—mainly the PRCC—commenced after the 
war and lasted until the early 1950s, which led to a sharp conflict between social groups. Ramet 
(1995) confirms that political institutions in early communist Poland were inefficient and only 
superficially established, which fostered the development o f a praetorian syndrome. These 
failures, alongside the communist party’s weakness and corruption, and the inconsistent
application and execution o f laws, meant that social groups began to oppose each other. This 
process continued outside widely accepted channels for mediation, and political power itself 
became fragmented. Organised institutions such as the military, students, religious organisations 
and labour unions started to behave in a more politicised way.
Huntington also suggests that praetorianism is a result o f a lag in the development o f 
political institutions in relation to social and economic development, bringing about political 
mobilisation without political integration—a process that could be observed in Poland from the 
1960s onwards (see Chapter 3). Political and social actors became mobilised in the absence of 
fully functional political institutions. This lack o f institutions meant that the actors’ demands 
could not be articulated and aggregated, which led to their radicalisation. The rise o f the 
Solidarity movement can thus be explained in terms of the growing praetorianism o f Polish 
society. In the absence o f mediation mechanisms, social and political forces confronted each 
other, which led to a state o f total conflict throughout 1980s Poland. Even the mass character 
o f the Solidarity movement, and its role in the fall o f communism as the largest civil society 
movement in the communist bloc, could not prevent significant internal problems in terms of 
self-definition as a civil society and political organisation (Ost 1991). In this context, the PRCC 
was a significant praetorian institution thorough the communist period. This was particularly 
relevant in the case o f symbolic praetorianism, namely becoming a symbolic representative of 
the nation vis-a-vis the communist state and claiming moral authority over the nation (see 
Chapter 3). The other tier o f the PRCC’s praetorian function, institutional praetorianism, was 
less pronounced as the Church never developed fully as part of political institutional structure 
of the communist (and then democratic state), only temporarily becoming a semi-formal 
mediating institution in late 1980s and early 1990s (see chapters 3 and 4).
And all of these processes contributed to the weakness o f civil society on the eve of 
Poland’s transformation, and to further problems with its development throughout the first 
decades o f transformation. As the Freedom House ‘Nations in Transit’ reports show (see
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above), strengthening civil society was, therefore, a major challenge to successful democratic 
consolidation in Poland. This was particularly relevant given that a vibrant civil society is often 
promoted as being a prerequisite for a genuine liberal democracy if it is to bring the modern 
state under societal control. Edwards (2003:4-45) argues that, although the basic notion o f civil 
society pertains to the totality o f voluntary associations, which are seemingly neutral from the 
point o f view o f democratic states, there are two important uses o f the term that make it essential 
for the development of liberal democracies. The first refers to the use o f ‘civil society’ as a value, 
reflecting the advantages o f cooperation. For the second, Edwards equates ‘civil society’ with 
a ‘democratic ecosystem’, which he defines as a public sphere in which engagement with the 
issues concerning society takes place. The two dimensions presented by Edwards underline the 
importance of civil society as a key pillar o f the polity in liberal democracies—and the weakest 
pillar o f the polity in post-communist Poland.
Maintaining the balance between the state and other parts o f society is a crucial task for 
civil society, then, but it can only be achieved if a number o f conditions are met. Kasfir (1998:2- 
5) suggests conditions that allow a functioning civil society to exist in a democratic state. First 
o f all, in a functioning liberal democracy, civil society organisations may influence politics (see 
below), but they should not become political actors themselves, to avoid civil society becoming 
political society. Following on from that, for the sake o f their credibility and integrity, civil 
society organisations should respect the rules they would like to enforce on the state, and they 
may not pursue an anti-democratic agenda. Finally, in order to be efficient, they should also be 
willing and able to confront the state on the issues they find important. Organisations that 
follow these rules, Kasfir contends, become ‘the core of civil society’. Those that do not ‘may 
be part o f the society at large’, but are not part o f civil society as such.
To address the main concern of this thesis, then: in post-1989 Poland, the PRCC’s 
activities suggest that the Church is not (or was not) confined by the classic boundaries o f civil 
society. Even though the PRCC claims allegiance to democracy, it often pursues an anti­
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democratic agenda. The case of anti-abortion legislation (see Chapter 4), where the Church 
reserved the right to influence government policy without regard for other civil society actors, 
or that o f the re-introduction o f religious education into public schools (see Chapter 4) were 
vivid examples o f the Church’s disregard for democratic principles. W hat is more, the Church 
is an independent institution, totally exempt from state control—way beyond other civil society 
organisations (e.g. in terms o f taxation)—making it totally unaccountable to society and external 
actors. O n the other hand, the Church frequently requires the state to account for its actions, 
particularly in the policy areas the PRCC is interested in, i.e. education, sexuality and morality 
(see Chapter 5). This kind o f behaviour reinforces an imbalance between a non-transparent civil 
society organisation (i.e. the PRCC) and a transparent state.
Although numerous sources confirm that Poland now enjoys a vibrant civil society, that 
very civil society nevertheless remains one o f the weakest pillars o f the newly built liberal 
democratic polity. In the Freedom House reports, it is noted that civil society growth dynamics 
slowed down after the first years o f transformation, and recent years have resulted in the 
downgrading o f civil society rankings (Nations in Transit 2010). Regular sociological surveys 
focusing on civil society in Poland (CBOS 2004,2008) confirm this phenomenon. Even though 
Poles show more confidence in civil society and trust each other more, this has no t translated 
into increased activity in civil society organisations.
As this thesis is mostly concerned with public life and the public dimension o f religion, 
it engages with the public dimension o f civil society. The latter is composed o f the totality of 
voluntary associations (including religious ones) that can be analysed internally as organisations 
and institutions, but which can also be viewed through the lens o f their public activity. One o f 
the key links between civil society and the other pillars o f democratic polity relates to the ability 
of civil society to influence public life. The activities o f civic associations and other institutions 
of civil society generate opinions and channel influence through the democratic discussion 
process in the public sphere. The term ‘public’ is very broad; it can refer to things accessible to
everyone and o f concern to everyone, as well as pertain to the common good or a shared 
interest, or simply to state-related activities. In social sciences, the term is most commonly 
applied in three contexts:
The people—the general public as presented in democratic theory, an electorate 
entitled to elect the government, and the bearer o f public opinion (...);
Statistics—the aggregate o f individual views, calculated on the basis o f survey data; 
An active public—the result o f people getting together to discuss or act in a certain 
way.
(Fraser 1990:70-71)
The first and third meanings are most relevant to the study of a modern democratic 
polity, particularly in the context o f relations between religion and politics. liberal democracies 
rely on an active general public producing a composite opinion o f its members and making 
informed choices derived from public debate. A properly functioning public sphere is a place 
in which political participation is enacted through dialogue, and where citizens debate issues of 
common concern, and it is fundamental to democratisation processes within liberal 
democracies.
According to Habermas (1989), the modern public sphere emerged alongside liberal 
democracies in the 18th century. In his StructuralTransformation of the Public Sphere, Habermas traces 
the history of this phenomenon to the bourgeois public sphere that emerged in Western Europe 
in the 18th and 19th centuries. Within a relatively short period o f time—a few generations—growing 
numbers o f middle-class citizens began to engage in arguments over key issues o f mutual 
interest. Debates were pursued initially in coffee shops and dining clubs, and through political 
pamphlets that grew ever more popular throughout the period (Herbert 2003:96). By engaging 
in this new form o f debate, citizens created a public domain for new ideas independent of both 
state and individual self-interest. This newly created public domain served as a mediatory
platform between the public and private spheres, and between society and the state, ‘by holding 
the state accountable to “society” by “publicity”’ (Fraser 1990:58). The key processes that 
facilitated the creation o f this bourgeois public realm included social differentiation and the 
separation o f political authority from everyday life. Both processes are equally essential for 
democratisation. Additionally, the privatisation of self and subjectivity, and the division between 
private and public, contributed to the strengthening o f the public domain.
Habermas further argues that the bourgeois public sphere fostered critical rationality 
and active involvement in public life. These features make it relevant to contemporary concepts 
o f civil society and to active participation. In the 1964 ‘Encyclopedia Article’ on the public 
sphere, Habermas defines it as a ‘realm of social life in which something approaching public 
opinion can be formed’ and where ‘access is guaranteed to all citizens’ (Habermas 1974:49). 
According to the author, access to information is instrumental in gaining institutional influence 
over the government, through law-making bodies. Control over the state apparatus is thus 
another feature o f the public sphere that overlaps with what civil society is expected to achieve 
in modern liberal democracies.
Although his approach is largely historical and normative, certain elements o f the 
Habermasian vision remain relevant today. Critics o f Habermas point to the fact that his 
concept o f the public sphere suffers from a narrow focus (e.g. excluding women and the lower 
classes), and idealises rational discussion in the ‘golden era’ o f communication (Asen 1999:119- 
123). Contemporary democracies and their civil societies actually tend to be inclusive and open 
to all social classes and groups. And Habermas (1989) himself agreed that the ‘old’ public sphere 
declined with the social and economic changes o f the 20th century. Changes in communication 
media, such as print, radio and TV, all worked against the milieu o f reasoned debate that he 
believed once dominated the bourgeois public arena. And it is this recognition that makes 
Habermas’s ideas relevant.
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This concerns the role o f the media in the public realm and its influence on public life, 
factors which are essential for understanding a modern democratic polity. Garnham (2000:130) 
argues that much o f today’s social interaction takes place in the media, a concern reflected by 
Habermas. Habermas suggests that today’s politics is increasingly dominated by PR and 
marketing techniques, and more and more emphasis is put on appearance and good impressions, 
a phenomenon Habermas calls ‘refeudalisation’ (1989:158). As part o f this process, Habermas 
mentions powerful private corporations, which have started to control and manipulate the 
media as well as the state. This process was complemented by the fact that, particularly after 
1945, the state began to play a more fundamental role in private life, eroding the difference 
between state and civil society and the public and private spheres.
All o f the above, according to Habermas, have contributed to the decline of democratic 
participation and traditional forms o f mediation between the general public and government, 
such as trades unions and political parties. Debates on fundamental issues have shifted from 
items crucial for citizens to politics focused on attracting the electorate, which in turn causes 
public and political life to degenerate. Habermas’s theory confirms a strong link between civil 
society and the public sphere. Herbert (2003:75) suggests that ‘civil society organisations channel 
private opinion into the public sphere but they do not constitute the latter’.
The PRCC can be classified as a manipulator o f both media and state, as described by 
Habermas. Although not a private corporation, the PRCC remains a non-state, undemocratic 
entity operating independently. Throughout the first twenty years o f democratic transformation, 
the Church has demonstrated its influence on both media and the two polity pillars (state and 
political society). As such, the PRCC has tended to erode the differences between state and civil 
society, and between civil society and the public sphere. The Church, in co-operation with 
politicians and state institutions, maintains control over many aspects o f government policy, 
independently o f the citizens’ views. Although contemporary Poland is classified as a modern
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secular democracy, the relationship between religion and the three pillars o f the polity contains 
elements characteristic o f confessional states, as we shall see.
Religion and the polity
The links between religion and the newly constructed democratic polity in post-1989 Poland 
can be explored from two directions: the influence o f the three pillars o f democratic polity on 
religion, and the influence of religion on democratic polity. This thesis will mostly be concerned 
with the influence o f religion on the state, political society and civil society, but some analysis 
o f the political influence on religion will be required.
As mentioned at the beginning o f this chapter, religion will be approached in its three 
dimensions (as a value system, religious practice and community/institution), but another 
important distinction needs to be made. In all three dimensions, religion can be analysed at the 
individual as well as group level. This thesis is mostly concerned with the public dimension of 
religion. Although religion on an individual level is significant, mainly because o f its influence 
on individual value systems and behaviour (Ramet 1995:64), the principal focus o f this thesis 
will be on group religiosity and religious organisations, ‘whose claims and pretention are always 
to some degree political’ (Haynes 1998:5, emphasis in the original).
The distinct character o f religion and politics, and the increasing division into public and 
private dimensions o f religion, are features of modern times, particularly in Europe. The pre­
modern relationship between religion and politics in Europe was much closer than in the 
contemporary model.
Although the processes of modernisation and secularisation have led to the realms of 
religion and politics becoming largely separate, the historical legacy o f the alliance between 
religion and the state is still visible across Europe and the wider world. This legacy makes
church-state relations central to that between religion and politics. Medhurst (1981:46) proposes 
a contemporary typology o f this context based on two main criteria:
The relationship of rulers with religious communities;
The relationship o f religious communities with the polity.
Medhurst’s then distinguishes between four types o f church-state regimes: the integrated religio- 
political system, the confessional polity, the religiously neutral polity and the anti-religious polity 
(1981:116—see Table 5). The proposed typology is evolutionary in character, as, according to 
Medhurst, states usually move from type to type in a linear fashion (although the process is 
sometimes reversed), rather than shifting from one type to another (more distant) one.
Table 5: Typology of church-state relations (Medhurst 1981)
Type 1 Type 2 Type 3 Type 4
Relationships 
o f Rulers with  
Religious 
Communities
The Integrated 
‘Religio- 
Political 
System’
The
Confessional 
Polity (or State)
The Religiously 
Neutral Polity 
(or State)
The Anti- 
Religious Polity 
(or State)
Relationships 
o f Religious 
Communities 
with the Polity
The Integrated 
‘Religio- 
Political 
System’
Confessional
Politics
Pluralistic
Politics
Sectarianism
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Types 2 and 3 are the most relevant to post-1989 Poland, which fits somewhere between 
those two models. Type 2 polity is characterised by a confessional state and confessional politics. 
According to Medhurst, the relations between Church and state take this shape when the 
dominant religio-political system (Type 1) gives way to more religious and ideological pluralism— 
thus underlining the linear character o f changes in the relationship between state and Church. 
As far as the attitudes o f religious communities and organisations are concerned, a Type 2 polity 
is characterised by actual ideological pluralism, which is regularly challenged by practitioners 
and leaders o f the dominant religious tradition in order to organise the members o f the majority 
religious community to deter perceived threats and defend the values and institutional interests 
o f their faith (Medhurst 1981:123).
The second model of church-state relations relevant to the Polish case study is 
Medhurst’s Type 3: a religiously neutral polity with pluralistic politics. According to Medhurst, 
a polity can be considered religiously neutral when religious and ideological pluralism have not 
only fully emerged, but have been accepted as legitimate by all the parties involved. This usually 
happens when confessional loyalties lose their salience to and relevance in the political domain 
as a result o f at least one of three processes: a change in public policy, growing indifference 
towards religion and revised ideological and theological understanding (Medhurst 1981:123). In 
consequence, the increased competition between conflicting ideologies and groups associated 
with them is accepted as conducive to political stability and the functioning o f the polity.
W hat is particularly important for a religiously neutral polity is for politics to be regarded 
as an autonomous or quasi-autonomous sphere o f activity. This autonomy means that religious 
communities, organisations and leaders no longer enjoy privileged status and close relationships 
with political society, and so cease to act as a source of guidance. O n the other hand, pluralistic 
politics in a Type 3 polity mean that religious communities experience limited involvement in 
politics. Members o f religious communities may still perceive themselves as having the duty to 
influence public debate, but they also accept that, in order to achieve this, they may need to
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forge alliances and co-operate with non-religious actors. Additionally, under the conditions of 
pluralistic politics, individual members of religious communities can disregard the guidance of 
their leaders in the sphere o f politics and freely choose from a range o f political options. This 
may threaten the identity of certain religious communities and decrease their capacity to 
contribute to political debates. Evidence from the first twenty years o f post-communist politics 
in Poland shows that a large number of politicians feel obliged by the teachings and policies of 
their Church, often in opposition to their party allegiances (see chapters 4 and 5). Medhurst 
(1981:128) lists three types of responses of religious communities to pluralistic politics: (1) 
completely opting out from political life; (2) creating political parties or movements inspired by 
religious values, but not closely related to Church institutions or groups, and not acting as 
defenders of orthodoxy; or (3) acting as pressure groups and abandoning other forms of 
organisation of religious opinion in the political realm (the Anglo-Saxon model). This 
arrangement between religion and politics in a Type 3 polity is most coherent with the division 
into state, political society and civil society in a liberal democracy (as described above). Maduro 
(2002) remarks that the idea o f the ‘separation o f Church and State’ is a form o f prerogative 
exercised by the state; the state also has the power to define what ‘religion’ is by granting 
religious legitimacy to social actors, including delegating powers and rights to churches and 
religious bodies. He further maintains that conflicts between the state and religious bodies can 
be analysed as ‘struggles between partially different agencies for the monopoly to define 
w hat/w ho is “religious” and w hat/who is not’ (Maduro 2002:602) .The case o f post-1989 Poland 
seems to contradict the primacy o f state over religious institutions. The first years of Poland’s 
democratic transformation were a time of intense co-operation and exchange of power and 
privilege between state and the Church. In the early 1990s, the PRCC often dictated state policy 
and legislation, sometimes with disregard for democratic procedure and in violation o f the law. 
The Polish state still supports the Catholic Church, offering it more recognition than other 
religious communities. W hat is more, on several occasions (see chapters 4 and 5) the Church
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granted itself the right to decide what was best for the state, and it was given an almost free 
hand in dictating legal and institutional solutions that suited its interests (Zakowski 2010), 
particularly at a time when weak state institutions could not respond accordingly (especially 
between 1989-1993) When it comes to the relationship o f religion with the second pillar of 
democratic polity—political society—the imbalance of power is less prominent. Religious 
organisations and groups have numerous instruments at their disposal in order to achieve their 
goals in the public realm, and with reference to political society. As political society is much less 
bound by formal and institutional limitations than the state, the potential leverage o f religion on 
political society is considerably higher. This is particularly important in cases of religions active 
in the public sphere in conditions o f religious deprivatisation (see Chapter 2). Casanova 
(1994:218-219) lists a number o f religious activities that take place at the political-society level 
in a religiously deprivatised context:
Resisting the disestablishment and differentiation o f the secular spheres;
Mobilisations and countermobilisations o f religious groups against other religions and 
against secularist movements and parties;
Mobilisation in defence of religious freedoms;
Demanding the rule o f law and legal protection o f rights;
Protecting the mobilisation of civil society and defending the institutionalisation of 
democratic regimes.
Casanova’s list confirms that religious actors can form complex relationships and exert 
influence on all levels o f political society. The most common way o f transmitting political 
opinion in liberal democracies is through political parties, and the relationship between religious 
groups and political parties is therefore crucial and based on a number o f elements. 
Institutionalised religions and religious groups have the highest chance o f influencing political
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parties, as their institutionalisation facilitates mutual contact: Church officials in Poland often 
meet their ‘opposite numbers’ in state institutions (e.g. the Primate meets the Prime Minister). 
Politicians and party leaders also have religious attitudes and preferences that influence their 
political behaviour, so that manifestos and party policies can be affected by religious content. 
And religious organisations can apply sufficient pressure on their members to influence their 
voting behaviour, thus exercising direct control over political parties.
The interaction between religion and post-1989 Polish politics illustrates the potential 
of religious institutions to influence party politics very well. Although the PRCC officially 
proclaims its political neutrality, examples o f its direct involvement in party politics are anything 
but rare. The most visible elements are public and private meetings between Church hierarchs 
and political party and government officials—particularly frequent during the first years of 
democratic governance (1989-1993; see Chapter 3). The PRCC regularly seeks to pursue its 
institutional interests—which are not always commensurate with the interests o f the wider 
Catholic community, or even with the policies pursued by the Vatican—through co-operation 
with political parties. It is worth noting that that the PRCC’s party preferences frequently change 
according to the interests involved (see Chapter 5); equally, these interests themselves change— 
this applies even to issues that the Church declares to be its perennial priorities. The issue of 
abortion legislation and the place it occupied on the list o f the PRCC’s priorities before 1989 
and the early 1990s is a good illustration of this phenomenon. Before 1989, the Church displayed 
little interest in the issue o f abortion, as it was low on the list o f public opinion’s priorities. Once 
it became an object of public attention, the PRCC entered the public debate with considerable 
authority (see Chapter 4). And from the other side, leaders o f political parties and politicians of 
all ranks often proclaim their allegiance to the Church, as well publicise their religious faith 
(mostly Roman Catholicism). Manifestos and other party documents often contain numerous 
references to religion and religiosity, both in terms of values as well as communities and 
institutions. Many parties in post-communist Poland openly refer to the Catholic Church as
their mentor and guide, particularly in social and cultural matters. Organised religious groups 
can also influence political society outside party politics. They can do so by channelling their 
demands through pressure groups and lobbying. This can occur in three ways: religious groups 
can contact existing pressure groups and present their agenda to them, pressure groups 
themselves can become religion-oriented, or religious organisations can act as pressure groups 
themselves. Haynes (1998:7) argues that when religious groups act as pressure groups and not 
as bodies practising a particular religion they are not always effective, but the political reality of 
post-1989 Poland seems to disprove this generalisation. The PRCC is the foremost religious 
pressure group, and exercises that pressure in numerous ways—mostly through the activities of 
its hierarchy and local clergy, as well as through statements and declarations on public policy. 
The drafting o f the new Polish constitution in the early 1990s is but one example o f how the 
Church has acted as a pressure group using a variety o f methods (see Chapter 4). Another way 
in which religion can significantly impact on political society in a liberal democracy is at the level 
o f the general population. In a political sense, a large part o f the general population (i.e. those 
with voting rights) constitutes the main source of political power—the electorate. Voting 
behaviour is one of the main channels o f religious influence on society. Religion can influence 
voters as both a passive factor (values, ideas) and an active one (organisational or as a mobilising 
factor). As the example of the US shows us, religious beliefs and their correlation with voting 
patterns can be strong enough to decide the results o f elections (Page 2004; Pew Forum 2008). 
In terms o f the active influence o f religion on voters, particularly in periods o f public 
controversy and times o f cultural mobilisation, religion can greatly influence the general 
population in public debates. Additionally, a group’s voting behaviour can be influenced by 
religious tradition and history in connection with their ethnicity, race and other elements o f their 
identity. The history of post-communist Poland is abundant with examples o f the Church 
influencing voting behaviour by multiple channels and methods, reaching the general population
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through official PRCC statements, as well as sermons, and, o f course, RE instruction in state 
schools, amongst others.
Although voting remains the main instance of the population’s influence on political 
society, there are other forms o f civic participation that can be influenced by religion. Casanova 
(1994) lists three areas o f particular significance: mass protest, civic disobedience and political 
violence. It is worth noting that all three forms o f active protest were present during the 
communist period (1944-1989), and their legacy is directly relevant to Poland’s political reality 
after the democratic transformation. But, as the analysis o f the Polish case study shows, political 
violence and civic disobedience are now marginal—almost non-existent—phenomena in Polish 
political life. However, various forms o f mass protest are popular ways o f expressing popular 
opinion, and are widely used by religious groups. Although the PRCC hierarchy and official 
Church institutions refrained from the use o f mass protest in post-1989 Poland, numerous 
groups within the Church frequently used this tool to influence public policy. In particular, the 
radical conservative Catholics centred upon Radio Maryja (RM) and its media empire (RMG) 
have developed a repertoire o f political activism involving mas s-protest (see Chapter 5). The 
activities o f RMG, a media empire that includes a daily newspaper, a TV channel and a radio 
station, is only nominally linked to the PRCC, but enjoys operational and financial independence 
from it, and brings in another aspect o f religion’s interaction with the polity, which involves 
civil society.
As mentioned before, the legacy o f the communist era left the PRCC positioned 
between political and civil societies and, despite numerous attempts from both the PRCC 
hierarchy and non-religious actors in political society to position religion within civil society, 
this issue is still a source of major friction in Poland’s public life. In recent years, scholars have 
paid increasing attention to the role of religion in the public sphere, with particular reference to 
the role o f religious groups in democratic transformation and in the building of a civil society 
in Europe, Asia, Africa and Latin America (Casanova 1994; Stepan and Linz 1996; Herbert
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1998; Potter et al. 1997). One o f the most important issues within this field o f study pertains to 
the place o f religion, and, more particularly, churches and religious organisations, within civil 
society. As religious organisations are not primarily interested in either economic gain or political 
power, and are for the most part based on voluntary membership, they are part o f civil society. 
They can, therefore, become legitimate participants in civil society, and act as such (Borowik 
2008). And yet, the absolute nature o f religious belief and the normative character o f  religious 
doctrines mean that religious communities and organisations are often concerned with their 
members’ loyalty and obedience to the group, which is not characteristic o f non-religious civil 
society organisations.
Whether or not religious groups can be classified as civil society organisations, in whole 
or in part, there are numerous, essential links between religion and civil society within a liberal- 
democratic polity. Lowry (2005) suggests that religion has a substantial impact on civil society, 
and that alongside education and public policy, religion is one o f the most im portant influences 
on the vitality o f civil society. Two levels o f interaction between religion and civil society are o f 
particular importance for this thesis: (1) the interaction between religion and civil society as part 
o f the polity triangle, occurring through civil society’s political activity and interaction with the 
state; and (2) the relevance of religion as a social force in the creation and functioning o f civil 
society independently o f religion. The second level of interaction is particularly im portant in the 
context of modernisation and secularisation, as the PRCC was an important actor shaping post­
communist Poland’s civil society for decades, and slowing certain secularisation processes (see 
Chapter 2).
The first level o f interaction depends on the influence of religion on civil society, on the 
strength of the latter and the relationships between all three pillars o f a democratic polity. 
Whereas both state and society are permanent and stable, the place and strength o f civil society 
vary greatly over space and time. This flexibility is at the origin of a very complex relationship 
between civil society and religion, particularly in the public sphere.
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As mentioned earlier in this chapter, civil society is frequently contrasted with political 
society and the state, as it involves groups and organisations that do not seek political office and 
are not part o f the state apparatus. This means that in a liberal democracy, civil society 
organisations are not competing for government posts. This, however, does not mean that they 
have no political relevance. Civil society organisations can have a profound influence on political 
society and the state through a range o f methods, including lobbying the government and other 
state institutions, forming alliances with political organisations and mobilising their followers to 
support their agenda. Cohen and Arato (1992:x) add that civil society organisations can generate 
influence through ‘the life o f democratic associations and unconstrained discussion in the 
cultural public sphere’, suggesting that public debates involving civil society can be an important 
form o f influence on politics and state.
The arsenal of other indirect methods of influencing politics which civil society 
organisations can employ is very diverse, and not dissimilar to the methods employed by 
political society members themselves, including the use of media and the sensitising o f public 
opinion. Casanova (1994:218) divides the interventions of religious groups into ‘agonical’, such 
as anti-abortion campaigns in the US and Europe, and ‘discursive’, such as pastoral letters and 
other communications issued by religious institutions. This division seems very suitable for the 
Polish post-1989 case study, as the history o f public debates in the 1990s and 2000s is full o f 
both agonical and discursive interventions by religious groups and organisations. The first 
category includes campaigns focused on priority issues that religious groups declared non- 
negotiable, such as abortion legislation, same-sex marriage and euthanasia, amongst others. On 
the other hand, both the PRCC and other (mostly Roman Catholic) organisations engaged in 
discursive interventions on the occasion o f relevant public debates, most often those concerning 
social and cultural matters, and less often on issues concerning the economy (see Chapter 5).
The second level at which the relationship between religion and civil society can be 
explored pertains to the very ability o f civil society to function in conditions where one religion
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(or a few religions) dominates the social sphere. As mentioned above, in certain non-democratic 
contexts, religion and state can co-exist in a way that would prevent certain forms o f civil society 
from developing and functioning. Theocracies such as Iran and Saudi Arabia are examples o f 
such a setting—there is no freedom of association in either of these countries, and the activities 
o f both civil society organisations and certain religious organisations (primarily non-Muslim) are 
severely restricted (Kazemipur and Razaei 2003; Al-Atawneh 2009). Conversely, communist 
regimes such as the ex-USSR, China and N orth Korea restrict the functioning o f religion and 
civil society because of their secular character (see Ramet 1993). The restrictiveness o f a ruling 
regime such as a theocracy or communist state can lead to the imposition o f limits on religion 
and civil society in two ways: by restricting the functioning of civil society itself (thus preventing 
any religious activity within it) and by distorting the links between religion and civil society. 
Domineering religious communities and institutions can limit the functioning of non-religious 
organisations as well as that o f other religious organisations that remain in conflict with the 
dominant religion. Borowik (2008) observes that the Catholic Church is more likely to act as a 
civil society organisation when it is in a position of minority or its rights are infringed upon— 
and much less so when it dominates the religious landscape, as it is in Poland.
The same repressive role o f a dominant religion can be observed on an individual level. 
Religion’s social significance can constrain the development o f individual autonomy (Gellner in 
Herbert 2003:76)—a situation that can be observed in certain traditional societies in Asia and 
Africa (see Kasfir 1998). Since ‘individuals, who are not able to act independently o f the 
community o f believers cannot become the building-stones o f the kind o f intermediary 
organizations on which civil society is built’ (Ozdalga 1997:74), traditional religiosity can 
obstruct the construction o f civil society. Although the social control exercised by religion in 
Poland diminished greatly over the years, as privatisation of religion progressed, certain elements 
o f it, including in family and community life, remain firmly in place (Baniak 2008).
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Casanova (1994:218) mentions another context wherein religion’s public presence can 
interfere with civil society: civil religion. Although civil religion and a vibrant civil society can 
coexist, the dominance o f civil religion sets the tone of public debate and imposes certain limits 
on civil society organisations. The term ‘civil religion’, coined by Bellah (1967), and originally 
used to describe the role o f religion in the USA, refers to a universal religion o f a nation, 
expressed through civil religious beliefs, symbols and rituals that provide a religious dimension 
to the entirety o f social life. Bellah’s contention is that cultural institutions, including religion, 
are usually matched up with certain kinds o f social groups. In the USA, for example, religion as 
a social phenomenon is represented by groups such as churches, education in schools, 
businesses and politicians, amongst others. Civil religion is unique in that it does not claim an 
identifiable social group, but rather the whole nation. Similarly, countries dominated by a civil 
religion tend not to have a single national church, but have several significant religious groups 
competing for public attention. This means that politicians and other public figures are expected 
to publicly present their religious views. As the US example shows, civil religion as such is not 
an obstacle to civil society. Conversely, the predominance of a single religious tradition and its 
merging with state and political society have a profound effect on the relationship between 
different actors within the polity and support for the public presence o f religion.
Although Poland does not have a civil religion, the dominant position o f Roman 
Catholicism and its main institutional representative has largely influenced the development of 
civil society in post-1989 Poland. All o f the Freedom House ‘Nations in Transit’ reports 
(Freedom House 2000-2008) list the Catholic Church as the main instigator and key supporter 
o f civil society in Poland, tracing this influence back to the role o f the PRCC during the 
communist period (see Chapter 3); the biggest non-governmental organisations in post­
communist Poland include Caritas Poland, the charitable arm of the Catholic Church, for 
instance. Paliwod (2007) suggests that religious organisations affiliated with the Catholic 
Church, if treated as a single body, represent the biggest civil society group in the country, with
over 340 associations and 2.5 million members. Although the number o f organisations and their 
membership o f the Catholic community are definitely at the forefront o f Polish civil society, 
however, the activities o f the PRCC and various Church groups and organisations suggest a 
more complex political picture. And one of the biggest questions in the assessment o f the 
relationship between religion and politics in Poland pertains to the attitude of religious 
organisations to democracy and democratisation.
Religion, democracy, democratisation
In the previous parts o f this chapter I have identified a number of ways in which religion and 
politics interact, analysing numerous expressions o f religious presence and religious interaction 
with civil and political societies and the state along the way. Two o f the most important 
questions that follow from the analysis o f possible interactions between religion and politics are: 
under what conditions does religion become active within the democratic polity? And why does 
it become an active participant o f the democratisation process by engaging in different relations 
with civil society, political society and the state?
As mentioned earlier, there are numerous overlaps between religion and all three pillars 
o f modern democratic polity. The relationship between religion and democracy has engaged 
scholars for long time, but remains a relatively undefined area. With a wave o f democratic 
transformations spanning the globe from Latin America to South-East Asia in recent decades, 
the issue has gained relevance (Casanova 1994). Philpott, Duffy and Toft (2011) have examined 
82 democratic transformation processes that took place between 1972 and 2000, and concluded 
that religious actors played a significant and constructive role in about a third o f cases. 
Huntington (1991:76) suggests that three-quarters o f all the countries that moved towards 
democracy between 1974 and 1990 were dominated by Catholicism.
Post-communist Poland, as a recently democratised Catholic country, is a relevant case 
for the study o f the links between religion and democratisation. Religion certainly played an 
important part in the democratisation process in Poland, and the links between religion 
(especially the Catholic Church) and democratisation warrant closer investigation.
The Catholic Church’s role involved different internal and external factors. Some 
authors (Gutierrez 1973; Huntington 1991) focus on the importance of internal factors: 
especially the evolution of the Catholic Church’s policies after the Second World War and the 
changes instituted by the Second Vatican Council. These authors suggest that internal factors 
had a decisive role in defining the Church’s active involvement in democratisation processes. 
However, although historical changes brought about by the Second World War and Vatican II8 
had some relevance for the Polish Church, the fact that Poland was cut off from the mainstream 
by the Iron Curtain, and was also reluctant to accept the Council’s reforms (Gowin 1999), 
mitigate the influence of these internal factors in the Polish case. What is more, the approach 
proposed by Gutierrez and Huntington fails to address the issue of the different attitudes of 
national Catholic churches to democracy and democratisation, despite the unified approach 
proposed by the Vatican.
Other authors focus on the external environment of the Catholic Church. Gill (1998), 
for instance, attributes the change in the Catholic Church’s behaviour to the presence o f 
competitors, mainly Protestant churches. However, the absence o f major non-Catholic political 
forces in Poland limits the relevance o f this approach to the case study. Philpott (2004, 2007) 
suggests that the relationship between Church and state, and notably the divergences within this 
relationship, was o f utmost importance for the Church’s change o f policy towards democracy 
and democratisation. Philpott argues that, in the face o f the diminishment of the Church-state 
alliance, the Church has had to find new ways o f appealing to the public, by amending its
8 The Second Vatican Council, 1962-1965.
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message and activities. This thesis has limited relevance to the case o f post-communist Poland 
as the relationship o f Church and state remains close, and yet religion and the Church itself 
maintain a high public visibility and influence on politics.
The third strand o f theories seeking to explain the political activity o f religion, and the 
Catholic Church in particular, draws on Social Movement Theory (SMT), and focuses on both 
internal and external factors, thus providing a more complete picture. A recent study o f 
democratic transformation (Mantilla 2010), suggests that the variables employed in SMT analysis 
are the most appropriate in explaining the political activism o f the Catholic Church. In SMT, 
analysing the political activity of religious groups requires an understanding o f three categories: 
motive, means and opportunity. In order to analyse all three categories, SMT draws on three 
sets o f variables: cultural and identity frames, resource mobilisation and political-opportunity 
structures. In order to grasp religion’s influence on individual and group preferences, cultural 
identity theory is employed. Furthermore, theories o f resource mobilisation are used to analyse 
religious organisations’ potential for political mobilisation. In order to assess the opportunities 
available to religious organisations and to show how they bring together means and motive for 
the sake o f political activity, SMT draws on the theories o f political opportunity and contentious 
politics. All o f the above-mentioned key elements o f SMT theory are inherently connected, and 
cannot be interpreted separately (McAdam, McCarthy and Zald 1996).
In the case o f post-communist Poland, one o f the key questions is what motivates 
religious institutions, particularly the Catholic Church, to actively engage in politics. Walt, 
Silverman and Fridy (2005) contend that there is no necessary link between religious 
communities and political action. For such a link to be formed, three conditions must be met: 
religious groups must consider political action to be their sacred obligation; they must draw on 
internal resources to put political action in motion; and a political environment must exist that 
religious groups can confront.
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The PRCC often acts as if  obliged to take up political action—if not for religious reasons, 
then for historical and cultural ones. Religion and culture shape each other, and thus cultural 
theory offers a substantial insight into how religion shapes individual preferences, which can be 
an important motive for the political mobilisation o f religious organisations. According to 
Wildavsky (1987), culture confers identity, prescribes behavioural norms and maintains 
boundaries for relationships. By providing values and norms and sustaining social networks, 
culture limits the number o f choices available to individuals. It also has the potential to direct 
individual preferences in such a way that they limit the range o f acceptable choices, thus 
performing a ‘power and control’ function. This in turn can be used by religious groups in 
political mobilisation, as religious groups can be creators and maintainers o f culture and strongly 
rely on it as a resource (see below). Swidler (1986) argues that culture can be a ‘tool kit’ for 
constructing political-action strategies, adding that connections between culture and action are 
easier to conclude during unsettled cultural periods. On the other hand, political elites may 
exploit cultural and religious grievances for the purposes o f power and authority. In this process, 
religious grievances can function as political motives for mobilising religious groups.
As post-communist Poland’s religious and political landscape is largely shaped by the 
country’s history (see Chapter 3), cultural analysis proves essential for understanding 
contemporary religious processes in Poland. N ot only are Polish national and religious identities 
merged as a result o f historical processes o f foreign domination, but the PRCC has a virtual 
monopoly on the religious market. Minority religions account for less than 5% of the total 
population (WVS 2012). New religious movements, a popular phenomenon in most European 
countries, have not recruited a substantial number of followers in post-1989 Poland. Statistics 
show that both the Catholic Church and a large part o f the population are hostile towards 
minority religions (RAS 2010). Despite the state’s liberal policy towards religious organisations, 
the PRCC (and Roman Catholicism in general) continue to dominate the public sphere in terms 
o f religious presence and activity. Two interconnected cultural characteristics foster the Polish
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Church’s high involvement in the political life o f the country: the pursuit o f hegemony and the 
motivation to maintain a ‘market share’ for Catholicism in Poland. Both are results o f the 
historical importance of the Church in Poland, as well as the consequence o f recent population 
changes, which have given Roman Catholicism a near monopoly. The PRCC is a dominant 
institution with substantial professional cadres, and as such tends to defend its corporate 
position. Anderson (2010) suggests that both the pursuit o f hegemony and the drive to maintain 
a market change are key motivators for the Church in public life. Ramet (1998:293) describes 
the PRCC as a ‘Julianic Church’—i.e. an institution that, given access to power, ‘[tries] to use 
state mechanisms to impose the rules and religious values o f its own faith on everyone living in 
the territory o f the given society, including those believers who subscribe to other faiths’.
The will to dominate and institute would not have materialised if it were not for the 
resources the Polish Church commands. Resource-mobilisation theory, a strand within SMT 
(Wald, Silverman and Fridy 2005:31), suggests that religious grievances can only be transformed 
into effective political action if  the group concerned has the relevant organisational capacity. 
Resources such as culture, leadership, material resources, communication networks and political 
space allow social movements to succeed. This explanatory mechanism is very applicable to 
contemporary Poland. Most o f the public interventions o f a religious nature in Poland’s politics 
draw on the resources commanded by the PRCC. It remains the largest independent social 
organisation in Poland, and has substantial human, material and financial resources at its 
disposal. The PRCC is currently the second biggest landowner in the country, after the state 
(Przekroj 2007, and as noted above). In terms o f non-material resources, the PRCC enjoys high— 
although declining—social authority (RAS 2010) and an exclusive status in most public debates 
(see chapters 4 and 5).
The last set o f conditions that facilitate the Church’s high public visibility includes 
external incentives and disincentives for political mobilisation. Opportunity is the key to social 
movements’ positioning in political life, as they operate in an environment full o f formal and
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informal structures. According to Tarrow (1994), access to institutional participation, the 
flexibility o f political alignments, conflicts within the political elite and the assistance o f powerful 
allies are most relevant to collective mobilisation. Religious organisations are more likely to 
mobilise politically in open, democratic systems than in authoritarian and non-democratic ones. 
Repressive regimes tend to limit the political activity o f religious groups. Conversely, uncertain 
political alignments, more typical o f transitional and less consolidated democracies, foster 
political mobilisation. In such cases, religious groups are more likely to find political solutions 
to their grievances. Conflicts within political elites are another important factor influencing the 
political mobilisation of religious actors. Having analysed the US and Canadian political systems, 
particularly electoral and legislative structures, Tatalovich (1995) concludes that those conflicts 
are structural in nature, which means that they are not inherent to particular religious 
communities, but result from the current political structure.
The assistance o f powerful allies within and outside the political system is the last of the 
four factors shaping political opportunity—and not the least important one. Wald, Silverman and 
Fridy (2005:138) state that ‘political means are endogenous resources’ and ‘[pjolitical 
opportunities are exogenous resources to a social movement’. Thus, the support and 
encouragement of friends and allies in high positions cannot be classified as a resource, but they 
are very significant for the mobilisation o f religious groups within the democratic polity.
The PRCC has such powerful allies. As mentioned earlier in this chapter, the Polish 
Church co-operated with a range o f political actors on a number of issues. The PRCC tends to 
prioritise issues on its agenda and co-opt political partners accordingly, regardless o f their 
political profile. N o single Polish political party enjoyed the PRCC’s support for the whole 
duration o f the democratic transition. Conversely, numerous political parties declared 
unwavering support for the PRCC’s policies and moral authority, as well as recognising its high 
importance in public affairs (see chapters 4 and 5). Despite continuously low public support 
for the Church-state/party-Church alliances, both in terms of PRCC involvement in politics
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and party allegiance to the Church, both sides continue to benefit from this reciprocity. Other 
important allies o f the Church in the public sphere include trades unions and right-wing civic 
organisations—mostly those concerned with morality and family and traditional and national 
values.
Conclusion
The close relationship between religion and politics in post-communist Poland is largely due to 
the complex nature o f the democratic transformation. As this thesis aims to show, the relevance 
o f the communist legacy and the first years o f transformation to the relationship between 
religion and politics in contemporary Poland are far greater than with respect to other areas of 
political life. The high visibility o f republicised religion in public life is one o f the most 
characteristic features o f post-communist Poland. Whereas many other areas o f the polity have 
been transformed, and kept changing throughout the first two decades of transition, the 
relationship between religion and politics and the high visibility o f religion were sustained in the 
long-term.
Stepan’s model o f three policy pillars is instrumental in understanding the democratic 
transformation process in post-communist Poland. The changes to the state structures, as well 
as those affecting political society and rebirth o f the civil society after decades o f communist 
rule, defined the shape of the new social and political order. In order to make sense o f religion 
in public life in post-communist Poland, the relationship between three pillars of the polity has 
to be thoroughly analysed, and the relationship between religion and the polity has to be 
explored. One o f the most important dimensions o f this analysis is the relationship between 
Church and state. As Maduro (2002) remarks, in a situation of the separation o f Church and 
state, the latter usually has primacy over the former, as it defines the legal and political
framework for co-operation. This was not exactly the case in post-communist Poland. The 
weaknesses o f the state and political society in the first years o f transformation provided fertile 
ground for the PRCC to pursue its own agenda and influence the state apparatus. To 
complement this, the Church became an active political actor and influenced the transformation 
o f political society. Last but not least, the reborn civil society was strongly influenced by the 
Church and its satellite organisations, which dominated the participation o f non-state actors in 
the early 1990s. The political developments of the first two decades of Polish transformation 
(see chapters 3-5) fully illustrate the ways in which the Church seized the opportunity to interact 
with all aspects o f the polity. In order to fully understand the mechanisms behind this behaviour, 
the motivation behind such actions needs to be understood.
One o f the key categories in understanding the new place of religion in Poland will be 
the concept o f praetorianism, denoting a situation where, in the absence o f stable institutions 
to channel public and political opinions, non-political organisations become carriers o f public 
and political sentiment and power. As I aim to show in Chapter 3, the PRCC became such an 
organisation during the communist period, particularly in the symbolic realm (as opposed to 
institutional praetorianism and functioning as a part o f political institutional framework, which 
only occurred briefly in late 1980s and early 1990s). The Church’s behaviour in post-communist 
Poland was influenced by the role it occupied in the communist era. After the fall o f 
communism, religion and religious organisations had to negotiate a new place within the polity, 
as the external environment had changed. Social Movement Theory (SMT), notably its resource- 
mobilisation strand, provides a comprehensive set o f tools to analyse both the internal and 
external factors that motivate religious organisations to act in public life. The understanding of 
three principal categories—motive, means and opportunity—is crucial in analysing the Church’s 
activity within the post-communist polity. As post-communist transformation is a particular 
form of polity transformation, theories of democratisation need to be employed to grasp the 
particularities o f the interventions o f a religious actor such as the PRCC in the conditions of
transformation. In the next chapter, I will be reviewing the most important theories o f religious 
change, notably the secularisation thesis and its numerous revisions, and their relevance to the 
case study.
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Chapter 2: Secularisation and Religious Change
Chapter 1 has focused on the background to the study o f religion and politics, notably the three 
pillars o f the polity and the relevant theories addressing the relationship between religion and 
politics. The main aim of this chapter is to review theories o f secularisation in relation to the 
Polish case study, particularly where they explain changes in the public dimension of religion 
and religiosity in social life. The secularisation thesis, and its various revisions and criticisms, 
have dominated the study o f religious change in sociology and political science over the last four 
decades. As the ‘death o f religion was the conventional wisdom in the social sciences during 
most of the twentieth century’ (Norris and Inglehart 2004:3), ideas o f secularisation became 
highly prominent.
In this chapter I review the main secularisation theories that have been developed by 
sociologists o f religion since the mid^O* century, and explore other approaches, including 
criticisms o f the original secularisation thesis (an umbrella term comprising many sub-theories, 
outlined below), its revisions, and alternative theories explaining religious change.
This chapter aims to assess the relevance of mainstream secularisation theories to the 
modern Polish political landscape—the subject matter o f the main body o f this thesis. The 
presumption has been that modern European states move towards secularisation, but this 
presumption seems misplaced in the context o f post-1989 public life in Poland. Other theories, 
including those o f rational choice or deprivatisation, have little application in contemporary 
Poland. The thesis hopes to answer how, and to what extent, republicised religion continues to 
dominate Polish political life. This chapter further argues that the mainstream secularisation 
theories do not allow for a full understanding o f post-1989 developments in religion and politics 
in Poland. This is because they focus mostly on abstract sociological processes (such as 
differentiation and rationalisation, amongst others), and they do not address human and 
institutional agency and the role o f historical and cultural factors affecting secularisation. As the
research presented in chapters 3-5 will show, it is those factors that largely influenced 
secularisation processes in post-1989 Poland, leading to a sustained republicisation o f religion 
whilst individual religiosity continued to fall.
Secularisation: an introduction
Secularisation is a key term for understanding the place o f religion in the contemporary world, 
but it is surrounded by confusion and controversy. A distinction needs to be made between the 
historical origins o f the word, its contemporary meaning and the normative understanding o f 
secularisation as a paradigm in the sociology o f religion.
Historically, the term has described the transfer o f property from ecclesiastical to civil 
authorities, and was first used with reference to the confiscation o f Church property by the king 
in early modern England (Herbert 2003:29). The term was first employed in the sociology of 
religion by prominent 19th-century thinkers (Max Weber, Emile Durkheim and Herbert Spencer, 
amongst others), who set out the idea that modernisation would lead to the decreasing 
importance o f religion in industrial society (Bruce 1992:172-195).
Currently, the term has multiple meanings. In a colloquial sense, secularisation defines 
a change resulting in the loss o f influence or control of religion over something. The use o f the 
term in the sociology o f religion is rather more complex, and differs from its common use. In 
the narrowest sense, secularisation is, ‘at a political level, the separation o f ecclesiastical and state 
power, with the resulting loss o f religious authority in the coercive sense’ (Herbert 2003:29). 
Dobbelaere (2001) suggests a broader application, defined on three levels: societal (separation 
o f Church and state, a decrease in the influence of religious organisations on social life and the 
diminishment o f their social authority); institutional (internal secularisation and transformation 
o f religious institutions); and individual (decrease in practice and belief). It must be noted,
however, that the last level is only relevant insofar as they are linked with the first, and so long 
as they influence religion’s social standing. Wilson (1982:150) confirms that secularisation ‘does 
not even suggest that most individuals have relinquished all their interest in religion, even 
though that may be the case’. Patrikios (2009:357) further argues that focusing on individual 
religiosity statistics ‘conceals the public role of religion’, and that religious authority can remain 
relevant in society independendy o f individual religiosity levels. Chaves (1994) adds that 
secularisation is best understood as referring to the declining scope o f religious authority, and 
is a concept better suited to understanding the complex relationship between different levels of 
religiosity and different actors and processes. Both Patrikios’ and Chaves’ contributions to the 
understanding of secularisation are highly relevant to the contemporary Polish case study, as 
they focus on the importance o f social and institutional levels as key to understanding 
secularisation, with religious authority operating independendy of the changes in individual 
religiosity.
Moyser (1991) further defines secularisation processes in the political realm (social and 
institutional levels) using a five-step model. The first stage o f political secularisation occurs in 
the constitutional sphere. I t is expressed through the lack of legal recognition o f and support 
for religion and, indeed, any particular religious institution or group. The following stage, policy 
secularisation, can be identified as a consequence of the entry o f state institutions into policy 
domains previously assigned to, or reserved for, religious bodies. Institutional secularisation, the 
third stage o f political secularisation, occurs when religious institutions and structures lose their 
lobbying power and influence on political organisations. Agenda secularisation, the fourth 
expression o f the secularisation process, can be observed when political society has no overtly 
religious content. And finally, ideological secularisation occurs when values and belief systems 
that function within the political realm are no longer phrased in religious terms (Moyser 1991:14- 
15). Moyser’s five-step model provides a simple and efficient tool for assessing the levels of 
secularisation in contemporary Poland (see Chapter 5). First of all, it distinguishes between five
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levels o f political secularisation evolving one from another—a phenomenon widely present in 
many Western European countries, and also expected o f the democratising Polish state after 
1989. Second, it focuses on different aspects o f public life, including the activities o f three polity 
pillars: state, political society and civil society, all o f which will be analysed in further chapters 
of this thesis.
Defining secularisation, however challenging, proves an easy task compared with 
attempting a more in-depth analysis of why it occurs and what the patterns and rules are that 
govern the process.
The secularisation thesis
The secularisation thesis, despite criticisms o f it, occupies a central place among theories o f 
religious change. It is a complex research framework combined with an explanatory model, the 
main premise o f which is the contention that modernisation has a negative impact on religion 
and religiosity. It must be noted that the secularisation thesis is not entirely coherent, and has 
been approached differendy by different groups o f scholars who worked independently o f each 
other over a period of almost half a century. Tschannen (1991) contends that at the theoretical 
level, various theories of secularisation have been systematically stated, but they cannot be 
combined into one single, coherent super-theory. A t the paradigmatic level, however, he 
concludes that ‘theoretical divergences largely dissolve, a number o f shared “concepts” impose 
themselves, and a fairly coherent picture o f secularization emerges’ (1991:396).
Tschannen identifies four core processes common to all secularisation theories: 
differentiation, modernisation, rationalisation and worldliness. The latter process is the least 
considered in scholarly writing, and is not as complex as the other three. A similar analytical 
framework to Tschannen’s is applied throughout later scholarly writings on secularisation.
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Herbert (2003), in his account o f the relations between religion and civil society in four countries 
around the globe (Egypt, Bosnia, Poland and the UK), points to five main pillars o f the 
secularisation process (Herbert 2003:35-43), adding societalisation (break-up o f local 
communities resulting from migration) to the list o f core processes identified by Tschannen.
Differentiation ‘is absolutely central to all the secularization theories, without exception’ 
(Tschannen 1991:404). In the briefest terms it is understood to be a process in which a domain 
o f meaning—previously understood as specifically religious—becomes differentiated from a 
religious world-view (Heelas 1998:2). This process brings about, amongst other things, a 
division between the public and private realms: one being the world of public activity, most 
often related to work, and the other being private and related to home and family life. This 
transition allows for a distinction to be made between public and private behaviour in many 
spheres o f life, including religion. As a result of differentiation processes, religion does not 
become one o f the ‘differentiated’ areas, but becomes fragmented and split between the other 
areas, such as economics, politics, culture or ethics, thereby retaining some influence over all of 
them.
Like another theorist, Luckmann (discussed below), Berger (1967) attributes high 
importance to modernisation processes and the differentiation that follows. In Berger’s view, 
secularisation is caused by a wide-reaching process: the emergence o f monotheism, 
Protestantism and modern industry. Parsons (1964) also contributes to this debate by providing 
a typology o f social differentiation, distinguishing ‘vertical differentiation’ (social stratification) 
from ‘horizontal differentiation’ (i.e. between social functions or through overriding kinship 
ties), and these from differentiation between culture and social systems, occurring when a 
system o f beliefs such as Christianity becomes differentiated from social structures (Parsons 
1964:343).
The second key trend in secularisation processes—societalisation—is strongly related to 
the economic developments o f modernity. I t is a process by which ‘life is increasingly enmeshed
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and organised, not locally but societally’, the latter being understood m ost commonly as the 
nation state (Wilson 1982:154). Core elements o f societalisation are the break-up o f small, local 
communities and the increased mobility o f the population. These factors are largely due to the 
necessity o f moving large numbers o f workers to urban areas as part o f the industrialisation 
process. Breaking traditional family and community ties results in a general decrease in the 
importance o f religious rituals, beliefs and institutions. It is commonly argued that modern, 
complex societies do not rely on shared religious beliefs, as the omnipresent state and 
bureaucracy become the guarantors o f social order, instead of previously employed religious 
beliefs and norms (Herbert 1998:38). This contention brings the societalisation process close to 
Emile Durkheim’s (1967) functionalist theory of religion: he argues that the importance of 
religion in social life should be understood through the prism o f the capabilities of religious 
norms and laws to knit society together, suggesting that these are diminished and partially 
replaced by other normative value systems in a post-industrial society.
The third component of the secularisation process differs significantly from the previous 
two. Whereas both differentiation and societalisation are mostly related to the economic and 
social realms o f human existence, rationalisation is related to ontology and epistemology. In 
simple terms, rationalisation means that logical and scientific explanations replace those that 
refer to supernatural agency. This is a process o f great significance, as it limits the explicatory 
powers of religious groups and institutions. In a ‘rationalised’ society, religious arguments lose 
their saliency, which then leads to the decreased potential o f religion to influence politics and 
other spheres o f social life. Many writers underline the importance o f this process in 
secularisation trends. Wilson (1976) contends that rationalisation is the most important factor 
in secularisation processes, being both their cause and consequence.
The fourth pillar o f secularisation, worldliness, works in conjunction with rationalisation 
processes, and is less concerned with economic factors than the other two pillars o f the 
secularisation thesis. Worldliness refers to the re-orientation o f modern religions and churches
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towards this-worldly issues important to an average believer. Those issues can include 
happiness, achievement and success, both professional and personal (Tschannen 1991:404). In 
a worldly religion, the everyday concerns of believers can be more important than questions 
related to the supernatural or the afterlife—as is the case with the phenomenon o f New Age 
spirituality. Berger (1967) also points to the increasing pluralisation of religious views and the 
worldliness o f religious and doctrinal concerns as main causes of secularisation.
Having mentioned the four core elements o f the secularisation thesis, it has to be noted 
that it is not the only model offered by contemporary sociology o f religion for the analysis of 
religiosity in the public realm. The first and most important process underlying secularisation 
trends—differentiation—has various consequences and is the most complex. Tschannen (1991), 
by offering a comparative analysis o f a wide range o f secularisation theories, further identified 
other minor elements of the paradigm linked to differentiation: the privatisation o f belief, 
whereby religion is considered a private and not a public matter; generalisation, whereby religion 
pervades secular institutions under disguise; the autonomisation of secular education; the 
collapse o f the religious world-view that occurs when traditional theology loses its credibility, 
and even theologians recognise the need to revise it; unbelief, expressed through a rise in 
agnosticism and atheism; religious pluralisation; and a general decline in religious practice. As 
far as rationalisation is concerned, he adds the following associated phenomena: scientisation 
(e.g. Copernicus’ theory replacing Earth-centred cosmology, evolution versus creationism etc.) 
and sociologisation, understood as a determination o f social life in a rational fashion (e.g. social 
policies, not Christian ethics, are constructed as an answer to crime).
One o f the most intense debates around the issue o f secularisation involves the structure 
o f development; in essence, does secularisation follow a linear, cause and effect pattern of 
formulated conclusions? Is there a necessary and identifiable progression from one condition 
to the next; a gradual movement from religiosity to secularisation? Are core modernisation 
processes always conducive to secularisation? These questions are of particular importance to
the further development o f this thesis. As research into the relationship between religion and 
politics in post-1989 Poland will show, many trends associated with the public authority of 
religion can easily be stopped, reversed or accelerated as a result o f actions undertaken by key 
actors within the democratic polity. This development stands in contrast to the classic 
approaches within the secularisation thesis.
The first approach, which largely dominated the sociology o f religion until the 1980s, 
perceived secularisation to be part o f a wider modernisation trend, and an evolutionary process 
governing contemporary societies. Parsons (1964) included secularisation processes in his 
theory of evolutionary universals in society. According to his thesis, which he hoped would 
contribute to ‘evolutionary thinking in sociology’ (Parsons 1964:339), contemporary societies 
are subject to irreversible social change trends that inevitably change the face o f the religious 
realm. Differentiation of social strata is crucial to ensuring a ‘transition from primitive social 
conditions to those o f the “archaic” civilizations’ (Parsons 1964:339).
Wilson (1976) followed the same logic in his Contemporary Transformations of Religion, 
stressing that secularisation is a gradual process involving a transition from community to society, 
and it cannot be stopped or avoided. The author pays particular attention to secularisation as a 
process that transforms religion around the world to a truly significant degree, because o f its 
broad scope and the scale of fostered change. According to his thesis, belief and commitment 
to the supernatural are in continual imminent decline. As a result, none o f the new religious 
phenomena or revival waves, such as ecumenism, charismatic religions or New Religious 
Movements, can have significant social consequences in the modern world. Furthermore, 
Wilson can see no way that religions can stage a comeback, since they are ‘always dying’.
A contemporary echo of Parsons’ and Wilson’s evolutionary thinking can be found in 
Bruce’s work (2002), devoted to secularisation in the western world. He dismisses the voices 
announcing a religious revival around the globe and plunges into the various manifestations o f 
spirituality and belief in the West as signs o f relativism, which affirms the equality o f all world
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views and opinions—thereby damaging the previously dominant position o f religious morality 
and ethics in a particular society. Bruce systematically challenges the proponents of the Religious 
Market Theory (RMT, see Norris and Inglehart 2004:16-18), who argue that increased religious 
supply fosters religious demand, suggesting that Christianity is losing power and popularity in 
the US, and that it is changing in ways earlier predicted by the secularisation paradigm.
The sort o f linear evolutionary movement presented here has long been challenged by 
certain academics, who approach the secularisation thesis from another angle. Martin (1978) 
was one o f the earliest critics of linear approaches to secularisation and the simplistic 
conclusions that trumpet the victory of the secular over the religious realm. One o f his main 
contentions is that secularisation can have entirely different consequences in different social 
environments. According to Martin, crucial questions should be asked: ‘whether or not the 
religion concerned is Catholic, whether or not there is a monopoly o f religion, and whether or 
not the “frame” o f the society is set up through conflict against internal oppressors’ (1978:17). 
He uses the examples of France and the US to show that secularisation can result in the 
polarisation o f both Catholics and laymen (in France), but that in a pluralist society such as the 
US no such conflict can occur. This is an interesting observation for the Polish case study, which 
this thesis is focusing on, as it suggests that religious and political actors can have a significant 
impact on the course of secularisation. In post-communist Poland, the collaboration between 
religious and political actors has largely preserved the high visibility o f religion in public life. In 
his m ost recent work (2006), Martin echoes some o f his earlier writings by stating that, even 
though religious and non-religious realms have become increasingly differentiated in the 
modern world, religious values (and Christian values in particular) remain influential in and 
relevant to modern societies. Quite importantly, Martin notes the shifting shapes o f popular 
religiosity through which religion maintains its presence in the social realm. Alignment o f a 
religion with the national rhetoric, a certain political project or the arts can be seen as a 
‘displacement’ through which religions thrive.
The classic secularisation thesis, presented above, although widely criticised (see below), 
remains a valid point o f reference for the study of secularisation in contemporary societies, not 
least because all other theories position themselves against its basic tenets. Many developments 
in post-1989 Poland follow the movement of the secularisation thesis: modernisation, 
rationalisation and social differentiation have reshaped the place o f religion in public life and 
maintained their influence on the role of religion in society. However, the high visibility o f 
religion in public life and the close relationship between religion—particularly the PRCC—and 
Poland’s political society suggest an enlarged scope o f analysis involving other theories o f 
religious change.
Privatisation and individualisation
The first attempts at challenging the secularisation thesis occurred with the emergence o f the 
privatisation and individualisation thesis. Although still acknowledging the impact o f 
modernisation on religiosity, this thesis paints a more complex picture o f religious change. 
Particular attention is paid to the influence o f modernisation processes on institutionalised, 
Church-oriented religiosity on the one hand, and private, individual religiosity on the other. The 
proponents o f the privatisation/individualisation thesis do not deny the marginalisation o f 
institutionalised, Church-centred religion, and they pay due attention to differentiation 
processes (see below). Instead, the main difference is a belief in the general decline in the 
significance of religion. According to theories o f privatisation/individualisation, the former 
official and hierarchical religious model will ultimately be replaced by private and individual 
forms o f belief.
One of the first attempts at building a nuanced approach to understanding religious 
change was made by Luckmann in his Invisible Religion (1967). The starting point for Luckmann’s
theoretical considerations is an undifferentiated world view and a functional view o f religion. 
Luckmann identifies five meanings of the notion of ‘religion’. The first and most basic meaning 
concerns the dialectical process of socialisation through which people aim to transcend their 
biological nature, seeking to explain their existence through a higher being or authority. All four 
remaining meanings derive from the first. The second and third meanings denote the universal, 
functional meaning-system that influences both societal and personal levels of identification, 
and the fourth and fifth refer to a specific belief system held at the societal and personal levels.
For Luckmann, the defining process in the contemporary transformation o f religion is 
differentiation at the conscious (individual) level, occurring when the previously homogenous 
and universal world-views and judgements start splitting into different layers. W hat follows is 
the rise of a differentiated social base: religious institutions. This rapid change has severe 
consequences for social life, both in its worldly and transcendental dimensions. Luckmann 
contends that the autonomisation of other aspects o f life follows, as a result o f which religion 
loses control over other social spheres. Pluralisation of concurring worldviews then causes 
religious interpretations o f reality to lose their appeal and subsequently to collapse. The third 
and most important consequence o f differentiation is privatisation—a situation where individuals 
build their own vision of the world based on voluntarily selected, distinct, often mutually 
exclusive world-views. Luckmann focuses on what he sees as the two most important aspects 
o f this privatisation of religion: ‘religious themes born in this private sphere (...) [that] become 
generalized and start to function as a new, “invisible” religion’ (Tschannen 1991:398). This then 
leads to an increase in the ‘this-worldliness’ o f religious conviction and a greater preoccupation 
with everyday life. According to other proponents of the individualisation thesis, people are free 
to determine the shape and content o f their new, private religions, unlike in hierarchical religious 
communities such as the Catholic Church, which precisely regulates the rules governing the lives 
o f its followers (Krech 1999:68).
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The individual’s ability to choose the elements o f religion and belief that he or she finds 
suitable results in the decreased importance o f unified religious traditions (detraditionalisation) 
and loss o f Church authority and importance (deinstitutionalisation). The latter has profound 
consequences for the position of religious institutions in Europe. First o f all, mainstream 
churches lose their monopoly on the ‘religious market’. Until recendy, most Europeans 
belonged to either the Catholic Church or a Protestant denomination. In contemporary Europe 
there are now numerous alternatives, a plurality that undermines the status quo; in turn, lower 
Church authority has contributed to the increased pluralism within religious organisations and 
groups (Kriiggeler 2001:24-26). Diminished Church authority consequently means that 
churches have reduced means o f social control, when high levels o f religious practice in 
European countries were once conditioned by socio-cultural mechanisms repeated for 
centuries. Falling church attendance is one manifestation of the loosening o f the social control 
previously enjoyed by mainstream churches.
Gabriel (2000) suggests that the main expression o f the individualisation and 
deinstitutionalisation o f religion in Christian Europe is the deinstitutionalisation o f Christian 
communities, known as Untkirchlung (from German Kirche, church). In pluralist societies, as 
churches lose their grip on individual and social life they cease to be a universally recognised 
social actor. According to Gabriel (2000:10-11) this is a three-tier process:
Decreased participation in institutional religion, expressed by the distancing o f the 
population from religious dogma, religious cult and ritual and behavioural patterns 
prescribed by the Church;
Liberating social sub-systems and institutions such as politics, academia, education, 
economy and science from the Church’s influence;
Loss of importance (or even disappearance) o f religious and symbolic forms o f social 
integration.
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The other strand o f the privatisation/individualisation thesis pertains to the process of 
individuals moving away from historically negotiated social forms and traditional social bonds. 
This form o f self-determination does not mean that individuals free themselves from society 
and exist in some sort o f extra-social reality, but that they are free to make individual choices, 
and have to bear the responsibility for making them. Individualisation changes both religion and 
religiosity. Religion is no longer just an element of culture, but also a matter o f personal choice; 
as a private matter, it does not occupy such a central position in public life. External factors 
influenced by religious identity, such as family and tradition, lose their importance. Individuals 
are responsible for finding their own responses to ultimate questions, meaning that they are free 
to decide when to end their lives and how to live them, leading to further pluralisation of world­
views. Individuals belonging to mainstream churches tend to question dogma, and liberally 
combine elements of different faiths according to their personal needs. The last important 
consequence o f religious individualisation relates to the institutional shape o f new religious 
phenomena. New forms o f religiosity arise outside o f the official and historical churches—this 
does not mean that religiosity declines in general, but that it takes on new forms outside 
traditional structures (Wohlrab-Sahr 2003).
Theories o f privatisation and individualisation have some applicability when assessing 
the historical background to post-1989 changes in Poland’s religious landscape (see Chapter 3). 
The limitations o f the privatisation thesis in relation to communist Poland result from the fact 
that the communist regime suppressed the private sphere and denied its separation from state 
and society. Poland was, however, subject to forced privatisation o f religion between 1944 and 
1989. Although it was not a natural sociological process, but a result o f communist policy 
towards religion, it left a lasting mark on religion and the Church in Poland. During the 
communist years, religion was suppressed from many areas o f public life—including education 
and media, and its possibility to organise high-visibility events was highly restricted (with minor 
exceptions, such as the 1979 papal visit to Poland, see Chapter 3). For most Poles, notably those
who were members of the communist party, or who wanted to pursue careers in state 
institutions, religion had to become a totally private affair. This forced change was an important 
influence on the PRCC, and had an impact on its return to public life after the collapse of 
communism, including its behaviour in the first years of democratic transformation (see Chapter
4)-
Postsecularisation/deprivatisation thesis
Casanova (1994) interrogates the secularisation thesis, arguing that it wrongly combines three 
distinct processes into one over-arching theory, and thus blurs the picture o f secularisation; he 
also provides compelling evidence that the transformation o f religion in contemporary 
European states is not a one-way street, and that in certain contexts religion can £de-privatise — 
that is, leave the private sphere and re-emerge in the public sphere.
Casanova’s postsecularisation thesis distinguishes three interrelated but separate 
markers, broadly echoing Tschannen’s four-part model: differentiation (including secularisation 
o f some spheres o f social life), the decline o f religious beliefs and practices, and the privatisation 
o f religion (marginalisation o f religion into the private sphere). However, whereas he agrees with 
proponents of the secularisation thesis that modernisation has a certain causal effect, he insists 
that a decline in religious practices and the privatisation o f religion do not follow automatically. 
According to Casanova, for all three processes to occur at the same time a church-state alliance 
has to be in place, and an Enlightenment Critique of Religion (ECR) must be present. Using the 
examples of post-Frankist Spain and post-Solidarity Poland, Casanova formulates the 
hypothesis that resisting, or even not keeping up with, democratic changes can be damaging to 
the Church institution’s standing.
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This theory is o f particular use to this research project, as it distinguishes between the 
modernisation processes and private/public religiosity at the same time as it identifies important 
relations between them. And one o f the limitations of Casanova’s thesis is actually o f direct 
benefit to this thesis, as it is based on the experiences o f Catholic societies.
Casanova also makes an important observation about deprivatisation, a process in many 
ways contrary to secularisation. Casanova points to the development of communication 
technologies and the emergence o f a transnational civil society (particularly important in the 
transition from communism in Eastern Europe) as the causes of the deprivatisation o f religion 
in Spain, Poland and Brazil. Deprivatisation is a process by which religion leaves the private 
sphere and re-enters many spheres o f social life from which it was previously ostracised as a 
result of differentiation and privatisation processes (Casanova 1994:211). Casanova argues that, 
although deprivatising religion allows it to enter all areas of democratic polity—including civil 
society, political society and the state—by doing so religion risks losing popular support, due to 
ECR. Casanova’s contention is that religion, and, more specifically, the Catholic Church, should 
not penetrate civil society and the realm o f the state because of potential conflicts between the 
democratic character of civil society and the absolutist tendencies o f religious organisations. 
Casanova sees the Church’s involvement in politics as inherently undemocratic: behaviour that 
further threatens the credibility of religion (Casanova 1996).
Cultural defence/cultural transition
Bruce (1998) suggests that the relationship between modernisation and secularisation can be 
redefined under certain conditions pertaining to culture and politics. The first—cultural defence— 
occurs when religious identity and religious institutions/organisations adopt defensive measures
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in a fight with a hostile force, such as an actor (occupant) or ideology (secular or religious 
doctrine).
The second context—cultural transition—is largely similar to the first, only that the ‘hostile 
force’ is not an external actor or ideology but rather a cultural process, such as modernisation 
or migration. Religious identity and religious organisations are valid points o f reference and 
sources o f stability in a changing environment, as they strengthen group unity and a sense o f 
belonging. Bruce stresses the fact that religious diversity undermines religion’s unifying 
potential, as religiously homogenous countries are better suited to maintaining their identity vis- 
a-vis their oppressors (Bruce 2009).
Unfortunately, Bruce’s theory has limited relevance to the Polish case. Although cultural 
defence was a driving mechanism that sustained Polish religiosity during the communist years, 
in the absence o f a hostile force in post-1989 Poland this became less pertinent. Despite some 
attempts made by the Polish Church to portray modernising forces such as the European Union 
as the new occupiers, no cultural mobilisation mechanism can be observed in post-communist 
Poland.
What is more, Bruce’s ‘barometric’ approach to religion, as a factor dependent solely on 
cultural defence and cultural transition and decreasing in importance once those circumstances 
cease to exist, does not account for institutional frameworks and social processes. Starrett 
(1998:227-228) points out that ‘religions (...) take on a very life o f their own with interest, 
dynamics and potentials that are only incompletely determined by the intersections o f forces 
that brought them about’.
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Religious resurgence
Resurgence theories, or desecularisation theories, surfaced in the works o f Kepel (1993), Berger 
(1999), Juergensmeyer (2000) and Huntington (1996). Kepel’s The Revenge of God: The Resurgence 
of Islam, Christianity and Judaism in the Modem World (1993) is a survey o f religious resurgence in 
the three Abrahamic faiths. Kepel challenges the belief, dominant among western sociologists 
o f religion, that the rapid modernisation o f western societies and the privatisation o f religion 
have led to immediate secularisation. Kepel picks three milestone events that had a profound 
influence on global politics in the late 1970s—the electoral success o f the Tikud  party in Israel in 
1977, the election o f Cardinal Karol Wojtyla as the Supreme Pontiff in 1978 and the Islamic 
revolution in Iran in 1979—arguing that religion is gaining ground across the globe, and that the 
prediction mechanism deducted from secularisation theories is wrong. Kepel contends that 
modernisation, the very same force his colleagues claimed would bring about secularisation, has 
essentially failed, and excluded many social groups, and has therefore prepared the ground for 
a return o f religion to the public square. The author lists recent failures—disenchantment with 
Marxism, industrialisation, mass migration, economic crises and technological progress—as 
factors that have contributed to the resurgence o f Christianity, Islam and Judaism in North 
America, Europe and the Middle East. Kepel’s approach is valuable to this particular thesis 
because it takes into account cultural differences and the particularities of national character that 
can influence the course o f the secularisation process, countering many previous theories that 
proclaim an equal effect of modernisation trends across the world regardless of cultural 
differences. As the history o f Polish national identity and its links with religious identity shows 
(see Chapter 3), historical and cultural factors can greatly influence the course of secularisation. 
The behaviour o f the PRCC (as well as the behaviour o f state and political actors towards 
religion) in the first years o f democratic transformation show the great potential of path-
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dependency (i.e. reproducing behaviour based on historical premises) in the relations between 
religion and politics in Poland.
Kepel offers a categorisation of religious revival movements into top-bottom and 
bottom-top. The former usually attempt to monopolise the public sphere, reforming state 
structures and imposing religious laws on the whole society. Kepel’s expertise in modern Islam 
and familiarity with Middle East politics help him to produce a brilliant account o f religious 
movements in Israel and Iran, using their example to illustrate the potential o f the top-bottom 
movements to develop a firm authority o f religion over many spheres o f public life. This is a 
relevant argument for the Polish case study: further chapters (notably Chapter 4) will argue that 
it was largely due to the top-bottom political and institutional changes and frameworks imposed 
by politicians in co-operation with the PRCC and other religious groups between 1989 and 1993 
(such as the reform o f educational laws) that helped religion to maintain its authority over Polish 
society.
On the other hand, the author uses Islamic resurgence in Egypt as an example o f the 
bottom-top approach, which is focused on building communities and improving the 
functionalisation o f religion. Kepel notes that Christian resurgence differs from that o f Islam 
and Judaism, observing the divergent character o f religious and state authorities within these 
religions. It is because o f this bifurcation, Kepel claims, that there was no threat o f a Christian 
equivalent o f the Khomeini sweeping to power in any Christian society. He also attributes the 
different attitudes towards democracy to doctrinal differences between Abrahamic faiths, and 
not to social, cultural or political factors. This is an important addition to the previous models 
of secularisation/desecularisation, as it specifies that Christian faiths (such as Roman 
Catholicism) have less potential to produce theocratic regimes.
Juergensmeyer’s Terror in the Mind of God (2000) focuses more on violent forms o f 
religious extremism, and predicts an ever-rising role of religious movements in public life. His 
research methodology largely differs from Kepel’s: Juergensmeyer takes a much more
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ethnographic approach, interviewing leaders of various extremist groups, from N orthern 
Ireland to Japan, presenting their rationales and analysing their actions and their consequences. 
Although violent religious extremism is not present in contemporary Poland, Juergensmeyer’s 
account is useful in that it offers a number of observations on why religious movements decide 
to go public and actively oppose their enemies. This happens most often, Juergensmeyer claims, 
when the concerns of religious groups relating to this world are seen as equal to the cosmic 
struggle of good vs. evil, when believers identify themselves with the struggle they embark upon 
and when they feel that individual action can make all the difference in the conflicts they 
participate in. Juergensmeyer’s proposed solution to violent clashes with and between religious 
groups relates to the secular majority. The author seems to believe that modern societies lack 
moral and spiritual values because of their secular character. Only a spiritual and religious revival 
in affected societies, and the increased presence o f religion in public life, would limit violent 
conflict.
Juergensmeyer’s considerations seem to contradict the reality of Poland’s political life 
after 1989, where religious groups and organisations, particularly those with a more radical 
profile, such as the Radio Maryja Group and League o f Polish Families, contributed to 
antagonising conflicts in the public sphere. The PRCC itself is often accused of stirring political 
conflict for the sake o f securing its own interests, even if doing so endangers the stability o f the 
political system. The case o f the first presidential election in 1990, which saw the Church’s 
involvement in an internal power struggle within the Solidarity movement resulting in the huge 
electoral success of the populist Stanislaw Tyminski, is a good example o f such meddling (see 
Chapter 4). And so we can say that the moral and spiritual values praised by Juergensmeyer do 
not seem to be the recipe for quenching political controversies in Poland, and many 
developments involving the PRCC’s direct intrusion into politics point out to a completely 
opposite conclusion to his idealised theories.
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Republicisation
Herbert’s republicisation thesis (2007, 2011) argues that the functionalisation of religion, 
combined with the protest character o f religion and a breakdown in confidence in various forms 
o f secularisation, accompanied by media de-regulation and commercialisation, favours the 
increased presence o f religion in public life. Herbert’s theory differs from deprivatisation in that 
it considers a context where religion was not necessarily subject to the privatisation process, and 
yet did not occupy a prominent place in social life. Using the example o f modern Egypt and the 
functionalisation of Islam in health, education and welfare, amongst other areas o f activity, 
Herbert suggests that social-differentiation processes can have an opposite effect on religious 
discourses to that predicted by secularisation theory. The rising influence o f Islamic institutions 
on Egyptian society seems to counter the basic claim o f classic secularisation theory: that social 
differentiation leads to the marginalisation o f religion through modern functional systems. 
Herbert also argues that new media facilitate a wider dissemination o f religious content, thus 
contributing to the intensification o f religious presence in both private and public life. W hat is 
more, Herbert’s thesis addresses the role religion and religious institutions play in ‘secular’ 
sphere such as education, politics or media, contending that this form o f activity sustains 
increased public presence o f religion. The republicisation thesis also makes an important 
distinction between the public visibility o f religion and religious revival, claiming that religious 
republicisation can occur independently o f (or even contrary to) changes in individual religiosity. 
This is particularly relevant in today’s Poland, where individual religiosity rates are falling, but 
where the prevalence o f religious content in politics and the strength o f radical religious media 
multiply the public visibility o f religion in society.
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Fenn and Smith: secular revolution
Fenn (1978) developed a non-linear typology o f secularisation processes in his Theory of 
Secularisation, distinguishing two concepts—‘mythical’ and ‘discursive’ thought—represented by 
consensus and conflict theories in sociological theory respectively. He then aligns himself with 
the latter, also represented by Weber and Bell, being a more ‘secularized, demythologized stage 
in (...) social theory’ (Fenn 1978:6). In this discursive paradigm, secularisation is a battle 
between those social actors who wish to expand the domain of the sacred and those who wish 
to restrict it. Five stages o f the process are characterised by Fenn: (1) separation o f distinct 
religious institutions and clergy; (2) sharpening borders between religious and secular realms; (3) 
developing generalised value systems and beliefs, potentially expressed in a civil religion; (4) 
gathering support for the religious-secular split; and (5) ensuring the separation o f individual 
and corporate life. Fenn stresses the nonlinear and potentially reversible character o f this model.
Fenn’s idea that secularisation is a result o f the struggle between social forces is echoed 
by Smith (2005). Authors contributing to the ‘secular revolution’ contend that the historical 
secularisation o f American public life is not a natural and inevitable process—a mere 
consequence o f modernisation—as suggested by most previous scholars. Smith claims that 
secularisation in the US was an outcome o f a struggle between conflicted interest groups 
attempting to control society. This claim is backed by a number of examples from the fields of 
education, science, public morality and human rights, and the patterns they have followed in
T9th—and-20th-century America.
Smith proposes to ‘move agency, interests, power, resources, mobilization, strategy, and 
conflict to the foreground in our understanding o f macrosocial secularization—a topic until now 
largely framed by abstract and agentless terms like “differentiation” and “rationalization”’ 
(Smith 2003:vii). Although revolutionary and innovative both in form and content, Smith’s 
theory quotes Chaves (1994), Dobbelaere (1981) and Sewell (1992) as its inspiration, as these
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authors have suggested shifting the focus o f secularisation theory from questions o f belief to 
issues o f authority, and insisted on the cultural construction of the nature o f social structures. 
Smith further admits that his research was influenced by what he calls ‘certain postmodernist 
sensibilities’ (Smith 2003:viii) in the way that it is concerned with the postmodern critique of 
Enlightenment universalism as a potential window for intellectual and social pluralism.
One o f the main values o f Smith’s work lies in the clear defining process o f his principal 
research categories o f religion, revolution and public life. Smith views religion as not merely a 
set o f cognitive beliefs or ethical imperatives, but as a way of life practiced by communities. 
Smith’s understanding o f public life as antagonistic puts him in Habermas’s footsteps when 
referring to areas o f social life in which culturally different groups o f people co-exist, with 
common arrangements in areas such as law, education, science and media, amongst others. By 
using revolution as a central category for his thesis, Smith looks into the issues o f power and 
authority, resource mobilisation and cultural and institutional transformation in American 
society. Smith’s theory is of high relevance to this thesis given that it focuses largely on 
institutions and vested interests and the non-linear character o f secularisation processes. 
Although Smith’s book focuses largely on American Protestantism, it portrays many universal 
mechanisms that can be related to post-1989 Poland, as we shall see, notably in reference to the 
first period o f Poland’s democratic transformation (1989-1993) and the subsequent years of 
consolidation of the place of religion in public life (1993-2007).
According to Smith, the secularisation o f American public life may be understood as a 
revolutionary process. Before this ‘revolution’, Smith argues, an established—mainly Protestant— 
regime was in place, and its institutional privilege and dominance provoked increasing 
grievances among excluded groups, including secular groups, Catholic groups and other 
denominations. In response, these disenfranchised groups engaged in activities designed to rid 
the established regime o f its social control. The anti-establishment insurgency, aided by a
103
number o f outside forces and happenings, overthrew the established regime and installed a new 
order.
Smith contends that traditional secularisation theory suffers from seven theoretical 
defects. The first defect Smith points to is over-abstraction. Obscuring concrete social and 
political factors crucial to understanding the course o f secularisation, such as specific historical 
actors and interests, means that they are not studied in depth by secularisation theorists. In a 
similar way, secularisation theory lacks an analysis o f human agency: it offers transformation 
without protagonists, action without actors and historical processes without agents. As this 
thesis argues, the main actors in Poland’s religious landscape—the PRCC and its interests—played, 
and continue to play, a crucial role in diverting the course of secularisation. Smith further 
charges that the classic secularisation theory presents an over-romanticised history of religion 
whereby the religious past is presented as a ‘golden era’, when individuals and communities were 
truly religious—a vision Smith rejects as a ‘backward-looking utopia’ (Martin 1969:30-31, 36).
Smith’s theory, framing secularisation in terms o f a power struggle between interested 
parties and focusing on institutions and interests, offers valuable insights for the study o f post­
communist Poland. This thesis argues that the current relationship between religion and public 
life in Poland is a result of the complex relationship between historical processes and actions 
taken by main actors such as the PRCC and political groups and institutions.
Furthermore, Smith’s re-examination of the secularisation thesis is helpful in identifying 
the main processes influencing religious change in contemporary Poland, a country experiencing 
rapid modernisation. Differentiation, societalisation and rationalisation can all be observed on 
different levels o f Polish social life. When it comes to public life, the two former processes have 
most relevance to the way in which religion’s position is evolving. Differentiation within Polish 
society and the independent functioning o f its different spheres, such as the economy and 
politics, have been accelerated by the collapse o f communism, which limited the independent
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functioning of different layers and groups within society, forcibly uniting them under the banner 
of real socialism.
Conclusion
In post-1989 Poland, the construction of a modern, liberal, democratic polity characterised by 
the increasingly independent functioning o f the state, political society and civil society posed 
new challenges to religion. From being forced into the private sphere, and only gradually re- 
emerging into public life since the 1960s, the Catholic Church has tried to find a new place in 
Poland’s public and private life. However, accelerating differentiation has made it challenging 
for the Church to maintain a grip on all aspects of social life. A t the same time, societalisation 
increasingly impeded the Church’s involvement in and importance to the private life o f Polish 
people. Increased social mobility and the break-up of traditional communities lowered the 
importance o f everyday religious rituals and redefined the traditional role o f the Church, no 
longer at the centre o f the community. Last but not least, rationalisation processes diminished 
the Church’s capacity to control certain debates. The abortion debate, for example, has 
expanded from religious arguments (abortion as a sin) to include rational and moral arguments 
(abortion as a human right and abortion as a form o f killing).
As much as the modernisation processes have influenced the relationship between 
Church and state and reshaped the place o f religion in public life, limiting the scope o f this 
research to modernisation does not produce the required results, and obscures other important 
factors influencing secularisation processes. The main alternative approaches, such as the 
individualisation thesis, which define themselves against the secularisation thesis, expand the 
scope o f analysis. Theories o f privatisation and individualisation offer valuable alternatives to 
the secularisation thesis, proving that the public role and importance o f religion can be separated
from the individual and private dimension o f religion. Poland was subject to a partially forced 
privatisation of religion between 1944 and 1989. This artificial state of privatisation had 
profound implications for the role of the Catholic Church under communist rule (see Chapter 
3), and for the ways in which religion then returned to public life after the Polish communist 
regime collapsed. Privatisation theory can be used to extrapolate a reversed process in post- 
1989 Poland. Polish individual and private religiosity has fallen steadily since 1989, yet religion 
remains highly visible in the public sphere, mainly through the actions o f the Catholic Church 
and its allies in political society.
Deprivatisation theory, together with republicisation theory, complements the insights 
offered by individualisation and privatisation theories. I t shows that processes of religious 
change are not only more complex than a simple trajectory of traditional/religious society 
transforming into a modern/secular society, but also that many trends of religious change can 
be reversed. After 44 years o f communist rule, religion in Poland rapidly returned to the public 
sphere, and had to establish a place for itself. The Catholic Church, used to its unique role in 
the communist system as both the most important non-state institution and an opposition force, 
had to rapidly redefine that role in the conditions o f democratic transformation. The fact that 
the communist authorities tried to force the Church out o f the public arena, using a range of 
repressive methods, whilst also using the PRCC in pursuing their agenda, makes the process 
even more complex and dynamic. In June 1989, religion returned to Poland’s public life almost 
overnight, taking everyone by surprise and drawing criticism from many directions. Casanova 
(1994) argues that new communication methods and the development of civil society can sustain 
religious deprivatisation, which in turn can lead to the kinds o f increased tensions and criticisms 
o f religion’s public role that can be observed in today’s Poland.
Herbert’s republicisation thesis attempts to address the same process, but offers a 
different explanation of the causes and mechanisms involved in religion’s increased public 
presence. Herbert points to the fact that disillusionment with different forms of secularisation
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combined with de-differentiation o f the sacred can contribute to religious republicisation. Quite 
importantiy, the republicisation thesis contends that religion can maintain high visibility 
regardless o f individual religiosity indicators, and looks at the activities o f religious actors in 
secular spheres such as education or politics. As Poland was subject to a forced secularisation 
as a result o f communist rule, the idea of a religiously neutral state is largely discredited. This 
has consequences for the place and role o f religion in modern public life. The Catholic Church 
often attempts to undermine critiques of its public activities by referring to the communist 
period, where most public religious activities were forbidden. Furthermore, Polish public 
opinion is very sensitive to any radical attempts at limiting the activities o f the Church, 
remembering its role in anti-communist opposition. Herbert (2007) also points out that the 
protest character of a given religion can contribute to sustaining its republicisation. The Polish 
Catholic Church tries to bridge its role as anti-communist opposition with that as the purported 
defender of Polish national identity in conditions o f rapid westernisation that endanger 
traditional beliefs and values. This contributes to the increased mobilising potential o f 
Catholicism in Poland: its power to promote forces o f change and structural transformation, in 
line with the SMT theory presented in the previous chapter (use o f motive, means and 
opportunity).
Theories of resurgence link very well with this concept in that they focus on the 
mobilising potential o f religion and the rise o f religiosity in conditions of modernisation. 
Although Poland is not experiencing an all-out religious revival—as noted, personal religiosity 
levels have been falling since the early 1990s—certain elements o f religious mobilisation and 
resurgence can be observed, particularly with reference to radical and extremist groups within 
the Church, such as the aforementioned Radio Maryja and the League o f Polish Families. This 
trend is also reaching out to touch mainstream political organisations, including Law and Justice, 
Poland’s second political force since 2005.
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Most o f the above-mentioned theories focus on social changes and processes that are 
unintended, rather than on actions undertaken by individuals, groups, organisations and 
institutions. This is a departure from the original meaning o f the term ‘secularisation’, which 
initially referred to the intentional and forced transfer o f property and rights from religious to 
secular authorities. Only Fenn and Smith focus on the role and influence o f actors and 
institutional interests in the secularisation process.
Smith’s theory is thus o f high relevance to this thesis as it proposes to focus on factors 
influencing secularisation largely ignored by others. Events unfolding in Poland’s public square 
post-1989 show an intense ideological and discursive struggle between the more secular- 
oriented groups and institutions and those favouring the greater involvement o f the Church and 
religion in public life. Smith suggests that the power balance between institutions taking part in 
this struggle, together with networks o f interdependence and the interests o f stakeholders, have 
decisive influence on the outcomes o f the secularisation process. Rising opposition to the 
Church’s involvement in politics, and little support for most policies addressed jointly by the 
Church and religious-minded groups and politicians, such as restrictive abortion laws, religious 
education in public schools and religious influence on political parties’ programmes and policies, 
mean that a large number of Church hierarchs and politicians continue their alliance, over the 
heads o f the electorate and in defiance o f public opinion. The next chapter will look at the 
history o f religion, state and national identity in Poland before 1989, assessing the importance 
o f the links between religious and state institutions for the place o f religion in public life, and 
setting the background for the further study o f post-communist reality in chapters 4 and 5.
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Chapter 3: Religion in Poland before 1989
The previous chapter looked at various theoretical models o f Church and state, focusing 
especially on the framework o f religious presence in the public sphere. This chapter has greater 
specificity, being devoted to the historical relationship between Church, state, religion and 
politics in Poland since the Middle Ages. The main aim of the chapter is to present the complex 
background o f contemporary relations between religion and public life in Poland, preceding a 
more detailed analysis o f more recent developments in this relationship. The histories o f Polish 
Christianity, Polish nationality and statehood are largely intertwined, and this is reflected in the 
structure of this chapter. Particular attention is paid to the emergence o f national-religious 
identity in 19th-century Poland and the place o f religion in the public realm in the 20th century: 
notably the changing reality o f foreign domination (until 1918), brief independence (1918-39), 
and war and communist rule (1939-89). The main arguments presented in this chapter pertain 
to these strong historical links between the national and religious identity o f Poles, as well as to 
the strong public presence o f the Church, particularly in the last two centuries, both under 
foreign occupation and during a brief period o f inter-war independence. I argue that the close 
links developed between the Catholic Church and the Polish national struggle in the 19th century, 
together with the Church’s strong role in the reborn Polish republic existing between 1918-1939 
and the PRCC’s unique contribution under the communist regime (including both collaboration 
and collusion with the authorities), have had profound consequences for Poland’s contemporary 
politics. In post-war Poland, the Church, despite persecution by the state, secured m ost o f its 
institutional interests, and often co-operated with both the communist government and 
opposition movements, thus securing a unique position in the transformation period after 1989 
(an issue which will be further discussed in Chapter 4).
109
Religion and Polish nationhood
The history o f Polish Christianity goes back to the Middle Ages. The second half o f the 10th 
century was crucial to the formation of the religious and national identity of what was to become 
the Polish nation. Most historians agree that the year 966, when Poland officially accepted 
Christianity, marked a defining moment in Poland’s history (Kloczowski 2000). The emergence 
o f Christianity as the dominant faith in Poland was rapidly politicised, and was closely associated 
with the ruling classes. Even though the foundations o f the Polish state are strongly associated 
with Christianity, and particularly with Catholicism, the country enjoyed a certain degree of 
religious freedom in the earliest centuries of its existence, and was home to representatives of 
many faiths. In the late 11th century, Jews from other Central-Eastern European lands began 
settling in Polish cities. By the 16th century, as many as three-quarters o f the world’s Jews found 
a home in Poland (Sanford 1994:79). Other religious communities, such as Armenians and 
Muslims, were also present in Poland after the formation of the Polish-Lithuanian 
Commonwealth in 1596. Poland was also the first principally Roman Catholic state within 
Europe to have a significant Orthodox community: the Orthodox Church had been present 
within Poland and Lithuania since the Great Schism in 1054 (Przybyl 2001).
This long tradition of pluralism and inter-faith co-existence was put to the test during 
the volatile years of foreign invasions in 17th- and 1 S^-century Poland. This is when, under 
conditions o f threat and sudden change, the Roman Catholic faith began to establish itself as 
the principal body holding the nation together, and as a symbol o f resistance to foreign 
oppression. The so-called ‘Swedish Deluge’ o f 1655 threatened the very core o f Poland’s 
existence, when Swedish armies ravaged Polish territory; this was when the hitherto underlying 
threat o f partition between neighbouring powers first emerged. A t the height o f their military 
campaign, the Swedes besieged the Czestochowa Monastery, where the revered icon of the 
Black Madonna was kept. To their surprise, the Swedish army was forced into a humiliating
retreat by a small number o f Polish knights and monks. The ‘Defence o f Czestochowa’ entered 
Polish national history and collective memory as a myth affirmed by the vow of King John 
Casimir Vasa in Lviv, made in 1656 (the ‘Lviv vows’), to dedicate the nation to the Virgin Mary, 
along with his promise to raise a church to commemorate the victory. The repercussions of this 
vow resounded in Polish politics into the present day. The Great Novena, a major public 
campaign devised by Primate Wyszynski in the 1950s and 1960s (see below), relied partially on 
the myth o f the ‘Defence of Czestochowa’ and the Polish king’s vow to entrust the Virgin Mary 
with protecting the Polish nation. Further references to the 1 7*-century events became a cause 
o f a major political controversy after the 2005 parliamentary elections, when the Law and Justice 
government decided to co-finance the Church’s wish to build a church in commemoration of 
the Lviv vows (see Chapter 5).
The Polish-Catholic union crystallised and flourished during the partition period (1789- 
1918). The joint action undertaken by Austria, Prussia and Russia deprived Poles of an 
independent state for over a century, and the Roman Catholic Church was faced with 
intolerance and significant persecution where the partitioning powers were non-Catholic 
(Protestant/German or Orthodox/Russian). This provoked a religious and patriotic reaction 
from the Polish people, and strengthened the links between religious (Catholic) and national 
identity in the Russian-occupied partition zone. The situation was substantially different in the 
Austrian-occupied zone. Some authors (Crankshaw 1983) suggest that Austria was a reluctant 
participant in the dismemberment of the Polish state, and only decided to join to prevent Russia 
and Prussia from threatening the balance o f power in Central and Eastern Europe. Indeed, 
Polish language, culture and religion enjoyed extraordinary protected status in the Austrian zone, 
and Poles were able to participate in the political and social life o f the country, and were even 
granted a contingent of seats in the national parliament in Vienna (Davies 2005).
The continued oppression of Polish cultural and religious (i.e. Catholic) rights in the 
Russian and Prussian zones boosted the national-religious identity o f the divided Polish nation.
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It reinforced the position o f the Roman Catholic Church as the advocate o f national liberation, 
and thus o f all Poles. Indeed, traditional political or social divisions within the ethnic Polish 
community lost their primary importance in the struggle for national liberation. Nationalists and 
social democrats, liberals and conservatives, elites and peasantry alike all rallied around the 
Church during the partition period.
For four generations, Poland’s national identity developed under conditions akin to a 
‘fortress under siege’ (Doktor 1999: 178), and thus a unity between Catholicism and ethnic 
Polishness was forged. Lack of identification with the state during the partition period (caused 
by the fact that m ost Poles felt that they do not belong in the partition states) consolidated the 
firm relationship between religious and national values, as a result o f which both the Catholic 
faith and the Church as an institution became icons of national importance (Tazbir 1996). This 
process occurred in a social reality where Catholic Poles were not a majority: the territories 
comprising the former Kingdom of Poland were still multicultural and multi-faith. As late as 
1900, m ost of the territories of what was to become the second Polish republic were considered 
‘multiconfessional’ (see Map 1 below; Madeley 2003:28).
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Map 1: Religious Europe 1900 (Madeley 2003)
The new Polish state, which emerged after partition in 1918 as a result o f the realignment 
o f borders o f European states after World War I, has been described as ‘a coat o f many colours’ 
(Rothschild 1993:40). By 1921, the new state had a population o f around 27,000,000, o f which 
69.2% were ethnic Poles, 14.3% Ukrainians and Ruthenians, 7.8% Jews and 3.9% Germans 
(Rothschild 1993:41). This overall diversity had many repercussions in different regions o f the 
country, as well as internationally. Poland was home to the largest Jewish Diaspora in the world: 
approximately a third o f all Jews. In the east of the country, Orthodox Belarusians and 
Ukrainians comprised the majority o f the rural population, while their landlords were mosdy 
Catholic Poles. In the biggest cities, however, Jews and Germans owned large amounts o f real 
estate, whilst Poles were very often tenants or labourers (Rothschild 1993).
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Urban-rural and majority-minority tensions were exacerbated by religious divisions. 
Strong links with rural communities have always been a characteristic feature of Polish 
Catholicism. Feudal, and then agrarian systems created the specific conditions for mass 
religiosity and the centrality o f religion in social life. In rural communities, the parish became 
the basic structure around which community life evolved. In the newly created state, local 
Church officials often enjoyed a power and esteem higher than that of certain state officials by 
virtue o f the forces of continuity and tradition (Pomian-Srzednicki 1982). It was this mark o f 
continuity that strengthened the Church’s role in Polish national identity. The strong links 
between Polish ethnicity and Catholicism were also sanctioned by the strong institutional 
support rendered to the Catholic Church by Polish authorities. The 1921 constitution 
guaranteed the Catholic Church a special status among the country’s religious institutions:
The Roman Catholic faith, being the religion o f the great majority of the nation, 
occupies a leading place in the state among other religions enjoying equal rights.
The Roman Catholic Church is governed by its own laws. The relationship between 
the State and the Church will be agreed through a treaty with the Holy See, to be 
ratified by the Sejm.
(Constitution 1921: Article 114)
In 1925, Poland signed the above-mentioned treaty (the Concordat) with the Holy See, 
thus regulating the relations between the largest religious institution in the country and the state. 
According to the document, bishops, clergy and all members o f the Church were assured free 
contact with the Vatican, and members o f the clergy were assured legal protection when 
performing their official duties; the property rights o f all clerics were also guaranteed by the 
state. Religious education was made obligatory in all public schools (except higher education), 
and Church authorities had the right to supervise it (Konkordat 1925).
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In addition to the official support that the Polish Roman Catholic Church enjoyed from 
the early years of the Second Republic,9 many lay-Catholic organisations, media and political 
parties supported the Church’s attempts to dominate public life. The Polish Roman Catholic 
media presented the regaining of independence as the ‘resurrection’ of a Catholic nation, linking 
it to the 1 ^ -cen tu ry  concept of Poland as the Christ o f nations that had been developed and 
supported by romantic poets and writers, the Church hierarchy and many prominent Polish 
politicians (Kowalczykowa 1991). This rhetoric was complemented by attempts to represent 
Poland as a mono-confessional state, and to marginalise the role o f ethnic and religious 
minorities. The right-wing national democrats [endeks) became the Church’s staunchest allies on 
the political scene. Endeks managed to influence the public debate on issues o f religion and 
cultural diversity by a range o f means, not all o f which were legal. The first president o f the 
Republic, Gabriel Narutowicz, a candidate popular among ethnic and religious minorities, was 
assassinated by one o f the endecja supporters only five days into his presidency (Modras 2004). 
Cases of Church officials intervening in areas o f government policy and civil rights were not 
unusual.
The brief period o f relative religious freedom, and the attempted dominance o f the 
mainstream religious community (i.e. Roman Catholicism) between 1918 and 1939, had 
profound implications for future developments in the fields o f religion and politics in Poland 
and, for our purposes, the inter-war period offers the only point o f reference to issues o f modern 
church-state relations in independent Poland, largely because they were followed by decades of 
occupation and foreign control. Many aspects o f the post-1989 transformation that will be 
described in chapters 4 and 5, such as the alliance o f right-wing political forces and the Church, 
were related to the Second Republic, hence its relevance to further parts o f this thesis.
9 The first Republic ended in 1795 with partition among Russia, Prussia and Austria; post-1989 Poland is referred 
to as the Third Republic.
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The short life o f the Second Republic was marked by political and social conflicts that 
affected all classes and ethnic groups. The early attempts at building a democratic society, the 
authoritarian rule of the military after the 1926 coup and the tensions in relations with Poland’s 
neighbours in the late 1930s were all but a prelude to the much more violent and tragic 
occurrences o f the Second World War.
World War II and the new social and political landscape
The Second World War, which began with the German invasion o f Poland on 1 September 
1939, understandably had a profound impact on the social landscape of the country that was to 
resonate for decades to come. N ot only did the country’s population suffer gready, but the 
political and administrative structure collapsed entirely and was replaced by parameters 
established by two occupying powers (Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union). The institution of 
post-war borders was to redefine the country’s position both within Europe and worldwide (see 
Map 2).
All denominations and religious institutions suffered dramatically with the onset o f war, 
and the religious composition o f the country was irreversibly changed. The predominant 
collective victim o f the oppression of World War II was of course the country’s Jewish 
population. Following the Nazi invasion, persecution and extermination led to over 3,000,000 
Polish Jews (90% o f the pre-war population) losing their lives. A community that had been an 
important part o f Polish society for over eight-hundred years, and which had constituted almost 
10% o f the pre-1939 population (in many cases forming the elite o f the most prominent social 
and professional groups, such as lawyers, doctors or craftsmen), was totally destroyed. The 
Holocaust wiped out the largest non-Christian religious community in the country (Piotrowski 
1997).
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O t h e r  e t h n i c  a n d  r e l i g i o u s  g r o u p s ,  s u c h  a s  O r t h o d o x  a n d  U n i a t e  U k r a i n i a n s ,  B e l a r u s i a n s  
a n d  P r o t e s t a n t  G e r m a n s ,  a l t h o u g h  s p a r e d  t h e  s u f f e r i n g  o f  t h e i r  J e w i s h  c o m p a t r i o t s ,  d i d  n o t  f i n d  
a  p l a c e  i n  t h e  n e w ,  p o s t - 1 9 4 5  P o l a n d .  T h e  r e a s o n s  f o r  t h i s  w e r e  c o m p l e x .  F i r s t  o f  a l l ,  t h e  
P o t s d a m  C o n f e r e n c e  o f  J u l y  1 9 4 5  c o m p l e t e l y  r e s h a p e d  P o l a n d ’ s  b o r d e r s .  L a r g e  s w a t h e s  o f  t h e  
e a s t e r n  p r o v i n c e s  o f  t h e  S e c o n d  R e p u b l i c  w e r e  i n c o r p o r a t e d  i n t o  t h e  U k r a i n i a n  a n d  B e l a r u s i a n  
S o v i e t  S o c i a l i s t  R e p u b l i c s ,  a n d  w i t h  t h e m  t h e  l a r g e  m a j o r i t y  o f  t h e  c o u n t r y ’ s  p r e - w a r  U k r a i n i a n  
a n d  B e l a r u s i a n  p o p u l a t i o n .  A l t h o u g h  P o l a n d  l o s t  4 6  %  o f  i t s  p r e - w a r  t e r r i t o r y  i n  t h e  e a s t ,  i t  w a s  
‘ c o m p e n s a t e d ’  b y  t h e  A l l i e s  w i t h  l a r g e  p o r t i o n s  o f  f o r m e r  G e r m a n  l a n d s ,  a m o n g  t h e m  
P o m e r a n i a ,  L o w e r  a n d  U p p e r  S i l e s i a  i n  t h e  w e s t ,  D a n z i g  i n  t h e  n o r t h  a n d  E a s t  P r u s s i a  i n  t h e  
n o r t h - e a s t .  S e c o n d ,  t h e  t e r r i t o r i a l  r e s t r u c t u r i n g  w a s  c o m p l e m e n t e d  b y  t h e  l a r g e - s c a l e  f o r c e d  
m i g r a t i o n  o f  U k r a i n i a n s  a n d  B e l a r u s i a n s  e a s t w a r d s ,  a n d  o f  P o l e s  a n d  G e r m a n s  w e s t w a r d s ,  t o  
e n s u r e  t h e  m a x i m u m  c o h e s i o n  b e t w e e n  s t a t e  a n d  e t h n i c  b o u n d a r i e s ,  i n  l i n e  w i t h  S t a l i n i s t  
n a t i o n a l  p o l i c y  ( C o n q u e s t  1 9 9 1 ) .
D E N M A R K
| j ^  A nnexed by Poland, 1945
A nnexed by Soviet Union. 1945
EH
M ap 2: Pre-1939/post-1945 Poland m ap (PBS 2010)
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Although minority groups and religions were the primary victims of both Nazi and 
Soviet actions, the majority o f the population, together with their religious institutions—primarily 
the Polish Roman Catholic Church—also suffered a great deal during the war years. In territories 
that were directly annexed by the Reich (i.e. in western Poland), Polish Catholics were refused 
the right to use their mother tongue during church services. Catholic Action, one of the most 
important lay Catholic organisations, was dissolved, as were many associations linked to the 
PRCC. Many priests and bishops were imprisoned and taken to concentration camps; some of 
them were forced to move to the General Government area (Nazi-occupied central Poland, 
separate from the Reich). A wide-ranging anti-Church programme included the abolition of the 
bishops’ administration, theological colleges and monasteries, leading to the eventual collapse 
of parish life—which significandy weakened local communities (Cywiriski 1982).
The Vatican took an ambivalent stance in relation to the new status of occupied Polish 
territories. In December 1939, Pope Pius XII entrusted the administration o f the Chelmno 
diocese in northern Poland to the German Bishop of Danzig, and appointed another German 
bishop as Apostolic Administrator for the Archdiocese o f Gniezno and Poznan in central 
Poland, with jurisdiction over Germans living in the archdiocese. These actions were met with 
marked objections from the exiled Polish government and its embassy in the Vatican. Polish 
officials insisted that the Pope’s actions violated the 1925 Concordat, by allowing a bishop 
resident outside o f Poland’s pre-1939 frontiers to control a part o f Polish territory (Piekarski 
1978). The communist provisional government in 1945 used this fact to declare the Concordat 
void (see below).
The situation in the General Government area was relatively better, although far from 
normal. The local clergy supported underground, anti-Nazi opposition movements, and the 
hierarchy reported on the situation on the ground back to the Vatican. Many priests and monks 
decided to support the anti-Nazi resistance directly, by joining the various partisan organisations
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as chaplains, teachers or editors of the underground press, and a number o f priests and nuns 
assisted the Jewish population in fleeing Nazi persecution (Dudek and Gryz 2006).
Poland’s eastern provinces, which changed hands frequendy between 1939 and 1945, 
were to suffer most during the war. In the Soviet-occupied Vilnius province, police arrested 
dozens o f local priests for ‘anti-state activities’ between 1939 and 1941. Soviet occupation 
resulted in a quick and brutal atheisation campaign. Church property was confiscated and 
churches and theological colleges closed, and the Church was banned from contacting the 
Vatican. Religious instruction in schools was abolished. Nuns working in hospitals and 
monasteries were expelled; some o f them continued their charitable work in hiding. Many 
ordinary citizens were victims o f forced migration to Siberia and other areas o f the Soviet Union 
for their declared religious affiliation. Priests often asked to accompany the faithful on their 
journeys (Cywinski 1982).
Between 1941 and 1944, wherever the area was occupied by Germans the situation only 
became worse. Those involved in resistance were murdered without trial. Church property was 
also confiscated without justification. The return of the Red Army to eastern Poland in 1945 
was marked by frequent murders of priests and robberies of churches and monasteries. The 
Uniate Church, active in the territories o f south-east Poland (today’s Ukraine), was an object of 
a particularly vicious campaign as a ‘foreign’ element on Orthodox soil. In  March 1945, the 
Soviet authorities presented Uniates with an ultimatum: they must abolish their union with the 
Vatican and convert to Orthodoxy. The lack of a response resulted in the arrests o f high-ranking 
Greek Catholic Church officials, including Bishop Slipyj and the staff o f the seminary. Later on, 
the Soviets forced the remaining clergy to organise a synod in Lvov, during which it was decided 
that the Uniate Church should join the Orthodox Church (Cywinski 1982).
The pre-war Polish Roman Catholic Church had over 10,000 registered priests and 
monks. Over one-fifth o f them, including five bishops, perished in the war. It was the bloodiest 
episode in the history o f the Polish Church over all the centuries o f its existence. The Catholic
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Church contributed to the defence o f national identity, and provided spiritual and physical 
support in times o f duress. The end of military activities brought a positive change in all possible 
ways. It did not, however, bring the long-awaited peace and social stability expected by both the 
Church hierarchy and the general population. It also completely changed the dynamics of 
relations between religion, society and public life for over four decades, as the new communist 
authorities had very specific plans regarding the place of religion in social life.
Early post-war years: reconnaissance in force (1944-1948)
Clearly, post-war Poland could not have resembled its pre-war self. An enormous change in the 
social, political and economic environment caused by war brought about substantial changes in 
the state o f Polish religion in general, and Polish Catholicism in particular. This was a period of 
forced secularisation, initially instituted by a foreign power but implemented by the hands of 
Polish communists.
There was now reduced diversity in Poland: there were just over 100,000 Jews, 300,000 
Protestants and another 100,000 Old Catholics (a branch o f Catholicism), plus representatives 
o f other denominations and non-believers. 96% of the post-war Polish population was Roman 
Catholic (Kloczowski 2000). Centuries o f inter-ethnic co-existence and multi-faith social reality 
in Poland had come to an abrupt end. And in addition to the geographic, demographic and 
ethnic changes, the new Polish state was soon about to experience one o f the most brutal and 
austere political regimes: Soviet communism.
The basis o f the new regime was the Polish Committee of National Liberation (‘Polski 
Komitet Wyzwolenia Narodowego’, PKWN), which was established by the Soviets in July 1944. 
The PKW N swiftly rejected the 1935 constitution as ‘fascist and illegal’ (Rosada and Gwozdz 
1955:165), and declared the 1921 constitution the only valid legal document to govern the
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country in the new reality. Despite the formal validity of the constitution, the communist 
authorities ruled the country arbitrarily, particularly whilst the anti-German offensive was still 
in place (the war ended officially on May 9 1945), and no national or international body was 
able to put a check on the communists’ actions.
The arbitrary character o f the new regime and the selective application of pre-war rules 
and laws can be illustrated by the communists’ treatment o f religion and religious communities 
during the first years o f their rule in Poland. Although generally anti-religious, Polish 
communists left a very mixed record o f church-state relations in the first years o f their grip on 
power.
The Soviet rule was based on Marxist-Leninist political theories, which asserted that 
religion is the opium for the masses and a diversion from the people’s earthly duties, including 
the foremost o f them: communist revolution. According to the Marxist-Leninists, religion 
impedes proletarian revolution by teaching people to accept their situation as it is, thus making 
them passive subjects. Additionally, Soviet Marxists believed that religion is a tool o f the 
bourgeois ruling classes that allows them to delude the masses and force them into a life o f 
misery. Under revolutionary socialism, religion must therefore disappear, and inevitably would 
do so, according to the Soviets.
It must be noted that Polish communism, although carefully supervised by the Kremlin, 
was largely different from what was happening in Soviet Union itself. The initial period o f rapid 
communist power-grabbing and the consolidation o f all state and social institutions was ended 
by Khrushchev’s post-1956 Thaw, showing that Polish society was not prone to Sovietisation. 
As this thesis focuses primarily on the presence o f religion in the public arena, the communist 
anti-religious and anti-Church policies will be reviewed only briefly, in order to illustrate the 
changing character of state limitations on the public presence o f religion.
After coming to power, the Polish communist government promptly started adjusting 
social reality to its own doctrine, along the lines o f orthodox Marxist-Leninist thought. The first
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months o f provisional communist government were marked by both suspicion o f and curiosity 
(of the government) about the loyalty o f the Church towards the new rulers o f the country, and 
its potential to mobilise the faithful. Nevertheless, in September 1944, religion was reinstated 
into school curricula, and the Catholic University o f Lublin (‘Katolicki Universytet Lubelski’, 
KUL) was allowed to re-open. Local offices o f the ‘Caritas’ charitable organisation were 
installed, and Church dignitaries, such as Archbishop Sapieha, were invited to state ceremonies. 
The reason for this was simple: it was a planned policy aimed at using the PRCC as a support 
structure in legitimising the new order in the eyes o f the population, as the communists had 
little popular credibility. The newly acquired western and northern provinces of communist 
Poland, granted by the allies at the Yalta conference and emptied by the rushed evacuation of 
Germans, had to be quickly repopulated. The communists recognised that this relatively new 
and unknown ground could be more easily ‘conquered’ when the newly established communities 
were accompanied by a priest—hence the authorities’ attempts at courting the clergy.
In order to boost this new policy, the government allowed for the establishment o f a 
liberal Catholic weekly newspaper, the Tygodnik Vows^echny (‘General Weekly’), the first edition 
o f which was published in Krakow in March 1945. O ther Catholic weeklies, such as Tygodnik 
Wars^amki (Warsaw Weekly’), Gtos Nied^elny (‘The Sunday Voice’) and Glos Katolicki (‘The 
Catholic Voice’), were also allowed to operate and publish freely. By 1948, as many as 70 local 
and national Catholic publications were in print, and their circulation accounted for 11 % of all 
the print media in the country (Stefaniak 1998).
A t the same time, however, a brutal and ruthless terror campaign swept across the 
country, targeting ‘enemies of the people’: mostly right-wing resistance fighters and those 
supporting them, but including anybody loosely connected with the underground Polish state 
and the Home Army (the biggest underground resistance organisation during the Second World 
War). Armed groups of communist soldiers fought the remaining anti-communist opposition, 
and the authorities arrested, tortured and executed hundreds and thousands o f their political
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opponents. This included those involved in the Church, exposing the hypocrisy at the heart of 
the communist regime. Priests and Church officials, particularly those in the service of the 
Home Army, were among the victims o f torture and targets o f political assassination. Clerics 
trying to enter the legal political life o f the new country—even at a local level—were targeted by 
the communist security apparatus. According to some historians, up to a thousand priests may 
have been tortured and imprisoned in the aftermath o f the war on account o f their political 
views (Myszor 1992; 2aryn 1997).
This new oppression o f the Church bled into the political sphere. As early as December 
1944, the PKW N abolished the pre-war religious oath for civil servants and replaced it with a 
secular one (Piekarski 1979). This clearly shows how important bureaucracy was to the secular 
‘clergy’—i.e. communist administrators—of the new regime. September 1945 saw the abolition of 
church wedding ceremonies, now rendered invalid under state law. In September 1945, the 
Provisional Government declared the 1925 Concordat void, justifying this measure by arguing 
that the Vatican had previously violated it during the war by favouring Germany (see the 
appointment of German bishops on Polish territories, described above). Although Pope Pius 
XI later explained his actions in a letter to the Polish bishops, justifying them by asserting the 
need for the faithful o f both nationalities to be assisted in times o f war, the communists did not 
take his argument into account. Anti-Catholic measures continued apace: although religious 
instruction was initially allowed back into public schools in 1944, Catholics faced more and 
more obstacles to securing regular lessons for their children in public schools.
Starting in 1945, when the war had come to an end and the allied powers had agreed at 
Yalta on the post-war European political order, the Polish communist authorities launched a 
more coherent, although still moderate (compared with post-1948 campaigns), anti-religious 
and anti-Church initiative. The main pillars o f this policy included: a restrictive approach to 
religious activity in the public sphere; pragmatic use of religious organisations for the benefit o f 
authorities; and a limit on the international links of religious organisations, with a view to
creating a national Church. The symptoms o f the restrictive approach, which were already 
present in the immediate post-1944 period, have already been described above. As before, the 
public face masked systematic oppression. The authorities allowed for the presence and 
functioning o f religious organisations; so, for example, the Polish Ecumenical Council was 
reactivated in October 1945. The Congregation of Jewish Communities also functioned freely 
from 1946. But this did not mean that public displays o f religious allegiance or the political 
activism of religious figures were tolerated. For example, Catholic Action, banned under Nazi 
occupation, did not gain the state’s permission to resume activities. The activities o f other pro- 
Church parties were also successfully boycotted. In August 1945, the National Party 
(‘Stronnictwo Narodowe’, SN) attempted to legalise its status, but instead its leaders were 
arrested by the security apparatus. The Labour Party (‘Stronnictwo Pracy’, SP), a pre-war 
Christian-democrat group, managed to register as a legal organisation, but, since its activities 
were permanently controlled by the communists, it was decided to dissolve it after just one year 
o f functioning. In 1947, an attempt was made by the “Warsaw Weekly’ magazine to draw former 
SN and SP supporters together; the new group, however, included supporters of the pre-war 
Christian-democrat and nationalist heritage, and so it was met with a prom pt and decisive 
response from the authorities, and the main protagonists were arrested (Stefaniak 1998).
The only political groups that were allowed to operate were those that pledged allegiance 
to the new regime. Boleslaw Piasecki’s D%is i Jutro (‘Today and Tomorrow’) weekly magazine 
and PAX—the Polish Progressive Catholic Movement—are both very good examples o f the 
pragmatic, utilitarian and cynical use o f religious movements by the communists. Piasecki, a pre­
war Polish fascist and a supporter o f Polish-German co-operation against the USSR, was 
captured by the Russians in 1944. He managed to persuade them that his popularity in post-war 
Poland could serve the communist cause. The communists decided to capitalise on this, and 
entrusted him with the task o f organising pro-communist lay-Catholic circles. ‘Today and 
Tomorrow’ thus proved useful: it became a starting point for the establishment o f a national
organisation that fully complied with the communist desire to build a socialist state allied with 
the USSR. For its part, PAX was, despite its name, essentially involved in publishing pro-regime 
books, newspapers and periodicals. In return, the state offered the organisation licences for a 
range o f activities, such as running a high-school and setting up a business arm called IN CO - 
Veritas, which produced religious artefacts, cleaning products and even fishing nets. The PAX 
empire was also involved in the creation o f other organisations for lay Catholics and clergy, such 
as the Peace Defenders’ Movement (£Ruch Obroncow Pokoju’; ROP), amongst others 
(Grajewski 1999). This policy o f creating pro-regime organisations that purportedly represented 
some religious groups within the society was continued throughout the whole communist 
period, as the authorities could not get the PRCC to officially collaborate with the government, 
and yet they sought some legitimisation from religious groups.
Another pillar o f the state’s early policy directed against the Church consisted of strong 
anti-Vatican rhetoric and activities, typified by their annulling the 1925 Concordat and ignoring 
the Vatican’s plea to spare the Uniate Church from persecution; as always, this stance was 
ambivalent, and contrasted by a moderate attitude to the PRCC and even an attempt to involve 
the Polish Church in building the new order. It may well have been that the Polish communists 
intended to draw the PRCC away from its superiors in Rome in an attempt to create a national 
Catholic Church, similar to the Russian Orthodox Church, which would have remained under 
Soviet control. Whether this was the aim o f the government or not, it failed completely, and the 
Vatican remained in close contact with the PRCC.
The communist authorities’ last step on a long and bloody march to power was the 
organisation o f national elections that were supposed to confirm the democratic legitimacy o f 
the new regime. The decision to organise them came only in 1947, when all political opponents 
had been neutralised and most anti-communist resistance groups had been eliminated. The 
Church did not remain neutral in the face o f what was basically a rigged election. It instructed 
Catholic voters not to vote for parties representing the communist coalition, as its programme
was based on Marxism-Leninism, and its secular-materialistic premises were not compatible 
with the teachings o f the Catholic Church. Tjgodnik Pom^echnj called on all Catholics to vote 
"only for those persons, electoral lists and programmes that are not in opposition to Catholic 
teachings and morality’ (Piekarski 1978:90).
Despite the unusual involvement o f the PRCC in the electoral campaign, and the 
influence it tried to exercise on the voting behaviour o f its members, however, the Democratic 
Bloc won a landslide victory, with over 80% support, obtaining virtually absolute political power 
in the newly elected Sejm (the lower chamber o f the Polish parliament). The election results were 
undeniably manipulated with the help of government ministries and civil servants, and 
numerous breaches of the electoral code were reported, but this did not stop the victorious 
parties from swiftly assuming power. In December 1948, after another round o f political purges 
and monopolisation of power, the Polish United Workers’ Party (later ‘the Party’ or PZPR) was 
created—a political institution that would wield absolute power until the end o f communist rule 
in Poland in June 1989. These developments equipped the ruling regime with new weapons in 
their struggle for a communist Poland (now named ‘People’s Republic of Poland’, ‘Polska 
Rzeczpospolita Ludowa’, PRL), and new forms o f political oppression were soon to emerge. 
These included the state’s religious policy and its activities in relation to the PRCC as the biggest 
non-state organisation in the country (making the PRCC a double target: as a large organisation, 
and as a religious one). Subsequent steps taken by the communist authorities between 1948 and 
1956 were to further exacerbate the difficult position o f the Church.
Strengthening the communist monopoly: 1948-56
Immediately after the ‘democratic’ victory of 1947, the communist authorities doubled their 
efforts to monopolise all spheres o f social life in the country by establishing communist
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institutions and building a totalitarian state. The aims of the Stalinist offensive were twofold: 
first o f all, building a united front o f communist institutions, governed centrally and acting 
unanimously in executing state policy; second, controlling all possible areas o f public life- 
including the religious sphere—and infiltrating the biggest religious institution, the PRCC.
Youth was identified as a key target group for communist control, particularly as young 
people most actively showed their support for Church and clergy. Local and regional 
administration was instructed to harass and intimidate members o f pro-Catholic associations 
and groups, as well as to encourage them to join the official communist youth organisations, 
such as the Union o f Polish Youth (‘Zwi^zek Mlodziezy Polskiej’, ZMP). Night office-raids, 
refusals to register new organisations and the dissolution of existing ones became more and 
more frequent. Religious instruction was gradually forced out o f state schools and moved into 
churches and parish offices. New ‘atheist’ schools started operating, often under the patronage 
of the newly created Childrens’ Friends’ Society (Towarzystwo Przyjaciol Dzieci’, TPD). This 
society’s purported independent status was indeed a cover for an institution financed entirely 
by the Ministry of Education. In addition, by 1949 priests had been removed from state 
hospitals, where they had served as chaplains. Now, key institutions—education, health and the 
third sector (civil society organisations)—were freed from PRCC influence.
The drive to limit the power o f the Church did not stop at rooting out its links with 
other state institutions. All priests were subject to invigilation and intense scrutiny by the security 
apparatus as a matter o f course. Since 1947, the authorities had started profiling the clergy and 
dividing them into ‘positive’ and ‘reactionary’ (poqytywne and reakcyjne) forces, as part o f a wider 
strategy o f infiltrating and dividing the Church from the inside in order to weaken and eventually 
destroy it. The state Office o f Security (‘Urz^d Bezpieczenstwa’, UB) opened case files for all 
members o f the clergy, collecting intelligence data-including compromising materials—about 
priests and Church leaders. Trials of clergy and even nuns became more and more widespread. 
Some were punished for disseminating underground materials and providing shelter to fugitive
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oppositionists; others for preaching about the abuses of power on the part o f the communist 
government, and inveighing against its hostile attitude towards religion, the Church and the 
Vatican (Zaryn 2003:92-93).
Even though the authorities officially avoided declaring war on religion and the Church, 
and punished those who publicly declared that communism destroys the Church (in order not 
to antagonise the general population), the anti-PRCC and anti-Vatican campaign intensified 
through 1949 and early 1950. One of the most striking manifestations o f the new approach to 
religion was the centralisation o f the anti-Church campaign in the hands o f an inter-agency 
committee established by the Political Bureau of PZPR in January 1949. Before that, fighting 
the Church and religion in general public life was the domain of a range o f state institutions, 
including the Office o f Security, Ministry o f Public Security, regional authorities and the 
Communist Party, amongst others. The newly established committee devised a coherent plan 
to limit the Church’s outreach into society, including judicial actions (show trials o f the clergy), 
educational actions (such as abolishing Catholic schooling and closing social science and 
humanities departments at the Catholic University of Lublin) and financial measures (such as 
taxing Church property and confiscating Church property in the former German territories in 
the north and west o f the country).
The summer o f 1949 saw a further deterioration in church-state relations, mainly caused 
by two high-profile events. In early July, the faithful at the Lublin cathedral reported that a 
Virgin Mary icon wept tears. News quickly spread across the region and the country. State 
officials dismissed the event as a superstition and an attempt by the Church to deceive its 
followers. The local church was then closed, and the bishop was asked to issue a statement 
firmly proclaiming that miracles do not exist; on refusing, he was arrested, and the press 
embarked on a nationwide campaign ridiculing the whole affair (Zaryn 1997).
Dramatic though it was, this event was quickly overshadowed by the government’s 
reaction to the Vatican’s declaration condemning Marxism and all supporters o f communist
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parties in Western Europe. The communist government accused the Church of intolerance and 
anti-state sentiment, and further intensified its anti-PRCC campaign. Between August 1949 and 
January 1950, all Church-run hospitals and Catholic associations were shut. In January 1950, the 
state confiscated the property o f Caritas, the biggest charity organisation run by the Church. Its 
property was seized, bank accounts frozen, and staff fired, evicted from offices or arrested. This 
was done despite the substantial material and financial support that Polish society received from 
Caritas’s international supporters. A puppet board was elected at Caritas, consisting o f ‘patriot- 
priests’ and representatives o f Bolestaw Piasecki’s PAX, in order to legitimise the seizures 
(Zaryn 1997).
The liquidation of Caritas was but a prelude to the largest anti-Church operation to date, 
which was implemented in February and March o f 1950. First, a nationwide structure bringing 
together ‘patriot-priests’ in support o f the communist regime was established (despite the earlier 
dissolution o f other Catholic organisations). The notorious Main Commission o f Priests 
(‘Glowna Komisja Ksi^zy’, GKK) was generously supported by the state through financial 
incentives (building materials for new churches, tax exemptions and the conferral o f real estate, 
amongst other things) and licences to publish newspapers. In March, the government issued a 
decree entitled cOn the takeover by the State o f mortmain properties’, declaring that all real 
estate property belonging to religious institutions (other than GKK) would be taken over by the 
state. The Council o f Ministers had the privilege o f deciding which categories o f confiscated 
property would remain under the Church’s management, and which would be taken away 
permanently or transferred to another (presumably pro-regime) religious organisation 
(Concordat Watch 2009).
The communists’ clampdown on Church activity forced the Church hierarchy to seek a 
compromise with the authorities. In April 1950, a joint PRCC-state commission worked on a 
modus vivendi agreement, which was signed on April 14 in Krakow. It referred to a number o f 
issues vital to the further existence and operation o f the PRCC, as well as the Church’s place in
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the public realm. The Church vowed to support a number o f state policies, including 
encouraging Catholics to ‘restore the country and increase the well-being o f the Nation’ as well 
as to oppose ‘anti-Polish and revisionist manifestations’ o f the German clergy (Concordat 
Watch 2009).
The agreement was widely hailed in the communist press and media as a success for the 
government and proof o f an ever-strengthening socialist state. The Episcopate instructed priests 
to present the document as a moderate success, and as an opportunity for the Church to 
maintain as much independence and freedom as possible in order to continue supporting the 
nation morally and charitably (Piekarski 1978).
It seems that, at this stage, the PRCC decided to abandon the strategy of unilateral 
opposition to the communist authorities in favour o f a more accommodating stance. At the 
same time, the communist authorities started to understand that it would be very difficult for 
them to completely eradicate the Church’s influence on society, even though the new 
government now had an absolute grip on all state institutions—including legislative and judiciary 
branches. The impasse resulting from the growing strength o f the communist authorities, mostly 
a consequence o f institutional arrangements and Soviet support, not popular following, and 
consistent resistance from the Church and the faithful, forced both sides to compromise in 
some o f their beliefs and adjust their positions to accommodate each other. This was a situation 
o f mutual loss and mutual benefit. The Church secured relative independence (although it was 
further persecuted, particularly between 1952 and 1956) at the cost of collaborating with the 
government, thus partially validating the state’s authority. For their part, the government had to 
admit that some o f the Church’s privileges were irrevocable, and accept that it would be 
increasingly difficult for the unpopular communist authorities to maintain stability and enforce 
communist reforms on society without some sort o f agreement with the PRCC. It must be 
noted that both sides were, by-and-large, forced to accept this state o f affairs, rather than choose 
it.
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This deadlock extended beyond relations between Church and state. The first half of 
the 1950s brought about feelings of disillusionment and despair to most Poles, with the 
communists tightening their grip on power and independent social institutions and international 
influences losing ground in the country. People for the most part appear not to have accepted 
the new order, but they still had to adjust to the new reality that was communist rule. The spirit 
o f opposition to the communist regime was replaced by a survival instinct: ‘society was 
supposed to live with the awareness that the existing situation was not to be changed (...) until 
the current generation died out’ (Swida-Ziemba 1997:241).
The permanence o f the communist regime was confirmed by the drafting and 
implementing o f new legislation. In February 1952, the communist authorities issued a decree 
declaring the abolition o f certain Church ranks and offices. This was an open attempt to intrude 
into a sphere previously exclusively reserved for Church authorities. The first Polish communist 
constitution that followed, in July 1952, was yet another blow to the independence and social 
standing of the Catholic Church, and presented an overview o f the communists’ understanding 
o f church-state relations. Article 70 o f the new basic law proclaimed that ‘the Church is 
separated from the State. The principles of the relationship between Church and State, as well 
as the legal position and the property status o f religious bodies, shall be determined by laws’, 
and that ‘the abuse o f freedom of conscience and religion for purposes o f endangering the 
interests o f the People’s Republic of Poland shall be punished’ (Sejm 2009). These constitutional 
clauses gave the state numerous advantages over the Church. First o f all, although the 
constitution declared that the Church was separate from the state, it still gave the state absolute 
power over religious matters. Moreover, the concept o f ‘abuse o f freedom of conscience of 
religion’ was formulated as a potential threat to the state, thus providing the authorities with a 
mechanism for controlling and limiting the activities o f religious organisations (i.e. potentially 
accusing them of abusing freedom of religion as an anti-government activity).
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The new constitutional provisions thus deprived the PRCC of the leading position it 
had been granted in the 1921 constitution, as the communist government sought to lessen the 
influence o f the Church by placing all denominations on an equal footing. According to the 
1921 constitution, relations between Church and state were supposedly regulated entirely by the 
Concordat. N o provisions were made for the consequences o f infringing upon the autonomy 
of the Church or its property rights. Furthermore, there was no mention of religious instruction 
in schools (Sejm 2009).
And so, through the institution o f the new constitution, the communist authorities 
confirmed the existence of a new model o f church-state separation: the state was independent 
from the Church, and the latter had no right to intervene in state affairs; equally, the state 
maintained control of the Church and religious affairs in general. In most democratic regimes 
churches are allowed to function freely, and are treated like other non-state organisations. The 
new Polish constitution, however, showed that the communist government did not afford the 
Church autonomy or equal status with other organisations. The PRCC had no official legal 
status, and there was no restriction on the regulatory power of the state over matters of religion. 
Moreover, a new provision found its way into the constitution—‘abuse o f freedom of conscience’ 
(Constitution 1952)—and any anti-state activities of the Church could be severely punished by 
the authorities in light o f the basic law.
Empowered by this new law and the accompanying anti-Church decrees, the 
government continued its clampdown on the last remnants of PRCC presence in social life. In 
September 1953, a prominent show trial was organised to prosecute Archbishop Kaczmarek of 
Kielce for purported espionage on behalf o f the American ambassador in Poland and the 
National Committee for a Free Europe. Never before had such a high-ranking Church official 
been tried by the communist Polish state, and it was a sign of an even tougher approach to the 
PRCC hierarchy adopted by the state. Cardinal Wyszynski was requested to issue a public 
condemnation o f the bishop, which he failed to produce. As a result, the Primate was asked to
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relinquish his pastoral duties and was later arrested. This was the symbolic peak o f Stalinist 
repression o f the PRCC; perhaps because o f internal and international indignation in defence 
o f the Cardinal, the Polish government gave up on the trial (Zaryn 2000).
Nevertheless, while Wyszynski was being moved across various locations in northern 
and eastern Poland in secrecy, persecution o f the PRCC hierarchy continued. A number of 
bishops and members o f their entourage were arrested and detained. All bishops were forced 
to take an oath o f allegiance to the People’s Republic o f Poland and its government, and to vow 
to strengthen the state and its security. This action was heavily criticised by the Holy See, 
showing that the communists’ strategy o f undermining Church unity was effective enough to 
provoke the Catholic hierarchy. A similar divide and rule strategy was implemented locally: 
authorities insisted on handing parishes over to ‘patriot-priests’, and ordered regional Church 
authorities to dismiss priests who did not follow state legislation. The last step in eradicating 
remnants o f religious presence in the public domain was the abolition o f morning prayers in 
state schools and replacing them with a morning assembly. With this, Catholicism was all but 
removed from public life.
The Stalinist period in the People’s Republic o f Poland thus set the terms o f future 
church-state relations, and was an important point o f reference both for state authorities and 
the PRCC hierarchy. The last years o f Stalin’s rule and the short period preceding the historical 
20th Congress o f the Communist Party o f the Soviet Union (CPSU) were marked by an 
aggressive attack on all aspects o f the PRCC’s local and national structures, its presence in Polish 
social and cultural life and its international standing. The authorities attempted to eliminate all 
independent civil society organisations (religious and secular alike) and realise the Marxist 
assumption that the rule o f the ‘universal class’ reunites state and society. This theory o f total 
assimilation led to an almost complete replacement o f civil society by the state. In terms o f 
church-state separation, the issue was now almost entirely one-sided; the Church was fully
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separated from all things relating to state and public life, but the state was firmly fixed on 
controlling the Church and all its operations.
This situation was not to last. As events unfolded, this divisive strategy began to prove 
inefficient and, despite initial gains, turned out to be a major blow to the communists’ already 
disastrous reputation in Polish society. In terms of the Church’s presence in public life, 1956, 
the year o f the Polish Thaw, was a real turning point. Despite the communists’ strict policies 
and attacks in the Stalinist period, the attempt to destroy the PRCC was eventually abandoned. 
The authorities never dared to imprison key Church leaders again, and even allowed for a 
number o f key Church initiatives to be unveiled (see below for details o f the Great Novena and 
papal visits to Poland), marking a shift in the balance of power, and affirming the place of 
religion in public life during the ensuing decades of communist rule. This was particularly visible 
in terms of the PRCC’s symbolic praetorian role as a moral authority undermining the monopoly 
o f the communist state.
Subsequent developments during the post-1956 communist era clearly show that the 
PRCC was once again to secure a stable place in the country’s public life. Although its position 
would still be challenged on numerous occasions, and although its privileges and functioning 
were limited by the socialist character of the state, co-operation between Church and state 
authorities continued in a range o f fields. The praetorian syndrome developed further, fuelled 
by regular political crises (1968, 1970, 1976, amongst others), meaning that the Church was 
increasingly active in Polish public and political life (albeit not entirely openly, and still as an 
official enemy o f the state), and became an institution allowing activists to channel certain 
political opinions and ideas within the public square.
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Illusory armistice: 1956-70
It is worth looking at the period known as the Polish Thaw more closely, for a major political 
change in Moscow, and Russian criticism o f Stalinist policies that took place then, had serious 
repercussions for the whole o f the Soviet bloc, including Poland. A t the time o f Khrushchev’s 
denunciation o f Stalinism, growing dissatisfaction with Boleslaw Bierut’s orthodox rule (1947- 
1956) and disappointment with the political and economic situation o f the country fomented 
widespread restiveness among the Poles. The Soviet-trained and organised Natolin group of 
Polish communists, in power during the Stalinist years, faced a major challenge from a group of 
home-grown communists led by Wladyslaw Gomulka. In  October 1956, a bloodless revolution 
took place in Poland, resulting in the coming to power o f more patriotic communists and the 
installation o f Gomulka as the country’s leader. The fact that Gomulka, a doctrinal communist 
and staunch ally o f the Soviet Union, was perceived by society to be a patriot shows the level o f 
indoctrination and moral relativism brought about by Stalinism. Whereas in late 1940s Gomulka 
would be perceived as a backward, uneducated communist apparatchik, in the face o f the 
brutality o f Bierut years and the terrible toll that Stalinist policies took on Poles, Gomulka was 
seen as a saviour.
Regardless of the categorisation o f Gomulka’s ideological position, he was regarded as 
a leader who would redirect the Communist Party’s thinking towards national interests. In  order 
to cement his grip on power, Gomulka sought support from dissident groups within society, 
including the Church. Mass protests in defence o f Cardinal Wyszynski resulted in Gomulka’s 
decision to free the detained cleric, along with his colleagues. Further to these developments, a 
Joint Commission o f Representatives o f the Government and the Episcopate was created to 
resolve contentious issues in Church-state relations. To the surprise o f many, it took the 
Commission only just over a month to reach an agreement. O n December 8 1956, the 
Commission issued the following statement:
The representatives o f the Episcopate declared that as a result o f changes in public life aimed at 
the consolidation o f rule and law, justice and peaceful coexistence, the raising of social morality 
and redressing o f wrongs, the Government and State authorities will find full understanding for 
these aims in the Church hierarchy and among the clergy. The representatives o f the Episcopate 
also expressed full support for the actions undertaken by the Government aimed at the 
consolidation and development o f People’s Poland, at the amalgamation of the efforts o f all 
citizens in harmonious work for the good o f the country, conscientious observance o f the laws 
o f People’s Poland, the fulfilment by citizens o f their duties toward the State.
(Piekarski 1979:66)
The document contained further statements confirming the PRCC’s allegiance to the socialist 
state, and listed numerous concessions from the authorities to the Church and religion in 
general. Non-obligatory teaching o f religion in state schools was allowed, and the state allowed 
the Vatican to nominate new bishops in the Recovered Territories (i.e. the western and northern 
parts o f the country that belonged to Germany before 1945).
The establishment of the Commission, and the final statement it produced, brought 
about a new balance of power in the People’s Poland. Ost (1990:112) contends that the Church 
had taken a corporatist position in 1956, and accepted privileges from Gomulka. Ost further 
argues that the PRCC, as an extremely hierarchical body, was used to negotiating with other 
hierarchical bodies, and saw itself as a partner in dialogue with state authorities. This would 
suggest that the Church was actually looking for a privileged position within the emerging state 
socialist system, with no intention to abolish that system. This view undermines the claim of 
some Polish authors (Dudek and Gryz 2006; Zaryn 2001) that the Church’s steadfast position 
had actually contributed to the ultimate failure o f a fully-fledged Soviet communist system in 
Poland. Since 1956, the Polish communist authorities have gradually distanced themselves from
two key policies of the Stalinist years: the merging o f state and society by abolishing all civil 
society organisations; and the enforced collectivisation of farming. By leaving the Church to 
operate relatively freely in certain areas, and abandoning the struggle against individual farming 
(since the countryside was strongly supportive o f the Church), Poland started following the 
‘Polish road to socialism’ proclaimed by Gomulka. This road was characterised by a certain 
dualism continuing church-state conflict, as well as a degree o f mutual accommodation in 
relations. By 1956, the communists seemed to have realised that each time they failed in an 
attempt to assault the Church they lost more credibility, as their already low level o f support fell 
in correlation with the Church’s rise in popularity.
Khrushchev’s Thaw and Gomulka’s rule contributed significandy to a period of relative 
improvement and cautious dialogue in church-state relations. Wyszynski emerged from 
detention stronger and more confident than before, and his release had a similar effect on the 
Church. The Primate set about devising a strategy of re-integrating religion into social life. 
Mindful o f previous accusations o f destabilising the country and interfering with party politics, 
he shifted focus to pastoral matters and social affairs. Cardinal Wyszynski’s release from jail 
coincided with the 300th anniversary o f the Jasna Gora vows of King John Casimir, considered 
a milestone for Polish Catholicism. The PRCC used this date as a springboard for the 
development of a decade-long campaign, the so-called Great Novena, preparing Polish 
Catholics for another national anniversary: the 1,000 years since Mieszko’s baptism, celebrated 
as the Millennium of Polish nationhood.
Although the communists were quick to point out that the Thaw had its limits—and that 
by no means was it an opportunity to revise the current socio-political system—certain 
concessions gained by the Church remained. Even though the state had no competitors in terms 
o f real power, the authorities of the People’s Poland and the Catholic Church engaged in a 
symbolic struggle for the souls of ordinary Poles. This was very evident in the preparations for 
the 1966 Millennium celebrations. The renewing o f the Jasna Gora vows in 1956 initiated a
period o f intense grass-roots-level work by the Church. The PRCC’s primary focus was on 
building an alternative discourse to the dominant Marxist-Leninist ideology and supporting 
communities in their daily struggle with social problems, such as family matters and alcoholism. 
The Great Novena continued with a replica of the Black Madonna icon setting out from 
Czestochowa and travelling through every parish in the country over a period o f more than two 
decades. The government focused on celebrating 1966 as the millennium o f Polish statehood, 
defining the character of the newly constructed political system and the communist regime. The 
PRCC, on the other hand, tried to focus on the consequences o f baptism and the historical 
importance o f Christianity as a constituent factor of Polish national identity, as a carrier of 
Poland’s unity through centuries o f foreign threat and domination, and as a symbolic 
representative o f the nation.
The Great Novena and Millennium celebrations organised by the Church were 
important milestones in regaining influence in the public sphere, still limited by the framework 
o f a secular communist state. In the face o f an obvious failure to break the impetus o f these 
Christian celebrations, the government tried to counter the PRCC’s successes by continuous 
attacks on other fronts. The 1965 letter o f Polish bishops to their German counterparts, 
affirming that ‘we forgive and ask for forgiveness’, became a pretext for the PZPR and the state 
apparatus to attack the Church’s patriotic credentials. The government accused the Church 
hierarchy o f being pro-German (i.e. pro-Nazi) and not loyal to Polish national interests (Dudek 
1995:181). Verbal and press attacks escalated in 1966-8, a further low point in church-state 
relations.
The Prague Spring (January-August 1968) revealed the real face o f the USSR’s 
dominance in Eastern Europe. Moderate attempts at reforming the Czechoslovakian 
communist state were countered by the brutal intervention o f Warsaw-pact armies. The Prague 
Spring made the Soviet Union sensitive to social tensions in satellite states and reluctant to 
initiate another intervention (i.e. in Poland), fearing deterioration in relations with the West.
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Under these circumstances, Polish communists offered the Church a temporary moratorium on 
open conflict, and PRCC-state talks resumed (Micewski 1994:50). Soviet intervention in 
Czechoslovakia caused a huge stir among Poland’s elites, particularly amongst students and 
intellectuals. The reforming potential o f the Thaw seemed exhausted, and there was widespread 
disappointment regarding the possibility o f changing the system from within.
The developments following the Prague Spring were crucial to the formation o f 
organised anti-communist opposition in Poland and a change in the status quo in church-state 
relations. A major power clash between different factions within the PZPR coincided with the 
controversy surrounding the Soviet-led intervention in Czechoslovakia. Both factors led to a 
wave o f popular unrest in Warsaw, Krakow and other big cities. A wave o f politically-inspired 
anti-Semitism swept across the country, forcing thousands o f Polish Jews into exile and others 
into hiding their origins. Under these circumstances, Polish communists urgently needed allies 
in calming social unrest. The PRCC was one such ally; Dudek and Gryz (2006) point out that 
although the Church generally opposed the political violence used by communists, it made no 
direct response to anti-Semitism and the subsequent enforced exodus of Jewish Poles. I t could 
be argued that the PRCC decided to take a more pro-government stance in order to secure 
further concessions, as had happened in the past. Yet again, as was the case during the 1956 
crisis, Church and state authorities co-operated on strategic issues to mutual benefit. The 
Church stayed clear o f the politically motivated anti-Semitic campaign unleashed by the 
authorities, and engaged in collaborative talks at a time o f popular unrest and political crisis, 
thus validating the authority o f the Party and contributing to stabilising the country’s social and 
political landscape. Conversely, it became obvious that the authorities could not control political 
crises, particularly those involving mass protests, without resorting to the Church’s assistance. 
This duopoly o f power and stability, which started in 1956, was now fully fledged, and continued 
to decide on key developments in the country in subsequent years.
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As early as May 1968, the PRCC had secured a major new influence in relation to its 
communication with clergy and the faithful. The Episcopate decided to start publishing a 
weekly, Pismo Okolne (‘The Circular’, PO), which offered a briefing on important Church events, 
shared the opinions o f Church authorities and publicised all relevant PRCC and Vatican 
documents. Communiques contained in the circular were supposed to be read out loud during 
Sunday services. The importance o f this decision lay in the particularity o f communist 
censorship. Only printed materials were subject to censorship, and so the circulars were 
typewritten and copied manually. This gave the PRCC an invaluable tool in communicating with 
its own clergy, and indeed the whole Catholic community in Poland. It also meant that the 
government implicidy allowed the Church to develop its own discourse and rhetoric without 
direct state supervision, a real breakthrough in the Soviet bloc (!Zaryn 2003:279).
Despite being a relative improvement on the Stalinist years, Gomutka’s rule was an 
unstable period in Polish Church history. The Church asserted itself as a semi-independent 
social institution with some influence over public life, but intense ideological struggles with the 
state and party apparatus continued. As important as these struggles were, what was more 
important for church-state relations was that the alliance between the PRCC and the communist 
authorities was ultimately strengthened. The authorities openly turned to the Church at times 
o f unrest, and the Church eagerly rendered its support to the authorities. In return, the Church 
continued to obtain concessions from the state for some o f its operations (including publishing 
a non-censored circular newsletter). Additionally, the Church’s strongly anti-communist and 
pro-human-rights activities were muted when an agreement with the state was at stake, as was 
the case during the Prague Spring and anti-Semitic events of March 1968. Despite ideological 
differences, the Church was ready to compromise on some o f its values and policies for the sake 
o f political gain.
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Interrupted decade — prelude to Solidarity: 1970-76
Nevertheless, it was these underlying tensions between state, Church and society which were 
revealed by rapid changes in post-1970 Poland. The economic inefficiency of Gomulka’s rule 
and accompanying drastic price increases resulted in mass protests among Gdansk workers in 
December 1970, leading to the death o f almost forty protesters and a change in the PZPR’s 
leadership.
The country’s new leader, Edward Gierek, came to power with a broad reform-and- 
change agenda. This also included a new framework for church-state relations both in internal 
and foreign policy. The most important changes were in the rhetoric used by party and state 
institutions and the official attitude towards the Church, which allowed for the greater public 
visibility o f the PRCC. The impetus towards secularising society and weakening the PRCC 
remained, however, and the state continued implementing certain anti-Church policies.
Gierek himself was born into a devoutly Catholic, working-class family, and was much 
more aware than Gomulka of the power of Polish religious belief and practice, particularly in 
the countryside. Having lived in France and Belgium, and being fluent in French, Gierek was 
also more sophisticated and cosmopolitan than Gomulka, and this influenced his choice of 
methods in dealing with the PRCC, and helped him to adopt a more secretive style o f dealing 
with the Church, involving more frequent direct talks with Church hierarchs that were not 
publicised (Rolicki 1990).
Gierek’s administration developed an ambitious plan o f economic and social 
development based on increased production and consumption, and sought a broad national 
consensus regarding necessary reforms. Official state propaganda praised the new ‘second 
Poland’ project o f a country ‘gaining strength’ and Poles ‘living better lives’ (Garton Ash 
1999:15-19). Since the new economic plans required substantial cash inflows, and because the 
West was the only available source of loans, Gierek’s project also included improving relations
141
on the other side o f the Iron Curtain. In Poland itself, the need for national unity and the 
calming of potential unrest required the party and state structures to seek allies outside the 
traditional power and control structures functioning in pre-1970 Poland. The Church’s 
increased public presence throughout the years of the Great Novena and the Millennium 
celebrations made it an ideal ally in reaching out to all social groups, strengthening the PRCC’s 
symbolic, praetorian role (Kubik 1994:127-129). The communists had concluded back in 1956 
that destroying and taking over the PRCC was not a viable strategy, and now further lessons 
from the post-Stalinist period suggested that the Church could be used as a ‘transmission belt’ 
(a group or institution communicating the official communist policy line to groups not direcdy 
affiliated with the Communist Party) in strengthening the party’s grip on society.
All o f the above-mentioned factors contributed to a complex, three-tiered pattern of 
state policy towards religion in the 1970s. In line with the new rulers’ strategy o f national unity, 
all open conflicts and public debates between the authorities and the Church were played down 
in official statements and communist media. Despite this purported armistice, however, 
concrete steps undertaken by the government in favour o f the Church were not widely 
publicised. Instead, the authorities remained overdy loyal to the communist atheist doctrine, 
and even extended the limitation of religious practice and functioning o f religious organisations, 
including the PRCC. Although policies directed against the PRCC were now more low-key and 
less confrontational, persecution o f the Church nevertheless continued. Even as the PRL’s new 
authorities tried to improve the country’s international image, emphasise the new character of 
church-state relations in their foreign policy and improve relations with the Vatican, they still 
tried to undermine the authority of the PRCC.
The first pillar o f the new state policy was mainly expressed through the public 
statements o f government and party officials. Prime Minister Piotr Jaroszewicz announced in 
December 1970 that the government ‘shall aim at a full normalisation o f relations between the 
State and Church, at the same time expecting that the Government’s efforts will meet with
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proper understanding o f clerical and lay Catholic circles’ (Piekarski 1979:69), which was the first 
statement made by a leader o f a Soviet satellite state to claim that relations between the 
communist authorities and religious groups/institutions were close to normal. Stanislaw Kania, 
a senior PZPR Central Committee member (and later Gierek’s successor) reiterated during a 
meeting with Bishop D^browski in January 1971 that the new authorities ‘sincerely want a 
compromise, because there is a conflict with the Church. It [i.e. the relationship between Church 
and state] should be good, but it is not’ (Raina 1995:47). Gierek himself spoke of co-operation 
between ‘believers and non-believers’ in his first official speech (Trybuna 1970). The PRCC 
authorities were divided over the party’s new approach. Some bishops, like Bishop Kalwa of 
Lublin, adopted a conciliatory tone. Bishop Kominek and Primate Wyszynski himself 
contended that the Church should be united with the people in their opposition to the 
communists, particularly after the bloody strikes o f December 1970, which did not lead to any 
setdement between workers and state. Ultimately, the Episcopate decided to take a moderate 
position and let the new communist leadership improve its record.
Another party-state committee for religious affairs was created in February 1971, with 
the aim o f ‘co-ordinating initiatives related to normalisation o f relations between state and 
Church’ (Dominiczak 1991:206). Primate Wyszynski met Prime Minister Jaroszewicz in March 
to discuss the concrete aspects o f this normalisation. The first results followed swiftly: in June 
1971, parliament passed a law restoring ownership o f Church lands and buildings confiscated 
in 1950. It was part o f a larger international dispute over the permanent character o f post-war 
territorial borders, particularly the western and northern territories given to Poland, and former 
Polish territories now belonging to the USSR. The state restored Church ownership o f more 
than 7,000 buildings, chapels and monasteries, as well as reinstating land the state had seized 
two decades earlier. In return, the Polish Church lobbied in the Vatican for the official 
recognition of the Oder-Neisse Line that had already been secured by a treaty between West 
Germany and Poland, signed in 1970. Although the Vatican refused to realign its diocesan
boundaries to reflect the new Polish-Soviet borders, Pope Paul VI officially announced the 
Vatican’s recognition of the Oder-Neisse Line in June 1972.
This reciprocity resulted in a number o f other concessions from the government’s side. 
Minor adjustments were made to the legislature, reducing the administrative burden on parish 
priests and granting a number o f building permits for new churches. Additionally, Gierek 
decided to scrap the police post guarding the icon o f the Black Madonna in Czestochowa, 
effectively allowing the Church to make full use o f this precious artefact. This was a significant 
decision, as it allowed the Church to reinstate its policy o f sending the icon around the country 
in a similar pattern to that followed during the Great Novena. The new peregrination of the 
icon started in 1972 from the Sandomierz diocese, and lasted throughout the 1970s. Although 
the success o f the Great Novena could not be repeated, the governmental Office for Religious 
Denominations reported in July 1973 that the icon’s passage through the Kielce region was 
accompanied by groups o f young people as well as volunteers o f the Voluntary Fire Brigades, 
and that the streets were filled with religious slogans and symbols (Zaryn 2003:302). This only 
confirmed the Church’s increased public visibility and relative freedom in pursuing certain 
elements o f its agenda. All o f the above-mentioned developments were interpreted by party and 
state stmctures as significant departures from the policies o f the Bierut and Gomulka eras, and 
as expressions o f genuine will for dialogue. The developments of early 1970s also confirmed 
that the government sought to ameliorate its relations with the Church and reach out to the 
public through the PRCC.
O n the side of the Church, however, the changes in church-state policy in the first half 
o f the 1970s were but a minor adjustment, and a small step towards normality. The PRCC saw 
the changes as being a result o f Church resilience and the concerted efforts o f its clergy and the 
faithful. And indeed, the tactical change in the regime’s movement away from an anti-religious 
policy did not mean that the state would abandon its anti-Church activity. A flagship project of 
Gierek’s administration, the socialisation o f agriculture, although it was not directly aimed at the
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Church, nevertheless undermined its social base by providing a challenge to small-size and 
subsistence farming and speeding up rural-urban migration. Upon Gierek’s coming to power, 
84% o f farmlands were privately owned; following new policies, this number dropped to 80% 
in 1975 (Rolicki 1990).
Education was the second key area where the state sought to further limit religious 
presence. A comprehensive school reform, launched in 1973 and completed in 1978, was 
modelled on the Soviet 10-class general education programme, including the introduction o f 
afternoon classes and increased socialist content in the curriculum. There were widespread 
concerns within the Church about decreased parental supervision in the new comprehensive 
schooling system, and about the difficulties in providing after-school religious instruction. 
Authorities also required teachers of religion to supply lists o f students attending religious 
classes, even though they took place outside the school premises (Piekarski 1978).
The last instance o f the party’s new offensive in church-state relations related to foreign 
affairs and the country’s international standing. First o f all, Gierek’s reliance on foreign loan 
suppliers increased the importance o f Poland’s image abroad, thus forcing the authorities to 
seek new international allies. Second, the state hoped to create a Vatican/government/PRCC 
forum and use it as a means of increasing leverage on the Polish Church. The PZPR saw the 
Vatican as an instrument to mitigate the PRCC’s political activity in Poland, in line with the 
Catholic Church’s official policy of political neutrality. The Holy See was also expected to 
influence the PRCC’s stance towards the legitimacy of the communist state. As one o f the party 
documents from the period suggested, the Vatican was expected to engage ‘in actions o f gaining 
complete loyalty o f the Church hierarchy towards the Government and respect o f the Church 
towards state interests in internal policy’ (Raina 2001:103).
Regular talks with the Vatican started in April 1971, and the establishment o f seven 
new dioceses in the Recovered Territories, resulting in the formal acceptance o f post-war border 
changes, was seen by the authorities as the first major successes o f this dialogue. In November
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1973, Pope Paul VI received the PRL’s Foreign Minister, Olszowski. However, despite the 
party’s sincere attempts at influencing the Vatican’s policy towards the PRCC and Polish 
Catholics, the Holy See refused to take any more steps towards accommodating Gierek’s 
demands. The First Secretary’s meeting with Paul VI in 1977, even though historically 
significant—as being the first meeting of a socialist state leader with the Supreme Pontiff—had 
few consequences for church-state relations in Poland.
Paradoxically, the PRCC and the Vatican turned out to be Gierek’s most desirable allies 
in the face o f the political and social crisis that gripped the country halfway through his term in 
office. In December 1975, the Party announced a series of proposals for constitutional 
amendments designed to strengthen the socialist character of the basic law and the position of 
the PZPR within the institutional order. One o f the most contentious proposals related to 
Article 57 o f the 1952 constitution, outlining the rights and obligations o f the PRL’s citizens. 
The party’s proposed version proclaimed that the ‘rights of citizens are inseparably linked with 
the thorough and conscientious fulfilling of duties to the fatherland’ (Zaryn 2003:336). This 
statement met with widespread criticism from intellectuals and artists, as well as from the 
Church hierarchy. The fact that the state rephrased the article is a clear example o f the PRCC’s 
growing political leverage, even in the years preceding the creation o f organised anti-communist 
opposition movements in Poland. The final wording o f the article was: ‘The citizens o f the 
Polish People’s Republic should honestly fulfil their duties towards the motherland and 
contribute to its development’ (Constitution 1952).
The PRCC’s new political clout had two important implications. First o f all, it proved 
that the PRCC had decided, if limited, influence over the party’s policies even in the key areas 
o f policy-making. Second, it could be understood as indicative o f the Church’s participation in 
the law-making process and, therefore, the legitimising o f the communist state. This was an 
im portant step in view o f the Church’s later co-operation with the communist authorities on 
legal changes pertaining to the PRCC’s status (see further in this chapter). Moreover, PRCC’s
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involvement in constitution-writing re-confirmed its corporatist status and enshrined the 
praetorian arrangements in communist Poland. Advising the government on legal issues was far 
from the Church’s standard practice in the public domain in Poland, and yet, in the absence of 
other actors able to defend the moderately anti-Soviet sentiment represented by many social 
groups and organisations, the PRCC acted as a political lobbyist. W hat is more, the Church yet 
again proved that it was ready and willing to enter into co-operative agreements with the 
communist authorities in order to promote its agenda. This episode o f close co-operation with 
the authorities has shown that the PRCC was, at times, capable o f transgressing its role as a 
symbolic praetorian institution and engaging in institutional praetorianism.
The ultimate test o f the PRCC’s position in the public sphere came immediately 
afterwards. Political crisis caused by constitutional reform was followed by a much more serious 
economic crisis. In June 1976, the government introduced a significant (30% on average) price 
increase for various commodities, including everyday goods and staple foods. This led to mass 
protests and strikes, forcing the communists to roll back the plan—a humiliating defeat for 
Gierek’s regime—which was a resounding echo o f the 1970 crisis they had pledged to avoid. 
Police brutality, the state’s lack o f flexibility, and the social unrest that followed the June 1976 
stand-off all brought about a major change in Polish politics and public life in general. The 
appearance o f independent, non-state organisations with political postulates, as well as 
increasing opposition to the government and the building of independent social institutions 
such as trades unions, were among the main contributory factors to the collapse o f the Polish 
communist regime just over a decade later.
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Lifting the Iron Curtain: 1976-89
The second half o f the 1970s proved to be a breakthrough for communist Eastern Europe, 
particularly for Poland. Rapid and often unforeseen changes in politics and the economy caused 
a major reshaping of public life: although still within the Soviet framework, they were a prelude 
to the revolutionary changes of the following decade. In the case of Poland’s communist regime 
and the role o f religion in Polish public life behind the Iron Curtain, the changes were 
comprehensive. First of all, the PRCC itself was evolving—both naturally, and as a result of 
political changes in the country (see below)—with the end of the Wyszynski era and a new 
relationship with the Vatican. This relationship was redrafted after the October 1978 election 
o f Karol Cardinal Wojtyla to the papal throne, an event that sent shockwaves through the Soviet 
camp. John Paul II’s enthronement was o f great significance to Poland’s fate over the next two 
decades. The Church’s external environment changed as well: in Poland, independent anti­
communist opposition groups started operating after June 1976 alongside a change in the 
country’s leadership. The Soviet Union was suffering ever more as a result o f fierce competition 
with the USA, and was not so prompt to respond to and supervise the satellite states. All of the 
above-mentioned factors contributed to the PRCC’s new role, and to the increased visibility of 
religion in Polish public life that was noticeable in the second half of the decade.
This period of the 1970s, preceding the creation of Solidarity, together with the first 
years o f trade-union activity, were crucial for further developments in Poland, both on the 
political (leading up to the Round Table and free elections in June 1989) and social levels, 
including the social standing o f the PRCC and the access to the public sphere by independent 
civil organisations. The early experiences o f both society and the Church when dealing with a 
number o f concurring social movements shaped public debate in post-1989 Poland in a number 
o f ways. In order to properly assess the new shape o f relationships between religion, society and 
the state apparatus, the reason for the post-1976 changes need to be analysed.
The first catalyst o f change emerged with the Radom and Ursus strikes. I t can be argued 
that the June 1976 protests resembled the 1956 and 1970 events in many ways. The similarities 
included short-term causes (primarily socio-economic) and the demands put forward by the 
striking workers, usually pertaining to their everyday needs and the government’s price-control 
policy. What made the 1976 strikes unique, however, was the involvement o f other social 
groups, such as students, intellectuals and artists, in defending the workers’ cause, and the long- 
lasting effects o f the increased social activity the strikes brought about.
Although today Solidarity is seen as the main opposition force that drove Polish society 
to democracy in the 1980s, there were a number of important (although smaller in size and 
scope) civic organisations that initiated the anti-communist wave. They were o f particular 
significance to church-state relations and the place of religion in public life, since many o f those 
organisations turned into political parties and movements in post-1989 Poland. It is also 
important to note the interplay between political activism, civil society and religion. Many 
notions o f what is considered ‘political’, ‘religious’ and ‘pertaining to civil society’ are profoundly 
influenced by the early years of the Solidarity movement and the PRCC’s increased involvement 
in public activity. Furthermore, the PRCC’s unrivalled status as the only independent social 
institution in communist Poland, and the relative increase in its public visibility after 1956 were 
challenged by the emergence of new social movements and events that soon unfolded.
As mentioned earlier in this chapter, Marxist-Leninist doctrine assumed the state’s total 
control o f society, advocating a merging o f all social institutions and groups that would not 
allow for a distinction between legislative, executive and judicial branches o f the state, or a 
distinction between political and civil societies. Even though religion was in many ways outside 
o f the official scheme, by abolishing all traditional divisions Polish communists allowed the 
Church to assume many roles. This was particularly visible in the developments following the 
1976 strikes.
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In September 1976, in response to the government’s crackdown on striking workers, 
fourteen intellectuals signed a public ‘Appeal to PRL’s Society and Authorities’ and established 
the ‘Workers’ Defence Committee’ (‘Komitet Obrony Robotnikow’, KOR). The Committee 
demanded the release of jailed workers and the rehiring of those fired for striking, thus revealing 
the scale o f the government’s crackdown on the strikes and their punishment o f those 
responsible for breaking the law. It is worth noting that the K OR gathered members 
representing all sides of the young Polish political underground, from nationalist right-wingers 
to socialists. The Committee expanded its membership and moved onto providing tangible 
support for workers affected by the government’s crackdown. Hiring lawyers, gathering medical 
evidence o f police brutality, providing information to foreign media and publishing their own 
periodical were among the K O R’s major achievements. Despite the government’s initial 
nervous reaction and the arrest o f key KOR activists, the Polish authorities were subdued by 
Western pressure and declared an amnesty in July 1977, freeing workers and activists involved 
in the post-June 1976 events.
The KOR’s creation and successful campaigning may have contributed to the 
spontaneous appearance o f other civil society organisations focused on civil and human rights. 
In 1977, the right-wing ‘Movement for Defense o f Human and Civic Rights’ (‘Ruch Obrony 
Praw Czlowieka i Obywatela’, ROPCiO) came to life, followed by the ‘Confederation of 
Independent Poland’ (‘Konfederacja Polski Niepodleglej’, KPN) and the ‘Young Poland 
Movement’ (‘Ruch Mlodej Polski’, RMP) in 1979. It must be noted that, although the official 
profile o f those organisations would categorise them as human-rights movements, many of their 
demands and implicit goals included changing government policy and even overthrowing the 
communist regime.
The PRCC’s reaction to the creation o f the KOR and similar groups was a significant 
indicator o f the Church’s attitude towards other seemingly like-minded, but ultimately 
independent, anti-communist organisations. Although Wyszynski and other PRCC hierarchs
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made numerous calls for the government to respect human and workers’ rights, the Church 
provided no explicit support for the KOR. Even though KOR activists, no matter how 
ideologically different from the Church, openly praised its advocacy o f human rights, the 
Episcopate never produced any public statements supporting the KOR. One can argue that the 
extreme character o f the K O R’s, ROPCiO’s and RMP’s demands, and the profiles o f their 
leadership (drawn from a variety of backgrounds, including socialists and anti-clericals) rendered 
any support impossible. It must be noted, however, that the Church’s behaviour was 
symptomatic o f an established, relatively well-situated institution that preserved the current 
order and valued stability over reform and unrest. The PRCC failed to react promptly to the 
June 1976 events, and only did so after initial reactions of other groups and individuals opposed 
the government’s actions (Zaryn 2003:379).
The initial wave of anti-communist protest, launched in 1976, received an unexpected 
boost when, in 1978, Cardinal Karol Wojtyla o f Cracow was elected to the papal throne. Taking 
the whole Soviet bloc’s establishment by surprise, the Polish Pope chose his native country as 
the destination o f his second foreign trip in June 1979. The mere idea o f the Supreme Pontiff 
visiting a Soviet bloc country seemed impossible, and yet—for a number o f reasons, not all of 
which are known even today—the Polish authorities agreed that the visit should take place. The 
visit, later referred to as the ‘second baptism o f Poland’, to underline its historical importance, 
proved to be a huge success for the Polish Church and Polish opposition. Even though the 
communist state-sponsored coverage downplayed the political significance o f the visit, the 
spontaneous reactions o f crowds and individuals during the pilgrimage far outstripped the 
response to official communist public events (see Kubik 1994). Over forty thousand volunteers 
registered to help with organising the visit. Thousands more took part in papal masses and other 
public events surrounding the visit. More importantly, the Pope’s visit symbolically transformed 
Polish society, boosted its morale and improved the PRCC’s standing in negotiations with the 
authorities. The Office for Religious Denominations announced in 1981 that the average
attendance at public religious events rose by 20-30% year on year. From October 1980, Catholic 
Masses were regularly transmitted by the state-owned Polish Radio. At the same time, the 
Catholic press enjoyed a real surge in popularity with the reactivation o f the ‘Sunday’ (Nied^ela) 
weekly, with a circulation o f over 100,000, and the introduction o f the Polish edition o f 
Osservatore Romano (Zaryn 2003:447). John Paul II’s dramatic call for The Holy Spirit to ‘descend 
and renew the face of the land, this land (John Paul II 1999:143) has proven prophetic, and has 
entered history o f Poland’s anti-communist opposition.
Despite the transformative character o f the Pope’s visit, the PRCC remained cautious 
in its attitude towards anti-communist opposition. The extent o f the Church’s leaning towards 
order and its wish to preserve a precious balance o f power in society was fully revealed during 
the crisis o f 1980 and the establishment o f the Solidarity trade union. A number o f works have 
been written about the unique nature of this social movement, trade union and, eventually, 
political entity (Garton Ash 1983; Goodwyn 1991; O st 1990; Kubik 1994; Osa 2003). I t is not 
the purpose o f this thesis to analyse the complex origins of Eastern Europe’s first independent 
trade union. However, the consequences o f Solidarity’s emergence in 1980 for Poland can be 
felt until the present day, and its relationship with the Church—both at Episcopate and local 
level—is o f profound importance to the shape o f Poland’s church-state relations and the place 
o f religion in public life. This clearly warrants closer investigation.
The Church influenced Solidarity’s creation in a number of ways. First o f all, the election 
o f John Paul II to the papal throne, his visit in Poland in June 1979 and the spirit o f increased 
freedom in public life contributed to the August 1980 accords. The accords—the foundation 
stone o f Solidarity—were also the culmination o f a violent summer of popular protest and worker 
strikes. This time the authorities conceded a massive defeat and allowed for a number o f long­
term changes in Polish politics and socio-economic life. September 1980 saw the creation (and 
legal registration) o f Eastern Europe’s first independent trade union. Furthermore, the 
authorities vowed to limit censorship, reform the economy and assist the victims o f the 1970
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and 1976 crises. Besides the spiritual guidance the Church provided to the movement, it also 
offered advice and support to its leaders in the difficult months o f the union’s creation.
Despite all the credit the Church received for its support o f Solidarity, the early response 
was muted, and the initial reactions o f the Episcopate to social unrest and the creation o f a 
mass-protest movement were far from enthusiastic (Micewski 1987). In the first months and 
years o f Solidarity’s activity, the Church was more focused on increasing its own standing, 
defending its interests and preserving the status quo than on promoting change. Back in August 
1980, when the country was on the brink o f a mass-strike, Wyszynski appealed for calm and 
responsible behaviour in the time o f unrest. The cardinal’s death in May 1981, and the 
subsequent change in the PRCC leadership, only increased the Church’s scepticism towards 
Solidarity (Passent 1988). The incumbent Cardinal Glemp was much less charismatic, more 
timid and more focused on the PRCC’s own interests. This was not a good prognosis for 
Solidarity and its agenda. Glemp’s fear o f instability, conflict and social chaos further distanced 
the Church from all opposition movements, not just Solidarity, and the institution o f martial 
law, declared by the communist authorities in December 1981, put the Episcopate’s allegiance 
to Solidarity to the test. Despite the West’s rapid condemnation o f martial law, neither the PRCC 
nor the Vatican issued any statements to this effect in the first days following the military coup.
When they did come, their reserve astonished many. The Episcopate’s fear o f Soviet 
intervention and Glemp’s inclination towards stability and social harmony, combined with 
aversion to KOR and ROPCiO as a ‘radical’ organisations, resulted in a number o f statements 
calling for the government to lift the harsh martial-law regulations, and urging Solidarity and 
other social activists to restrain themselves. Glemp condemned Solidarity leaders for their 
extreme demands, declared that the movement shared responsibility for the course o f events 
and supported the government’s claims that Solidarity had indeed planned outbreaks of 
violence, therefore implicidy justifying some o f the government’s actions (Ramet 1995:186). In 
a speech at the Catholic University o f Lublin in November 1982, Glemp enquired about the
Church’s strategy towards the government during martial law, asking rhetorically, W ould the 
Church set up some sorts o f plans, tactics and strategies? So it would enter some sort o f factional 
struggle, political game, it would become a partner, so it would have enemies? You’re expecting 
the Church to oppose its enemies and hate [them]?’ (Passent 1988). Glemp’s obsession with a 
Western plot aimed at destabilising the country and sacrificing Poland in the name o f breaking 
the Iron Curtain (Zaryn 2003:453) further contributed to the Episcopate’s reserved stance 
towards the then illegal Solidarity (it was officially delegalized through a new Trade Union Act 
o f October 1982, and fully legalised again only in April 1989).
The period between introduction o f martial law (December 1981) and delegalisation of 
Solidarity (October 1982) and first partially free elections in the Soviet bloc (June 1989) were 
characterised by a certain dichotomy in relations between the PRCC, Solidarity and the state. 
O n one hand, PRCC-state relations became closer intensified—the relations between PRCC and 
the communist government were at their most intense in the Solidarity years (Zielinski 
2003:294). O n the other hand, there was a visible tension within the Church, and a split between 
those advocating calm and reserve and those actively supporting Solidarity, and a two-tier 
approach combining support for Solidarity’s activities on one hand, and active collaboration 
with the government on the other. In 1982, a small-scale revolution shook the PRCC when a 
group o f two hundred local clergymen, angered by the Episcopate’s soft stance vis-a-vis the 
authorities, paid a visit to Cardinal Glemp to express their frustration with the state o f affairs. 
Although the Church certainly never endorsed martial law, it nevertheless co-operated with the 
authorities at every stage, therefore legitimising some o f the government’s actions. The group 
that visited the Cardinal demanded a more supportive stance o f the PRCC towards Solidarity 
and may have contributed to the PRCC hierarchy allowing for more active grass-root level 
support for the movement from then on (Ost 1990:156-60).
It would be unjust to view the Church’s relations with Solidarity through the actions of 
its hierarchy and to say that the PRCC only displayed negative attitudes towards the
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underground movement. Throughout the period o f ‘underground Solidarity’ (1982-1989), local 
PRCC structures and resources (buildings, clergymen, nuns and religious community centres) 
provided invaluable support and advice to Solidarity leaders fleeing arrest for underground 
activities during martial law until the movement’s legal re-emergence. This included providing 
shelter for activists in hiding, charitable aid and legal aid for the arrested Solidarity members and 
their families, as well as providing premises for meeting and lectures and providing increased 
pastoral ministry services to all social and professional groups that requested it (Zaryn 2003:489- 
497).
John Paul II also offered support to the Polish opposition from the very first months 
o f his papacy, and his influence on the course o f events leading up to the collapse of 
communism in Poland should not be underestimated (see above). And yet, despite the Church’s 
repeated claims o f political neutrality and their support for the opposition, a number o f 
statements and events show that the Church was equally preoccupied with securing its own 
interests and increasing its public presence through co-operating with the authorities. Following 
Cardinal Wojtyla’s election (but not only because o f it) the Polish Church’s internal situation, 
public standing and influence on internal and international politics improved in numerous ways. 
Starting with John Paul II’s visit to Poland in June 1979, the Church enjoyed unrivalled public 
attention and media coverage, including on state-controlled radio and television. All public TV 
and radio channels covered the event, including live transmissions, which was a real 
breakthrough for a secular socialist state. The PRCC’s educational activities flourished during 
martial law, and many churches turned into busy community centres supporting artists, local 
communities and Solidarity activists. Despite the overall economic crisis o f the 1980s, the PRCC 
enjoyed an unprecedented building boom, having secured an agreement with the government 
before martial law was declared. On the other hand, the communist authorities continued to 
control and limit the Church’s activities and the place o f religion in public space. The infamous 
‘battle o f the crosses’ (a controversy over the installation o f crosses near the Auschwitz
concentration camp), which brought Poland to the world’s attention in the 1990s (see Chapter 
5), started in 1982, when the communist authorities decided to enforce the communist 
legislation regarding religious symbols in public venues. A symbolic summary o f the superficial 
normality in church-state relations in early 1980s can be found in a communique of the Joint 
Commission o f the Episcopate and Government Representatives from December 1983, 
insisting that ‘church-state relations in Poland were developing properly’ (Monticone 1986:187).
Those superficially good relations started to deteriorate after John Paul II’s second visit 
in Poland, in June 1983. The communist government hoped that by allowing the Pope to visit 
it would contribute to calming down widespread frustration and dissatisfaction with martial law. 
Moreover, the Pope’s visit was linked to the 600th anniversary of the Czestochowa Black 
Madonna icon, and was supposed to focus on purely pastoral and spiritual matters. To the 
government’s surprise, the attendance rates during the 1983 visit surpassed even the 1979 
numbers, with over seven million people (almost a quarter of the total population) attending 
services and standing on the route o f the papal motorcade crossing the country. This mass 
public display o f religiosity angered the authorities, and may have contributed to a surge in anti­
clericalism visible in state policies from 1984. This was the year o f a ‘freeze’ in church-state 
relations, caused on the one hand by the murder o f father Popieluszko, a popular Warsaw priest, 
by communist security services, and on the other a new government policy on religion that 
aimed to weaken the PRCC and secularise the society. It was seen by the PUWP as a 
continuation o f the struggle against internal opposition—now that independent trades unions 
were in disarray, religion was a first class enemy. In 1985, the communist party decided to 
introduce secular ‘religious education’ in secondary schools and universities in Poland, aiming 
to teach about models of church-state relations and criticise the Catholic Church (Zaryn 
2003:538). The government redoubled its efforts to remove crosses from schools across the 
country, a policy that was deeply unpopular with pupils and teachers alike, and led to numerous 
local-level rebellions and trials (Dudek and Gryz 2006:407-410). This was complemented by an
increased infiltration o f the Catholic clergy by communist security services, with up to 15% of 
clergymen registered as secret informants by 1986 (Grajewski 1999:214).
John Paul IPs third visit to Poland, in 1987, had been the subject o f intense negotiations 
between the PRCC, the government and the Holy See since 1985, and was, in the eyes o f the 
communists, meant to calm social unrest and dissatisfaction with the rapidly deteriorating 
economic situation. Yet again, it brought a surge of public displays o f religiosity and further 
diminished the communist government’s grip on society, paving the way towards the Round 
Table meeting and the later collapse o f communist rule (see below).
All o f the above-mentioned political and social developments, initiated in 1976 and 
growing through the 1980s, led to a substantial re-positioning o f the Church and religion in 
Poland’s public life. With the emergence o f Solidarity, the PRCC lost its exclusive status as the 
only independent, non-state organisation in the PRL, but gained new attributes that can be 
characterised as ‘participating without belonging’ to political society. The curious nature of 
Polish opposition movements in the 1980s has been characterised by O st as ‘the politics o f anti­
politics’ (Ost 1990). All Solidarity leaders, like their colleagues from earlier formations such as 
the KOR and the ROPCiO, vehemently denied involvement in politics and presented 
themselves as defenders o f human rights, as trade union officials or as social activists (Ost 1991). 
The Church often condemned the political engagement o f its clergymen, and yet remained a 
very active participant in public and political life. It could be argued that in view o f the difficult 
conditions under which the PRCC had to operate during the last years o f communist rule, 
accusations o f politicisation and self-interest are unjustified. On the other hand, the Church’s 
behaviour throughout the Solidarity years, particularly in the second half o f the 1980s, 
demonstrated that it had a vibrant interest in all things political, notably in securing its own 
institutional status.
The PRCC’s new attitude towards the state was cemented during the key political 
processes leading to democratic change in communist Poland. In 1988, the politically bankrupt
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PZPR engaged in regular talks with the opposition about possible reforms. The PRCC 
Episcopate was part o f the process, and assisted the re-legalisation o f Solidarity after another 
wave of worker strikes came to an end in late 1988. Lech Walesa and the Minister o f Internal 
Affairs, General Czeslaw Kiszczak, agreed that a series o f structured, regular consultations 
would take place between the Party and Solidarity in order to discuss democratic reforms of the 
state. The Round Table talks brought together many important opposition and Party figures, 
and were facilitated by the Church. The talks began in February 1989 and lasted until April 1989. 
They comprised three work groups, focused on political reform, party and union pluralism and 
economic and social issues. The main outcomes of the Round Table talks included the 
reinstatement of the upper chamber of the Parliament and the presidential office and the 
granting of party and union pluralism, amongst a plethora o f other pro-democratic changes. As 
a result, the first partly free democratic elections in the Soviet bloc took place on June 4 1989.
The Church’s role in reinstating Solidarity and facilitating the Round Table talks showed 
the PRCC’s ability to manoeuvre between government and opposition and secure a pivotal role 
in the transformation process. This policy was rewarded by both sides. Solidarity’s gratitude was 
most vigorously expressed in the post-1989 period (analysed in Chapter 4); the communist 
authorities, aware of their own demise, were much more prom pt in their reactions. In May 1989 
the last communist Sejm passed three laws regulating the PRCC’s legal status and religious 
freedoms and the social and economic rights of the clergy. This was a genuine breakthrough in 
a country where, according to official state ideology, religion was still restricted to private life, 
and where many minority religious denominations were regularly denied their basic rights.
Conclusion
This chapter has outlined the role o f religion and the Catholic Church in Poland’s history with
reference to its influence on national identity, the public presence o f religion and relations
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between state, society and religion. Although Poland is now seen as a homogenous Catholic 
country, its history confirms that religious diversity prevailed in Poland over centuries. The 
merging o f national and religious identity, although present in earlier periods o f Polish history, 
was reinforced only through foreign domination in the 19th and 20th centuries. A brief period of 
Polish independence between 1918 and 1939, along with relative democratisation and freedom 
of religion during this period, resulted in the rapid growth o f anti-clerical and secular forces. 
The political and social landscape was once again reshuffled in the aftermath o f World War II, 
putting religion on the defensive. Over four decades of communist rule meant a time o f forced 
secularisation of public space, but the Church managed to retain some independence, and 
individual religiosity remained strong (ISKK 2012).
Despite the communists’ initial anti-religious zeal, the PRCC managed to secure the 
bulk o f its material and symbolic presence in the PRL. What is more, individual religiosity 
remained strong throughout the communist period. After the violence of the Stalinist years and 
persecution o f clergy, the Episcopate and religion returned to everyday reality for most Poles. 
Although many important areas o f social activity previously accessible to religious institutions, 
such as education, health care and charitable work, had been confined to state institutions, the 
PRCC remained strong and independent, a voice o f relative opposition to communism and an 
important focus o f non-state activity and thought. The gradual lifting of anti-religious legislation 
and activity post-1956 allowed the Church to slowly reclaim a part o f the public sphere and 
work out a modus vivendi in relations with the state. The Church’s resources and opportunities 
for action were limited, but its motivation to act in the public arena remained visible, as was its 
ability to be an efficient political operator, able regularly to co-operate with the government on 
a number o f issues.
Notably, throughout the later years o f communist rule (from the 1960s onwards), the 
PRCC became a carrier of public opinion and channelled the views of part of society to the 
communist authorities-a situation Huntington (1968) refers to as praetorianism. In  the absence
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of other significant non-state institutions, the Church often presented itself as the symbolic 
representative o f the nation and addressed the government in highly relevant cases, such as the 
Millennium celebrations and workers’ rights.
PRCC had the will and resources necessary to engage in co-operation with the 
government before any other non-state groups, such as KOR, ROPCiO and finally Solidarity, 
emerged.
Widespread claims o f fierce PRCC anti-communism, and an unwavering opposition to 
the regime expressed by the Episcopate and clergy presented in post-communist Poland (see 
Chapter 4), do not look credible when assessed in the light o f the PRCC’s behaviour in the last 
decades of communist rule, particularly in the 1980s. Although the PRCC often defended 
human rights and stood up for the oppressed, whatever their background, its policy was largely 
based on defending its own institutional interests and privileges. The first reactions of the PRCC 
to the emergence o f Solidarity confirm that its later support for the group was more of a tactical 
than strategic choice. Following from brief episodes o f institutional praetorianism at the end of 
the 1970s (constitutional affairs and stabilising social unrest on the eve of martial law), the PRCC 
showed itself willing to enter into the sphere o f institutional praetorianism throughout the 1980s 
(and then the early 1990s; see Chapter 4), including assuming a formal mediatory role between 
government and opposition in Round Table talks. What is more, the Church actively tried to 
expand its public presence at the expense o f other groups in the lead-up to democratic change. 
Merely a year before the first democratic elections in the Soviet bloc, the Polish Episcopate 
contended that a measure o f the PRL’s democratisation is the authorities’ consent to ‘establish 
a broad social Catholic movement under the Episcopate’s auspices and (...) [provide an] opening 
to private initiative through a relevant constitutional clause’ (Monticone 1986:99). Although 
officially still denouncing the communist regime, the PRCC rushed to secure its legal status 
ahead o f other religious and civil society organisations in May 1989, without any regard for 
minority religious groups. A t the same time, the PRCC was very vocal about its devotion to
democracy and human rights and its desire to co-operate with other actors within the polity in 
order to reform the communist system. Strengthened by its successes, conceived on Polish 
communism’s deathbed, and enjoying a great deal o f authority among Poles, the PRCC marched 
on to new victories in the new democratic reality. The legacy o f communist era was highly 
significant in the first years o f democratic transformation (1989-1993), and consequendy in 
setting the overall tone o f religious republicisation and relationships between religion and public 
life in post-communist Poland. The next chapter will focus on those developments.
161
Chapter 4: Religion and Democratic Transformation: 1989-1993
Indeedwarriors and spectators alike seem to agree that the main ideological battle taking place today in Poland 
after the defeat of socialism is that between Catholicism and liberalism.
(Casanova 1994:109)
In Chapter 3 1 analysed the historical role o f religion in Poland and the place o f religion in public 
life over the centuries, arguing that it played a crucial role in the development o f the Polish state 
and national identity. Furthermore, I contended that in post-war Poland, despite the PRCC’s 
opposition to communist policies and its own co-operation with opposition movements 
(notably the Solidarity trade union), the Church was increasingly focused on securing its own 
interests, and indeed, gradually increased its presence in public life during the last decades of 
communist rule.
In this chapter I will assess the impact of the fall o f the communist regime in 1989 and 
the early years o f Polish democracy (1989-1993) on the role o f religion in public life in Poland. 
This will be done through an analysis o f public statements and policies pursued by politicians 
and political parties, churches, religious groups and institutions. The central argument of this 
chapter is that because of the collapse o f state and social institutions, a split in the anti­
communist opposition and the limited reach o f civil society in the first years of democratic 
reforms (1989-1993), the PRCC’s policies and leadership allowed it to further assert itself in the 
public realm and occupy a central place in a number of decision-making processes essential to 
the character o f the new state. Secular groups, as well as non-Catholic religions, were gradually 
pushed to the margins o f public debate. The Church’s ability to manoeuvre between civil society 
and the political landscape inherited from previous regime contributed to its monopolisation of 
public life and high levels o f religious republicisation. W hat is more, the Church’s ambiguous 
attitude towards democracy, and the state’s neutrality in religious matters, complicated
democratic transformation and impeded the development of a functional liberal democratic 
polity.
The idea that the initial transformation period, between 1989 and 1993, was crucial to 
the political and social development in Poland for years to come and led to the unwaveringly 
high public presence o f religion in the face o f ever-changing individual religiosity and 
widespread opposition to the Church’s involvement in politics, is the subject o f the next chapter.
The fall o f the communist regime in Poland
The June 1989 elections in Poland were a breakthrough for the whole Soviet bloc. For the first 
time since 1945, the communist party agreed to share power with the opposition, and opposition 
candidates were allowed to run for a share of parliamentary seats. The Round Table Agreement 
gave Solidarity a chance to compete for a third o f seats in the parliament’s lower chamber and 
all o f the re-established upper chamber seats; in the end, they won a landslide victory, seizing all 
o f the seats available. A permanent overthrow of the communist regime, which had seemed 
impossible only a few years earlier, became a reality. The 1989 events in Poland took most 
national and international political actors by surprise—including main stakeholders such as 
Western European and US governments, the Soviet Union, Polish communists, the opposition 
(notably, Solidarity) and the Vatican. All o f them had to adjust to the new reality and develop 
new policies to face the situation. This was essential, as Poland was about to face a major socio­
political change towards liberal democracy, and needed external support to implement necessary 
reforms.
The collapse o f communism had a profound effect on all aspects o f social life, including 
the place of religion in public life. The wave o f democratic reforms and changes that followed 
the collapse was all-encompassing, but some o f these changes had a particularly im portant
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influence on religion, society and public life. First o f all, Poland was transforming from a 
totalitarian communist dictatorship into a democratic state. All political institutions o f the state 
were to be reformed. The political life of the country turned into a pluralist and—at least 
theoretically—ideologically neutral space. On an individual level, the new social order allowed 
for a differentiation of world views. People could, at last, believe what they liked, without fear 
o f state retribution. Civil society was allowed to emerge as a new force, fostering the 
empowerment o f individuals and ushering in a new quality of the political system: it would now 
function independently from state structures. An absolute ideology was replaced with a 
democratic electoral system and a culture of bargaining and negotiation. Poland left the vacuum 
of Soviet isolation to embrace globalisation; as a result, local issues quickly became global, and 
an eastern perspective was swiftly replaced by an aspiration to join the W est’.
Democratic reforms were most noticeable after the June 1989 elections, rapidly 
influencing the political and institutional spheres. Social changes, although equally important, 
were slower and initially less obvious. One of the most relevant changes on this level pertained 
to the new understanding o f nation and society. Even though communism officially refrained 
from nationalist rhetoric and policies, Polish communists nevertheless based their popularity on 
nationalist sentiments. In the post-1989 reality, Poland had to redefine that national identity. 
Embracing democracy equalled moving away from being an ethnic nation to being a political, 
civic nation. In  politics and the public sphere this also meant departing from this romantic and 
historical vision (often perpetrated by the Church) and accepting an identity as a liberal society. 
This process had profound consequences for developments in the field of religion and public 
life. A historical and romantic vision of the Polish nation assumed that regaining independence 
was the ultimate goal o f all political activity (Kowalczykowa 1991). This meant not only 
exercising sovereignty over Poland as a state, but also performing a moral transformation of 
society. But in a liberal society, independence is not a goal in itself; rather, it can be seen as a 
tool to achieve other aims, such as democratic norms, the rule o f law and modernisation. This
last notion was at the forefront o f most relevant debates in Poland’s newly democratised public 
sphere (see below for an outline o f the PRCC’s post-1989 policies).
Although overwhelmingly positive for most social actors (including religious 
organisations and most social groups), democratic reforms came at a price. All of the above- 
mentioned changes and processes occurred and intensified over a short period o f time, 
contributing to increased social tensions and conflicts. Most o f the old institutions and 
organisations either left the stage (the PZPR) or had to redefine themselves (Solidarity), and 
new social forces emerged (political parties, NGO s, religious groups). Tensions and conflicts 
built up in the religious sphere of Poland’s social life, both in its private and public dimensions.
Religion and the Church in the new reality
The fall o f communism therefore caused a major change in the position o f religion and religious 
organisations in Polish public life. As I explained in the previous chapter, religion was legally 
banned from pre-1989 politics, and religious organisations were largely persecuted and 
discriminated against. The existence o f minority religions and groups in the People’s Republic 
of Poland was limited on at least two levels: religious freedom and the degree o f minority rights. 
Communist authorities rejected the notion of the public visibility o f religion and restricted it to 
the private sphere, thereby handicapping the activities of religious communities—particularly 
small ones that relied on closely knit community relations for their existence. In  addition, the 
communist authorities often pursued nationalist and xenophobic policies that further 
discriminated against minority groups. The Kielce Pogrom of 1946 (resulting in the mass exodus 
o f Polish Jews), Operation Vistula (which forced the re-setdement o f ethnic Ukrainians—mosdy 
Orthodox and Greek Catholics—in southeast Poland in 1947) and the persecution o f Jehovah’s 
Witnesses in 1950, are but a few examples o f the persecution o f minority religions and
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communities in communist Poland, which left them small and weak both in terms o f numbers 
as well as organised representation (Dirksen 2002). This contributed to the PRCC’s inexperience 
in dealing with multiculturalism and the differentiation o f world views which would be a major 
part o f the new reality. In the new democratic system, one o f the main challenges facing the 
Church was adjusting to religious pluralism and embracing the nascent civil society that allowed 
different social movements, previously suppressed by communist governments, to emerge in 
public life. The historical experiences of Polish Catholicism, especially those of the communist 
period, did not adequately prepare the PRCC for such a change.
As mentioned in the previous chapter, the PRCC under communism was greatly 
influenced by its leader and Primate o f Poland between 1953 and 1981, Cardinal Stefan 
Wyszynski. His vision o f Catholicism was based on a historical conception of the Polish nation, 
stemming from the 19th-century romantic notion of heroic Polish Catholicism fighting against 
hostile external forces. In this vision, Catholicism became a principal identity marker under a 
foreign-imposed, communist rule (Zubrzycki 1997:43). During the Great Novena in the 1950s 
and 1960s, a new and alternative discourse created by the Catholic Church made Catholic ritual 
a central expression of freedom, without much regard for non-believers and other faith 
traditions.
The Church’s inability to interact or co-operate with minority religions and groups was 
linked to its ambiguous stance towards civil society in general. Although civil society in its liberal 
form only started functioning in post-1989 Poland, the roots o f the PRCC’s attitude towards it 
w ent back a few decades further. As the previous chapter has illustrated, although the PRCC 
supported opposition politics and voiced its dissent from the communist government’s policies, 
it typically co-operated with the regime each time that it might secure the Church’s privileges 
and institutional interests, even at the expense o f other groups. In the 1980s, the PRCC’s unique 
position as a partner o f both Solidarity and the government facilitated political negotiations, and 
enabled it to act as a creative force driving civil society and the new democratic regime. This
position was reinforced by the fact that in the face of a complete collapse of the ruling party 
and an almost complete reshuffle of parliamentary and governmental structures, the Church’s 
leadership remained unchanged throughout 1989 and well into the new democratic reality, and 
the PRCC was the only institution relatively unaffected by the rapid change.
For all this, the PRCC was both inexperienced and unprepared for interaction with 
minority religions and groups; nevertheless, the inability to communicate and co-operate with 
external bodies was not the only challenge the Church faced. After years o f consolidating 
opposition forces and acting as the sole voice o f independent society, the Church was exposed 
to very little criticism. This was due to a number o f reasons. First of all, the Polish Church had 
always been a highly clericalised institution, and laymen (including members o f the general 
public) played a minor role in its policy and decision-making. Second, at the time o f communist 
rule there were no other independent social organisations that could challenge the PRCC’s 
actions. This gave the Church hierarchy a virtual monopoly on non-state discourse. Third, the 
Church had, and has, a conservative, elitist and authoritarian structure, and decades o f 
paternalistic, aggressive rhetoric—directed mostly against the state, but also against opposition 
and other organisations—resulted in a complete lack o f flexibility and adaptability to the new 
social landscape. Finally, the post-communist legacy o f the PRCC made it difficult to adjust to 
the new reality, as the developments o f the 1989-1993 period will clearly show.
Religion and democratic elections: 1989-1993
The first four years o f Poland’s democratic transformation were rich in political events—first and 
foremost, a series o f parliamentary, local and presidential elections that led to a major exchange 
of political elites. After the first partly democratic election in June 1989, four more popular votes 
took place within a period o f only four years. In May 1990, the first democratic local-
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government elections took place across the country. In November 1990, Poles chose their first 
democratically elected president. As early as 1991, the participants in the first semi-democratic 
Sejm decided to dissolve this body and call for fully free elections, which took place in October 
1991. The first term o f Poland’s democratic parliament was also interrupted by a political crisis 
and another early vote in September 1993. All of the above events obviously occurred within a 
short period o f time, which would be unusual and challenging even for a developed democracy. 
But Poland was at a very early stage of reforming its political institutions, and these frequent 
changes in the political landscape brought about instability, and had profound consequences for 
Poland’s later political life.
A t the time, though, the lack of strong political institutions and relevant democratic 
procedures, combined with the weakness o f civil society organisations, facilitated the Church’s 
involvement in mainstream politics in the immediate post-1989 transformation period. As 
described in Chapter 3 (and earlier in this chapter), the historical legacy o f the communist period, 
notably the suppression o f the PRCC’s public profile, made the Church eager to enter the 
political arena during the first pre-election campaign in early 1989.
The June 1989 elections were exceptional in many ways. The two main contenders were 
the PZPR and the Solidarity opposition. The elections were seen as more than a simple vote, 
but rather as a referendum on the communist regime and a symbolic expression o f disapproval 
for the current system. Considering the close links between the Church and Solidarity in the 
communist period, the PRCC’s involvement in the elections was expected, and was initially 
judged in moral, not political terms: the PRCC was seen as a mentor o f the Solidarity movement, 
and thus entitled to ‘help’. The sudden appearance of the PRCC as a political force, however, 
surprised even those usually sympathetic to the Church’s involvement in public life (Zielinska 
2008). A third o f all running candidates (mostly from the Solidarity list) declared some sort o f 
allegiance to the Church and affiliation with its institutions (Walesa 1990:142), and it turned out 
that they could count on very concrete support in return. I t was soon deemed normal by top-
level politicians to involve and consult with the PRCC leadership on matters o f government 
policy. In May 1989, Primate Glemp hosted a meeting for Solidarity’s leadership, including Lech 
Walesa (the future first democratically elected president o f Poland), Tadeusz Mazowiecki (the 
future first democratic prime-minister) and Andrzej Stelmachowski (the future first speaker of 
the Senate), amongst others. During the meeting, the Primate was briefed on the imminent 
elections and challenges lying ahead for Solidarity; he presented his comments on the nature of 
democratic politics and mentioned issues relevant to the PRCC’s agenda (Prymas 1989).
A t the same time, most parishes turned into local electoral headquarters o f Solidarity. 
Clergy actively participated in selecting opposition candidates, and assisted them in running their 
campaigns by giving material support and advice. This is particularly important in view o f the 
fact that Solidarity candidates had already started displaying vital ideological differences among 
themselves—a feature the PRCC used to pursue its own agenda, notably to increase its leverage 
on the political process. Some individuals representing more radical opposition organisations, 
such as the KPN and Fighting Solidarity (‘Solidarnosc Walcz^ca’, SW), which did not enjoy a 
good relationship with the Church, were not added to the list. In the city o f Radom in central 
Poland, for instance, Jan Jozef Lipski, a hero of the democratic opposition and a devoted 
socialist, had to compete in the run-off to the Senate with a right-wing candidate supported by 
the local bishop. In many other cities and regions, local Solidarity candidates had to face ‘friendly 
fire’ from representatives o f small, Christian-democratic organisations and groups that did not 
belong to the mainstream of pre-1989 opposition, but which were supported by the Church 
(Gawin 1999:53).
On the other hand, many Christian-democratic and nationalist opposition figures 
protested against the inclusion of more liberal and left-leaning candidates, believing they were 
not deserving o f equal representation on Solidarity’s list. This was a reflection o f old disputes 
within the Solidarity movement, for the most part silenced during the anti-communist struggle.
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The main debate related to the very character of Solidarity as a trade union, a political 
movement, a moral force and a coalition of ideologically distant groups and individuals. By 
reaching out to the majority o f Polish society, and with a membership base o f over ten million 
during its peak popularity period, common ground for Solidarity membership was rather slight— 
its basic elements being opposition to communism, on whatever grounds, and a will to achieve 
an independent, democratic state. Perhaps as a consequence, the post-communist reality was 
not widely debated before the transformation, and so Solidarity was ill-equipped to pursue 
independent policies. The main bone o f contention was whether it was to remain a broadly 
social movement, go back to its trade union roots or transform into a political party. This debate 
continued throughout the 1990s, and eventually led to the disintegration of the Solidarity 
movement into an array of political groups and organisations (see Dabertowa 2005).
W hat concerns us most, however, is the second big debate, relating to the PRCC’s 
relationship with Solidarity. The Church was perceived as one of the main institutional backers 
o f the movement in the pre-1989 reality. N ow  that Solidarity was deciding on its own future 
and was able to operate freely in a democratic society, the PRCC had to re-evaluate its policy. 
O n the one hand, some forces within Solidarity were strongly supportive of the Church 
(although some opposed it very firmly, and the movement itself consisted o f Catholics, 
members o f other faith communities and atheists). O n the other hand, the PRCC never decided 
whether it was a part o f the movement, its supporter or its mentor, or even whether it was an 
arbiter in communications with the communist government. This made its role in the post­
communist environment in relation to Solidarity a challenging task, as it often had to face stark 
choices in its relationship with the movement.
This was a watershed moment for the PRCC, as it now entered the new democratic 
reality as a political force, a civil society actor and a religious movement. As the emerging 
environment led to the pluralisation o f political forces and the creation of new political 
movements not aligned with the old ‘communists vs. Solidarity’ divide, the Church had to decide
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whether it would give up its role as Solidarity’s sponsor or as a political actor in general. As the 
Church’s statements and actions in the preceding months had shown, it was not willing to give 
up its unique (strong) status for the sake o f fostering Poland’s transition to a liberal democracy.
As the Church chose a policy o f active involvement in party and government politics, 
its influence on candidate lists and its support for particular groups and individuals went beyond 
working alongside the candidates and parties themselves. Many local priests mobilised their 
parishioners to participate in elections, and instructed them on how to vote and whom to 
support. Cases o f direct support for particular candidates and groups, typically rendered by the 
local provost during a Sunday Mass, were not unheard of. Interestingly enough, direct pre- 
electoral support was promoted mainly in this way: i.e. by local provosts, at parish level, and not 
by the Episcopate itself. As it had been in communist times, the Episcopate remained the voice 
of restraint and reason. This meant that, even though there had historically been significant 
differences between local parish politics and the Episcopate, the gap had actually widened in 
the post-1989 reality. As described above, local clergy actively supported Solidarity politicians 
and got involved in pre-electoral agitation, but the national Church authorities seemed surprised 
with this development: Primate Glemp himself admitted that he did not ‘recognise’ his priests, 
and did not ‘know what got into them’ (Czywczyk and Smigielska 1990:148). These differences 
would be similarly marked in subsequent elections, in 1990-1993 (see below).
Establishing the extent of the PRCC’s reach in the 1989 elections is almost impossible, 
but it is important to mention that even the PZPR Politburo was astonished at the level o f 
support showered upon Solidarity by the Church (at the local level), and blamed the latter for 
its defeat: ‘it turned out that parishes have overwhelmingly joined the campaign in supporting 
opposition candidates. Participation of parishes not only provided an organisational 
infrastructure for opposition (...) but was of great influence on the voters’ opinions and attitudes’ 
(Perzkowski 1994:449).
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Solidarity’s sweeping victory in 1989—winning all 35% of the available Sejm seats (the 
remaining 65% were reserved for PZPR candidates) and 99 o f the Senate seats—presented the 
PRCC with new leverage within the political establishment, an opportunity the Church was 
eager to seize.
The local government elections in May that year reaffirmed the Church’s involvement 
in politics at all levels. Once again, Solidarity candidates had to stand against each other, with 
liberal and independent candidates opposing the groups officially sponsored by the Church. An 
example from Lodz, the second-largest Polish city and an important industrial hub, illustrates 
the importance of the PRCC’s support. The Regional Civic Committee (‘Wojewodzki Komitet 
Obywatelski’) faced the Church-supported Lodz Civic Agreement (‘Lodzkie Porozumienie 
Obywatelskie’), with the latter winning an overwhelming majority o f 62.5% of the votes 
(Kowalski 1990:77). The local elections were also the first time when the PRCC started referring 
to the candidates’ personal religious convictions as a decisive factor in choosing the right one, 
which was to be a common occurrence in the years to come. In an early May issue of Pismo 
Okolne (‘The Circular’, PO), the Episcopate called on the faithful to make sure that ‘people 
elected to public and political service would bear witness to human and evangelic values. (...) 
One should not think that the attitude o f religious neutrality (...) cannot be considered. (...) Only 
people with a strong conscience can serve the community well’ (PO 30.04.-06.05. 1990).
The first parliamentary and local government elections were a prelude to a major 
stmggle surrounding the upcoming presidential election that ultimately involved the Church. 
According to the 1989 Round Table Agreement, the communists had the right to elect their 
‘own’ president, and in July 1989 General Wojciech Jaruzelski was duly elected by parliament. 
Although he was initially chosen for a five-year term, after the first democratic reforms were 
implemented the social pressure for his resignation mounted very fast. His rival, Walesa, who 
was the leader o f parliamentary opposition and of the Solidarity trade union, entrusted Jaroslaw 
Kaczynski (who became Poland’s prime minister in 2006—see next chapter) with the task of
forming a new government. The biggest controversy related to the possibility o f a coalition 
between Solidarity and the communists. Solidarity’s shortlist o f candidates for the prime 
minister’s office included Bronislaw Geremek, a left-leaning intellectual and oppositionist, and 
Tadeusz Mazowiecki, a fellow Solidarity figure with a strong liberal Catholic profile. In a 1991 
interview, Kaczynski contended that the final choice was only made in favour of Mazowiecki 
due to the Church’s support: ‘I t was also known, that Mazowiecki will be liked by the Church 
and it played a certain role. In Walesa’s eyes it was a serious trump. (...) Geremek would be less 
welcome by the Church’ (Odwrotna 1991:46). On August 17 1989, Walesa met with Primate 
Glemp to discuss the election o f a new prime-minister, and only four days later Mazowiecki was 
installed with a coalition government involving both communist and Solidarity politicians.
This was a good example o f clientelist behaviour expressed through the mobilisation of 
a religious group, corresponding to Casanova’s typology o f behaviour o f religious organisations 
in a deprivatised environment (Casanova 1994:218; see also Chapter 1). The Church’s 
preference for Mazowiecki was an important consideration for Walesa, who knew that by 
choosing the PRCC’s preferred candidate he could in turn count on the Church’s support in 
this difficult time.
After what had been a period o f (purported) unity in the Solidarity camp, and following 
intense negotiations with the communist government members, Mazowiecki fell out with 
Walesa, who favoured fast tracking economic and social reforms and a more radical approach 
to dealing with the weakening communists. This was a major division in the Solidarity camp. 
With Walesa and Mazowiecki both having close links to the Church, however, the Episcopate 
prompdy offered help with mediating the conflict. This scenario resembled the procedures that 
had been in place in communist Poland, with the PRCC negotiating between government and 
opposition; the only difference was that now Poland was a new-born democracy, and the 
conflicting parties were central to government politics. And so, despite a regime change, and
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even an ideology and system change, the PRCC’s role in the political life of the country remained 
unchallenged.
Between February and July 1990, bishops Alojzy Orszulik, Tadeusz Goclowski and 
Bronislaw D^browski hosted a series of meetings with Walesa and Mazowiecki, trying to 
mitigate the conflict and prevent deepening the rift between Solidarity factions. The potential 
split o f the opposition camp into two opposing groups was not the only issue at stake. With the 
growing dissatisfaction o f society with the Round-Table Agreement, and more radical demands 
for the communists’ total withdrawal from political life, new presidential elections were on the 
horizon. Both Walesa and Mazowiecki considered running in the elections. Mazowiecki initially 
enjoyed the PRCC’s support, and some o f his allies sought to use his influence on the Church 
to convince Walesa, a declared Catholic, not to compete in the upcoming presidential race. 
Meetings between PRCC officials, Vatican diplomats and government and opposition figures 
were frequent and open. Nobody tried to hide the fact that current political issues were at the 
heart o f those meetings. N o other faith communities or civil society organisations had the 
opportunity to influence the government on such a scale.
Following the developments o f early 1990, then, we can conclude that Church forces 
tried to play the conflicting sides against each other to achieve maximum leverage on state 
structures and politicians. This confirmed the Church’s willingness to maintain its exclusive 
status as not only a civil society actor or a religious movement, but as a key political participant. 
It also further confirmed that both the Church and political figures, particularly those linked to 
Solidarity, decided to stick with their pre-1989 behavioural patterns. This path o f mutual 
dependence meant that, despite a changing political reality, religious and political actors 
conspired and secretly co-operated as if under conditions o f oppression and discrimination, as 
they had before 1989.
With pressure mounting on Jaruzelski, and the governmental crisis deepening, the 
Church-government meetings became a regular feature o f Poland’s political life. In mid-June
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1990, Walesa met Cardinal Agostino Casaroli, the Vatican’s Secretary o f State; the meeting was 
a source o f numerous media leaks about a supposed message from the Pope that the Cardinal 
handed to Walesa as a sign of John Paul II’s growing frustration with the political impasse. Only 
two weeks afterwards, the so-called ‘lettergate’ broke. This time, Mazowiecki was the centre o f 
attention after his office announced that he had indeed received a letter from the Pope. The 
way the press release was edited suggested that the Pope was voicing his support for Mazowiecki 
in the conflict with Walesa. I t transpired, however, that it was just a courtesy letter, and Walesa 
received a very similar document (Kurski 2008:92).
Yet, although it seems that the Vatican’s supposed meddling in Polish politics was very 
much an issue o f misinterpretation, the Holy See was careful not to denounce the use of its 
correspondence for political means, and this contributed to the impression that the Church was 
a key political player in the run-up to the presidential election. This impression was reaffirmed 
when John Paul II hosted Walesa at a private audience in August 1990; the latter contended 
that the Supreme Pontiff was interested in the aims o f his political campaign, and that he 
‘defused [Walesa’s] doubts and complexes’ (Walesa 1990:213). The PRCC’s national structures 
complemented the Vatican’s policy: the PRCC hosted frequent (separate) meetings for Walesa, 
Mazowiecki and other politicians over July, August and September 1990—that is, during the peak 
o f the governmental crisis. The animosity between Walesa and Mazowiecki now ran deep: in 
early August, Walesa employed Mazowiecki’s key adversary, Andrzej Micewski, as the head o f 
his advisory team. Micewski was a conservative Catholic journalist who had been in a state o f 
open conflict with Mazowiecki over his liberal convictions, since both had been active in the 
PAX movement in the 1950s.
During one o f the Church-facilitated meetings, on September 18 1990, President 
Jaruzelski announced that he would bow to social pressure and voluntarily give up his office. 
This announcement was first made public after the meeting, hosted by Primate Glemp, and the 
following day Jaruzelski formally confirmed his resignation (Odwrotna 1991:132).
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Characteristically, Walesa, conscious o f the negative attitude towards his candidacy within the 
Episcopate, announced his formal intention to run for president on the eve of the September 
18 meeting. Once Jaruzelski had resigned and the new presidential elections had been 
announced for late November, the PRCC capitalised on its political leverage and got involved 
at the very centre o f the campaign.
In the early stages, only two contenders attracted significant popular support: Walesa 
and Mazowiecki. Even though only a few weeks earlier Walesa had been an unwelcome 
candidate, once he was opposed by the liberal Mazowiecki the PRCC’s preference changed in 
favour o f the Solidarity leader. Walesa was known for his admiration o f the Pope, his belief in 
traditional values and a more nationally centred vision of the state. Although officially the 
Church remained neutral, the split between central authorities and local clergy, so visible during 
the 1989 parliamentary campaign, was resurfacing. Many local parishes acted as electoral 
headquarters for Walesa’s staff, and priests called upon their parishioners to support Walesa 
(Gowin 1999:28-30). And long before Mazowiecki joined the presidential race, he was an object 
o f a smear campaign in the right-wing press and other media (possibly motivated by the 
Church), suggesting that he was actually Jewish and that he hid his ‘true’ identity. Once 
Mazowiecki started his campaign, the attacks intensified. His opponents suggested that his 
Jewish origins made him ineligible to run the country.
The rumours were reminiscent o f the worst traditions o f Polish pre-war anti-Semitism 
that had been spread by Endecja (the national-democratic movement) and extremist circles 
within the Church itself. The Polish Church, having a long track record o f anti-Semitism, was 
still haunted by this legacy. Many local priests, and some members o f the Episcopate, quiedy 
agreed with the allegations against Mazowiecki and preferred not to touch upon this issue any 
further. The Episcopal authorities, however, decided to issue a prom pt rebuttal o f the anti- 
Semitic campaign. The Deputy Secretary o f the Episcopate said in an interview for Tygodnik 
Vom^echny that ‘using (...) anti-Semitism for the sake of the electoral campaign is regrettable and
should be condemned’ (Gebert 1991:260). This was a rare occurrence o f a prom pt and direct 
rebuttal o f anti-Semitic actions arising from within the PRCC’s lower ranks. Numerous further 
examples o f anti-Semitic behaviour, including the case o f Radio Maryja (see below), show that 
this was not a symptom of a major policy change o f the PRCC towards anti-Semitism, however.
In addition to the anti-Semitic campaign against Mazowiecki, the presidential campaign 
was characterised by its religious content, and the PRCC remained a key player. It is important 
to note that the religious strand o f the campaign did not pertain solely to the actors and 
institutions involved, but also to the discursive character of the process. A significant strand of 
attack on Mazowiecki’s credibility was based on the argument that, despite his purported 
Catholicism, he was a communist and an enemy of the Church. The attack was based on the 
distribution of an article he wrote in 1953 for Wrociamki Tygodnik Kato/icki (‘Wroclaw Catholic 
Weekly’), criticising Bishop Czeslaw Kaczmarek of Kielce, who had been sentenced by the 
communists in a show-trial for supposed anti-government activity (Zaryn 2003:88).
While religious circles and the media determined that the struggle between Walesa and 
Mazowiecki, both legendary opposition figures, was the key to rallying the Church’s support 
and securing victory, a third candidate entered the stage and changed the rules o f the game. 
Stanislaw Tyminski was a businessman who had spent most o f his life in Latin America, and 
whose electoral programme was a mixture o f economic populism and political newspeak. Some 
suggested he had links to the communist security apparatus. I t was obvious that he had no 
coherent philosophy and, having no previous history in Poland’s political life, he built his 
support on populist slogans. Tyminski’s campaign was entirely secular and he had no links to 
the Church, and so obviously the clergy did not welcome his candidacy (Wisniewska 2008).
Despite the emergence o f this new figure, the power struggle between the two Solidarity 
candidates absorbed the PRCC to the extent that it overlooked the potential threat Tyminski 
posed to the whole opposition movement, and ignored the significance o f his appearance in the 
presidential contest. This was a mistake: in the first round of the election, Tyminski won 23%
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of the votes and came second only to Walesa, who secured 40% of the votes. The ‘war at the 
top’, as it was called, between Walesa and Mazowiecki had completely exhausted the Solidarity 
camp, resulting in a double defeat. First o f all, a representative of Solidarity’s liberal and 
intellectual wing was eliminated from the presidential race. Second, the focus on internal 
Solidarity affairs and the involvement of the Church in the bipartisan conflict resulted in the 
neglect o f other political opponents, and thus the rise o f the populist Tyminski.
I t was only a week after Mazowiecki’s humiliating defeat that the Episcopate issued a 
stern warning: ‘we are aware of the great effort that the nation made under Solidarity’s auspices 
in order to get rid of the totalitarian system’s burden. Election of the country’s leader is (...) a 
conclusion o f this effort and sacrifice’ (Grabowska and Krzeminski 1991:322). The mention o f 
Solidarity in the Episcopate’s statement was a clear reference to Walesa and an expression of 
the Church’s support for him in the second round o f the elections. The importance o f this 
statement is underlined by the fact that Primate Glemp himself reaffirmed it a few days later at 
a press conference in Rome. Walesa won a landslide victory in the second round, with over 74% 
o f the vote in his favour. Acknowledging that his victory owed much to the Church, Walesa 
remained its closest ally throughout his term. He also chose the Jasna Gora monastery in 
Czestochowa as his first destination as president-elect; on December 11 he renewed his vows 
to the Virgin Mary as a token o f gratitude for winning the election (Grabowska and Krzeminski 
1991:323). Once in office he also nominated Father Franciszek Cebula, his long-term confessor, 
as his personal chaplain. One o f the chaplain’s duties was to personally review all official 
statements made in relation to the Church; this showed to what extent the PRCC controlled 
state policy in the early years o f transformation (Rabiej and Rosinska 1993:220).
Because ofTyminski’s enigmatic andjaruzelski’s communist past, the Church’s decision 
to openly support Walesa in the second round of the elections was not widely criticised. Public 
opinion saw it as a continuation o f the first wave o f free elections in 1989, and the Church’s 
actions were seen as a fulfilment o f moral obligations and a necessary compromise: Church
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neutrality asserted for the sake o f the greater good, i.e. the victory o f a Solidarity candidate 
(Gowin 1999:55).
There was litde excuse, however, for the Church’s continued interest in government and 
party politics after Walesa’s victory in December 1990. The first fully democratic parliamentary 
elections, in 1991, were run in the context o f a stable political system, and provided a relatively 
even playing field for all the running parties and groups. Despite this fact, and despite the 
numerous calls from civil society organisations that principal democratic rules should be 
observed during the election, the PRCC became deeply involved in the campaign (Gowin 
1999:50-60). This was in many ways an echo of the 1989 and 1990 campaigns, but this time the 
PRCC drew conclusions from its past experiences and devised a more coherent strategy.
Throughout 1991, the Episcopate issued a regular series o f statements, published in 
Pismo Okolne, pertaining to democracy, elections and the duties o f a Catholic voter. The tone 
and content o f the statements ranged from general remarks about democracy to precise 
instructions about voting behaviour. In February 1991, the Episcopate ‘obliged lay Catholics 
not only to participate in elections, but also to cover for candidates able to take up responsible 
duties for the country and organise those political forces that can efficiently express the will and 
convictions o f the believers’ (PO 1991a). Later on, the Episcopate ‘noted with appreciation that 
the tendencies bringing together Christian groups are more and more visible’ (PO 1991a). In 
another issue, Polish bishops contended that ‘For no-one, and especially not for the believer, 
can it be a matter o f indifference what the political community in which he will fulfil his life’s 
purpose will be [like]’ (PO 36/91, in Borowik 2002:243). These statements confirmed the 
PRCC’s attitude and persistent meddling both with elections and politics in general. Despite its 
claims to the contrary, the PRCC continued to be involved in the electoral process, even though 
the communist threat it had previously referred to had disappeared and the political system’s 
stability was not in immediate danger. The Church chose to follow the path o f being a censor
179
of the political system as it was in the pre-1989 reality, only that now the system was open and 
democratic and needed no such censor.
Other statements, issued in Pismo 0 koine on the eve of the October 1991 parliamentary 
elections, were marked by two important features. First, they focused on the PRCC’s position 
regarding parties, programmes and candidates. In other letters, the Episcopate listed in detail 
the characteristics o f candidates who were understood to be in agreement with ‘objective 
Christian ethics’. They were to be ‘honest and wise, [and] accept the Evangelic system o f values 
and the Polish Christian tradition’ (PO 1991c), as well as prepared to ‘guarantee to retain the 
identity of the Nation and its Christian values’ (199Id) and ‘speak clearly in the defence o f life 
from the moment of conception’ (1991e). The negative features o f candidates were also 
described. They were not to be:
- arguing against catechism in school; the PRCC spoke against those who ‘having 
regained the law o f God in Polish schools try to create a heretic’s state’, because 
‘can we trust them in the future?’ (PO 38/91);
- supportive o f state neutrality in religious affairs; the PRCC objected to systems 
which ‘under the pretext of a neutral world-view, remove God from the structure’
(PO 36/91);
- ‘standing] outside the Polish Christian tradition’ (PO 35/91).
(Borowik 2002:243)
The Episcopate also actively lobbied for its preferred model o f church-state relations. 
The September issue of Pismo 0 koine (2-8.09.1991) alleged that the Church felt challenged by 
those who accused it of political meddling. In response, the Episcopate underlined that 
Catholics had the ‘obligation and right’ to defend Christian values in public life, just as other 
communities had the right to defend theirs. Furthermore, the Episcopate contended that ‘we
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[The Episcopate] do not support any o f the sides [in political disputes]. We do not indicate any 
electoral lists’. And they insisted that the clergy is ‘obliged not to allow electoral campaign to 
enter churches and chapels and [the clergy] does not take part in the campaign’ (PO 1991 f). 
Further down the same document, bishops condemned totalitarian regimes, and added that: 
‘N ot only totalitarianism but also a purportedly ideologically neutral regime that gets rid o f God 
in its structures is not to be accepted’ (PO 1991f). This particular vision o f church-state relations 
echoed the sermon o f John Paul II during his June 1991 visit to Poland, and thereby suggested 
that the PRCC’s actions were getting approval from the Vatican, which only reinforced the 
Church’s intervention in domestic politics (Jackowski 1993:132). Quite importantly, the 
statements contained in recent Church publications (such as those about ‘neutral regimes’ not 
being accepted) and lack o f clear guidelines from the Pope reinforced the impression that the 
Church wanted to be an active political player, and that it was determined to challenge the liberal 
democratic assumption of a secular state.
Clearly, the Church was unwilling to withdraw from politics; furthermore, the principle 
o f religious neutrality o f the state did not entirely sit easily with the PRCC’s agenda. This agenda, 
so clearly outlined in Pismo Okolne and elsewhere, was translated into the reality o f the electoral 
campaign. The Christian-National Union (‘Zjednoczenie Chrzescijansko-Narodowe’, ZchN), a 
major right-wing party close to the Church, formed an alliance with minor right-wing 
organisations called Catholic Electoral Action (Wyborcza Akcja Katolicka’, WAI<), clearly 
referring to its members’ religious views. Canon law only permits the use o f the word ‘Catholic’ 
in reference to official Church structures, and so W AK’s name suggested that the group had 
official backing from the Church. WAK used the Church infrastructure during the campaign 
alongside other right-wing groups. The campaign itself grew increasingly fierce, and right-wing 
and nationalist groups often declared that they represented the symbolic struggle between good 
(Catholic) and evil (secular, communist). The Church was eager to pick up this rhetoric, and 
also presented the vote as if it were a referendum on moral values. A local priest referred to the
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election as a choice between Jesus and Barabbas (the biblical fellow inmate o f Jesus) (Pach 
1991); although this was a rare example of such radical rhetoric employed by a single clergyman, 
the PRCC authorities were very close to its ideological position.
This was an interesting shift from the 1989 elections, where a rift became visible 
between the hot-headed local priests and the more reserved central authorities. This suggested 
a growing Church radicalism. Bishop Michalik, an influential member o f the Conference o f the 
Episcopate, said a month before the elections that ‘A Catholic is obliged to vote for a Catholic, 
a Christian for a Christian, a Muslim for a Muslim, and a Jew for Jew’ (Michalik 1991). Even 
though the bishop later stressed that his intention was to underline the idea that voters should 
cast their votes in accordance with their convictions, many saw it as a voice of sectarianism, and 
another attempt to introduce religion as a political category, especially in view o f the Church’s 
involvement in politics since 1989. Other commentators pointed out the statement’s anti- 
Semitic character—particularly as PRCC officials were previously embroiled in anti-Semitic 
scandals, including the Mazowiecki controversy in 1990 (Gebert 1991:260).
A final blow to whatever was left o f the Church’s credibility as a neutral observer o f 
democratic processes followed shortly after Michalik’s statement. An October communique of 
the Conference of the Episcopate urged that ‘only [those] political groups, that clearly defend 
right to life (...), respect the laws o f the family (...) and respect for [Poland’s] traditions stemming 
from Christian roots—should be given a mandate of believers’ (PO 1991g). Further on in the 
same document, the Church leaders urged voters to ‘rally around those few electoral committees 
that support values in accordance with Christian ethics and Catholic social teaching’ (PO 1991g).
The communique was at the heart of one o f the biggest scandals in church-state relations 
in the early 1990s. I t appeared that letters sent by some diocesan curiae, acting as regional 
distributors o f the document, contained an attachment with a list o f the ‘few electoral 
committees’ that should be supported by Catholics. The document was unsigned, and was 
addressed to ‘pastors and faithful—do not provide this information from the pulpit’ (Gowin
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1999:58). The exact circumstances o f the list’s creation and distribution were never fully- 
explained. The Conference o f the Episcopate did not discuss any such list officially. No 
reference to it was made in the communique. The fact that the list was widely distributed among 
parishes across the whole country suggests that at least some officials at the Conference must 
have been aware of it. Tygodnik Powszechny believed that Primate Glemp himself must have 
known about the document (Boniecki 1991). Following reports confirming that the list was 
indeed circulated among local priests, and that they used their Sunday sermons (the elections 
were held on a Sunday) to campaign for certain parties and candidates, only aggravated reaction 
to the affair. Campaigning during election day is and was against the law. That the crime was 
perpetrated by representatives o f the purportedly neutral PRCC only made things worse. N or 
was the campaign limited to identifying ‘suitable’ candidates, but also involved attacks on those 
not supported by the PRCC. Interestingly enough, the party most viciously attacked by the 
Church was the Democratic Union (‘Unia Demokratyczna’, UD), a left-leaning opposition party 
originating from the Solidarity movement. This is remarkable given that the UD enjoyed strong 
support from the Catholic intelligentsia, and the PRCC’s slander campaign led to a deterioration 
in relations within the Catholic community, and deepened the rift between the more 
conservative, right-wing parties, such as ZChN, and liberal ones, such as the UD and the Labour 
Union (‘Unia Pracy’, UP), most of which also stemmed from Solidarity (Kosciol 1991).
The right-wing and Catholic parties enjoyed considerable electoral success in the 
October 1991 elections, with WAK coming in third after the UD and the post-communist party, 
followed by Centre Agreement (‘Porozumienie Centrum’, PC) (fourth) and the K PN  (fifth). 
The three right-wing parties were supported by 25% of all voters and secured almost a third of 
parliamentary seats (Kozlowski 2010). The new government was based on a coalition o f right- 
wing parties led by Jan Olszewski from the Centre Agreement. Olszewski was a devout 
supporter o f the Church, and openly declared his allegiance to the PRCC. He visited the Vatican
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on his first foreign trip, where he met with John Paul II, who blessed Olszewski as the 
‘breakthrough prime minister’ (Tygodnik 1992).
The October 1991 elections were a real triumph for the PRCC and its political agenda. 
It was also the most comprehensive example o f the Church’s political offensive: from 
supporting right-wing political parties in their electoral campaign, to directly influencing the 
election outcomes through politicisation of the pulpit on election day, and subsequently to co­
operating with and lobbying the government in key areas of Church interest. I f  there were any 
doubts as to the Church’s role—as observer or actor—in post-communist politics, they 
disappeared with Olszewski’s coming to power and the Church’s ever-increasing presence in 
politics. It was clear that the Church would not retreat from its politically active position, 
developed throughout the 1980s and during the first months o f democratic transition.
Olszewski’s government had a conservative and strongly anti-communist agenda and 
pursued pro-Catholic social policies; it enjoyed the Church’s support in promoting some of its 
legislative ideas (e.g. abortion legislation: see further on in this chapter). Olszewski’s rise to 
power agitated Polish politics and exacerbated the internal divisions within the Solidarity camp, 
as some o f its members opposed Olszewski’s radical anti-communism, favouring gradual 
reform. The Church’s active engagement in government politics of the Olszewski era can be 
illustrated by Primate Glemp’s involvement in mediating a conflict between Olszewski and 
Walesa. The ‘war on top’ erupted in spring 1992, when Olszewski’s minister o f defence, Jan 
Parys, left the government after a clash with communist generals. Walesa’s camp had a different 
vision o f the armed forces’ reform, and the conflict between president and prime minister 
threatened the stability o f state institutions. Primate Glemp visited the prime minister’s office, 
and later the presidential palace. According to Anusz (1994:259), an active Centre Agreement 
politician close to Walesa, Glemp tried to convince the conflicting politicians to embrace a new, 
wider parliamentary coalition. I t would involve right-wing and agrarian parties and guarantee a 
stable government that would follow the social teachings of the Catholic Church.
Unfortunately for Glemp, the conflict got out of hand after a government minister 
accused Walesa of being a communist secret-service informant. Olszewski’s government fell 
amidst accusations o f a witch hunt and the extreme politicisation of the state apparatus. The 
Episcopate issued a communique supporting lustration policies (aimed at removing former 
communist security-service informants and functionaries from government and civil service), 
thereby siding with Olszewski and further humiliating Walesa (Jackowski 1992:65).
Olszewski’s failure to implement a fully-fledged lustration process cemented the 
collapse o f the Solidarity camp. Left-leaning and secular-minded figures such as Adam Michnik, 
chief editor o f Ga^eta Wyborc^a (‘Electoral Gazette’, GW) and Tadeusz Mazowiecki condemned 
Olszewski—and, indirectly, the Church—for meddling in politics (Sacrum 1992). The scandalous 
involvement o f the PRCC in the 1991 elections, and the failed attempt at maintaining a right- 
wing coalition in 1992, had long-term consequences for Polish politics and the Church. 
Olszewski’s government is seen by some as having been the first truly non-communist 
government, and many right-wing parties have built conspiracy theories out o f its fall in June 
1992 and the subsequent return o f post-communists to power (see Chapter 5). Moreover, an 
almost universal contempt for the Church’s direct involvement in elections and government 
politics expressed by major political parties and media led to a reorientation o f the PRCC’s 
policy in respect o f democratic processes and church-state relations.
After the fall o f Olszewski’s government, Walesa entrusted Waldemar Pawlak o f the 
Polish Peasant Party with the mission o f forming a government. After Pawlak’s failure the task 
was passed on to Hanna Suchocka, representing the right wing o f the UD. Both candidates were 
close to the Church. Pawlak was the head o f the PSL, a party that the Episcopate saw as an 
important pillar o f the nationalist-agrarian coalition it had tried to help realise in 1991. Suchocka 
was a conservative politician who went on to become Poland’s ambassador to the Holy See (see 
Chapter 5). Suchocka’s government remained in power for just over a year; political instability 
and bargaining between coalition parties and the president resulted in a no-confidence vote in
the parliament’s lower chamber in May 1993. The fact that the no-confidence vote against a 
Solidarity government was inspired by the Solidarity trade union because it had failed to reach 
an agreement with the government on public-sector pay effectively sealed the fate o f the 
Solidarity movement. New elections, which had been scheduled less than two years after the 
previous vote in September 1993, were a clear indication o f the political volatility of the newly 
independent state (Gebethner 1995).
The Church’s revised position towards upcoming elections was marked by a lack of 
explicit support for any o f the major contenders, including the main right-wing parties. This did 
not mean that the Episcopate gave up on the idea of voicing its pre-electoral concerns publicly, 
nor that the local clergy abstained from actively supporting candidates and groups close to the 
Church. It merely meant that, following the disastrous consequences o f the 1991 campaign, the 
Church decided to act in a more subtle way and to moderate its discourse. A communique issued 
after the 261st Conference of the Episcopate in May 1993 contended that Christian values are 
embedded within universal values based on natural law and, therefore, they can be embraced by 
everyone, regardless o f their religious or moral convictions. Furthermore, the document 
proclaimed the Church to be the guardian o f ‘moral order’, and, as such, a body concerned with 
the programmes o f political parties and government policies in order to secure basic values and 
human rights. The bishops underlined the historical importance o f Christianity and Polish 
culture, and maintained that Christian values were at the core o f national identity. Last but not 
least, the Episcopate listed the basic Christian values, such as human life, human dignity and the 
protection of life from the moment o f conception, amongst others (Komunikat 1993). The 
document reaffirmed the Church’s will to be actively involved in democratic processes in the 
country, and to include religious matters in the political agenda.
The central authorities o f the Polish Church did not, then, become directly involved in 
promoting particular parties or programmes during the 1993 campaign. Nevertheless, local 
Church hierarchs did not refrain from engaging in political bargaining. Because of a change in
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the electoral law, introducing a 5% threshold needed for parties to enter parliament, small 
groups had no chance o f electoral success. The biggest pro-Church coalition to contest the 
elections, Fatherland (‘Ojczyzna’), was brought to life with the backing o f Archbishop 
Goclowski o f Gdansk. It included ZChN and three minor right-wing parties. In  Warsaw, Father 
Jozef Maj, a priest with a long record of anti-communist activity, and the chaplain of many 
political prisoners in the communist era, facilitated talks between three conservative parties, 
including Centre Agreement. The talks were held at the parsonage o f Saint Catherine’s church 
in Warsaw, where Maj was a provost (Anusz 1994:261). Even though the negotiations ended in 
fiasco, they were vivid proof o f the PRCC’s continued active involvement in politics and keen 
interest in exercising influence on parties and members o f parliament.
It should be noted that the PRCC’s desire to co-operate closely with political parties was 
not one-sided. During the 1993 campaign, many candidates spoke openly about their allegiance 
to the Church and their respect for its teachings. ZChN ’s programme was filled with passages 
almost copy-pasted from the communiques and statements of the Episcopate. Issues such as 
morality, public order and upholding Christian values were o f primary importance in the party’s 
policy documents (Wielowieyska and Zaluska 1993). The presence o f Christian values and 
allegiance to the Church in a right-wing, Christian party are hardly surprising, but the list o f 
Catholic zealots included parties that, at least by definition, should not have displayed a strongly 
religious profile. PSL, an agrarian party and heir to the communist United Peasant Party 
(‘Zjednoczone Stronnictwo Ludowe’, ZSL), was equally zealous in praising the role o f the 
Catholic Church in Poland’s history and as a defender o f the national interest (Rejer 1993). The 
same applied to Andrzej Lepper, a farmer turned political revolutionary, and later deputy prime 
minister in Jaroslaw Kaczynski’s government (see Chapter 5). Lepper founded Self-Defence 
(‘Samoobrona’, SO), a trade union and political party, in January 1992. His programme was a 
mixture o f socialist and etatist economic policies with populist slogans. Even though Lepper 
most often praised the communist period as the golden era o f Polish farming, and criticised the
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free market, his rhetoric was full o f references to Church, Catholicism and national identity: 
‘One cannot imagine Polish national culture without (...) Catholicism. It is the Church that 
allowed us, Poles, to defend our national identity’ (U11993). Lepper often quoted John Paul IPs 
remark that capitalism cannot be the only alternative to communism, and declared that wanting 
to ‘be a Christian in Samoobronds activities means (...) to refer to the social ramifications o f the 
Gospel and papal teachings’ (U11993). Even the left-leaning UD decided to join in the struggle 
against a secular state. Its representatives claimed that the Church’s aim was to stand up for 
society’s moral values, support state reforms and remind church-goers about their civic duties 
(Aduszkiewicz 2000:354-356).
The only major political force that voiced its concerns about the continued involvement 
o f the PRCC in politics was the Democratic Left Alliance, the ex-communist party. The SLD’s 
1993 programme found it unacceptable that ‘laws o f the state are subdued to religious norms’ 
(Sojusz 1993:4). The fact that the SLD won the election and formed a coalition government 
with the PSL constituted a major departure from the political climate o f 1989-1993, and 
reshaped the place and role of religion in Polish politics, as those parties favoured a much more 
secular state and did not want so much Church involvement in politics (see Chapter 5).
The extent of the Church’s involvement in the first democratic elections (1989, 1991, 
1993) and the incoherent (or muted) response o f state and political institutions are a testimony 
to PRCC’s ambivalent attitude to the young Polish democracy. The Church allowed itself to 
meddle with democratic processes as much as the state and wider public allowed it to do so, 
and keep as much distance from state and party politics as it had to. W hat is more, the eagerness 
with which even big political organisations (notably right-wing ones) resorted to appealing for 
the Church’s help in securing voter’s support confirms the Church’s strength and continuous 
influence on public affairs vis-a-vis a weak state apparatus and civil society.
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Catholic policymaking: education and broadcasting
As the first part o f this chapter illustrates, the PRCC promptly entered the political mainstream 
of democratic Poland after 1989, and maintained a high visibility and exerted influence over 
political parties, parliaments and governments. The following section will focus on particular 
areas o f policy-making where the Church exercised this influence to change government policy 
and foster changes in the law in order to prosecute its goals.
In Poland, education is widely seen as one o f the most important areas o f the Church’s 
social teachings. After Vatican II, the Catholic Church devoted a lot of attention to all aspects 
o f education and upbringing and underlined the ethical and moral dimension o f the educational 
process (Skorowski 2009:160-174). Establishing the role o f religion in the state education 
system—which in the absence o f private education establishments in 1989 accounted for virtually 
all schools in the country—was one o f the top priorities o f the Polish Church after the democratic 
transformation in 1989. The PRCC had already secured a number o f privileges in May 1989, 
when the communist parliament passed a statute on the Church’s legal status and religious 
freedoms (see Chapter 3). The document granted legal status to the Catholic University of 
Lublin and the theological seminaries run by the PRCC. Furthermore, the Church was granted 
the right to establish and administer schools and orphanages (Ramet 1995:192). This was merely 
a framework for the Church’s activities, however: indeed, the possibility o f running its own 
educational establishments was o f secondary importance to reinstating religious education in 
public schools. The teaching o f Catholic theology and the social doctrine o f the Church in state 
schools had been ended in 1961, but even after that date communist authorities still financed 
the Academy o f Catholic Theology and paid salaries to teachers o f religious classes (Daniel 
1995:403).
After the election of the first non-communist parliament in June 1989, a wide range o f 
Church institutions and groups started voicing their concerns about the quality o f the
189
communist education system, and expressed the need to reintegrate religious education into the 
curriculum. The Catholic press started considering legal changes and options for returning to 
the pre-1961 state o f affairs (Krukowski 1990). The Episcopate’s communique from June 1990 
was issued ‘unanimously supporting a full return o f religious education to schools and the need 
to guarantee this in the Constitution and the education act’ (PO 1991a). A pastoral letter on 
‘The Return o f Catechisation to Polish School’ followed shortly afterwards (PO 1991b), along 
with a detailed background o f the Church’s demands. The document underlined the historical 
relationship between catechisation and the history o f Poland and its nationhood, and the crucial 
role Catholicism and Catholic education had played in the struggle for independence. The 
Episcopate argued that allowing religion back into state schools was a way of righting the wrongs 
o f the communist period. Social and historical arguments were predominant, but the letter also 
contained a number o f religious sentiments: namely that Catholics have the right to study their 
faith and develop their religious identity and—since education and upbringing are inseparable— 
that school is the natural environment for teaching religious education. W hat is more, religious 
education is an emanation o f Christ’s teaching, and a natural environment for evangelisation 
(PO 1991b). This rights-based argument, stemming from the PRCC’s integrist10 stance on the 
matter, was given full support and recognition by many politicians and state institutions.
Both o f the PRCC documents were issued amidst the electoral campaign in which the 
then prime-minister, Tadeusz Mazowiecki, a known liberal Catholic, faced Lech Walesa, known 
for his conservative outlook on religious matters. Facing a challenge both from religious circles 
and his opponent in the presidential race, Mazowiecki submitted to the demands o f the Church, 
and instructed his minister o f education to deal with the matter. In June 1990, the Joint 
Commission o f Government and the Episcopate issued a resolution recommending the return 
o f religious education to schools (Pietrzak 1991:107). O n August 2 1990, a consultation took
10 An early-20th century term describing the forces opposing modernisation within the Catholic Church.
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place between the Episcopate and the government within the framework o f the Joint 
Commission, established to facilitate regular contacts between the two institutions. The 
Commission’s final statement contained a declaration affirming the promise to return religious 
education to state schools.
This was highly unusual for a number o f reasons. First o f all, the Commission was not 
a legislative body—it was not even a state institution. Second, the Catholic Church was the only 
religious organisation consulted in the process. Other consultation forums, such as the Polish 
Ecumenical Council, were already in place, and a number of minority religions had reinstated 
their representative bodies (Beznic 1997). Even though the government had the opportunity to 
consult other religious organisations, it did not do so. No other stakeholders were invited. 
Equally, the PRCC made no attempts to reach out to other religious or non-religious 
organisations in order to invite them to the consultation process (D^bowski 2008). The day 
after the publication o f the statement, Henryk Samsonowicz, the acting minister o f education, 
signed an instruction that the teaching o f religion on a voluntary basis should return to all state 
primary and secondary schools. This was yet another curiosity. The legal instrument of the 
minister’s choice—an instruction—was the lowest on the scale o f legal documents produced at 
government level; it was not in itself a normative act. After the legality o f this choice was later 
questioned by the Ombudsman and the Constitutional Tribunal (see below), Mazowiecki (2004) 
later explained that ‘religious education was brought back [to school] with due respect for the 
rule o f voluntarism: the school gives an opportunity [to take up religious education] and does 
not create a duty’. The education minister claimed that 80% of the population supported 
religion’s return to schools, and so his decision was legitimate (Samsonowicz 2007). The 
instruction did not refer to any other legal documents as its basis, and contained a clause 
describing it as a temporary act until the new education legislation was in place. Theoretically, 
the instruction referred to all denominations, but as it was enacted as an initiative o f the Joint 
Commission it was largely understood as a solely Catholic affair.
According to the document, all parents who wished their children to join RE classes 
should petition the school’s authorities. RE was supposed to be taught for two hours a week, 
and the lessons were officially placed in the class schedule. The manuals and other teaching 
materials were to be provided by relevant Church authorities. The instruction also included 
special provisions for Catholic pupils willing to attend church services during teaching hours. 
Nominating RE teachers was entirely up to the religious authorities. Quite controversially, no 
formal qualifications were required o f RE teachers, except the approval of their religious 
institution. Yet RE teachers were to enjoy the same pay and benefits given to other teachers, 
and the state vowed to cover their remuneration (Pietrzak 1991:108).
Public opinion, a number o f smaller religious organisations and the Polish Ecumenical 
Council all voiced their concern about the decision. Most criticism did not surround the 
introduction o f religious education to schools, but the way in which the government decided to 
take such an important decision, and how it was communicated to the public. Due to pressure 
from the Polish Ecumenical Council, concerned with the absence o f provisions for non- 
Catholics, the ministry decided to issue an instruction in respect o f this on August 24, allowing 
minority religious groups to organise religious instructions where necessary (Gowin 1999:197- 
198).
Even still, the Ombudsman, Ewa L^towska, decided to bring an action against the 
ministerial instructions before the Constitutional Tribunal, the highest judicial authority in 
Poland. This was the first step in a long and fierce, legal and discursive battle fought by 
politicians, lawyers, religious organisations and the public over religious education. L^towska’s 
first (and not only) action before the Tribunal focused on the decision-making procedure and 
the legal instrument used by the government. The Ombudsman did not challenge the grounds 
for introducing religious education in state schools; instead, L^towska contended that the 
decision was an infringement of the 1961 law on education that proclaimed the secularity of
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state schools, as well as the 1989 laws on the status o f the Catholic Church and the constitutional 
freedom of conscience and religion (Gowin 1995:141-143).
The Ombudsman’s action exacerbated the conflict, and all sides engaged in a fierce 
debate, with religious arguments abounding. The supporters o f RE in public schools criticised 
the Ombudsman’s decision in the strongest possible terms. L^towska was accused o f defending 
the communist legacy and favouring formal law-making over values advocated by religion 
(Krukowski 1990). She defended her position by claiming that democratic procedures should 
be observed, and that her action was about defending human rights. The ministry and the Joint 
Commission, for their part, tried to assure everyone that their decision was right, and that the 
Ombudsman had no grounds for her action. One of the Commission’s statements contended 
that the instructions only allowed RE classes to take place in school buildings and were 
voluntary, and therefore did not constitute an alteration o f the curriculum (Ratajczak 2006).
The Tribunal’s eventual ruling was therefore crucial, and not only because it was the 
highest legal authority in the country; the ruling was also the first o f its kind in a country where 
democracy had been reintroduced less than two years previously; indeed, it was the first ruling 
on religion in public life. In January 1991, the Tribunal decided to dismiss the Ombudsman’s 
action and to uphold both o f the ministry’s instructions on RE. W hat is more, the Tribunal also 
decided to engage in the debate on church-state relations and the secular character o f the state 
by challenging both acts that the Ombudsman referred to: the 1961 education legislation and 
the 1989 church-state acts. The Tribunal’s verdict also suggested that lawmakers should develop 
new legislation on education and church-state relations. In so doing, the Tribunal attracted 
criticism from prominent lawyers, and was accused o f meddling with politics and taking an 
extreme view on a sensitive matter of national importance (Pietrzak 1991:118).
The Tribunal’s ruling reassured politicians and Church alike that their attempts to bring 
religion into schools would not be challenged. This happened at a crucial time for the shaping 
o f state legislation on education, and the parliamentary debate on state schools. In a July 1991
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draft of the Education Act, approved by the Sejm, Christian values had been placed in the 
preamble, and schools were obliged to enable teaching of religion within their premises. The 
PRCC was still not satisfied, however, as it wanted schools to ‘organise’ teaching and not just 
enable it. The lower house of parliament, the Senate sided with the Church on this matter and 
revised the act, turning ‘enabling’ into ‘organising’, and extending parental rights to request 
religious education classes in secondary schools. The Sejm, in turn, refused to consider the Senaf s 
amendments, and the act was suspended in a legislative limbo. Only a year later, with the 
prospect o f leaving the old communist legislation in place, was the stalemate brought to an end. 
In September 1991, the currently binding legislation was adopted. It contained both the 
Christian values clause in the preamble, as well as the obligation for schools to ‘organise’ 
religious education, thus fulfilling all o f the Church’s demands in that respect and confirming 
its authority in policy-making (Gowin 1999:199-200).
Both the Church and the politicians supporting it were prom pt to capitalise on the new 
legislation. The reservations o f the Ombudsman, presented in 1991, had been dismissed as 
invalid. The new minister of education, Andrzej Stelmachowski, was a close friend of Primate 
Glemp, and was subject to his influence. In April 1992, the minister issued an ordinance on 
‘conditions and methods o f teaching religion in public [i.e. state] schools’ (Ro^por^qd^enie 1992), 
setting out a number of changes to religious education. The main changes included introducing 
ethics as an alternative for students not attending RE classes, instituting a system o f declarations 
(to be submitted to head teachers) for parents who did not wish their children to attend RE 
classes, establishing the rule that RE teachers must be nominated by churches on the 
government payroll and introducing religious symbols to classrooms. As in the case o f the 1991 
instruction, the Ombudsman challenged the ministry’s decision and protested against the 
legislation at the Constitutional Tribunal in August 1992 (Dudek 2008). This action caused even 
more criticism o f the Ombudsman’s office by the Church and right-wing groups, and involved 
personal attacks on Tadeusz Zielinski, the new Ombudsman. Zielinski was accused by Primate
Glemp of being a ‘custodian o f the old regime’ and ‘not representing the will o f the nation’ 
(Sabbat-Swidlicka 1993:20). The Ombudsman fought back, and accused the Church o f turning 
Poland into a confessional state, an opinion that had also been voiced by many secular and left- 
wing politicians and intellectuals since 1989 (Zielinski 1993).
In April 1993, the Tribunal issued a new verdict, and partially agreed with the 
Ombudsman’s concerns, which constituted a defeat for the Church and its allies. Forcing 
parents to declare that their children would not attend RE classes was deemed unconstitutional. 
The Tribunal also ruled that students attending RE classes outside school premises (a practice 
which happened mostly within minority religious communities) should not have their marks 
recorded in the official end-of-term and end-of-year certificates; the Tribunal also made minor 
adjustments to the redundancy provisions for RE teachers (R^ec^pospolita 1997). The main 
premise o f the RE legislation, i.e. the presence o f RE classes in state schools and state support 
for religious instruction, was maintained.
The main flaws o f the legislative process regarding RE in state schools—including a lack 
o f wider consultation, the exclusive position o f the Church and the leniency o f politicians 
towards the official PRCC standpoint—were repeated on the occasion o f changes in the 
broadcasting law. Yet again, the government worked closely with the PRCC to develop a crucial 
piece of legislation that would change the communist legacy, this time setting a foundation for 
future development o f Poland’s media. The Broadcasting Act o f December 1992 stated that 
‘auditions should respect religious feelings o f the audience, particularly (...) the Christian value 
system’ (Gowin 1995:155). This clause was protested not only by the lay elites but also by some 
Catholic intellectuals. It reflected widespread concerns about the Church hierarchy’s attempts 
to influence policy-making beyond the will and interest o f church-goers. The Broadcasting Act 
was also brought to the Constitutional Tribunal, this time by a group o f left-wing 
parliamentarians, but the Tribunal rejected their case in June 1994. Although the Act was 
denounced as containing ‘legislative defects’, these defects were not deemed relevant to the
constitutional character of the whole act (Gowin 1999:213). This meant that the broadcasting 
law remained in force in the shape proposed by the government under the PRCC’s influence; 
yet further proof o f  the Church’s successful campaign to realise its interests, and, notably, 
maintain its grip on key areas of communication and media in order to assure the public visibility 
of religion.
The PRCC’s political gains, and the concessions obtained from the new but weak state 
authorities between 1989 and 1993, particularly in the field of education, have not only set the 
tone o f policy-making in other areas (see abortion policy-making, below) but positioned the 
Church firmly in the public square for decades to come. The broadcasting law and religious- 
education legislation, brought to life with the Church’s help between 1991 and 1993, still remain 
in force (albeit with changes) today. Any attempt at changing the status quo (see Chapter 5) is 
met with fierce opposition from both the PRCC and its political allies. Moreover, the presence 
o f religious (Catholic) education in schools has allowed the Church to maintain an important 
degree o f social control on all levels, from central to local (Podgorska 2008). Political 
developments o f the 1990s and early 2000s show that the gains made by the Church in particular 
policy areas were more long-lasting and stable than those o f political parties and groups.
Abortion and sexuality
The abortion debate was, and still is, one o f the most contentious issues in Polish politics. It 
must be noted that Poland is not an exception in this, and similar debates take place in other 
countries around the globe. What is particular to the Polish case, however, is that most o f the 
decisions were taken between 1988 and 1993, and this is also when most relevant arguments in 
the debate, resounding still today, first surfaced. The period between the first communist 
initiative, aimed at restricting the PRL’s liberal abortion legislation, in late 1988, and the passing
of the new abortion law in January 1993 was marked by extraordinary activity within the Polish 
Church, including the Episcopate, local clergy and lay organisations and movements.
Another particularity o f the Polish abortion debate was the sudden shift in the Church’s 
prioritisation o f this issue, which occurred with the regime change. Even though abortion policy 
was always one o f the key parts o f the Catholic Church’s struggle to defend its social teaching 
all over the globe, it was not a priority for the PRCC during the communist period. The Polish 
abortion law o f 1956 (amended in 1959) was a model Soviet-style act allowing for unrestricted 
access to abortion. Despite the law’s clearly anti-Catholic character, PRCC did not pay much 
attention to this act and its consequences before 1988, showing that it was by no means an 
absolute, timeless priority for the Church (a claim later voiced by the Church hierarchy) (Gowin 
1999:151). This shows how flexible the Church was in prioritising key issues and bringing them 
to the public’s attention, despite its claims to being a defender o f key moral principles.
In 1988, the ailing communist government attempted to revive the abortion debate in 
order to redirect the public’s attention from the country’s economic and social stagnation and 
to split the opposition camp, which included both leftist, secular and pro-abortionist groups, as 
well as right-wing groups opposed to abortion. The Church responded to the government’s 
invitation and participated in bilateral talks on a possible revision of the abortion law. The 
Episcopate put forward a set of proposals, including an absolute ban on abortion and the 
criminalisation of the act, including criminalising mothers who underwent abortions (Salij 1989). 
The last communist parliament initiated a debate on the legislative proposal of the Church in 
May 1989, but the imminent democratic election prevented it from taking a final decision. 
During a meeting hosted by Primate Glemp on May 5 1989 for Walesa, Mazowiecki and other 
Solidarity leaders, the PRCC leader brought his guests’ attention to the importance o f abortion 
policy for the Church.
It was a marked departure from the pre-1989 passive stance o f PRCC on abortion. 
Glemp underlined the belief that ‘abortion cannot be an object o f political games nor the basis
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for judging parliamentary candidates’ (Prymas 1989). This statement stands in stark contrast 
with the PRCC’s actions after the June 1989 elections, as abortion became one o f the most 
politicised policy areas, and the Church was actively involved in the policy-making process at all 
stages. In December 1989, a group o f Solidarity senators initiated a revision o f the 1956 
Abortion Act in line with the PRCC’s position on the matter. It is important to note that this 
time it was not the Church which initiated the process. Gowin (1999:152) makes an interesting 
observation in relation to the Church’s increased interest in abortion in August and September 
1990. According to Gowin’s analysis o f Pismo Okoine’s output during this period, abortion 
replaced religious education as a key theme only in autumn 1990, as the Church secured a major 
victory in the field of education in August of this year (as explained earlier in this chapter) 
(Gowin 1999:152-155). This confirms that the PRCC was selective in prioritising issues on its 
agenda in line with the political climate, contrary to the Church’s claims to promoting ‘absolute 
values’ and waging a continuous struggle to defend unborn children.
The Church’s prom pt shift from almost complete inactivity to nearly full engagement 
in the abortion debate demonstrated the instrumental approach that the PRCC took to 
forwarding its agenda, and revealed its ability to act flexibly in order to maximise its 
constitutional interests. Having achieved its policy goals regarding religious education, the 
Church set about pursuing its anti-abortion intentions. The upper house of the parliament 
started drafting a new law on abortion in 1990, taking the Episcopate’s proposal, submitted to 
the previous parliament, as a starting point. In July, two Senat committees adopted a draft 
abortion bill, largely identical to the PRCC’s proposals, with two key changes: women 
performing abortions were not to be punished, and abortion was allowed if the pregnancy 
threatened the pregnant woman’s life or if  it resulted from a crime. The Episcopate’s Family 
Commission protested the Senats draft on both points, and demanded the old pre-election draft 
be left untouched (Komisja 1991:6). By the time the Senats draft was referred to a Sejm 
Extraordinary Committee dealing with the issue, all o f the changes proposed by the PRCC had
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been taken on board. As the legal battle for the abortion bill accelerated throughout 1990, it 
impacted greatly on the upcoming presidential election. Both Walesa and Mazowiecki, main 
contenders in the presidential race, reaffirmed their allegiance to the Church and gave full 
support for its stance on abortion (Jankowska 1991:180-181).
The controversy surrounding the adoption o f abortion legislation was accompanied by 
a wave of popular protests both by the pro-life lobby and opponents o f the new legislation, 
including women’s movements and human rights groups. The issue also exacerbated tensions 
within the opposition parties and post-communists alike. While pro-lifers had the upper hand 
in parliament and in public debates, the situation among the general population was the 
opposite. Opinion polls conducted in November 1990 suggested that 60% of Poles opposed 
the Senats draft (Jankowska 1991:179). The same number of respondents said that a referendum 
should be organised to decide on the new abortion law (Zubrzycki 1997:45).
The electorate’s voice was completely ignored, however, and the lawmakers continued 
to push for a restrictive abortion law without a referendum. The pro-life lobby in parliament 
acted under pressure to deliver the new law before John Paul II’s next visit to Poland, due in 
June 1991. The Pope, for his part, reaffirmed his strong views on anti-abortion legislation on 
numerous occasions, and in January 1991 he referred to the ongoing legislative process, 
reaffirming his support for the Polish Church and the Episcopate’s struggle to pass a restrictive 
abortion act (Nowicka 1996:24). The Church categorically opposed a referendum, on the 
grounds that it would constitute a vote on the right to life and a violation o f the constitution, 
although no lawyer or independent institution backed this point o f view (PO 1991b). This stood 
in contrast to Cardinal Glemp’s 1989 pledge to keep abortion out o f political debates, and the 
Church’s repeated pleas for transparent and democratic policy-making. Eventually, both the 
pro-life lobby and opponents o f the new legislation brought the legislative process to a deadlock, 
making it impossible for the Sejm to pass a law or decide on the referendum. The parliament 
dissolved in autumn 1991 without deciding on the matter (Gowin 1999:156). This was a clear
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example o f the Church’s disregard for democratic principles, and proof o f its instrumental use 
of contentious political issues for own gain. Even though most Poles supported the idea o f a 
referendum, the Church rejected the very idea that abortion issues could be decided in a popular 
vote. Additionally, the PRCC preferred for the legislative limbo to last, leaving in place an old 
communist piece o f legislation, instead of trying to reach a compromise with its opponents.
The new parliament elected in October 1993 included more right-wing and conservative 
MPs than the previous one. All o f them were eager to finish the task initiated during the previous 
term, and enjoyed the strong backing o f the Church. A t the end o f 1991, a group o f MPs tabled 
the same proposal that had been discussed in the previous parliament. In  March 1992, the Polish 
W omen’s League produced a counter-proposal, but it was swiftly rejected by the Sejm. Now that 
pro-abortionists’ voices had been quashed, the pro-life lobby anticipated an easy victory. To the 
surprise o f many, however, the biggest challenge in the 1993 parliament arose from internecine 
conflict. Some politicians favoured a mild version o f the act, allowing for abortions under certain 
circumstances. A large group o f MPs, mosdy from the Catholic Electoral Action, favoured a 
more restrictive ban, along the guidelines prepared by the Episcopate. In the meantime, the 
Social Committee for a Referendum [on Abortion] started collecting signatures. Meanwhile, the 
old communist act remained in force, meaning that thousands o f abortions were performed 
every m onth (Kulczycki 1995:475). Pro-life parliamentarians rushed to negotiate an agreement 
in order to prevent the referendum and change the communist legislation. The new abortion 
law, approved by parliament in January 1993, enforced a general ban. Under the new law, 
abortion would only be deemed legal if: (1) it constituted a threat or a serious health threat to 
the mother; (2) it was a result o f activities undertaken to save the mother’s life or prevent serious 
threat to her health; (3) pre-natal examination suggested that the foetus might be seriously and 
irreversibly damaged; and/ or (4) it was a result o f a crime (Gowin 1999:158).
One o f the most important features o f the public debate that followed the introduction 
o f the new law was the attempt by its supporters to publicise it as a ‘compromise’. The document
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was indeed a compromise solution between those right-wing groups that favoured a softer 
approach to abortion and the hardliners. In the ensuing discussions, the Church and pro-life 
groups often presented it as a compromise between the supporters and opponents o f abortion, 
although the former group was not represented in the law-making process (Chudy 1993). This 
contentious issue—of compromise—would be of particular importance in future abortion 
debates: any attempts at revising the law would be criticised as attempts to destroy this 
purported ‘compromise’ (see Chapter 5). Despite the triumphalism o f certain parliamentarians, 
however, the Church refrained from expressing its satisfaction with the new law. Glemp said 
merely that it was ‘a step in the tight direction’ (Kulczycki 1995:485), while insisting that it did 
not satisfy the Church’s demands.
The abortion debate that took place between 1988 and 1993 was shaped largely by 
religious arguments, and in the context of the dictates o f the Church and its allies. But its true 
essence was a political struggle that struck at the heart o f democratic principles. Voices o f dissent 
were marginalised, and both sides in the debate used radical arguments to present their cases. 
N ot only did the Church show its disregard for democratic policy-making, but also repeatedly 
confirmed that it did not support a religiously neutral state. The Church-controlled debate 
eventually had to come to an end with the 1993 parliamentary elections, won by the post­
communists and the agrarian party (PSL), both presenting an alternative view on the abortion 
issue. This will be further examined in Chapter 5.
The Concordat
A Concordat is an international treaty between the Holy See and the state, regulating relations 
between the Church and state and society. Although a Concordat lies within the international 
public-law domain, its unique character comes from the fact that it does not bind countries (e.g.
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Poland and the Vatican State), but a country and a religious body (the Holy See) that is a 
universally recognised international organisation. Moreover, even though Concordats are 
concluded between the Holy See (an international body) and state authorities, they only refer to 
citizens of the signatory state on its territory (in this case, Poland), and with reference to the 
Catholic Church. The history o f Concordats goes back to the Middle Ages, and the relations 
between popes and secular rulers in Europe. According to Wislocki (1993), the history o f 
Concordats shows that they are an expression o f the political will o f the Church and state 
authorities, and a reflection o f state interests in internal and external policy. Wislocki further 
notes that Concordats are usually signed thanks to the state’s will to co-operate with the Holy 
See, as the latter is generally eager to engage in the process o f political discussion, but has no 
means of initiating it on its own.
Poland’s Concordat history started in the inter-war period (see Chapter 3), when the 
1921 constitution obliged the Polish government to seek regulation o f church-state relations 
based on a treaty with the Holy See. A few months after the constitution entered into force, the 
Ministry o f Religious Denominations and Public Education started developing the document, 
and in 1924 the Council o f Ministers sent it to the Vatican for comments. After a brief 
consultation process, the document was signed in February 1925 and entered into force the 
same year. The most contentious part o f the document pertained to financial arrangements 
between Church and state (including payment of civil service salaries to priests) and the 
reclamation o f Church property confiscated during the partitions. Other Concordat clauses have 
since been accepted without much controversy.
The validity o f the 1925 Concordat in the post-war period was questioned by the new 
communist authorities, claiming that the Holy See effectively cancelled it by violating parts of 
the agreement (referring to the authority o f the Polish Roman Catholic Church over the 
territories o f the Second Republic occupied by Nazi Germany). During the communist period, 
numerous governments tried to normalise the relationship with the Holy See, without much
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success (as we saw in Chapter 3). The first initiative leading up to an agreement between the 
government and the Holy See emerged in 1983, during a meeting o f the Joint Commission of 
the Government and Episcopate. Representatives o f the PRCC proposed that a treaty be 
concluded with the following two key points: affirmation o f the permanent character o f the 
socialist state, and assertion o f the PRCC’s respect for the constitution and national interest. 
Over the next five years, the Commission produced a 23-point document describing Church- 
state relations, including the PRCC’s respect for the state’s secular character and the freedom 
and autonomy o f religious activity for the Church. The Convention was signed by both sides in 
May 1988 and sent to the Vatican for consultation (Wislocki 1993:23-24). Soon afterwards, the 
PRL’s government negotiated two documents with the PRCC: the Act on State Relations with 
the Catholic Church and the aforementioned Convention. Rapid changes in the political and 
international sphere made the Church reluctant to sign the Convention in its then-current form. 
The Act on State Relations was passed by the last communist parliament in April 1989 (as we 
saw in Chapter 3), and the Convention was shelved. In future discussions, the PRCC refused to 
refer to the 1988 Convention, and declared it invalid in view of the regime change. I t must be 
noted that the Act on State Relations, although passed by a communist parliament, was not 
questioned by the Church. Janik (2010) argued that the Church’s later refusal to draw from the 
Convention constituted a breach o f the pacta sunt servanda rule, as the Episcopate had signed the 
document in 1988. The declaration of the Convention’s virtual non-existence by the Church is 
even more important in view o f later developments leading up to the signing o f the 1993 
Concordat, as we shall see.
After the June 1989 elections, relations between Poland and the Holy See rapidly 
improved. In July 1989 Poland re-established diplomatic relations, and in September John Paul 
II nominated Archbishop Jozef Kowalczyk (a Polish cleric) as the papal nuncio in Poland. In 
October 1991, the nuncio presented the Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs with a draft o f the 
Concordat (Skorowski 2009:54). Kowalczyk contended that the new document would lead to a
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‘reopening’ o f the state-Vatican talks. As Janik (2010) points out, this was a half-truth—the talks 
started from scratch, with no link to the 1983-1988 talks. The new Vatican draft made no 
reference to the 1988 document. The government agreed to call a joint Church-state 
commission to negotiate the draft and prepare it for signing and ratification. The commission 
was composed o f  six government officials (including the Minister o f Foreign Affairs) and six 
representatives o f the Church, including the nuncio and five Polish bishops (Wislocki 1993:99- 
100). The negotiation process was very brief, and after two months the document was passed 
on to the Council o f Ministers. The agreed document comprised a short preamble and twenty- 
nine articles. The preamble briefly introduces the aims and rationale behind the Concordat, 
including its legal framework and related documents (such as Polish constitutional law) and 
other legal acts and documents o f Vatican II, as well as canon law (Concordat 1998).
The articles can be divided into five main chapters. The first focuses on institutional 
relations and the autonomy o f Church and state. The second pertains to the Church’s legal 
status. This is o f particular importance, as during the communist period the PRCC was the only 
church without a legal status, and the Episcopate was very keen on regulating this matter 
(despite the Act on State Relations passed in 1989). The third refers to the freedoms o f the 
Church in relation to the state, including the creation o f new organisations and bodies, the 
appointing Church officials, autonomy in performing its functions, freedom o f religion and 
guarantee o f religious holidays. The fourth concerns areas o f co-operation between the state 
and the Church for the benefit o f society, including marriage and family matters, religious 
education, chaplaincy in state institutions (such as the army), religious broadcasting, the 
charitable activities o f the Church and the construction and cultural rights o f the PRCC. The 
final chapter pertains mostly to procedures and details o f the implementation of the Concordat 
(Krakowski 1993:28-35).
The document was adopted by the Council o f Ministers on June 1 1993, and then signed 
by the Krzysztof Skubiszewski, the Minister o f Foreign Affairs, and Nuncio Kowalczyk on July
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28 1993 (Anusz 1994:261). But this was not the last step in the legislation process, as the 
document then needed to be discussed by both parliamentary chambers and duly ratified by 
both sides (see Chapter 5), but in many ways Skubiszewski’s and Kowalczyk’s signatures 
symbolically ‘sealed the deal’ between both parties and concluded the heated debate on the 
Concordat that had been ongoing since 1991. I t was a very relevant debate, demonstrating the 
PRCC’s strategy o f monopolisation in the public domain, as well as revealing the close and 
sometimes secretive relationship between religion and politics which typified the first years o f 
democratic transformation.
One of the first and most pertinent critiques, both o f the Concordat process and then 
the document itself, came from minority religions and churches. The Polish Ecumenical Council 
(‘Polska Rada Ekumeniczna’, PRE), representing Protestant and minority churches, had often 
voiced its reservations towards the Concordat talks. The basis o f the critique was threefold. First 
o f all, minority religions felt side-lined and neglected in the post-1989 period, both in terms of 
government discourse and policy, and they saw the Concordat as another attempt at legalising 
the PRCC’s monopoly through recourse to religious authority and national Polish-Catholic 
identity. Second, some members of the PRE remarked that in the modern liberal democracy 
that Poland’s government claimed to be, exclusive contracts with certain religious 
denominations, no matter how dominant, were no longer necessary. Last but not least, the PRE 
criticised the Concordat document itself, and the consequences o f its immediate 
implementation. The PRE noted that the document did not contain a clause on equality for all 
religious denominations, although a similar clause could be found in Italy’s Concordat o f 1984. 
Minority denominations were also concerned with the financial aspects o f the law, which 
provided the PRCC with an advantage over other churches in terms o f state funding (Szarek 
1993:233-237).
Another wave o f criticism came from liberal and left-wing parties, as well as civil society 
organisations, constitutional lawyers and others opposed to the Concordat—both in general and
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in this particular form. The most important point o f criticism referred to Suchocka’s 
government’s competence to handle the issue. The government had no political legitimacy after 
May 29 1993, when the parliament gave it a no-confidence vote (Gowin 1999:251), yet the 
government adopted and subsequently signed a document of great legal and constitutional 
significance. This showed how confident the Church and its allies felt in pursuing their agenda. 
Even though public opinion was unequivocal in its support for the document, and the 
government had no political base, the decision that the PRCC saw as essential (signing the 
Concordat despite lack o f political legitimacy) was pushed through.
Those critical of the government accused it o f unnecessary haste and secrecy in adopting 
the document—no wide consultation was employed during the process, and the new Concordat 
made no reference to the 1988 Convention. Moreover, those concerned with the deepening 
bond between the state and the PRCC pointed to the fact that the document originated from 
the Vatican, and was then discussed by a commission including government ministers and six 
Polish bishops (although one was acting as the papal nuncio), which created the impression of 
a secretive deal being made between the Polish government and the Polish Church, with little 
regard for the international dimension o f the document (Korbonski 2000:136). A number o f 
critical voices focused not so much on the overall framework of the Concordat and the 
circumstances o f its coming to life, but on the particular clauses it contained. Besides the 
financial aspects o f the document, including state financing for two Catholic universities, and 
the possibility o f establishing state-funded Catholic chaplaincies in public institutions—matters 
already raised by the PRE—there were a number of non-financial points under criticism. The 
institution o f ‘Concordat marriages’ that existed outside o f the state’s official register raised 
concerns about possible bigamy cases, as it allowed for two marriage-registration systems to 
exist in parallel. Allowing for (Catholic) religious education produced criticism from the 
proponents o f secular education and concern at the PRCC’s increased presence in educational 
establishments. The arguments rehearsed during the implementation o f the new education laws
were repeated in this debate, but yet again the PRCC and its political allies had the upper hand. 
Concordat education clauses reconfirmed the state’s full support for Catholic religious 
education as an essential part o f the state education system.
All in all, the Concordat process, however important for Poland’s Catholics, constituted 
another instance o f the PRCC’s monopolisation o f public life and its failure to engage other 
parties in a constructive debate. Minority religions felt further side-lined, secular parts o f the 
public sphere threatened, and even the Catholic community felt excluded from the process. 
Gowin (1995:176) claims that the Church ‘once again ignored the need to inform and convince 
the public o f the rightness o f its initiative’, thus contributing to growing tensions between the 
Church and public opinion.
Property Commission
Besides exerting its influence on national politics and key policy areas such as education, 
broadcasting and sexuality, the PRCC was keen to secure its financial position in the newly 
democratic reality. By 1989, the communist government had already started talking to the PRCC 
about the restitution o f Church property confiscated during the Stalinist years. The estimates o f 
the PRCC’s property losses in the early years o f communist rule vary from 85,000-170,000 
hectares (Szulc 2006). The communist authorities in their dying years tried to win the Church’s 
support for moderate reforms within the system, and therefore offered it a chance to reclaim 
some o f its lost property. In 1989, the authorities established a Property Commission that was 
supposed to make decisions regarding the return o f state and local government property to the 
PRCC. The Commission comprised six representatives o f the government and six 
representatives o f the Church (Lazarewicz 2009b); working in three teams o f four, the 
Commission was meant to review applications from Church institutions (parish churches,
monasteries, regional bishoprics and the Episcopate, amongst others) and return confiscated 
property.
Due to the rapid changes in the political environment that ensued, the Commission only 
started operating in 1991. I t was founded by the president o f the Office of the Council of 
Ministers, Jan Ambroziak, a former employee o f the PRCC’s Episcopate (Agnosiewicz 2002). 
Ambroziak urged the Commission’s members to issue decisions promptly if the Church 
presented compelling evidence in support of its case (Lazarewicz 2009a). The Commission’s 
regulatory procedure, prepared by Ambroziak, was a vivid example o f the imbalance o f power 
in Polish politics between the state and the Church in the early years o f transformation. First o f 
all, members of the Commission, although partially nominated by the government, did not have 
to act on its instruction, and were not held accountable for their actions. The application 
procedure was secret, and interested parties were not informed about the ongoing process of 
reclaiming property. This included the current owners o f the property in question. Moreover, 
the Commission’s decision was final, and no appeal procedure was devised. Valuation o f the 
claimed property was to be provided by the PRCC alone, and no independent valuation was 
required for the Commission to return property {Regulatory Procedure 2002). The Commission 
initially accepted applications, until 1992, and over 3000 were filed by that date. Originally, the 
Commission was supposed to decide on applications within six months, but it remained 
operational until 2011. By 2009, over 2500 applications had been decided, and over 60,000 
hectares o f Church property had been returned. Much o f this land now belonged to local 
authorities, private companies and public institutions, including hospitals and universities, and 
the reinstatement o f land caused a public backlash against the Church’s actions, including 
numerous protests and lawsuits (Wisniewska 2009). The Commission had been the cause of a 
major political scandal in 2011, when it was discovered that the Church’s claims had not been 
independently verified (i.e. the PRCC itself assessed how much it wanted back and what the 
value was o f equivalent real estate offered), and that PRCC institutions had used the recovered
property for profit-making activities (Lozinski 2011). By the time it was dissolved, the 
Commission had contributed to significant strengthening o f the Church’s real-estate portfolio, 
and had increased its material wealth. The state anti-corruption agency launched an investigation 
into the Commission’s operations in 2011; as o f 2013 the investigation is ongoing, and the first 
guilty verdict against a surveyor appointed by PRCC was handed out in 2012 (Pietraszewski 
2012; Skowronek 2013).
Conclusion
In this chapter I have outlined the relationship between religion and politics in the first years of 
Polish transformation after the 1989 democratic elections. The first four years o f democratic 
government were marked by rapid reforms and rising tensions in the political, economic, 
cultural and religious realms. The main institutions o f the old regime—the communist 
government and the communist party—had long-since collapsed. With Solidarity’s coming to 
power, important divisions started to arise within the movement. New political groups and 
parties were created. The Church remained the only major social institution relatively unaffected 
by the regime change. It had to respond, however, to a much bigger challenge: functioning in a 
new democratic reality, a surprising scenario for even the most outspoken opponent o f the 
communist regime. Newly democratic Poland set about becoming a Western liberal democracy, 
and this brought about tension within and between social groups and institutions. Those 
favoured by the communists, such as state trades unions, farmers and industry workers, lost out 
in the new system. Those that had been subjugated by the old regime, including Solidarity and 
the Church, could now enjoy new opportunities.
The Church entered the democratic public arena with confidence and a great authority 
inherited from the past era. The communist praetorianism legacy made the Church the only
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mediating authority in society, accepted by both the failing communist government and the 
emerging opposition. Once both of the great powers o f pre-1989 Poland started dividing, 
arguing and standing against each other in democratic elections, the Church remained the last 
instance o f stability. This gave the PRCC tremendous leverage and influence on political 
processes. The former opposition politicians were very quick to reaffirm their allegiance to the 
Church, and praised it for supporting Solidarity during the communist times, giving the PRCC 
much more credit than it actually deserved for the sake of their own political gain, as the Church 
became an important political actor. Part of the praetorian legacy was also the overall 
institutional chaos and lack of structured dialogue between government institutions, political 
parties and social organisations during the first transition period. This put the Church in the 
driving seat again, making it an indispensable part o f the country’s political landscape. Similarly 
to the events o f late 1980s, the Church reaffirmed its role not only as a symbolic praetorian 
institution (this time providing continuity and stability in times o f rapid transformation), but 
also engaged in institutional praetorianism, actively participating in policy-making and 
facilitating communication between state and political institutions.
It must be noted that the PRCC’s new role was not only due to the politicians’ eagerness 
to involve it in politics, or the exceptional circumstances of transition. As the Church leadership 
had already engaged in political activity during the 1980s, the first democratic elections merely 
intensified this process o f religious republicisation. Although the country’s rulers and society 
vowed to transform Poland into a Western liberal democracy and build a civil society, the 
Church’s vision was not entirely compatible with these concepts. The account of the Church’s 
involvement in the first elections between 1989 and 1993 proves that political neutrality was not 
on the PRCC’s agenda during these years. Cases o f active campaigning by priests, and the regular 
use o f Church premises for political purposes were common. N ot only did the Polish Church 
get involved in elections, but it also made sure its policies were embraced by the government. 
Advocating restrictive abortion legislation and broadcasting laws and rushing religious
education into schools are just a few examples o f how efficient and persistent the Church was 
in pursuing its interests. The PRCC showed that although it agreed with basic tenets o f a 
democratic state, it wanted it to be based on Christian values and the social teachings o f the 
Catholic Church as the dominant faith.
The most controversial elements o f the Church’s political activity, however, were not 
the policies themselves (although they were contested by many), but the ways in which they 
were introduced. The Church, in co-operation with the authorities, completely bypassed most 
consultation processes and marginalised other social institutions, including minority religious 
groups. While Primate Glemp was a regular guest in government and parliament offices, only 
two out o f seven Polish prime ministers met with representatives o f minority religions between 
1989 and 1993 (Szarek 1993:233). Issues such as religious education or abortion law were 
decided almost exclusively in co-operation between the PRCC and government. This further 
confirmed the Church’s unwelcoming attitude towards democratic bargaining principles, a 
component o f liberal democracies. Even if the PRCC sometimes presented itself as a civil 
society organisation, it did so only to show that ‘it knew better what civil society’s needs are’, 
and was there to help achieve them (Borowik 2008).
The PRCC strived to maximise its institutional strength by securing a privileged status— 
not just through good relations with politicians—and by pursuing its policy plans. The Church’s 
exceptional status in society was confirmed by the Concordat, making Catholicism primus inter 
pares in Poland’s religious landscape. The creation o f the Property Commission, and the 
subsequent return of vast amounts o f land and real estate-including the confiscation o f public 
property such as hospitals and universities—has shown that the Church’s plans are based on 
maximising its power at the expense o f the public and the state, and even with disregard o f the 
law.
All o f the above processes have become o f great significance for the future o f nascent 
Polish democracy. The Church’s continuous involvement in politics, and the politicians’
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eagerness to embrace the PRCC’s political activity, have hugely influenced the development (or 
lack thereof) o f Poland’s civil society. The PRCC came close to becoming a monopolist in many 
important government consultations on policy issues; indeed, many religious minorities have 
been effectively marginalised. This has also had a long-lasting impact on Poland’s secularisation. 
Certain processes that may otherwise have taken place were virtually ‘frozen’ by the PRCC’s 
rapid and total seizure of public life, including enforcing religious education, insisting on 
Catholic-friendly broadcasting and applying a restrictive abortion law on a society that would 
otherwise be reluctant to embrace those policies.
Besides—or perhaps because of—public controversy, the PRCC’s contentious policies 
have caused it to lose a lot o f its pre-1989 popularity. Just before communism collapsed, over 
90% of Poles had confidence in the Church, making it the most trustworthy institution in the 
country. This number quickly came down to under 50% in November 1992 (Daniel 1995:412). 
Whereas in 1991 only 53% of Poles thought the Church meddled too much with politics, in 
1994 this number had already reached 70% (Kosciol 2002).
However, since late 1993, a significant change in the Church’s involvement in politics 
and the politicians’ stance towards religion can be noted. The gradual normalisation o f the 
reform processes, and the stabilisation o f Poland’s political institutions, have transformed the 
relationship between Church and state, and caused the two spheres to become more separate. 
The return o f the post-communists to power in 1993 also contributed to the government 
adopting a more reserved position towards religion. Most o f the mechanisms developed in the 
first four years o f transition, however, as well as key policies decided then, remained in place, 
and influenced the political and social landscape of the country for years to come. The patterns 
o f this influence will be analysed in Chapter 5.
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Chapter 5: Sustained Republicisation: 1993-2007
The previous chapter dealt with the first years of Polish transformation (1989-1993) and the 
place o f religion and the Church in politics and public life. There, I showed that the legacy of 
the 1980s and the strong position o f the Church, combined with the sympathy o f political 
figures to the Church’s concerns and the prioritisation o f the institutional interests o f the PRCC 
and political parties, combined with rapid transformation in Polish politics, led to the re- 
emergence o f religion in public life. In the chapter I looked at the key issues influencing the 
relationship between politics and religion in post-1989 Poland, including birth control, 
education, broadcasting and Church finances.
This chapter will continue the analysis o f the relationship between religion, politics, the 
Church and public life in Poland beyond the initial transformation period, covering the years 
1993-2007. The reason for choosing 1993 as a break point was addressed in the previous 
chapter—this was the year of the relative normalisation of church-state relations, including the 
signing o f the Concordat and the return o f the post-communists to power. The terminal date- 
2007—marked the time when the right-wing, pro-Catholic coalition o f Law and Justice, Self- 
Defence and the League o f Polish Families collapsed.
The aim o f the chapter is two-fold. First of all, I set out to show how the relationship 
between religion and politics developed over the course o f the first two decades o f Polish 
democracy. For the sake o f consistency, a number of areas that I examined in Chapter 4 will 
also be addressed, such as abortion, religious education and broadcasting, amongst other issues. 
This links in with the second aim o f the chapter, which is to illustrate how the early 
transformation years (1989-1993) influenced the course o f later events and sustained religious 
republicisation in Poland. I will argue that the mechanisms and policies developed in this 
immediate post-communist transformation period were largely preserved over the next few 
years, despite continuous changes in the country’s political, social and economic life. The
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preservation o f the status quo in the areas strategic to the Church and its allies is a testimony to 
continuous strength of religion in Polish public life and the lobbying power of the PRCC. The 
lack o f any significant changes in policy areas deemed a priority by the Church and religious 
circles also confirms that the first years o f transformation were essential for further political 
developments in the country, as the policies agreed upon then last for over two decades now. 
Last but not least, I will demonstrate the non-linear character of the secularisation o f Polish 
public life. This will be done in order to relate the chapter’s content to the theories o f 
secularisation presented in Chapter 1. The material presented will illustrate how the close 
relationship between religion and politics in post-1989 Poland diverted the course o f certain 
secularisation processes, or prevented them from taking place entirely. Using Moyser’s five-step 
model o f political secularisation, I will show how a right-wing government managed to reverse 
many secularisation trends over a short period o f time, despite reluctant public opinion and 
opposition from left-wing parties. The PRCC’s role in the process was central—particularly given 
the fact that the Church capitalised on its quick gains during the 1989-1993 period and strongly 
defended the status quo in key policy areas, while additionally trying to increase its presence and 
importance in other areas.
Abortion and sexuality
As the previous chapter has illustrated, abortion and sexuality issues remained very high on the 
agenda in Polish politics in the late 1980s and early 1990s. As we saw, the January 1993 
legislation, even though it embraced most o f the PRCC’s concerns regarding abortion, did not 
conclude the debate. The Church was not satisfied, as the act allowed abortion under certain 
circumstances. A  prominent Catholic weekly urged the community ‘not to call a disaster a 
compromise’ (Chudy 1993). In fact, the Church pushed for even more restrictive measures to
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be put in place, despite the fact that 60% of Poles disagreed with the Catholic stance on this 
issue and just over 30% supported it (Bijak 1996).
The immediate effects o f the new abortion law included a sharp fall in the number of 
legal abortions performed in Poland, obviously, but also the fast development o f an abortion 
underground and ‘abortion tourism’ (Nowicka 1996). Church officials did not openly 
acknowledge this, choosing to celebrate the decrease o f legal abortions as obvious proof o f the 
new law’s positive effect on society. The initial dissatisfaction with the new law that the PRCC 
expressed in the first months after it was passed was replaced by a more moderate stance for 
this very reason, along with the fact that the pro-choice lobby and other opponents o f the 
restrictive legislation started to voice their reservations so loudly (Gowin 1999:160).
However, the September 1993 elections brought about the defeat o f the right-wing and 
Catholic parties and coalitions and resulted in the return o f the post-communist parties to 
power. The Democratic Left Alliance, which gained the largest number o f votes, was openly 
anti-clerical, and vowed to revise the January 1993 Abortion Act. The minority coalition partner, 
the Polish Peasant Party, was more hesitant on this issue, as its ideology mixed elements of 
traditional moral conservatism with a left-wing take on the state and economy. This 
disagreement within the coalition slowed down work on the new legislation. The upcoming local 
elections forced the SLD to appease its leftist electorate, but the tensions between the SLD and 
the PSL meant that the Parliamentary Women’s Group (‘Parlamentarna Grupa Kobiet’, PGK) 
took the initiative. In June 1994, the lower house o f parliament passed amendments to the 
abortion law (Millard 1999:134). The main amendment concerned the possibility o f terminating 
pregnancy due to ‘social reasons’—particularly the difficult social situation of pregnant women. 
It also allowed for abortions to be performed legally outside the state health-care system. Before 
coming into force, the bill had to be approved by the president, but Walesa was a declared anti­
abortionist and had no intention o f signing the document. When justifying his veto, the former 
Solidarity leader said that ‘no economic reasons can legalise an assault on human life. (...) As the
president o f Poland, defined in the constitution as a state ruled by law, with a millennium-old 
Christian tradition, I cannot sign such a document’ (Walesa, in Gowin 1999:161). Walesa’s 
refusal combined elements of personal conviction with a respect for Christian tradition as a 
•justification for certain legal provisions. The statement illustrated a common phenomenon in 
contemporary Polish politics, as we have seen, drawing moral conviction from a vague notion 
of the ‘Christian legacy’ of the country. Statements o f this type were usually concomitant with 
the PRCC’s current stance and testify to the continued political power o f the Church.
Walesa’s veto meant that the amendments returned to parliament. After fierce criticism 
from the Episcopate, the PSL decided to change its position and did not support the 
amendments in the second vote. This, combined with the right-wing opposition’s support for 
the presidential veto, meant that parliament failed to override it. The old anti-abortion measures 
remained in place until the election as president of Aleksander Kwasniewski, a young ex- 
communist politician promising change and future-oriented politics. But political differences 
between the SLD and the PSL again did not allow the ex-communists to take the initiative on 
abortion. It was the SLD’s minor ally, the Labour Union that took up the amendments where 
Walesa’s veto had left them. An Extraordinary Parliamentary Commission debated the 
amendments in early 1996, and after three months’ discussion tabled a bill incorporating three 
major changes: legalising abortion for women in ‘difficult life circumstances’, introducing sex 
education in schools and encouraging the wide use o f contraceptives. Significantly, the proposed 
bill reinstated neutral terminology: ‘pregnant woman’ and ‘foetus’ replaced ‘mother of a 
conceived child’ and ‘conceived child’, respectively (Nowicka 1996:24). In August 1996 the Sejm, 
dominated by the left-wing parties, passed the proposed amendments.
The Church’s reaction was immediate and very strong. Bishop Pieronek o f Cracow, the 
Secretary o f the Episcopate, called it a ‘crime against humanity’, and Bishop Ryczan o f Kielce 
called the parliamentarians ‘unworthy’, claiming that it would have been better for Poland had 
the pregnant womens’ mothers performed abortions on them (New Law  1996). The Pope
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himself decided to speak out against the law. In a letter, the Supreme Pontiff fulminated that ea 
nation which kills its own children is a nation without a future’, and that the Polish Church ‘has 
gone into mourning because o f the criminal law’ passed by the parliament (Noszczyk 1996). 
Church officials and Catholic activists actively rallied against the legislation. Opposition to 
supporters of the law was very often radical (see Pieronek and Ryczan’s statements above), and 
all political parties and organisations showing signs o f support for the amendments were 
criticised in the strongest terms. In a general atmosphere o f accusation, hostility and polarisation 
o f positions, with particular extremism on the part o f anti-abortion campaigners within and 
around the Church, public opinion was yet again neglected. Between 1994 and 1999 the support 
for a total ban on abortion, favoured by the PRCC, had dropped from 14% to 10%. H alf o f the 
respondents in a 1996 poll contended that abortion should be allowed for social reasons, in total 
opposition to the Church’s teachings (Zielinska 2000:40).
This process confirmed two important tendencies within the Church. The first one was 
that the Church continued to purport to act as a representative o f the nation vis-a-vis the state 
(e.g. by putting forward its own legislative proposals), a position adopted during the 19th-century 
partitions and the communist period, and largely maintained in the post-1989 order. The second 
tendency was that the PRCC saw itself outside o f the democratic state structures—it frequendy 
acted with disregard for democratic mechanisms, and argued for certain policy issues such as 
abortion and sexuality to be exempt from democratic bargaining and subject only to the social 
doctrine of the Catholic Church.
President Kwasniewski decided to support the new act, however, and in November 
1996 the liberalised abortion law was signed. It remained in force until 1998, and contributed to 
a further deterioration o f church-state relations and the greater polarisation o f the abortion 
debate. It also caused the number of legally performed abortions to increase for the first time 
since 1981. Up until the new law, in post-1989 Poland the number o f legal abortions had 
dropped regularly year by year. In 1989, over 80,000 legal abortions were registered, but by 1996
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this number had dropped to 521. The new legislation pushed the numbers up again, to 3,189 in 
1994 (Johnston 2000). A t the same time, underground abortions were estimated to be around 
200,000 terminations per annum (Czerwinski 2003:658).
The new, liberal law was not in place for long. In December 1996 a group o f right-wing 
senators took the abortion bill to the Constitutional Tribunal, arguing that it was 
unconstitutional on a number of points. According to the petitioners, the new act infringed the 
right to life from conception, stripped the ‘conceived child’ o f its legal status and prioritised the 
interests o f the mother and her social situation over the child’s right to life. All o f these 
arguments had, o f course, been set out by Church officials, and so the case was mostly built 
around arguments used regularly by the Church in the abortion debate. The senators confirmed 
their allegiance to the Church when they included sexual education on their list o f reservations 
to the new law, claiming that it was unconstitutional as well. Although sexual education was not 
related to abortion legislation, it was an important point on the PRCC’s agenda (Gowin 
1999:163).
The tensions surrounding the abortion debate, and the upcoming constitutional 
referendum and parliamentary elections, caused the Tribunal to act promptly. The state 
prosecutor, when presenting his statement in front o f the Tribunal, argued in favour of the bill. 
He claimed that protecting ‘conceived children’ from conception would require comprehensive 
changes in the law, including total penalisation o f abortion. According to the prosecutor, the 
new legislation was an improvement on the 1993 Act and should remain in force. To the surprise 
o f many, the Constitutional Tribunal ruled against parliament and state prosecution in late May 
1997, declaring the new act unconstitutional on five out o f eight points raised by the senators 
(Eberts 1998:826). The ruling caused a major controversy among the elites and in wider society. 
There was no agreement even within the Tribunal itself: three judges filed dissenting opinions, 
stating that the Tribunal had exceeded its powers and had become involved in a political 
argument. I t must be noted that the three dissenting judges were nominated by the SLD, and
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their ruling on the abortion case was largely consistent with their party’s programme. And the 
person with the m ost decisive power in the Tribunal was its chair, Andrzej Zoll, who was 
nominated by a right-wing party (Siedlecka 2006). Other criticisms of the Tribunal’s ruling, 
coming from the country’s most prominent lawyers, included misinterpretation o f the new 
constitution (see below for details o f the constitutional debate) that had been adopted only two 
months earlier (Trybunai 1997:142-160).
The Church welcomed the Tribunal’s ruling, and called for all sides o f the conflict to 
respect the ‘compromise’ incorporated in the 1993 law. Bishop Pieronek said that he ‘felt safer 
in Poland’ after the Tribunal’s decision (Pieronek, in Eberts 1998:826). The PRCC’s confidence 
in the Tribunal’s ruling was strengthened by the victory o f a right-wing coalition party, Solidarity 
Electoral Action (‘Akcja Wyborcza Solidarnosc’, AWS), in the September 1997 parliamentary 
elections. The AWS was created in an attempt to revive the Solidarity ethos in Polish politics, 
and bring together parties remaining from the anti-communist opposition. The coalition’s 
coming to power was o f crucial importance to the Church and its policy ideas in the public 
sphere. The SLD-PLS government had been the first and only post-1989 government to have 
decided to cut visible ties with the Church, and not to pursue the PRCC’s agenda in key areas 
such as abortion, sexuality and education (see below). The AWS’s administration represented a 
major change in this respect. According to Wenzel (1998:145), ‘The key to understanding the 
program of the AWS is to treat it as a value-based grouping. All participants define themselves 
as following the Christian ideology, as interpreted by the Catholic Church’. Solidarity’s draft 
constitution, one o f the key documents to which the AWS referred, declared that ‘human life is 
protected from conception to natural death’ (a direct expression o f the Church’s position on 
the issue) and announced the coalition’s strategy once in power (Konstytucja 1994). In 
December 1997, the Solidarity-dominated lower house o f parliament confirmed the Tribunal’s 
ruling, therefore reinstating the 1993 law (Eberts 1998:826).
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The dramatic circumstances surrounding the rewriting o f the 1993 abortion law in 1994- 
1997, accompanied by an intense and heated public debate, led to the polarisation o f opinions 
within the political establishment. I t must be noted that throughout, public opinion remained 
unchanged. Zielinska (2000:41) argues that, paradoxically, the fact that 58% of Poles accepted 
the 1996 amendments and only 33% opposed them was due to the anti-abortion campaigning 
by the Church and political parties. Zielinska further suggests that the abundance o f anti­
abortion rhetoric expounded by PRCC officials and politicians produced the opposite to the 
desired effect, fostering an increasing dissatisfaction with the state and the Church’s intrusion 
into private life. It is important to note that even at this stage neither the right-wing politicians 
nor the PRCC decided to consider the public opinion’s reservations and continuously 
campaigned for a tough abortion law.
Nevertheless, another important consequence o f the 1996-1997 debacle was that 
following the 1997 elections no other government decided to challenge the status quo on 
abortion. The SLD’s failed attempts at doing so, the strong reaction o f the Church and its allies, 
and the defeat o f the SLD and the PSL in subsequent elections in 1997 all demonstrated the 
potential of the Church to exercise its influence on national politics. Even though the post­
communists returned to power again in 2001, they still11 have not attempted to re-address the 
abortion policy. Tentative attempts at reviving the abortion debate and liberalising the existing 
law made in the late 1990s and early 2000s have quickly been silenced by the Church’s calls to 
respect ‘compromise’ (Treder 1999; Kompromis 2007; see also page 25). And yet, efforts made 
by the PiS-LPR coalition government to make the abortion law more restrictive (see further on 
in this chapter) resulted in the mobilisation o f pro-choice liberal and left-wing groups 
determined to protect the current legislation, fearing that new proposals would lead to a 
complete ban on abortion (Bratkowska and Graff 2007).
11 As of 2012.
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This uneasy status quo holds, and is a vivid example o f the Church’s continued 
bargaining power. Even though it is frequendy referred to as a ‘compromise’, the law largely 
reflects the Church’s position, and makes Poland one o f the most restrictive abortion regimes 
in Europe, together with Malta and Ireland. The anti-abortion lobby and the majority o f Poles 
that do not support restrictive abortion legislation remain silent to avoid upsetting the Church 
(fearing that it could, in return, campaign for a stricter law), and because o f the dominant 
political climate that impedes any major legal changes that would contradict the Church’s policy, 
regardless of the political orientation o f the government.
Education
Although the main controversy concerning the presence and form o f religious instruction in 
public schools only developed in the early 1990s, and was somehow muted by the Constitutional 
Tribunal’s 1993 ruling on the legality of religious education, the issue still occupies a central 
place in Polish politics and church-state relations. A number of key debates within the Church 
and on religious issues in the public sphere were closely linked to the place o f religion in 
education, and of education in religion. The 1993 Concordat debate, the creation o f the 1997 
Constitution and the sexuality debate all contained references to both.
In Chapter 4 we saw that the signing o f the Concordat in 1993 was grounds for the first 
controversy in the field o f education after the Tribunal’s ruling. Article 12 o f the document 
declared that public schools and kindergartens should provide space for RE education within 
their programmes. It also specified that RE teachers (catechists) were only subject to Church, 
not state laws and regulations in terms o f teaching methods, curriculum content and 
employment. These provisions were challenged by centre and left-wing activists and lawyers—to 
no effect (Pietrzak 1994). In 1997, the leftist SLD government tried to formally ban the inclusion
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of RE grades on end-of-term and end-of-year school certificates, but the initiative was blocked 
by the parliament’s upper chamber, where the right-wing parties had a majority (Gowin 
1999:202). Ratification o f the Concordat in 1998 confirmed RE’s place in the educational 
system. The new AWS government’s stance had once again proved that right-wing parties were 
eager to implement the Church’s agenda, even in the absence o f direct pressure from the PRCC. 
Immediately after coming to power in 1998, the post-Solidarity party tabled a project dividing 
public schools into secular and Christian. The project, sponsored by the Ministry o f Education, 
was criticised in both Church and secular circles, and was eventually dropped (Gowin 1999:202). 
The subsequent left-wing government, in power between 2001 and 2005, did not challenge the 
status quo regarding RE in state education, despite its pre-election pledges. Major changes in 
favour o f the Church’s demands, and sometimes even exceeding them, came during the PiS- 
LPR coalition after the 2005 elections (see below for details o f the 2005-2007 government’s 
activities).
In the meantime, the debate on religion and education continued, despite the absence 
o f major changes in the general framework. The debate developed in many directions. The first 
and most important strand pertained to church-state relations and the place o f religion within 
society in general, and the educational system in particular. The second concerned the influence 
o f the Church—as the most important provider o f RE in schools—on key educational issues. The 
third, held mostly within Catholic circles but also resounding within secular organisations, 
referred to the role o f Catholic catechisation in the upbringing of young Catholics, and the 
implications o f an official RE programme in schools for the Catholic Church and Catholics in 
general.
The first discussion was the most essential and profound in its consequences for the 
shape o f church-state relations and wider relations between religion and society. In Chapter 4, 
I explained that the prom pt introduction o f RE in state schools after the fall o f communism 
mobilised both supporters and opponents o f this policy, and divided public opinion along new
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secular-religious lines, which were largely different from the divisions that had pertained in 
communist Poland (in pre-1989 Poland, most Poles opposing the government would favour 
religious education in schools). Opponents o f RE in public schools contended that its 
introduction infringed equality before the law and threatened state neutrality in matters of belief. 
A lot o f them argued that this was not an ideological matter, insisting that proponents of RE in 
schools would react the same way if an atheist worldview were presented as part o f the official 
curriculum. Their main argument was that the state should not support any worldviews, in order 
not to prejudice one against another (Janicki 1990; Graczyk 1997). This model o f church-state 
relations was fully in line with the liberal democratic view that modern Poland wanted to draw 
from, but it was not the only view represented in the public debate.
Supporters o f religious education in schools used two kinds o f argument. Most of them 
referred to the country’s Christian past and traditions and the role o f the PRCC in defending 
statehood and fighting against foreign oppression—including during the communist period 
(D^bowski 2008). Another widely supported group o f arguments concerned the fact that the 
majority of Poles were Catholic, and that the state should recognise this fact. A prominent right- 
wing politician maintained that respecting religious freedom required the state to ‘introduce 
religion into comprehensive education and upbringing programme’ (Grzeskowiak 1990). 
Whereas the first strand of the religion-education debate focused on legal and political issues 
stemming from theories of state and church-state relations, as well as political ideologies, the 
second strand was much more down-to-earth and practical, as it concerned the Church’s 
influence over education and related issues through the presence o f RE classes in state schools.
Opponents of RE argued that allowing the Church to enter state schools would cause 
direct pressure on pupils and parents-not only in RE, but in all issues that the Church was 
involved in—and that this would result in discrimination against non-Catholics. Numerous 
reports from parents, schools, non-governmental organisations and journalists confirmed that 
this fear was largely justified. With over 90% o f primary school pupils attending RE classes, and
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a significant proportion o f secondary and high school students doing the same, protection of 
the secular minority had become a major issue in Polish schools (Majcherek 2010). Areas of 
controversy were numerous. In  many schools, particularly in smaller towns and rural areas, the 
provision of ethics classes for pupils not attending RE classes had met with obstacles and was 
often Active. Although the Church has long denied that this is a major problem, and both state 
and local authorities have downplayed it, the European Court o f Human Rights ruled in June 
2010 that the lack of choice between RE and ethics constituted a violation of human rights, and 
urged the Polish government to take appropriate measures to avoid this in the future (Majcherek 
2010). Even though, according to opinion polls, 70% of Poles would prefer religious education 
classes to have a more neutral curriculum, focused on different world religions (Podgorska 
2008), the present Polish model is reserved for the Church (and, marginally, other religious 
denominations) and the teaching o f the Catholic catechism. Neither schools nor parents have 
any influence on the RE curriculum, nor do teachers. This leads to frequent conflicts and 
tensions between school authorities, parents and their children. Some of the educational 
materials used during RE classes have caused controversy by presenting an exclusively Catholic 
view on most issues, and dismissing in a derogatory manner those presenting alternative views 
(Podgorska 2008).
Given how hermetic this RE model is, the Church exercises considerable power in 
Polish schools and in education in general. Cases o f catechists and local priests intervening on 
behalf o f the Church in secular matters that purportedly contravene Catholic doctrine are 
frequent (D^bowski 2008). According to a report on RE in schools by Podgorska (2008), the 
most common interventions have included school parties banned on Fridays (the Catholic day 
o f abstinence), school holidays planned around religious events, and the cancellation o f extra­
curricular activities deemed inappropriate by the Church (for example RPGs [role-playing 
games] and fantasy-gaming societies).
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Additionally, the local Church authorities exercise pressure on school authorities in 
matters that they deem important. Official complaints pertaining to catechists and their practices 
are dealt with very slowly. Schools are punished for their pupils’ ‘disobedience’ towards RE 
teachers. As described earlier in this chapter, there are a number of key areas, such as abortion 
and sexuality, in which the Church prioritises its activities. This is also the case in educational 
establishments. Although sex education is a separate subject from RE, and although issues o f 
sexuality are in no way part o f the Church’s competences in education, there are frequent reports 
o f Church intervention in these matters in schools (Jarzynski 2009).
Although sexual issues prove most contentious in the debate on church-state relations 
in education, there are other clashes which exceed the official curriculum. The theory o f 
evolution, officially embraced by the Vatican as not contravening Church doctrine, still proves 
contentious in Polish schools. And the history curriculum is also challenged by RE teachers, 
with issues such as the Inquisition and the Crusades being either side-lined or completely 
omitted from the catechesis (Podgorska 2008).
The third pillar o f the education debate concerns the transfer o f RE classes from vestries 
and parishes, where they were held during the communist period, to public schools. The fact 
that catechesis was to become an ordinary school subject, with grades and attendance lists, was 
not, rather strikingly, easily accepted by all members of the Church. Even though m ost religious 
groups and organisations welcomed the change, there were voices of dissent. Janusz Korwin- 
Mikke, a controversial right-wing MP, said in his 1992 parliamentary speech that introducing 
religion into public schools was a conspiracy o f secular circles against the Church intended to 
turn pupils away from religion (Korwin-Mikke 1992). Another Catholic intellectual suggested 
that placing RE classes in public schools destroyed the bond o f young Catholics with their 
parishes, and made religion just another subject to be studied for a couple o f years and then 
forgotten (Obremski 1993). A number o f RE teachers (priests and laymen) also suggested that 
holding RE classes on school premises would deter pupils and be detrimental to the quality o f
teaching (Dgbowski 2008). Despite the initial worries and objections, after introducing RE into 
schools (and the Constitutional Tribunal’s 1993 verdict reconfirming the legality o f this move), 
PRCC authorities firmly defended the contentious policy and did whatever it could to support 
it. Initial fears about the damaging consequences o f this policy on the PRCC’s image, and on 
the place of religion in young people’s lives, were overshadowed by the institutional interests of 
the Church and the will to maximise its influence on society. None o f the post-1993 
governments, either right- or left-wing, challenged the status quo either. A number o f Polish 
sociologists o f religion and politicians have pondered upon this issue, as it appears that most 
political forces in the country are wary o f upsetting the Church, as they see it as a powerful 
political actor, and they do not act for fear of a negative reaction from the PRCC, even if they 
know that the electorate supports them (Borowik 2008 and 2010; Janicki and Wladyka 2009; 
Burnetko 2008).
The education debate shows that the Church became conscious o f a stark choice: an 
ideologically neutral state or the chance to enjoy the benefits o f being the biggest religious 
organisation; the PRCC clearly preferred the latter. The way that RE education was first 
introduced into schools and then defended proves that the PRCC had little regard for 
democratic procedures when pursuing its own agenda. This can be illustrated by a quote from 
the 1990 pastoral letter o f the Episcopate on catechesis in schools, in which the bishops 
maintained that RE’s return to schools was a matter o f basic human rights, and therefore ‘cannot 
be based on principles o f consent or a political interplay o f political forces’ (List 1990). The 
developments o f the late 1990s and early 2000s show that the decisions taken in that key period 
(1989-1993) had great significance for maintaining the status quo for years to come, and that 
the alliance between the Church and political society was maintained.
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Constitution
The constitutional debate that took place in Poland throughout the 1990s brought together the 
most important issues concerning religion, politics and church-state relations that had persisted 
in the public domain after the fall o f communism. This was due to the essential character of the 
debate on basic law, together with the vivid interest o f religious organisations, particularly the 
PRCC, in the matter, as well as the eagerness o f political organisations to use religious rhetoric 
in the debate.
In terms o f the PRCC’s role in public life, the constitutional debate was particularly 
important. Even though the Church’s actions in public and political life were muted after 1993 
(see above in this chapter: Education and abortion), it joined in the debate as one of the most 
important stakeholders, and remained one of the key figures in constitution-making until 1997, 
when the document was approved in a referendum. The four most important features o f this 
debate were the mobilising potential o f the Catholic Church, the influence o f the Church on 
politics and politicians, the political establishment’s eagerness to co-operate with the Church, 
the role o f discourse in public debate and the ability o f the Church and its allies to promote 
their agenda in the public sphere.
The Polish constitutional debate started in the early 1990s. After a regime change and 
numerous changes in society and the economy, Poland needed a new basic legal framework. 
The first attempts at reforming basic law during the first democratic term o f the Polish 
parliament after 1989 proved futile, due to large differences in opinion on how the new 
constitution should be constructed and approved. Since the old communist constitution o f 1952 
did not provide a good framework for the governance and functioning o f the new regime, it 
was temporarily replaced by the so-called ‘Small Constitution’, a legal act with basic 
constitutional provisions, adopted in 1992 (Ustawa 1992).
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The Church positioned itself in the centre o f the constitutional debate in its very early 
stages. In 1990 the Episcopate published a letter on the ‘Position of the Conference of the 
Episcopate o f Poland on the Axiological Premises of the New Constitution’ (Stanowisko 1990), 
even though the decision-making process had not really started. The return to power o f the ex- 
communists in 1993 accelerated developments. Both the SLD and the PSL, stemming as they 
did from mainstream communist parties, sought a legitimate strategy that would strengthen their 
position in the new democratic reality. Participating in the drafting of a new constitution in a 
situation where both parties had a parliamentary majority proved a perfect legitimising strategy. 
O n the other hand, the Church and right-wing parties, acting in agreement, did not welcome 
the new SLD-PSL initiative for the exact same reason—they feared that the ex-communist 
majority would try to impose their will and apply their version o f the constitution. This meant 
that, whereas the post-communist parties and their coalition partner, the UP, were inclined to 
reach a compromise regarding a number o f issues, the Church and right-wing parties were very 
radical in their demands and not inclined to negotiate their position—an indication o f strength 
and confidence in their power.
The first, and probably most important, marker o f the significance o f religion in public 
debate was the fact that the Church and its allies, including right-wing political parties and civil 
society organisations, managed to mainstream the Church’s agenda in the constitutional debate 
and secure a very important place within it. Despite a plethora o f stakeholders and views on the 
most important issues within the constitution, most debates were limited to two main groups, 
the liberal and left-wing establishment, most often represented by the Freedom Union (‘Unia 
Wolnosci’, UW), the SLD, the PSL and the UP, and the right-wing, conservative and pro- 
Church circles represented by the Church and smaller right-wing parties later united in the AWS. 
This division pre-determined the character o f most debates and polarised public opinion along 
secular-religious lines.
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The most important strand o f the Polish constitutional debate—its preamble—illustrates 
the above-described phenomenon well. The fact that the most important part o f the 
constitutional debate did not concern institutional arrangements, checks and balances or any 
other governance issues, so keenly debated in other countries, but rather values, symbols and 
the definition of the nation, indicated that symbolic politics could still mobilise Poles like they 
did in the times o f the Great Novena (as outlined in Chapter 3).
A preamble is not part o f the constitution text as such; it is merely an introduction and 
a statement of the values and intentions o f the law-makers. Most European countries’ 
constitutions have preambles, but those o f CEE countries focus on history and political changes 
in the country; a preamble is not an essential part o f the basic law.
The preamble debate focused on a number o f issues, but those particularly relevant from 
the point o f view o f religion and politics were the definition of nation, the source o f state law 
and the Invocatio Dei (‘Call on G od’, a reference to God in a legal text). Although none of these 
refer to specific legal clauses within the constitution, and have no legally binding power, they 
became the most hotly contested issues in Polish public opinion since the collapse of 
communism.
The seemingly irrelevant issue of defining what a nation is in the Polish constitution’s 
preamble developed into a major discussion that lasted four years. The first draft o f the 
constitution prepared by the parliament’s Constitutional Commission opened with the words 
‘We, Polish citizens’. This prompted the conservative and pro-Church politicians to start 
pondering the importance o f the ‘nation’ (i.e. an ethnic concept) as opposed to ‘citizenship’ and 
‘society’, which they deemed modern and not historically rooted. This demonstrated the 
Church’s readiness to ‘historicise’ the constitutional debate, which proved useful with regards 
to other issues that the Church wanted to put forward (see below), and created a legitimisation 
strategy for the Church’s continuous involvement. The Church’s official reaction to the first 
draft and the citizenship issue was summarised by Archbishop Jozef Michalik o f Przemysl:
I f  the great majority of citizens have a clear Polish national consciousness, and refer 
to it in its life to be of precious value, and the parliament considers that it is not 
necessary to include it in the preamble because it would offend a small group of 
another nationality or descent, we have to ask the question: do we live in a 
democratic country, or in democratic totalitarianism? Analyzing the preamble, one 
gets the impression o f an unjustified fear. It seems as if the authors would want to 
dilute the feeling of a national tie and its identity build among others on the basis 
o f faith, replacing it by a right to the minority. So the Christian, national majority 
should be the hostage o f the minority. This would be unfair, and conflict generating.
(Michalik, in Zubrzycki 2001:638)
Michalik’s statements confirmed the PRCC’s ambivalence towards democracy. The 
protection o f minority rights, one o f liberal democracy’s central premises, was not one o f the 
Polish Church’s priorities, certainly not when it came to defending traditional, national and 
religious values. The civic values upon which modern democracies are based came second to 
religious-ethnic nationalism. Although Michalik was referring to a contemporary discussion, his 
idea may be traced back to Cardinal Wyszynski’s ‘theology o f the nation’ and his vision of 
building a religious-ethnic community opposed to the secular state (see Czaczkowska 2009 and 
Majewski 2010). Pope John Paul II also often emphasised that the two most important 
constituents o f humanity are nation (not society) and family—a view that the Polish Church has 
eagerly taken up in the constitutional debate.
Michalik’s argument was also very much in line with the position o f radical and Catholic 
right-wing parties and groups, which opposed the new constitution on similar grounds. Back in 
1992, Wieslaw Chrzanowski, a prominent Christian-National Union politician and intellectual, 
said that ‘The nation consists o f people among whom certain values are formed, a certain culture
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which is the heritage o f the past’, and thus favoured a close link between Church and state 
(Chrzanowski 2005:274). During the constitutional preamble debate, another right-wing 
intellectual, Wojciech Cejrowski, went further, declaring that a ‘foreigner who setded in Poland 
recendy and received Polish citizenship will have as much right to decide on matters o f the 
Nation as the descendants o f Tadeusz Kosciuszko [an 18th century Polish general and military 
leader]’ (Cejrowski in Burnetko and Press 2007). Cejrowski’s fears o f foreign domination were 
marked: he described certain new, non-Polish citizens as ‘slant-eyed Vietnamese (...) for whom 
a Christmas Tree is a ridiculous custom and Holy God in Trinity is the result of reincarnation’ 
(Cejrowski, in Burnetko and Press 2007). The same ethnic understanding o f nationhood was 
widely adopted by the right-wing parties that formed the AWS and won the 1998 elections 
(Wenzel 1998:144). The Episcopate’s official position was that the law-makers should 
acknowledge the importance o f the ‘Polish Nation’ as a key subject o f the constitution, rather 
than Polish citizens (Gowin 1999:243), a crucial distinction favouring an ethnic (and religious) 
understanding o f the electorate.
The second basic constitutional notion—defining the source o f the country’s legal order— 
also turned into a major debate in Poland. The Episcopate’s expectation was that the law-makers 
would list God-given natural law as the supreme source o f rights, standing above the positive 
law decreed by the secular state (Czaczkowska 1997). This demand was questioned even within 
the Church, however, as it went beyond the legal practice o f any democratic state. The head o f 
the Episcopate’s own constitutional team, Father Remigiusz Sobanski, challenged the 
Episcopate’s position by asking: ‘Who would be competent to declare incompatibility with 
natural law?’ and declaring this demand impossible to realise (Sobanski 1997). President 
Kwasniewski stated that ‘in no secular country with a neutral worldview does natural law stand 
above positive law’ (Kwasniewski, in Zubrzycki 2001:646), but a pamphlet published by a 
prominent Catholic journalist in 1997 accused the new constitution o f ‘rejecting natural law, and
231
accepting solely the laws constituted by the state’, thereby ‘rejecting our Latin civilisation and 
reliance on Byzantine civilisation’ (Burnetko and Press 2007:37).
This discussion o f natural law extended into another, even more important debate: that 
pertaining to the place o f God and religion in the preamble. The Invocatio Dei controversy was 
strictly related to the Church’s agenda and its desire to include God and Christianity among key 
terms o f reference in the newly democratic state, a wish that it had pursued consistently since 
the 1980s, starting from the negotiations with the communist government (as we saw in chapters 
3 and 4). This notion was treated as a priority, and both the Church and those politicians who 
favoured an Invocatio Dei drew upon the most radical arguments to support their point o f view. 
Primate Glemp said that ‘for the faithful Polish society, placing G od’s name [in the constitution] 
equals national identity and ideological sovereignty; it represents the will to refer to the Supreme 
G ood that can be acknowledged by everyone, not necessarily through an act o f faith’ (Glemp 
1995).
It is important to note that, according to Polish Church hierarchy, the constitution 
should not only make a clear reference to God, but specifically to the Catholic vision o f God, 
and omit any references to non-religious value systems. In his reaction to an early constitutional 
draft containing a reference to God and humanist values, Primate Glemp expressed his 
opposition to ‘atheism enriched by Masonic ideology’, and stated that ‘As Catholics, we will 
decidedly stand for the presence o f a reference to God in the preamble. We want a real God in 
the Constitution’ (Glemp 1997). Archbishop Michalik seconded the primate’s view, asserting: 
‘G od is not a kind o f philosophical, Masonic idea, or a vague New Age god’ (Michalik 1997).
The Church’s decisive action against embedding humanist values within the 
constitution, combined with a massive campaign in favour of a ‘God clause’ within it, influenced 
the final shape of the constitutional preamble. The latest draft, presented by the constitutional 
commission o f parliament, was based on a private proposal published by Stefan Wilkanowicz, 
a Catholic journalist, in Tjgodnik Pom^echny, back in 1996. The proposal included a reference to
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God as a source of universal values such as truth, justice, goodness and beauty, leaving space 
for ‘those not sharing such faith [in God] but respecting (...) those universal values as arising 
from other sources’ (Constitution 1997). The ‘other sources’ indicated in the preamble had not 
been named, as they had been in the previous drafts. In addition to this principal reference to 
God, the preamble contained two more references to religion. I t mentioned that Polish culture 
is ‘rooted in the Christian heritage o f the Nation’, and recognised the nation’s ‘responsibility 
before G od’ (Constitution 1997). Christianity was presented in a positive light, as one o f the 
pillars o f national culture. N o other religious tradition was named, which, in view o f Poland’s 
rich history o f multiculturalism, underlining the non-inclusive nature o f the constitution 
(Borecki 2007:12).
The preamble debate, completed with the acceptance of the Tygodnik Pom^echny draft, 
constituted a huge victory for the Church and its allies. Although the issue o f Invocatio Dei and 
the definition o f nationhood were the Church’s top priority in terms o f discourse and its 
symbolic influence on Polish public life, a number o f other constitutional issues attracted its 
attention during the constitutional drafting period. The most important o f them was the model 
o f church-state relations and the related issue o f religious freedoms in the constitution.
The shape o f church-state relations was particularly sensitive. As Poland started to 
develop towards a liberal democracy, there were widespread calls for the separation o f state and 
Church, following the West European model (as we saw in Chapter 2). The separation policy, 
pursued mostly by left and centre political parties, including the SLD and the UW, proved 
difficult for right-wing parties and the Church. This was largely due to the negative experiences 
o f the communist period. In Chapter 3 ,1 set out how the communist government positioned 
itself as a secular regime and favoured the separation o f state and religious matters, while 
effectively discriminating against and repressing religious institutions and limiting the presence 
o f religion in public life. Although the new democratic order meant that the separation policy 
had a different meaning to the communist one, historical associations prevailed. Back in 1992,
Wieslaw Chrzanowski said that he did not believe in the ‘confessional neutrality o f the state’ 
(Chrzanowski 1992). Primate Glemp expressed similar views, even when his own Social Council 
adopted a position calling for state neutrality in matters o f religion. Glemp contended that ‘a 
free Christian nation has the right to a Christian state’ (Agnosiewicz 2003).
Parliamentary lawmakers initially planned to follow the liberal democratic model, and 
proposed an article on church-state separation and one on the neutrality o f the state in religious 
matters. The first clause was immediately challenged by the Church, and the law-makers 
promptly replaced it with the a declaration o f the ‘autonomy and mutual independence’ o f both 
institutions, thus making Church and state equal and elevating religious organisations to semi­
official status, a status not granted to anyone else in the Polish constitution (Nowakowska 1995). 
Additionally, the relations with the Catholic Church were supposed to ‘be determined by 
international treaty concluded with the Holy See, and by statute’ (Constitution 1997). This 
arrangement clearly put the PRCC ahead of other denominations, but fell short o f the pre-war 
constitutional clause recognising Catholicism as the principal religion in Poland. Due to the 
pressure exercised by minority churches, notably the Polish Orthodox Church and the Adventist 
Church, the article declared that all churches and religious organisations had equal rights 
(Borecki 2007:11; Constitution 1997).
A substantial part of public opinion challenged this state o f affairs, accusing parliament 
o f favouring the PRCC over other denominations. Father Jozef Krukowski, head o f the Catholic 
University o f Lublin’s Canon Law Department, and himself a prominent Church intellectual, 
said that the Church’s adversaries had a ‘primitive understanding o f egalitarianism, based on 
likening equality to identity o f all religious denominations, which is contradictory to justice’ 
(Krukowski 1999:32). The Episcopate not only did not acknowledge parliament’s conciliatory 
stance on the issue, but actually went further in its demands by protesting against the second 
clause—the ‘neutrality’ o f the state in Church matters. Primate Glemp criticised the commission 
for using this term, linking it with the communist policy o f persecuting religious organisations.
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As a consequence, parliament proposed a new one: the state would be ‘impartial’ in matters of 
personal conviction (Korbonski 2000:137). Together, the discussions o f the contents o f Article 
25 made it the most widely contested article in the whole constitutional debate. This 
demonstrated the Church’s continued ability to prioritise its agenda in public matters and 
successfully campaign for its view to be adopted as official and state-sponsored.
The next pillar o f the Church’s constitutional campaign, supported by right-wing parties 
and religious organisations across the country, pertained to issues perceived to be o f high moral 
value by the Church, including marriage and family. The question o f abortion, so important for 
the Church’s post-1989 agenda, was again at the forefront of the discussion. The first draft o f 
the constitution granted all citizens the right to life. Bowing to the Episcopate’s request to put 
more stress on preventing abortion, the lawmakers produced an article according to which the 
state ‘shall ensure the legal protection o f the life of every human being’ (Constitution 1997). 
Some members o f the Episcopate escalated their demands, and required that the constitution 
ban abortion outright, but the tensions that had already arisen around the issue, and the 
reluctance of some bishops to aggravate the conflict, mitigated these demands (Gowin 
1999:245). The Episcopate also insisted that parliament rule out homosexual marriages, and this 
plea was swiftly accepted by the constitutional committee: Article 18 o f the final constitutional 
draft declared that marriage is a ‘union o f a man and a woman’ (Constitution 1997).
The last group o f the PRCC’s demands in the social sphere o f the constitutional debate 
pertained to parenting and children’s rights. The Church had long favoured a traditional family 
model, and the proposed article on family did not please the bishops. The law stated that parents 
‘shall have the right to rear their children in accordance with their own convictions’, which was 
in line with the Episcopate’s arguments, but also made clear that upbringing must ‘respect the 
degree o f maturity o f a child as well as his freedom of conscience and belief, and also his 
convictions’ (Constitution 1997). And it was this last clause that provoked the PRCC’s 
concerns—about the possible intrusion o f the state in matters o f upbringing and the potential
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granting to children the right to have a voice in their fate. This seemingly innocuous, common- 
sense statement provoked the PRCC’s protests. Archbishop Michalik said blundy that the 
constitution ‘protects family, but gives children rights, which is bad’ (Czaczkowska 1997).
Despite the fact that the Church managed to attain most of its principal goals regarding 
the drafting o f the constitution, including the Invocatio Dei, the Concordat and the definition o f 
nation and marriage (amongst others), the PRCC did not support the final constitutional draft, 
which was subject to a referendum in May 1997. Although previously supportive of the process, 
the Church decided to reject the document in its totality and engage in a high-profile public 
campaign of opposition, criticising and undermining the document and its authors. This was 
done in co-operation with the Church’s political allies, notably the AWS, which hoped to get 
re-elected on the wave o f anti-constitutional protest, and which tabled its own constitutional 
proposal (see Wenzel 1998).
The range of anti-constitutional arguments used by the PRCC and its allies was very 
broad. The above-quoted Archbishop Michalik summarised them well in his 1997 interview:
It does not defend life and does not promote natural law. It does not oppose 
deprivation. I t does not consider social good, privatisation or property. I t promotes 
liberty, but limits religiosity. (...) I t instates the right to silence, which is dangerous, 
as it can lead to banning evangelisation and religion. I t is also bad that it allows for 
a transfer o f sovereignty to other states.
(Michalik, in Czaczkowska 1997)
Marian Krzaklewski, the AWS leader, drew a symbolic parallel between the anti-constitutional 
campaign and the Church’s anti-communist activity by claiming that the ‘Nation’, represented 
by the AWS, could not accept the constitution produced by ex-communists, and used the 
famous PRCC expression nonpossumus (‘we cannot’), previously used by the PRCC in opposition
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to Stalinist repression in 1953 (mentioned in Chapter 3). The AWS thus offered a merger of 
patriotic, national and religious values in a political-religious alliance that was meant to overcome 
the rule o f post-communist parties and lead to the rejection o f the constitution in the May 
referendum. By comparing the constitutional draft to a ‘Bolshevik avalanche’, Krzaklewski 
called on Poles to unite against another (perceived) foreign threat (that is, suggesting that the 
constitution was drawn on the inspiration o f the West) by following the voice o f ‘their’ Church. 
The culmination o f the anti-constitutional campaign came in early May, just days before the 
referendum. The Episcopate published a communique openly calling for the rejection o f the 
constitution, as it raised ‘serious moral doubts’ (Communique 1997). The communique was a 
negation of the PRCC’s earlier declarations o f political neutrality, and further aggravated the 
political conflict surrounding the constitution. Although it was accepted in the referendum and 
entered into force a few months later, the constitution remained a contentious issue, and was 
used by the PRCC in later public debates, e.g. during the European integration debate to show 
that it allows for the EU to control Poland (see comments below on the European integration 
debate).
All in all, the constitutional debate was a good example o f an all-out public campaign 
initiated and co-ordinated by the Church within the public sphere. It proved the Church’s ability 
to influence policy-making and promote its agenda in Polish politics. In many ways, it was 
reminiscent o f the Church’s activity in the 1989-1993 period, both through its intensity and the 
methods employed by the Church to achieve its goals. Additionally, the campaign proved that 
politicians from left-wing parties were equally prone to PRCC lobbying, and that they were 
ready to accommodate PRCC demands even in the most strategic areas of law-making. And 
once the Church had secured its strategic interests in the constitution, it became more involved 
in one o f the main political debates of the last two decades in Poland: European integration.
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European integration
Integration with the European Union was one o f the main challenges that the Polish state and 
society faced after 1989. It was a long-term process, encompassing a number o f social, economic 
and cultural changes, and engaging all social and political groups. Although the European 
integration process did not concern religious affairs directly, it was perceived as a major 
modernisation trend affecting Poland’s national identity, and defining the future o f the country. 
As such, it remained at the centre o f attention not only for the PRCC but also other religious 
groups and organisations, and often involved discussions about the country’s religious identity 
and the role o f religion in public life. Moreover, as it was a negotiation process between virtually 
all social groups, it also involved the PRCC as a stakeholder and one o f the key participants.
Although other religious groups and churches were involved in the European 
integration process at different stages, the PRCC played the most pro-active role and entered 
the debate on Poland’s European future in the early 1990s, continuing to contribute all the way 
up to the referendum on Poland’s accession in 2003 and beyond, once the country had already 
entered the European Union.
Immediately after the fall of communism in 1989, the overall attitude o f the Polish 
political establishment and society towards Europe—and wide-ranging integration with Euro- 
Atlantic structures such as the EU and NATO—was overwhelmingly positive. Additionally, there 
was a certain expectation that Europe could gain from Poland’s EU entry. Gowin (1999:225) 
wrote that this attitude was a mix of ‘hope that our country (...) will become a fully-fledged 
member o f the community o f nations o f Europe’, but also that it will ‘be a role model’ thanks 
to its moral and ethical record during the communist period. Bishop Kowalski asked rhetorically 
in 1991: ‘shouldn’t it be our ambition to change the way o f thinking [of Europeans] through our 
entry to the so-called European home?’ (Kowalski 1991). This attitude marked the Church’s 
subsequent attitude towards the European Union: underlining the exceptional character of
Poland’s religiosity and the role that Polish Catholics could play in revitalising European 
religion.
The first wave o f Euro-enthusiasm was, however, the result o f a certain ‘freedom shock’ 
that Poland experienced in the first months and even years o f democratic transformation, a 
period marked by a general openness towards the West and a willingness to embrace all things 
Western, exemplified by the radical economic reforms pursued by Leszek Balcerowicz in the 
first years o f economic change. As the most rapid and chaotic transformation period came to 
an end, the European Union became less than a symbolic embodiment o f Poland’s longing to 
‘rejoin Europe’, but more o f a complex pattern o f co-operation that offered benefits to Poland, 
but also applied new pressures and demanded changes in the country.
The Church’s attitude to Europe developed in a parallel fashion. The Episcopate 
gradually started to voice its first reservations about the integration process, positioning Catholic 
Poland against the decadent West, a rhetoric that accompanied the Church’s European policy 
for years to come. The change in the PRCC’s position, which took place in 1991, was only the 
first o f many turns that the Church’s European strategy took over the next dozen years. Indeed, 
evaluating the PRCC’s stance towards the European Union between 1991 and the 2003 
referendum enables us to assess the Church’s lack o f coherence, its internal struggles and 
overarching tendency to maximise its institutional power in a changing political environment.
Once the PRCC had positioned itself against European integration in 1991, it started 
building a coalition o f political and social groups that would identify with its stance on the issue 
(Leszczynska 2008). Catholic, right-wing parties, including ZChN, were the Church’s natural 
allies in this respect. Since 1992, the Christian-National Union was the only major political party 
that opposed the ratification of an agreement between Poland and the European Communities. 
Henryk Goryszewski, one o f ZChN ’s leaders, warned that as a result o f the agreement Poland 
would find itself ‘among the wolves’, and that it would lose its national identity (Goryszewski 
1993). Concerns about national identity, traditional values and the place o f Poland in a united
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Europe dominated the PRCC’s discourse on European affairs during this period. The Church 
was looking for a new place in the public domain (see previous chapter), and positioned itself 
as a defender of national-religious values and an opponent o f modernity. The European Union, 
however distant in terms o f Poland’s potential membership, was seen as a major modernising 
force, preaching secular, liberal Western values that potentially threatened not only the 
traditional vision of society supported by the PRCC, but also the PRCC’s own position in public 
life (Zielinska 2008).
Despite this growing opposition, it must be noted that, although the Church was 
sceptical o f European integration, and sometimes voiced its concerns regarding this process, 
the issue was not among the PRCC’s key priorities before 1995, as confirmed by Bishop 
Pieronek (Pieronek 1995:25). However, in 1995, as Poland began to co-operate with the 
European Union, and as the new president declared the will to accelerate the integration process, 
the Church’s anti-European rhetoric intensified and broadened in scope. The arguments 
presented by members of the Episcopate that year were representative of the PRCC’s catalogue 
of reservations about the European Union, and modernisation in general. Primate Glemp 
warned in a Jasna Gora sermon that Europe was about to weaken Central-Eastern European 
countries, including Poland, on three levels: ‘economic, lifestyle-moral and religious’ (Glemp 
1995).
These three areas had dominated the Church’s anti-European rhetoric for a number of 
years. The Church’s economic concerns focused on the purportedly ultra-liberal and ruthless 
face o f European capitalism that it believed would take over Poland once the country entered 
the EU. It feared that Poland’s weak and underdeveloped economy would fall prey to European 
giants. In Bishop Stefanek’s words, the European common market was a place where ‘the strong 
(...) buy the weak and turn them into slaves’ (Stefanek, in Czaczkowska 1995). In addition to 
these economic reservations, lifestyle-related and moral concerns focused on the issues that the 
Church had already indicated in its campaigns from the early 1990s: abortion, euthanasia and
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homosexual marriages. The last tier o f the Church’s reservations focused on the EU ’s potential 
to accelerate secularisation, privatise religion and decrease the authority o f the Church (see 
Wiscicki 1996). Here, Primate Glemp again revealed his sympathy for conspiracy theories by 
declaring that ‘ruthless business people striving to enfeeble the countries o f Central and Eastern 
Europe’ so that ‘they can pose no threat by its potential, especially the spiritual one’ (Glemp 
1995b).
This mass anti-European campaign looked increasingly out of place in a country that 
otherwise embraced modernisation, and where most political forces, except the extreme right, 
set European integration as their main foreign-policy goal. Unsurprisingly, then, the position of 
the Episcopate proved hard to defend. Support for European integration among Poles was 
strong—in 1994, 77% of respondents supported Poland’s membership bid, 80% in 1996 and 
63% in 1998 (Stadtmuller 2000:39). Numerous pro-European statements coming from liberal 
Catholic circles, including Tygodnik Pom^echny and even some bishops (including the influential 
Bishop Muszynski o f Gniezno), suggested that the Episcopate’s official position, as expressed 
by Glemp, did not even reflect the voice of a stable majority within the PRCC. The anti- 
European rhetoric presented by Church officials was also at odds with the Vatican. John Paul 
II had long advocated for the European integration process, starting with the reunification o f 
Eastern and Western Europe, hitherto divided by the Iron Curtain. The Pope’s call for Europe 
to ‘breathe with two lungs’ (John Paul II 1988:8) accorded well with those in Poland who 
supported European integration after the fall of the Berlin Wall.
All o f the above-mentioned factors ultimately contributed to the Episcopate’s re- 
evaluation o f its official position. And so it must be noted that, although the official position o f 
the Church changed greatly after 1997 and over the next couple o f years, there remained serious 
divisions within the Church, mostly within the top echelons of the Episcopate, regarding the 
future o f Poland’s European integration. This was reflected in the Church’s behaviour in the 
pre-referendum campaign o f 2003 (see below).
The first signs of the Church’s changed position on Europe came in 1997, soon after 
Pope John Paul II’s visit to Poland. As we have seen, the Supreme Pontiff often referred to the 
contemporary political situation in Poland in his sermons, and made frequent comments on the 
challenges to European integration. This was mostly presented as a positive development, and 
the Pope encouraged Poles to embrace their European future. In his speech on the occasion of 
the anniversary o f St. Adalbert’s death, John Paul II referred to a new wall dividing Europe; this 
time not physical, but mental and spiritual, built through racism, prejudice and lack o f European 
solidarity. He further called for Europe to be a community, not only o f peoples but also of 
spirit, repeating his wish for a spiritual dimension to European integration (John Paul II 
1997:271-277). This was widely interpreted as a request for the Polish Church to accept the 
European integration process as unavoidable, and to engage positively with the challenges lying 
ahead.
The results of the Pope’s words were soon made apparent. During a sermon in the 
autumn of 1997, Bishop Pieronek, one o f the most pro-European members of the Episcopate, 
said that European integration was a challenge and a ‘great apostolic assignment’ for the Church, 
and that ‘Europe should not be feared’ (Pieronek 1997). As confirmation of his words, the 
Polish Episcopate organised a tour o f European institutions for its members. Some authors 
(Korbonski 1999; Leszczynska 2002 and 2008) suggest that the visit played a decisive role in the 
Episcopate’s change of heart. The opportunity to familiarise themselves with European 
institutions, and the role that issues of social solidarity, equality and religious freedoms played 
in the EU, may have influenced the bishops. Other authors (Gowin 1999) point to the fact that 
the visit was the symbolic expression o f a reformed Episcopal European policy. However, it 
can also be argued that the Church noticed that public opinion was supportive o f EU 
integration, and that the PRCC’s opposition to the process might provoke a backlash (Zielinska 
2008).
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In any case, post-1997 developments have shown that the change o f direction is a more 
long-term phenomenon. The public statements o f Church officials after their return from 
Brussels confirm this: Bishop Pieronek said that ‘one should not abuse the Church for the 
purpose o f anti-European demagogy and fuelling anti-European sentiments’ (Pieronek 
1998:130). Bishop Goclowski went further in expressing a new Euro-optimism, advocating that 
‘the Church in Poland never had any reservations concerning Poland’s entry to the European 
Union’ (Goclowski in Leszczynska 2002:131). The Pope issued another strong statement 
favouring European enlargement during his speech to the Polish Parliament in 1999: ‘Poland’s 
EU integration has always been supported by the Holy See’ (Knotz 2003:55).
At the same time, the split within the PRCC regarding European matters was 
increasingly visible. Right-wing and integrist groups, including the Radio Maryja Group, 
displayed radical anti-European sentiments. Nas% D ^ennik wrote about European legislation 
being a ‘brutal attack against humanity, tantamount to an open struggle against the Catholic 
Church’ and an ‘ideology based on a horrible homo economicus (...) causing death and 
destruction’ (Bartnik 2000). Criticism o f the EU was common among lower-ranking clergy and 
some local Catholic media (see Leszczynska 2002:150-158). Nevertheless, parts o f the hierarchy 
remained decidedly Euro-enthusiastic and supportive o f enlargement, albeit with reservations, 
the principal o f which was the issue o f morality and religion in the EU. The Episcopate called 
for ‘restoring Europe for Christianity’ (Casanova 2003:202) and remarked that entering the 
Union was not essentially a threat, but an opportunity for and challenge to Polish Catholics.
The notion o f opportunity and challenge returned with strength in the early 2000s, when 
a number o f changes in Poland and in the European Union engaged the Church in yet another 
high-profile public campaign to defend its interests and promote its point o f view, including a 
plea to consider the views o f the Catholic majority. At the 2000 Nice Summit, the EU  adopted 
its Charter o f Fundamental Rights, a document enshrining human rights, including economic 
and social rights, within European legislation. It contained numerous references to issues at the
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centre o f the Church’s interests, including clauses on equality, dignity, solidarity and citizens’ 
rights (Charter 2000). Since Poland’s EU entry was imminent, the Charter had the potential to 
influence the Polish legal system; the Church’s primary concerns were that this would lead to 
the liberalisation o f abortion law and the legalisation o f euthanasia and homosexual 
relationships. The re-election of Aleksander Kwasniewski as Poland’s president in 2000, and the 
accession to power of the SLD in 2001, reinforced the Church’s eagerness to engage in dialogue 
over European matters, as the PRCC feared that the new government will ignore religious 
arguments in the European integration debate.
The drafting process o f the European Constitution, which commenced in 2002 in 
Brussels, brought co-operation between the PRCC and the Polish government back to its early 
1990s level. This was an interesting phenomenon for a number of reasons. First o f all, almost 
ten years had passed since the signing o f the Concordat, and in the meantime the Church’s 
involvement in Polish politics had grown more subtle and less intense (with exceptions, see 
above). Second, the co-operation surrounding the European Convention and pre-accession 
referendum that started in 2002 took place between the PRCC and a post-communist 
government and president—not Solidarity politicians, as had been the case in the early 1990s. 
Primate Glemp held two high-profile meetings with Prime Minister Miller (SLD) and President 
Kwasniewski (formerly SLD) within a couple o f months o f each other. Both politicians 
reconfirmed the vital role the PRCC was to play in European affairs: the Prime Minister declared 
that ‘the voice o f the Church will be very important during the accession referendum’ (Spotkanie 
Premiera 2002), and the President’s chancellery announced that European integration should 
be understood not only as a political and economic process but also a spiritual one (Spotkanie 
Prezydenta 2002).
The draft European Constitution dealt with a number o f issues previously raised by the 
Church on the occasion of debating the Polish constitution: Invocatio Dei, abortion, sexuality and 
national sovereignty. This time, however, the Church’s pivotal role in the accession process,
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particularly in the EU referendum scheduled for 2003, made the PRCC’s support much more 
crucial. Polish politicians o f all persuasions supported the PRCC’s position, but the majority of 
European politicians refused to include references to Christianity and religion in the 
constitution; indeed, the final version o f the European Constitution, published in July 2003, 
contained no references to Christianity. President Kwasniewski, a former communist 
apparatchik and a self-declared secular social democrat, called the lack o f Christian references 
in the EU constitution a ‘misunderstanding’, as ‘Europe would not be what it is without its 
Christian roots’ (Kolska 2003). The Episcopate was more radical in its assessment o f the new 
EU  document, calling it ‘ahistorical and insulting towards the Fathers o f New Europe’ 
(Jackowska 2003:135).
In the meantime, another important public debate developed, with the PRCC playing 
an significant role. In the run-up to the pre-accession referendum, the pro-European 
government could not be sure that the vote’s outcome would be satisfactory. To begin with, the 
voice o f Euro-sceptical circles, including those within the PRCC who opposed the EU, was still 
strong. The turnover in the proposed referendum needed to exceed 50% of eligible voters; since 
electoral participation had chronically suffered in the post-1989 period, this threshold was not 
easy to meet. Both of these factors rendered the PRCC’s support crucial to the government’s 
referendum success. In December 2002 alone, Prime Minister Miller went to the Vatican to 
meet Pope John Paul II, and then hosted Primate Glemp in his office to discuss matters o f 
European integration. Both dignitaries assured Miller o f their support for the cause. I t seemed 
that the government had secured this front in the European batde ahead. It was surprising, then, 
that the day after Miller’s meeting with Glemp, the ruling party announced a plan to revise the 
abortion law in order to make it much more liberal. All o f a sudden, the Church’s support for 
European integration waned. Archbishop Muszynski claimed that the question o f abortion 
‘could have significant influence on the citizens’ standpoint before the accession referendum’, 
thus suggesting that if  the government were to go ahead with planned abortion reform, the
PRCC would withdraw its support for the EU (Muszynski 2002). The PRCC’s prom pt reaction 
to the SLD’s abortion reform plans proved that the Church’s support for European integration 
remained insincere, but it also demonstrated the PRCC’s continuous leverage on government 
politics.
As a result o f the PRCC’s protests, the government swiftly dropped the abortion plans. 
Both Church officials and politicians denied that any deal had been made, but numerous sources 
claimed otherwise (Janicki and Wladyka 2009). In January 2003, the government sent an official 
note to the European institutions informing them that the impending Accession Treaty should 
not apply to ‘matters o f moral significance and relating to the protection o f human life’ 
(Deklaracja 2003). A few months later, the Sejm rushed to reassure the PRCC of its loyalty in 
this matter, by adopting a special resolution declaring that ‘Polish legislation is not limited by 
any international regulations within the domains of: moral order o f social life, dignity o f family, 
marriage and education, as well as protection of human life’ (Uchwala 2003). Even though the 
two most important political institutions, the Sejm and the government, issued declarations 
reaffirming their support for the PRCC’s position and annulling the previously tabled abortion 
legislation proposal, the PRCC’s final word on European enlargement remained ambivalent. In 
a statement issued in early May, just weeks before the EU accession referendum, the Episcopate 
adopted a very indecisive stance on European integration. According to Leszczynska (2008), 
the Church decided to provide moderate support for EU integration mostly because the 
majority o f Poles supported it, and it was clear that the referendum would approve Poland’s EU 
entry. Although bishops called for all Catholics to participate in the referendum, they warned 
against ‘propaganda’ coming from both sides, and reminded the electorate that Europe could 
only be united as a union o f values and spirit (Slowo Biskupow 2003). Once again Pope John 
Paul II had to intervene: in an address to Polish pilgrims in Rome in late May 2003 he said that 
‘Poland has always constituted an important part of Europe and today Poland cannot exclude 
itself from this community’ (John Paul II 2003).
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The referendum took place in June 2003. An overwhelming majority (77%) of the voters 
supported Poland’s EU entry. Afterwards, the accession support levels for EU integration 
remained constantly high. And, as the matter came off the political agenda, PRCC’s interest in 
it dropped. Today, issues pertaining to morality and sexuality, as mentioned above, still remain 
at the centre o f the Church’s attention, and any European initiatives in the field are usually 
subject to PRCC scrutiny. All in all, however, European integration is no longer a contentious 
topic for the Polish Church, and does not merit much attention—mainly because Poland is now 
firmly embedded within EU structures, and there is little political controversy about European 
integration (Burgonski and Sowinski 2011).
Radio Maryja Group
The Catholic media plays an important role in Polish social life. As o f 2002, 43 Catholic radio 
stations were officially registered and operating (Fras 2002). The popularity o f religious media 
is mostly due to the social significance o f religion, not to the strength o f the media outlets 
themselves, as they are mostly attached to local dioceses and have limited resources and little 
independence. There is one notable exception to this rule: the Radio Maryja Group, established 
by a Redemptorist monk, Father Tadeusz Rydzyk. The three main pillars o f Father Rydzyk’s 
vast media empire are a number o f media outlets, a community of supporters and a network of 
political and business connections.
The history of RMG’s development, and the influence Rydzyk exercises on Polish 
politics—including those in the highest echelons o f power across the political spectrum—are an 
important testimony to the continued mobilising potential o f religion in Poland. Quite 
importantly, this mobilisation takes place far from the decision centres o f the PRCC. Although 
RMG media (see below) portray themselves as Catholic and focus greatly on religious content,
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numerous cases o f PRCC-RMG conflicts have shown that the Episcopate does not exercise 
authority over the group (Ideologia Radia Maryja 2010).
The media outlets constituting the Radio Maryja Group today include a radio station— 
Radio Maryja, the most important part o f the group—a daily newspaper (Nas% D^iennik, ‘Our 
Daily’), a TV station (T V  Trwam), a private university in Torun (‘Wyzsza Szkola Kultury 
Spolecznej i Medialnej’, College o f Social and Media Culture), a charitable foundation (Lux 
Veritatis), a museum and an array o f other projects—all with a strongly nationalist-Catholic 
profile, often in conflict with the PRCC’s official position (RM website 2007).
RMG represents a strong integrist current within the PRCC, so-called ‘closed’ 
Catholicism, as opposed to the ‘open’ Catholicism of liberal and intellectual groups within the 
Church (Gowin 1999:344). The main features o f the closed Catholicism represented by RM 
include identifying Polish national identity with Roman Catholicism, linking nation with state 
and opposing social changes and Western-style modernisation. The post-1989 democratic 
changes were perceived by the integrists as a period o f anti-Catholic struggle. The alternative 
that they offered was anti-modernist revolution (based on the sense of belonging to a Catholic 
community) and opposing reforms and the liberal world order. This approach was, in many 
ways, a continuation o f the Church’s activities during the communist era, with the communist 
enemy replaced by a liberal one (Ideologia Radia Maryja 2010).
The empire took over a decade to build up, from very humble beginnings. Initially, the 
station only broadcasted locally, but within the first couple of years it had managed to cover 
80% of Poland’s territory. Rydzyk’s first major public appearance took place in 1994, when the 
station was about to receive its nationwide licence. RM competed with two major commercial 
radio stations, Radio Zet and RMF FM. In order to secure a licence as a privileged ‘social 
medium’, Radio Maryja had to convince the state media watchdog, the National Broadcasting 
Council (‘Krajowa Rada Radiofonii i Telewizji’, KRRiT), that it operated as a non-commercial 
outlet, and that its main focus was religion and prayer. Rydzyk embarked on a vociferous public
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campaign advertising his radio as a purely religious initiative that required the support o f all 
believers. A t the same time, he started portraying all those opposed to RM’s privileged status as 
enemies o f the faith and of God. His media campaign resulted in over 50,000 letters o f support 
being sent to the KRRiT (Piskala and Potkaj 2007:88). Thanks to Rydzyk’s skilful campaign, 
RM was granted the licence it wanted, with the support o f all politicians on the KRRiT board, 
including post-communists, who were usually opposed to granting exclusive privileges to 
religious broadcasters (Czubkowska and Rzeczkowski 2006). After receiving the status o f a 
social broadcaster, Rydzyk started expanding the influence o f his radio station (and then other 
media) beyond the Church and religious matters. From the very first years o f operation, Radio 
Maryja, and then other parts of RMG, actively participated in Poland’s public life, and often got 
involved in politics.
As we saw in Chapter 4, the 1995 presidential election was highly contentious, and a 
number o f religious media and other organisations became involved in the electoral campaign. 
None o f them, however, did so with the dedication and fervour o f Radio Maryja. By 1994, RMG 
had already acquired a rather bad name among the general public as an anti-liberal and 
nationalist media outlet for its attacks on Jacek Kuron, a former opposition politician and a 
presidential candidate, focusing on his purportedly ‘Stalinist’ past and Jewish background 
(Piskala and Potkaj 2007:70). During the last months o f the election campaign, when the 
principal right-wing contender, Lech Walesa, faced the threat of defeat from other right-wing 
(albeit more liberal and less pro-Church) candidates, including Kuron and Hanna Gronkiewicz- 
Waltz, chairperson o f the National Bank o f Poland, RM engaged in a smear campaign against 
the latter two. In its typical style, it offered a call-in platform for its listeners, allowing them to 
voice all sorts o f concerns about, and hurl insults at, politicians whom RM did not favour. Both 
Kuron and Gronkiewicz-Waltz were accused o f hiding their ethnic (i.e. Jewish) origins and 
connections to Freemasonry (Czubkowska and Rzeczkowski 2006). RM’s activity contributed
249
to Walesa’s success in the first round of elections, but did not stop him from losing in the 
second round against the post-communist candidate.
Having established itself as a considerable power source in national politics, RM 
continued meddling in government and parliamentary life. In 1996, it became involved in the 
anti-abortion campaign, when the socialist-dominated parliament initiated work on an abortion 
liberalisation law (discussed in Chapter 4). Rydzyk frequently appeared on air declaring that MPs 
supporting the liberalisation were ‘prostitutes’ who should have their heads shaved (Makowski 
1998). Although certain voices within the PRCC strongly disagreed with Rydzyk’s contentious 
methods, no formal action was taken against the cleric.
Encouraged by growing popular support—it was now the fifth most popular radio station 
in Poland, with a listener base o f almost five million (Millward Brown 2006)—Rydzyk moved 
on from offering a forum for opinions to intervening direcdy in elections and government. In 
the 1997 parliamentary election campaign, Rydzyk mediated with the AWS to get RM-supported 
politicians and activists onto electoral lists. As a result, over 30 o f them, including an RM 
announcer, Anna Sobecka, became AWS MPs. As one o f Rydzyk’s former co-workers testified, 
‘Father-Director’ (this was Rydzyk’s nickname as head o f the station) used to regularly contact 
‘his’ MPs, and not only instruct them about the station’s policies, but ‘simply call them up and 
reprimand’ them in cases where he did not agree with their actions (Czaczkowska and 
Rzeczkowski 2006).
After the creation o f a daily newspaper and the opening o f a satellite TV station, 
Rydzyk’s influence increased considerably. A t the same time, RM maintained the contentious, 
privileged status o f a ‘social broadcaster’, which gave it numerous tax and licensing benefits. 
The PRCC made moderate attempts at curbing Rydzyk’s political activity by creating a special 
Pastoral Care Team to supervise RM’s operations (Episcopate 2002). Despite this, RM G’s 
highly political activity continued. Before the 2001 parliamentary elections, Rydzyk proved yet 
again that he held the key to the support base o f radical and nationalist voters. Although the
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AWS maintained its right-wing and pro-Church rhetoric, Rydzyk decided that it was time to 
withdraw its support for the AWS and champion a new political formation. The establishment 
o f the LPR contributed to the AWS’s total defeat in the elections and the emergence o f a new, 
more radical right-wing party. The LPR, despite its very short history and lack o f clear 
leadership, secured 8% of the vote and 38 parliamentary seats. Most LPR MPs openly pledged 
allegiance to Rydzyk and his radio station. But this short-lived political alliance ended when the 
LPR endorsed the results o f the 2003 EU referendum, which Rydzyk decided to boycott 
(Czaczkowska, Rzeczkowski 2006). Yet again Rydzyk showed his outstanding political instinct 
when he decided to support the Law and Justice’s (PiS) electoral campaign in 2004 and 2005. 
Once PiS won the parliamentary elections, Rydzyk found himself close to the highest 
government officials. For their part, PiS generously rewarded RMG for the support rendered to 
them, dispensing government grants and exclusive coverage o f government events for T V  
Trwam (see above).
After PiS’s and LPR’s defeat in the 2007 elections, RMG retreated to opposition, with 
only occasional support for PiS’s political activity (Ideologia Radia Maryja 2010). Rydzyk once 
again chose temporary political alliances over consistent support for any one political party or 
faction, which would make him dependent on the prevailing political climate; in the unstable 
party politics o f contemporary Poland, this strategy allowed him to be constantly present in 
politics simply by switching between allies.
Although to date Rydzyk has been present in Polish public life for almost two decades, 
nothing seems to endanger his popularity or power. As mentioned above, the PRCC has tried 
to curtail his controversial political activity on numerous occasions, but without much zeal or 
success. In 2006, even the Vatican stepped in to curb Rydzyk’s active defiance o f Church 
authority (Purvis 2006), which temporarily limited RM’s meddling with national politics, but this 
had no long-term effect. Despite this disapprobation, individual bishops do not refrain from
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visiting his station, and frequently appear in his programmes. In 2007, over 20 bishops visited 
RM and T V  Trwam every month (Bishops in Radio Maryja 2010).
Rydzyk and his empire seem to be resistant to all forms of control and supervision, even 
those coming from state authorities and the judiciary. The character o f Rydzyk’s zealous 
entrepreneurial activity has been put into question on numerous occasions. As outspoken 
opponents o f economic liberalisation, RMG became involved in a number o f controversial 
business initiatives aimed at supporting Polish enterprises against foreign competitors and 
saving them from bankruptcy or takeovers. The most prominent case involved a public 
fundraising campaign to buy back the famous Gdansk shipyard from the state. Even though 
hundreds o f millions of dollars o f donations were collected, no money was actually spent on 
the takeover, and the money’s fate is still unclear (Morawski 2006).
Besides his shady business activities and interest in behind-the-scenes lobbying in 
government politics, Rydzyk’s power lies in RMG’s strong listener community and its potential 
to mobilise public opinion behind causes he favours. Since the early years o f their creation, RM 
radio, the newspaper and the TV station have been known for their coherent nationalist- 
religious, anti-liberal rhetoric. The most frequently targeted ‘enemies’ o f RMG include: left-wing 
and liberal politicians, the homosexual community, foreign and private capital, the European 
Union, the United States, Jews and other religious minorities, private media companies and all 
those who dare to disagree with the ‘Father-Director’ (Kowalski 1997).
Radio Maryja’s ultraconservative rhetoric has become a powerful unification theme for 
sections o f Polish society that feel dispossessed in the wake o f the ideological and economic 
reforms pursued since 1989. Radio Maryja provides a voice for them by promoting and creating 
a group identity based around key conservative-Christian values and radical-right political 
ideological discourses. Such a strong group identity, and an accompanying negative attitude 
towards alternative opinions, has led to exclusion, and does not foster open dialogue within 
Polish civil society. By providing fertile ground for conspiracy theories, and by inciting public
252
opinion, Radio Maryja’s radical discourse divides Polish public life and undermines the authority 
o f religious organisations, most notably the PRCC and the Vatican. For almost twenty years, 
the authorities o f the Polish Church have been unable to curtail the political activism of Father 
Rydzyk and his empire. Despite direct criticism from the Vatican and endless Polish groups and 
organisations, Radio Maryja is free to broadcast as the ‘Catholic voice in your home’ and 
contribute to the public presence o f integrist, right-wing Catholicism. The PRCC hierarchy 
chose the controversial and antagonising influence o f RMG over Church unity and its public 
image as a politically neutral and democratic institution. This shows that maintaining a high 
public profile for Catholic media, however controversial, was more important than maintaining 
a distance from politics and projecting a consistent image o f the Church. It also showed that 
Rydzyk’s political alliances were valued by the Episcopate, thus providing him with a safety-net 
despite the controversy he caused (Szostkiewicz 2007, 2010). But RMG’s activities are not the 
only area o f activity where the Church has defied public opinion and even the Vatican in 
pursuing controversial activities in the public square.
The PRCC and Jews: the Jedwabne controversy
Even though today’s Poland is largely mono-cultural and mono-confessional, the country’s 
multicultural past (discussed in Chapter 3) makes intercultural and interfaith relations an 
important and sensitive topic of public debate. Although relationships between different 
Christian denominations play a significant role in Poland’s public life, and issues such as the 
growing Muslim presence and NRMs (New Religious Movements) occasionally attract media 
attention, most inter-religious controversies in post-1989 Poland centre on Christian-Jewish 
relations. They often become the focus of public debate, and are a source o f major controversy 
within both political and civil societies. The relations between the PRCC and Poland’s Jewish
community, as well as its relations with world Jewry, remain an important marker o f the public 
prominence of religion. Many o f the issues in question pertain to statehood, national history, 
memory and modernisation. Because o f the religious dimension o f the Polish-Jewish dialogue, 
the Church has secured an important place as a stakeholder in most important issues pertaining 
to Jews and Judaism in Poland’s public life.
The post-1989 Polish Jewish community is estimated at around ten to fifteen thousand 
people (Krzeminski 2003). Despite such very low numbers, Jews and Judaism remain present 
in Poland’s public debate, mainly because o f the historical importance o f Jews in Poland, but 
also because o f contemporary issues such as the Holocaust and the creation o f the State of 
Israel, which o f course remain important for various political, cultural and economic reasons.
Although Polish-Jewish relations are now reviving, anti-Semitism remains a challenge 
for Polish-Jewish and Christian-Jewish relations. A 2002 opinion poll showed that 24% of Poles 
share the conviction that Jews have too much influence on Polish politics’ (Kublik 2002). 
Numerous international organisations point to the fact that, although anti-Semitism no longer 
takes the violent forms that characterised it in the past, the authorities are not doing enough to 
prevent it (Contemporary Global Antisemitism 2008; ECRI 2010). The rapid changes o f the 
1990s, the economic transformation and the revival o f many nationalist and right-wing political 
factions have all exacerbated anti-Semitic sentiments and raised concerns about Poland’s ability 
to cope with its multicultural past (Bauer 1990).
Despite the importance of Polish-Jewish and Christian-Jewish relations, as well as 
widespread concerns about the communist government’s anti-Jewish activity (Kersten 2000), 
the PRCC’s policy towards Jews during the communist period was inconsistent, ranging from 
indifference to minor attempts at dialogue (Checinski 1982; Zaryn 2001). The situation started 
to change after the fall o f the communist regime, but the progress was not substantial. The 
PRCC’s controversial record o f dealing with Polish-Jewish and Christian-Jewish dialogue post- 
1989 confirms that the Church was far from ready to face up to its controversial past and address
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religious and political pluralism in the new reality. This was particularly visible during one o f the 
most important public debates relating to Poland’s wartime past, and Polish-Jewish relations in 
the aftermath o f World War II: the Jedwabne controversy.
Jan Tomasz Gross’s Neighbours, published in 2000, provoked huge public controversy 
and heated public debate on Poland’s wartime history and national identity. The book describes 
the mass-murder o f a Jewish community from the north-eastern Polish town o f Jedwabne by 
their non-Jewish neighbours in July 1941. The evidence provided by the book suggested that 
the pogrom was initiated by the Polish Catholic majority, without any opposition from the local 
authorities—including the local priest—and was carried out with particular brutality (Gross 2000). 
Gross not only challenged the popular image of Poles as victims o f World War II, but also 
provoked a nationwide debate on Polish anti-Semitism (Szarota 2001). Although Gross is a 
historian, his research contravened earlier findings regarding Jedwabne and was subsequently 
challenged by other academics. The Institute of National Remembrance (‘Instytut Pami^ci 
Narodowej’, IPN), a state body responsible for prosecuting Nazi and communist crimes, 
launched an official inquiry into the pogrom. The most contentious issues that the IPN  focused 
on were the responsibility o f the Polish (Catholic) community o f Jedwabne for the mass-killing 
o f their Jewish neighbours, the role o f the local Nazi troops and the reaction o f local authorities. 
Many intellectuals and politicians called for a public apology from the Polish authorities, 
however, regardless o f the outcomes o f the official inquiry. O ther responses varied: from 
ignoring the call for an inquiry entirely, to setting out radical opposition to the publication o f 
Gross’s book and its conclusions, including accusations o f an anti-Polish and anti-Church plot 
involving the powerful international Jewish lobby (Szarota 2001).
The controversy surrounding the religious aspect o f the pogrom—the Catholic majority 
killing a Jewish minority-required the PRCC’s response. Its initial failure to react to, and later 
to engage with, the most important challenges resulting from this case were im portant indicators 
of the Church’s attitude towards religious pluralism, and to Poland’s national identity and
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wartime history. N ot only did the PRCC fail to take a stance during the first months o f the 
debate, but, by allowing some o f its clergy and even more senior officials to issue conflicting 
and often radical statements regarding the tragedy, it undermined its own authority and further 
exacerbated the conflict over Jedwabne.
The Jedwabne debate did provoke an immediate, angry response at a local level, and one 
o f the most fervent critiques o f Gross and the book was by Father Edward Orlowski, priest of 
the parish church in Jedwabne. According to Orlowski, ‘the media provoked’ the Jedwabne 
case, and they were to blame for an attack on the city’s good name; thus Orlowski suggested a 
widespread conspiracy behind Gross’s book and the debate that followed (Pytlakowski 2001).
Orlowski’s words went unnoticed by the PRCC, even though Orlowski’s superior, 
Bishop Stanislaw Stefanek, shared his own conspiracy theories in a 2001 sermon in Jedwabne. 
Stefanek referred to the ‘Shoah-business’ as the main reason behind the Jedwabne controversy, 
remarking that ‘the best business profit is made on the innocent blood of the slaughtered Jews 
and we have to be aware of whose displeasure we expose ourselves to when we talk about it 
loud. That is why such enormous mechanisms have been launched’ (Stefanek 2001). Stefanek 
used the rhetoric o f conspiracy during another sermon in June 2001. O n this occasion, the 
bishop contended that he had been previously warned about a possible ‘attack’ on Jedwabne, 
and that money was the main motivation of the conspirators (Winnicki and Lizut 2001). This 
idea was also supported by Prelate Jankowski, who claimed that Jews were trying to impose an 
enormous ‘extortion’ on ‘poor Poland, devastated by Nazis and communists’ (Jankowski 2001). 
All o f these statements demonstrated that popular anti-Semitism, so widespread in the Church 
before 1939, was still an issue affecting Polish-Jewish relations and the Church’s public standing 
in the new millennium.
It must be noted that the rhetoric of conspiracy and struggle advocated by Jankowski 
and Stefanek an isolated voice within the Church. Bishop Henryk Muszynski, the former head 
o f the Episcopal Commission for Dialogue with Judaism, explained in Tygodnik Pom^echny that,
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even though a complete account o f the events that took place in Jedwabne in July 1941 might 
never be established, the debate on Polish-Jewish relations was necessary, and could possibly be 
very fruitful for both sides (Burnetko 2001). Father Michal Czajkowski, the president o f the 
Polish Council o f Christians and Jews, signed a letter together with key Solidarity leaders calling 
for Polish repentance and mourning for the Jedwabne victims, without even waiting for the 
final results o f the official inquiry. He also called on Poles to participate in the official Jedwabne 
anniversary ceremony on July 10 2001 (Graczyk 2001). In a similar manner, Bishop Tadeusz 
Pieronek said that admitting sin is unconditional in Christianity, and that Poles should admit 
their guilt in the Jedwabne case if  it were proved by the inquiry (Graczyk 2001).
Despite a number of conciliatory voices, however, senior PRCC officials sided more 
often with the radicals—both by failing to restrain them and by pursuing their own controversial 
policies. In response to numerous calls for public reconciliation between the Church and the 
Jewish community, the Episcopate proposed its own commemorative church service in the 
name o f the Jedwabne victims and ‘all the evil that the Jews originally experienced from the 
Poles’ (Lizut 2001). Yet the significance of this conciliatory step was undermined by the fact 
that the Episcopate decided to act alone. Furthermore, Primate Glemp put the whole 
reconciliation process into question by embracing the Jedwabne conspiracy theories and 
declaring that the ‘trend for [Rabbi Avi] Weiss and the Carmelite order passed, now it’s time for 
Gross and Jedwabne’, suggesting that the whole Jedwabne case was planned and administered 
by the Jewish lobby (Kaminski 2001). Glemp also cited Jewish participation in the Soviet 
administration during wartime Poland as a possible justification for the pogrom. Furthermore, 
Glemp rejected the arguments o f those who wanted to ‘force a reply’ from the PRCC by 
suggesting that an apology was due from the Jewish community for communist crimes 
committed by Jewish members o f the party (Kaminski 2001).
Glemp’s tendency to combine a conciliatory tone with anti-Semitic stereotyping was 
reaffirmed in an interview published in May 2001, in which Glemp decided to reveal the
257
background o f the Episcopate’s Jedwabne policy and some o f his own views on Jews and 
Jewish-Christian relations. In his opening remarks, Glemp said he was not convinced that the 
PRCC should be involved in the Jedwabne debate, and that Gross’s book had been written at 
someone else’s request. When asked about the nature of the planned commemorative service, 
the Primate complained about an anti-Church campaign, and said that, since the Polish Church 
had previously apologised to Jews in 1990 (referring to the letter on the 25th anniversary of 
Nostra Aetate), this should be enough (Glemp 2001).
He further shared the Episcopate’s doubts over the reciprocal character o f the apologies. 
He said that the Episcopate wondered if the Jews should also apologise for their support o f the 
Soviets, their participation in the security apparatus o f the communist state and their co­
responsibility for transporting Poles to Siberia. The Primate also offered a brief comment on 
Polish pre-war anti-Semitism, stating that Jews were ‘smarter than Poles’ and knew how to abuse 
them. Glemp then claimed that ‘strange Jewish folklore’ was one o f the main reasons for 
negative attitudes towards Jews (Glemp 2001).
In March 2001, the PRCC decided that no official document from the PRCC was 
necessary in the Jedwabne case. The spokesperson for the Episcopate, Father Adam Schultz, 
said that ‘the statements on the Jedwabne massacre made by Primate Glemp and other bishops 
fully present the Church’s attitude to this painful drama’, and that ‘the Episcopate will not issue 
an official statement in this respect’ (Nie b&d%ie 2001). The Episcopate finally decided to organise 
its own commemoration ceremony with a Mass on May 27 2001. The venue and date for the 
Mass had been carefully, if very interestingly, selected. The All Saints Church in Warsaw stood 
next to the walls o f the Jewish Ghetto during WWII. The church’s wartime provost, Father 
Maurycy Godlewski, had been known for his anti-Semitic sermons and activities before the war, 
but he had then saved Jews from the ghetto (Graczyk 2001). Ironically, a year after the Jedwabne 
Mass it was discovered that the bookshop located in the basement o f the church sold anti- 
Semitic publications. Local Church authorities, although previously informed about this fact,
reacted only when informed by the local press, by ordering the owners of the bookshop to 
remove the publications (Cislak 2002). The date o f the service fell on the eve o f the feast o f 
Shavuot, an important Jewish holiday, making it impossible for Poland’s Chief Rabbi, who was 
invited as the main representative o f Poland’s Jewish community, to attend (Sabor 2008). It is 
impossible to imagine that the PRCC’s authorities did not now about the holiday, putting in 
doubt the sincerity and desire for interfaith dialogue o f the planned service (D^bowski 2008).
All three o f the case studies described above demonstrate the PRCC’s ambivalent and 
dubious attitude to interreligious and intercultural dialogue. Even though the Polish Church 
made some attempts to embrace Poland’s multicultural past and engage in contemporary 
debates on Poland’s national identity—as being composed of multiple cultural elements—a 
number o f controversial statements and actions put the Church’s ability to function in a 
multicultural environment in doubt. And anti-Semitism remains a major challenge, both for the 
Episcopate and for low-ranking clergy. The PRCC is still not able to engage in regular dialogue 
with other faith and civil society organisations, and does not respond well to attempts at revising 
the more controversial parts of its own history, or those o f Polish nationhood (Borowik 2008). 
O n the other hand, the Church seems content to facilitate right-wing and extremist integrist 
groups within society for the sake o f maintaining its high public profile as an institution- 
reminiscent of its treatment o f RMG (see above). There is little evidence o f any regard for 
minority religions or secular-minded groups. Attempts at dialogue are usually conducted in such 
a way that they focus on the Church’s own interests and policies.
Law and Justice Government (2005-2007)
The 2005 parliamentary and presidential elections in Poland were an important development in
relations between religion, politics and public life. The general and presidential elections marked
a departure from the traditional left-right divide in Polish politics, and witnessed the rise o f  two
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major conservative parties that still dominate the Polish political scene today. The parliamentary 
elections brought to power an exotic coalition of the conservative and populist PiS, the ultra- 
Catholic LPR and the peasant-populist SO. PiS became the largest political power in the 
country, securing 27% of the votes and over 33% of parliamentary seats (PKW 2007).
For the first time in post-1989 Poland, all o f the coalition parties publicly and explicitly 
declared their allegiance to the Catholic Church, both before and after the elections. PiS did it 
in the most open and consistent way, both through seeking the support of the highest Church 
authorities, local bishops and priests, and by frequently declaring its pro-Christian agenda and 
boasting o f its past successes in supporting the social doctrine o f the Catholic Church (Kandydaci 
2005). The religious establishment also participated in the public debate preceding the elections 
by commenting on various elements of party programmes important to the Church’s agenda.
The substantial difference in the relationship between religion and politics before and 
after the 2005 elections lies in the increased presence of religious content in almost all spheres 
o f Polish political life. Moyser’s (1991) model o f political secularisation provides a cohesive and 
precise framework for the analysis of this process within a modern state. Moyser’s model will 
be used to illustrate the phenomenon o f the re-emergence o f religion in the Polish public sphere 
after the 2005 elections, looking at all five pillars o f secularisation as devised by Moyser.
Moyser (1991:13) contends that modernisation processes foster the separation o f 
religion and politics and trigger secularisation, constructing it as a complex, five-step process 
(see Chapter 2). The first stage o f Moyser’s secularisation model is constitutional secularisation, 
understood as the process of withdrawing constitutional recognition o f the state for religious 
institutions, so that the state no longer defines its goals in religious terms. Constitutional 
secularisation was never complete in post-1989 Poland, and religious and secular groups did 
clash on a number o f occasions when defining the level o f constitutional secularisation—whether 
during the 1997 constitution debate, European integration or the Concordat (see earlier in this 
chapter and Chapter 4).
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The policies proposed and partially pursued by the post-2005 coalition have led to a 
new dynamic in the constitutional secularisation debate. Law and Justice’s main policy 
documents and pre-election declarations suggested that PiS’s most prevalent political concept, 
the so-called ‘Fourth Republic’, was aimed at revising the foundations o f the relationship 
between the state and the Church, as well as re-addressing the country’s Catholic legacy and its 
place in public life. The whole project, gradually constructed by PiS from the early 2000s, was 
both a complex ideological declaration and a policy document. It was mainly based on 
questioning the achievements of post-1989 Poland, presenting it as a corruption-ridden private 
republic ruled by an informal network o f ex-communist security-service officials, party 
apparatchiks and greedy businessmen. According to PiS, this state of affairs could only have 
ceased under its own rule, and the Third Republic should therefore be replaced by a new, 
reformed state and society (Kaczynski 2003).
Calling for a return to traditional values in public life, putting nation and family first and 
promoting Christian morality were at the forefront of the ‘Fourth Republic’ project, promoted 
during the parliamentary campaign. These ideals featured with similar frequency in Lech 
Kaczynski’s presidential campaign, as expressed on his posters. Kaczynski’s main election 
slogan was ‘Prezydent Czwartej Rzeczpospolitej’ (‘President o f the Fourth Republic’) (PiS 
website 2007). One o f PiS’s flagship policy documents was the draft new constitution, presented 
before the 2005 elections. Its preamble proclaimed: ‘In the Name of God Almighty! We, the 
Polish Nation, thankful to God’s Providence for the gift o f regained independence’ (PiS 
Constitution 2005). In obvious opposition to the status quo (the current preamble referring 
both to believers and non-believers; see above for details o f the 1997 constitutional debate), it 
provided no space for those citizens o f the Fourth Republic who did not belong to any religious 
denomination.
In most cases, the constitutional preamble remains in the sphere o f symbolic politics, 
but in the Polish case it goes beyond symbolism. As mentioned above, the 1997 preamble was
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the result o f a long and sophisticated political bargaining process between the main political 
parties o f the time: the secular Democratic Left Alliance and Freedom Union, and the more 
Catholic-minded Solidarity Electoral Action.
The church-state model shift in the policies of PiS and the Kaczynski twins was 
substantial. In a declaration entitled Catholic Poland in Christian Europe, published at the same time 
as the draft constitution, Jaroslaw Kaczynski, then president o f PiS and later prime-minister, 
declared that ‘throughout all our [Polish] history (...) Christianity is a fundamental fact o f our 
national life’ (Catholic Poland 2005). The document proclaimed that the ultimate goal o f PiS’s 
policies is ‘Guaranteeing Christian rules the place they deserve in social life is a necessary 
element o f the moral renewal of the State’ (Catholic Poland 2005). The declaration contains 
further statements reconfirming PiS’s allegiance to the Catholic Church and the religious 
heritage o f the country, proclaiming an active struggle to maintain the presence o f religion in 
the public sphere. Moreover, PiS openly declared that it ‘rejects the vision of an ideologically 
neutral state as a facade for axiological nihilism’ {Catholic Poland 2005:7). During a meeting at the 
Soros Foundation in 2004, Jaroslaw Kaczynski revealed the mind-set of his party in the 
constitutional debate by saying that ‘we [PiS] are not hiding the fact, that the constitution should 
be based on a value system, that is the only socially known and binding in Poland’—by which he 
meant, basing the most important legal document in the country on Catholic values (Hartman 
2007).
This constitutional support for a single religious doctrine was evident in actions 
undertaken by PiS both in their internal and external policies. During the difficult process of 
drafting the European Constitution undertaken by European politicians gathered at the 
European Convention, PiS MPs focused on securing a place for Christian heritage in the 
preamble, breaking the broad consensus among Polish political forces on promoting the unique 
formula embedded in the 1997 constitution (<Catholic Poland 2005:4). The most tangible 
expression o f PiS constitutional support for the Catholic Church came through the process of
262
drafting the 2007 budget, when it decided to support ‘Swi^tynia Opatrznosci’ (‘Temple of 
Providence’), a multimillion building project undertaken by the PRCC with a PLN 130 million 
(approx. 30-million pounds sterling) budget. This church and museum complex in Warsaw is 
one of the flagship development projects of the Church, and a symbol of its revival after the fall 
o f communism. It is meant to express the gratitude o f the Polish Catholic nation to God for 
saving it from Swedish invasion in the 1600s, as promised in King Jan Kazimierz’s vows taken 
in Czestochowa, but never realised because o f the partition of the country and the impact of 
wars and communist rule (as I mentioned in Chapter 3). Although the legislation on church- 
state relations prohibits the state from supporting religious establishments, PiS officials 
promised financial support back in 2005. Ultimately, the museum and educational pillar o f the 
project had to be separated from the construction of the church, so that the state could legally 
support the investment—to a sum of PLN 40 million (approx. 7 million pounds sterling) from 
the 2007 state budget (Hartman 2007).
The constitutional de-secularisation o f Polish politics under PiS rule was complemented 
by policy de-secularisation. Policy secularisation is a process which occurs when the state 
withdraws from policy domains previously dominated by the Church, and stops regulating social 
life on the basis o f religious criteria (Moyser 2007). Two years of PiS government between 2005 
and 2007 produced a reversal of this trend.
The main expression o f policy de-secularisation was the reform o f the education sector. 
As we saw in Chapter 4, the education debate was most lively during the early 1990s, and has 
remained controversial ever since. However, before 2005, the status quo, favouring the Church 
and right-wing groups, was not challenged. As a result o f the 2005 coalition agreement, the 
Ministry of Education fell into the lap o f the LPR. After the formation o f Jaroslaw Kaczynski’s 
government, the ministry was headed by Roman Giertych, the LPR’s president. One o f 
Giertych’s main policy initiatives concerned the instruction of religion in Polish schools, long a 
bone of contention in Polish politics, as we have seen. As religious education is not a part o f
the official curriculum, pupils should theoretically be presented with the option o f either 
following a voluntary class in Catholic theology, taught mainly by Catholic priests or nuns, or a 
class in ethics. As o f 2005, fewer than 1% o f pupils attend the ethics classes (Religia na matur^e 
2006).
Minister Giertych’s agenda in this field was to include the marks obtained in RE classes 
on the final certificates that pupils receive at the end o f each school year (Religia na matur^e 2006). 
Moreover, Giertych proposed that religion be part o f the new A-level exams as a voluntary 
subject, together with obligatory subjects normally taught at school. In the absence o f a 
sustainable framework allowing for any alternatives (i.e. non-Catholic religions and ethics), 
Giertych’s initiative would mean that most students would only be able to pass an exam in 
religious education, and that taking RE would improve the students’ overall grades.
However, and despite these initiatives, the possibility that the PiS-led government could 
reverse overall trends towards policy secularisation are restricted by the Church’s self-imposed 
limits on claiming the powers of the state. The PRCC was not willing to get actively involved in 
shaping educational policy beyond RE, which prevented Giertych and other like-minded 
politicians from increasing the presence of religion in education (Religia na matur^e 2006).
In the case o f institutional de-secularisation, however, such limits did not apply. This 
third stage o f secularisation, as identified by Moyser, refers to the political saliency and lobbying 
power o f religious institutions and groups acting as pressure groups, political parties and 
movements. PiS’s accession to power left ample space for the reversal o f institutional 
secularisation in many aspects of public life. The most visible expression o f de-secularisation in 
the ‘Fourth Republic’ was the influence exercised by traditional Catholic groups and media on 
government policies, and the government’s 2eal to please the Church and its allies.
Radio Maryja, one o f the most important communication channels for Polish Catholics, 
and an active participant in the public and political life of post-communist Poland (as we saw
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earlier in this chapter), was the most vivid example o f increased church-state co-operation after 
2005. Radio Maryja’s agenda was very much in line with PiS’s concept o f the Fourth Republic.
RM always relied on good relations with politicians, as one o f the opinion magazines 
stated immediately after the 2005 elections: ‘one pope, two presidents and seven prime ministers 
changed (...) since the creation o f RM (...) but Father Director lasts and plays an ever larger 
role in Polish politics’ (Czubkowska 2006). Even so, before 2005, RM’s political influence 
remained more o f a public secret than the open policy of the station or its political allies. The 
2005 parliamentary and presidential campaigns suggested an impending shift in policy, however: 
Father Rydzyk openly promoted PiS candidates during some o f the broadcasts, and largely 
contributed to the defeat of the liberal presidential candidate, Donald Tusk, in the second round 
of elections (Hotub 2005). The electoral victory o f PiS was welcomed by all media constituting 
the RM empire, including the Nas% D^ennik newspaper and the Trwam satellite channel (Ideologia 
Radia Maryja 2010).
Since then, the alliance between the RM group and the government has gone from 
strength to strength. T V  Trwam was given exclusive coverage of the signing of the so-called 
Stabilisation Pact between PiS and two populist soon-to-be-coalition parties (LPR and SO), which 
led to a major controversy (Wisniewska 2006). Rydzyk’s radio and TV outlets both overtly 
supported the PiS government and regularly criticised its opponents. Government officials were 
the only regular guests o f RM’s political broadcasts; some opposition parties, particularly the 
liberal Civic Platform (‘Platforma Obywatelska’, PO), were even informally banned from its 
premises.
And this alliance between parts o f the Church (albeit unofficial parts) and the political 
establishment worked both ways. Grateful for the open support o f its policies, government 
officials did not refrain from commenting positively on Church affairs and favouring its policies. 
The most symbolic act o f this twinning was president Lech Kaczynski’s choice o f the Vatican 
for his first foreign visit. More casual expressions o f the state’s interests in PRCC business
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included Prime Minister Kaczynski’s enquiry about the possible moving o f the seat o f the Polish 
Primate from Warsaw to Gniezno (the historical capital of Poland), and President Kaczynski’s 
intervention in the Wielgus case, where a primate nominee was accused o f being a former 
communist confidante, and who was only asked to step down by the Vatican authorities after 
presidential intervention (Ryec^pospolita 2007).
The most prominent political events occurring during PiS rule pertain to the fourth stage 
of Moyser’s secularisation model, however. Agenda secularisation occurs when issues and 
problems important in the political process lose their religious content. During PiS’s rule, the 
religious dimension o f policy-making, particularly of social policy, became more visible than 
ever before. The set o f issues within the scope o f the Church’s interest have remained constant 
since the fall o f communism: abortion laws, same-sex marriage, sexual education, the Concordat 
and various aspects o f family planning, such as contraception and child benefits (Herbert 2003). 
PiS’s Catholic Poland (2005) manifesto includes an explicit list o f the issues of potential interest 
to the Catholic electorate and the Church, where the party authorities pride themselves on 
supporting the agenda o f the Catholic Church in the law-making process. This has included the 
establishment o f the National Day of Life (to counteract any liberalisation tendencies in relation 
to abortion laws), the rejection of the financial contribution of the state towards the costs of 
contraceptives and opposing those actions o f the Government Plenipotentiary for Gender 
Equality that ‘undermine the moral order’ {Catholic Poland 2005:10), amongst others.
The PiS-LPR-SO coalition took the obligations presented in the Catholic Poland 
declaration seriously, and introduced a whole plethora of religiously motivated policies and 
legislation. N o changes have been made to the restrictive abortion law, and no government 
support has been granted to the pilot programme to introduce the morning-after pill. The post 
o f the Government Plenipotentiary for Gender Equality was abolished, and its powers have 
been transferred to the Family Unit at the Ministry o f Labour and Social Policy (Ministry of 
Labour 2007). This last change reflected a long-term policy pursued by the PRCC, aimed at
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decreasing the focus on gender equality and shifting the state’s attention to family affairs 
(D^browska-Szulc 2008; Stanosz 2010). PiS also sought to reinforce and extend the legal 
definition of marriage (as a union between a man and a woman) in order to block all future 
initiatives pertaining to same-sex marriages, which was another important PRCC demand that 
it had emphasised since the constitutional debate (Biskupz 2011). Minister Giertych ordered the 
withdrawal o f the widely acclaimed Compass Manual for Human Rights Education, edited by 
the Council o f Europe, from the teacher-training curriculum, on the grounds that it promoted 
homosexuality (Kula 2006). The government’s strong conviction that sexuality should be 
considered and judged in religious terms was confirmed by President Kaczynski’s speech at the 
2007 National Forum on Europe, held in Ireland. President Kaczynski, when asked about his 
position on homophobia, replied that he was not homophobic, but was against ‘the idea of 
homosexuality being promoted as an alternative to heterosexuality’, maintaining that ‘if  that kind 
o f approach to sexual life were to be promoted on a massive scale, the human race would 
disappear’ (Kaczynski 2007).
Moyser’s final stage o f secularisation, ideological secularisation, occurs when ‘basic 
values and belief-systems used to evaluate the political realm and to give it meaning cease to be 
couched in religious terms’ (Moyser 1991:14). All of the above-mentioned material relating to 
the previous stages o f secularisation shows that in contemporary Poland many basic values and 
belief-systems functioning in the political sphere are closely linked to religion. PiS’s rule 
strengthened this link. Maciej Giertych, a member o f the European Parliament, father o f the 
education minister and an LPR guru said during his presidential campaign o f 2005 that the 
Church not only has a right, but an obligation to criticise state authorities, and they in return 
have absolutely no right to criticise the Church (Giertych 2001). This logic appears to be 
prevalent among the ruling elites of the PiS government. Jaroslaw Kaczynski, commenting on 
Bishop Wielgus’s case, said that ‘the Church should be strong, and the Primate’s function serves 
this purpose’ (Nosowski 2007). During the aforementioned meeting at the Soros Foundation,
Jaroslaw Kaczynski also stated that the Catholic value system, the foundation o f the Fourth 
Republic, contains ‘nothing that would be unacceptable for a non-believer, unless they are a 
personal enemy o f G od’ (Hartman 2007). This view seems to confirm the inability o f the right- 
wing parties to embrace any alternative worldviews, particularly those coming from the more 
secular-minded parts o f public opinion.
Applying Moyser’s model o f secularisation to post-2005 Poland allows for the 
conclusion that most secularisation trends in the public sphere have been reversed. It is worth 
underlining that this process took place in parallel with Poles’ growing negative attitudes towards 
the public presence o f religion. Haynes’s (1998) categorisation o f religious responses to political 
developments provides a useful tool for examining the links between religious groups and 
institutions and politics as a way to foster de-secularisation and religious republicisation. Haynes 
lists the ‘resistance to the disestablishment and the differentiation o f the religious from the 
secular sphere’, mainly used by fundamentalist religious groups (1998:7). The Polish political 
scene during the PiS-LPR-SO coalition was the stage of many expressions o f this resistance—in 
the fields o f education, family planning and many more—confirmed by the statements o f Church 
officials and Catholic media, mainly from the RM group. The coalition’s actions demonstrated 
that they did not see a clear divide between the secular world o f politics and the religious realm, 
and that they wanted to influence political society through religious means, both directly and 
indirectly.
The second level o f religious response identified by Haynes, namely the ‘mobilisations 
and countermobilisations o f religious groups and confessional parties against other religions and 
against secular movements and parties’ (Haynes 1998:7), can also be observed in Poland’s post- 
2005 politics. Its most vivid expression was the continuous support o f the RM group and parts 
o f the Church establishment for PiS during both the parliamentary and presidential campaigns 
(Kandydaci 2005). Mobilisations against other religious groups remain rare, mainly because of 
their low political power in a country dominated by the Catholic Church. Still, the most
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important enemies o f RM remain the Jews and Jewish organisations. I t is debatable whether this 
hostility is religiously motivated; on most occasions, however, when the issue o f Polish-Jewish 
relations comes back onto the political scene, RM has advertised various accusations against the 
Jews. During the Jedwabne case (as we saw earlier in this chapter), RM was mostly preoccupied 
with defending the honour o f the Polish nation against a supposed worldwide, Jewish-led 
conspiracy (Edelman 2005). In 2006, one of the RM journalists was condemned for anti- 
Semitism by the Media Ethics Council, which did not stop PiS officials from publicly supporting 
and appearing in RM programmes.
With all o f this taken into account, and with careful consideration given to the Polish 
political scene after the 2005 elections, we can see not just an absence o f secularisation trends, 
but an almost complete reversal o f them, despite a decline in individual religiosity and general 
opposition to the increased visibility of religion in politics.
Conclusion
In this chapter I have reviewed the relationship between religion and politics and public 
life after the initial period o f systemic transformation in post-communist Poland until the fall 
o f the Law and Justice government. Those fifteen years (1993-2007) were marked by a close 
relationship between the Catholic Church and all democratic governments, albeit with different 
degrees o f intensity. Moreover, the Church and its allies, including the religious media, 
continuously maintained a high public profile and attempted to influence public life. W hat is 
more, the PRCC and its supporters attempted to monopolise public space in certain areas 
perceived as strategic by the Church, to the detriment o f other civil society organisations and 
religious groups.
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The Church remained most active in key areas o f government policy and public debate, 
including the construction o f Poland’s new constitutional order, its growing economic and social 
modernisation and strategic areas of foreign policy, such as integration with the European 
Union. W hat is more, the PRCC remained a vigilant guardian of the status quo in certain policy 
areas, where it secured significant gains between 1989 and 1993.
By 1993, Poland had in place one o f the most restrictive abortion regimes in the world. 
All attempts at revising the law in this area were challenged by the Church. The PRCC granted 
itself the right to represent what it claimed was the will of the people, and in doing so surpassed 
consultation procedures characteristic o f liberal democracies. The issue o f including religious 
education classes in the state education system was approached in a similar manner. And, once 
the PRCC secured a decision favourable to its policy goals, which happened in 1990-91, it 
refused to re-open the issue, and even used its bargaining power with governments and political 
actors to silence any further debate.
Although the Church defended its behaviour and the policies it implemented in the first 
years of transformation, a certain discourse shift can be observed as having taken place in recent 
years. First o f all, Church hierarchs have become less prominent in their public statements on 
political issues, and usually resort to calls for calming the public debate—a strategy they used as 
a tool for silencing political opponents, particularly in areas where the PRCC had previously 
secured strategic gains. Second, the PRCC has learnt to selectively borrow from the vocabulary 
o f civil society organisations, wherever it saw that this could be of material benefit. And so, 
when defending the presence o f RE classes in 1993, PRCC framed it as a human-rights issue 
that the Church was defending because it had an interest in defending human rights. 
Furthermore, when the Church’s public activity was challenged, the PRCC presented itself as 
only one o f many social actors or civil society organisations, thus having the right to voice its 
concerns in the public square.
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Conversely, on matters pertaining to national identity and statehood, the PRCC has not 
changed the stance it presented in the first years o f democratic transition, and relies on its 
purportedly unique status. It consistently portrays itself and acts as the symbolic representative 
o f the nation on matters pertaining to statehood and identity. During the constitutional debate, 
it fiercely defended the ethnic concept of nation, as opposed to the modern, civic understanding 
of the concept, and actively lobbied for religious values to be firmly embedded within the new 
constitution. This is justified through the fact that Poland is a country with a majority Catholic 
population and a strong religious tradition, thus making the Church a legitimate (and unique) 
actor in public life.
Additionally, the PRCC shows littie regard for pluralism, neither allowing for other 
societal actors to be involved in public life nor engaging with other religious communities and 
organisations. In matters pertaining to intercultural dialogue or difficult issues o f national history 
that have often been buried by communists and only later re-examined, it frequently sides with 
radical and extreme right-wing groups. The prevalence o f radical elements within the PRCC is 
strengthened by the fact that the biggest Catholic media consortium in the country, the Radio 
Maryja Group, presents conservative, even xenophobic, views and opinions, constantly stirring 
up public controversy. Despite the fact that the PRCC is a hierarchical and centrally managed 
institution, it has not succeeded in bringing Radio Maryja in line with the official Church policy 
on such key issues as anti-Semitism, xenophobia and European integration, nor encouraging its 
direct involvement in politics in general.
Evidence from other policy-making areas (that have not been analysed in this chapter), 
including women’s rights, sexual minority rights and health-care policy (notably with regards 
HIV/AIDS) suggests that PRCC’s ambivalent attitude towards pluralism and democratic 
processes exacerbates the deficiencies of the Polish state in this regards. Fuszara’s (2010) analysis 
o f participation o f women in public life in the first 20 years o f transformation confirms a deep 
split within civil society organisations working with women’s issues along religious lines, with
‘A division into organisations linked with a church (especially the Roman- Catholic Church) and 
those not linked with any, is the deepest division to be noted in the Polish women’s movement’ 
(Fuszara 2010:97). This is relevant in the context o f the state’s and politicians’ continuous refusal 
to address issues o f abortion and reproductive rights further to the initial ‘compromise’ reached 
between PRCC and the political parties in 1991-1993. Owczarzak’s (2009) review o f the history 
o f Polish HIV activism in the early 1990s through the prism o f human rights, democratic reform 
and moral authority issues further confirms that the Polish state’s attitude to democracy in early 
years of transformation was often ‘not based on political participation but in the reassertion of 
state authority to control and disseminate knowledge’ thus encouraging the Church to provide 
‘moral guidance to newly democratic and European Poles’ (Owczarzak 2009:432). In a similar 
fashion, the tensions between LGBT and feminist groups and state authorities that have 
recurred regularly since 2007 over the Pride Parade in Warsaw confirm the Polish state’s 
difficulty to fully embrace democratic pluralism twenty years since its introduction (Regulska 
2009:548-549).
The PRCC’s active involvement in Poland’s political life has been facilitated by the fact 
that political parties and groups, as well as state officials, eagerly co-operated with the Church 
on a range o f matters, from government policy-making to campaigning, in turn offering direct 
support for the PRCC’s interests and policies.
The coming to power o f a conservative, right-wing coalition between PiS, SO and LPR 
in 2005 showed that the unwritten alliance between the PRCC, political parties and government 
operates independently from voter preferences and public opinion, and has the potential not 
only to sustain republicisation, but to totally change the character o f Polish politics and impede 
the course o f the secularisation o f public life.
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Conclusion
In August 2010, a violent dispute broke out in front o f the Presidential Palace in Warsaw. Over 
a thousand angry protesters clashed on the square in front o f the palace over the removal o f a 
wooden cross commemorating the victims o f the plane crash which killed the Polish president 
and over 90 high-ranking state officials and politicians on 10 April 2010. The cross, erected on 
15 April by a group of scouts, stood in front o f the palace until mid-September. Its removal was 
a source o f a major political controversy that involved politicians from all major political parties, 
the government, the president and the thousands o f protesters campaigning either for or against 
its removal. The protesters joined anti-cross marches and demonstrations and flooded social 
networks. The so-called ‘cross war’ exacerbated social tensions surrounding the place o f religion 
in Poland’s public life. Jaroslaw Kaczynski, the late president’s twin brother, who also served a 
term as prime minister, made a public appearance at the cross site, laid flowers at its base and 
insisted that it should be allowed to remain in place. President Bronislaw Komorowski stayed 
away from the presidential palace during the dispute, and set up a temporary office in another 
location. The president proposed to move the cross to a nearby church. Prime Minister Donald 
Tusk criticised Mr Kaczynski for politicising the issue.
The Church, although remaining in the centre o f the debate, remained strangely absent 
from the solution-finding process. The PRCC found itself deeply split between more moderate 
clergy and a conservative, politicised hierarchy. Many from the latter group had openly backed 
Jaroslaw Kaczynski in his presidential bid earlier that year. Some members o f the Episcopate 
remained reserved; Bishop Nycz contended that ‘I t is not up to the church to solve this issue; 
it is the job o f the new president’ (Nycz 2010). Others were much more critical: Bishop 
Pieronek, former secretary o f the Episcopate, regretted that the Polish Church found a leader 
amongst politicians (referring to Kaczynski), and that it was not appropriate for the Church to 
side with politicians on political issues (Pieronek 2010).
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Many commentators duly attributed the sudden eruption o f the cross controversy to the 
contentious place o f religion in Polish politics and the absence o f a debate on secularising the 
public square (Sowa 2011). All of the above happened against the backdrop o f rapidly declining 
religious practice and the falling authority o f the Church among Poles. Since the fall of 
communism, the proportion of Polish Catholics attending weekly church services has dropped 
from 60% to just over 40% (Przeciszewski 2009). According to the World Values Survey, an 
overwhelming majority o f Poles oppose Church leaders’ influence on government and on voting 
behaviour—80% and 85%, respectively—more than in Western European states such as Holland 
or the U K  (WVS 2012). Furthermore, the majority of Poles (66%) think that the PRCC’s 
involvement in current political affairs is too high (Kosciol 2011). I f  Poland has been rapidly 
modernising for over two decades, and if the social significance of religion as well as individual 
religiosity have been decreasing, why was the public profile o f religion in this matter, and notably 
the Catholic Church, so high?
In the preceding chapters I have analysed the complex relationship between religion and 
politics in post-1989 Poland, with particular reference to the role o f the Catholic Church. My 
main task was to explain why, despite processes normally associated with secularisation such as 
modernisation, differentiation and declining individual religiosity, religion managed to maintain 
high public visibility as well as considerable authority in politics and public life in general.
My main argument is that, while Poland experienced some individual secularisation, and 
although individual religiosity levels have fallen significantly (WVS 2012), in the public sphere 
religion has managed to republicise itself and maintain its public visibility due to the historical 
and cultural legacy of the communist era, as well as the close ties between religious institutions 
(notably the PRCC) and key pillars o f the democratic polity (state, political society and civil 
society). Furthermore, I argue that individual and institutional actors, such as politicians, 
religious leaders and religious institutions, shaped the relationship between religion and politics 
far more than did sociological processes such as modernisation, differentiation and
274
rationalisation, which have taken hold o f Polish society in the first two decades o f democratic 
transformation. The interests and behaviour o f state and political actors, as well as civil society 
organisations and religious bodies (again, mainly the PRCC) in the first period of systemic 
transformation (1989-1993) shaped the relationship between religion and public life, and 
preserved the high visibility o f religion in Poland for years to come.
The conclusions o f my thesis regarding secularisation and republicisation in post­
communist Poland are divided into four parts. First, I  discuss the influence of historical factors, 
notably the communist era, on the place o f religion in Poland’s public life today. My main 
argument is that the Church developed a central position within society, and a strategic 
relationship with communist state institutions and an oppositional stance in the communist era, 
making itself a key polity actor after 1989. Second, I discuss the importance o f institutional 
factors in the transformation process. My main argument here is that the institutional dynamics 
o f the post-communist polity and the newly shaped relations between state, political society and 
civil society (notably, the stability o f the Church and instability o f other institutions) were crucial 
for the republicisation and sustained presence o f religion in public life. Third, I discuss the 
particularities o f post-communism in the democratisation process and the role o f religion and 
religious participants within it. Religious republicisation was particularly noticeable in the first 
four years o f transformation, between the June 1989 elections and the signing o f the Concordat 
regulating the relationship between Poland and the Catholic Church in 1993. Last but not least, 
I offer conclusions regarding the sustained republicisation o f religion in post-communist 
Poland. I argue that the active role played by the PRCC and its political allies in the first years 
o f transformation resulted in a political and institutional system that has lasted in Polish politics 
ever since.
While the conclusions o f this thesis are primarily specific to the Polish case, they might 
also be tested and explored further with reference to secularisation and religious change in other 
contexts, especially in the CEE. The three main such hypotheses relate to the role o f institutions
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and actors, the significance of historical factors such as preaetorianism and path dependency, 
and the need to use a broader range o f indicators o f secularisation, notably those focused on 
public visibility and the influence o f religion.
Legacy of the communist era
The merging of national and religious identity, reinforced through the partition of the country 
and foreign domination in the 19th and early 20th centuries, was an important feature o f Polish 
public life in the last century. Due to the major changes in the political and social landscape in 
the aftermath of World War II, religion and religious institutions were on the defensive. Over 
four decades o f communist rule were a time of forced secularisation of public space, but the 
Church managed to retain some independence, and individual religiosity remained strong. As 
was shown in Chapter 3, the PRCC came out o f the forty-year communist rule weakened 
institutionally (e.g. through land seizures and a lack o f recognition in many political processes), 
but still maintained its position as the biggest non-state actor. Furthermore, figures of individual 
religiosity remained virtually unchanged for a generation (ISKK 2012). Despite the communist 
authorities’ initial anti-religious zeal in the Stalinist years, the PRCC managed to secure the bulk 
o f its presence in public life. Although many important areas of social activity previously 
accessible to religious institutions, such as education, health-care and charitable work, had been 
restricted to state institutions, the PRCC remained strong and independent, a voice o f relative 
opposition against communism and an important focus of non-state activity and thought. The 
1956 Khrushchev Thaw allowed the Church to slowly reclaim a part o f the public sphere and 
work out a modus vivendi in relations with the state. The Church’s resources and opportunities 
for action were limited, but its desire to act in the public sphere remained visible. As all other 
institutions were controlled by the state and the Party, the Church became an unofficial channel
for transmitting public and political opinion to the communist authorities. This phenomenon— 
praetorianism—had consequences for the Church’s behaviour in post-communist Poland (see 
below). The PRCC’s behaviour in the last decade o f communist rule discredits its self-portrayal 
as an unwavering opposition force. As evidenced in Chapter 3, although the PRCC often 
defended human rights and stood up for the oppressed, whatever their background, its policy 
was largely based on defending its own institutional interests and privileges. This was particularly 
visible in the 1980s, when the PRCC tried to expand its public presence at the expense of other 
groups in the lead-up to democratic change. Merely a year before the first democratic elections 
in the Soviet bloc, the Polish Episcopate contended that a measure of the People’s Republic o f 
Poland’s democratisation was the establishment o f a Catholic social movement authorised by 
the government and mentored by the PRCC. Right before the first democratic elections in post­
war Poland, in May 1989, the PRCC rushed to secure its exclusive legal status ahead o f other 
religious and civil society organisations.
Polity triangle: state, political society and civil society
The study o f Poland’s politics after 1989, conducted in chapters 3-5, revealed that the 
institutional dynamics o f the new democratic polity were crucial for the republicisation o f 
religion and its continued public visibility, along with that of the Church. Religious 
organisations-particularly the largest one, the PRCC-have been closely tied to all three pillars 
o f the polity, including the state, political society and civil society.
The PRCC still enjoys unique recognition and support from the Polish state, despite the 
formal neutrality o f the Polish government in religious matters, as well as the existence o f a 
number o f minority faiths and religious communities. Since the first democratic elections in 
June 1989, particularly in the first years o f transition, state institutions have consulted the
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Church on numerous occasions, particularly in the fields o f education, reproductive rights and 
broadcasting. The Church did not refrain from exercising direct influence on government 
policy. Over the years, the PRCC became a regular partner in official government consultations, 
as well as conducting unofficial lobbying and policy-making. I t is important to note that the 
influence o f the Church on state institutions did not diminish over the years, but remained 
stable. In the first years of democratic transformation, between 1989 and 1993, there was a 
particularly close relationship between the state (including the parliament and the president) and 
Church institutions such as the Primate and Episcopate. Since the signing of the Concordat in 
1993, those relationships have not been as close, but still remain vital for all parties involved. 
The relationship has grown less intense because o f the opposition o f public opinion to the 
Church’s meddling with government politics, as well the coming to power o f left-wing parties 
in 1993-1997 and 2001-2005. O n the other hand, the relationship between the Church and 
government, as well as politicians, remained vital, as the PRCC relied on main political forces 
to secure the status quo in the key policy areas (education, reproductive rights, media). 
Government and political parties could also resort to the PRCC’s help when they needed 
popular support (e.g. before the European Union membership referendum in 2003). The 
political parties’ continuous support for the PRCC’s agenda was particularly important to the 
Church, as the majority o f public opinion did not agree with its stance on issues such as religious 
education and reproductive rights, and generally opposed religious leaders’ involvement in 
politics (WVS 2012)
The above-mentioned process is related to the structure o f the polity, notably the state 
and political society and the influence the Church exerts on them. A large number of Poland’s 
post-1989 politicians are drawn from the Solidarity movement, which enjoyed a close, if 
complex relationship with the Church during the communist period. A number of political 
organisations, not only those stemming from Solidarity, pledge allegiance to Catholic values and 
the Church itself. Developments in Polish politics over the first two decades of transformation,
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particularly those pertaining to social policy and other areas deemed strategic for the Church 
(analysed in chapters 4 and 5) have shown that the PRCC has allies throughout the political 
spectrum, and it is not confined by the traditional conservative/right-wing vs. progressive/left- 
wing divide. N one o f Poland’s political parties in power since 1989 have challenged the Church’s 
dominant position in social, cultural and economic life. Some individuals, particularly within 
left-wing parties such as the Democratic Left Alliance, have sought to limit the Church’s 
influence and weaken its position in politics, but this has not been systematic. Over twenty years 
after the collapse o f communism, the PRCC remains politically well-connected. The first years 
o f transformation (1989-1993) provided a fertile ground for building political alliances, and the 
Church was much more active during the first four years of democratic rule; but, as the example 
o f the Law and Justice government (2005-2007) shows, the Church was willing and able to re­
enter the political landscape with a similar vigour to that which distinguished its actions after 
the first democratic elections. Conversely, individual politicians as well as political parties were 
eager to support the Church’s agenda. This often happened without regard for party discipline 
(for politicians) or the preferences of voters (for parties). In cases such as religious education 
and abortion, it appeared that the PRCC and political parties operated in a vacuum, and public 
opinion or voter preference did not have leverage on policy-making. Last but not least, the 
PRCC remained an important influence on the development o f civil society in democratic 
Poland. This was due to two principal reasons. First o f all, the PRCC often acted as if it was not 
part o f civil society, or that it was either against it or above it in terms of importance and rights. 
Second, when the PRCC positioned itself as a civil society organisation, it still often limited 
other actors, and, because o f its sheer size as the biggest non-state organisation in the country, 
it overshadowed their development.
The first four years o f the new democratic polity were marked by rapid reforms and 
rising tensions in the political, economic, cultural and religious realms. The main institutions o f 
the old regime—the communist government and the communist party—collapsed. With
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Solidarity’s coming to power, important divisions started to arise within the movement. New 
political groups and parties were created. The Church remained the only major social institution 
internally unaffected by the regime change. It had to respond, however, to a much bigger 
external challenge: functioning in a new democratic reality, a surprising scenario for everyone at 
the time. Newly democratic Poland set about becoming a western liberal democracy, and this 
brought about tensions within social groups and institutions. Those favoured by the 
communists, such as state trade unions, farmers and industry workers, lost out in the new 
system. Those subjugated by the old regime, including Solidarity and the Church, could now 
enjoy new opportunities.
The Church entered the democratic public arena with confidence and an authority 
inherited from the previous era. The communist praetorian legacy made the Church the only 
mediating authority in society accepted by both the failing communist government and the 
emerging opposition. Once both o f the great powers o f pre-1989 Poland started dividing, 
arguing and standing against each other in democratic elections, the Church remained the last 
instance o f stability. This gave the PRCC tremendous leverage and influence on political 
processes. As I have demonstrated in Chapter 4, the former opposition politicians were very 
quick to reaffirm their allegiance to the Church, and praised it for supporting Solidarity during 
communist times, giving the PRCC much more credit than it actually deserved. Part o f the 
praetorian legacy was also the overall institutional chaos and lack o f structured dialogue between 
government institutions, political parties and social organisations during the first transition 
period. This put the Church at the centre of the country’s political life again, and gave it a chance 
to engage in both symbolic and institutional praetorianism by operating alongside newly 
democratic political institutions and marginalising other social actors. As a hierarchical 
organisation interested in controlling its members, and not involving them in decision-making, 
the PRCC positioned itself outside of, and sometimes opposed to, civil society. Statements 
issued by the Polish Church hierarchy in the early 1990s indicated that the PRCC did not
280
embrace civil society, and did not see itself as an essential element o f a democratising society 
(Borowik 2008). The PRCC’s involvement with state institutions, governments and political 
organisations suggested that it wanted direct access to political power, and as such could not be 
part o f civil society. Regular meetings with politicians, electoral campaigning and involvement 
in policy-making turned the Church into a hybrid political and civil society actor. Since the mid- 
1990s, when the Church became less involved in politics and lowered its public profile, the 
PRCC has portrayed itself as a civil society organisation (as was the case in the EU  accession 
debate—see Chapter 5), but it still refused to abide by the unwritten norms governing civil 
society. One of the main issues was the PRCC’s attitude towards democracy and 
democratisation.
Democratisation
After 1989, the PRCC’s stance towards democracy and democratisation was ambiguous and 
inconsistent. On the one hand, the Church embraced the fall o f communism and supported the 
opposition forces in changing Poland into a functioning democracy. On the other hand, it used 
the moment o f weakness o f the state and political society to gain significant power and influence 
in public life, bypassing democratic processes in order to do so. Once Poland became a new 
democracy, the PRCC officials often refused to accept democratic rules in areas they 
judgmentally deemed non-negotiable, such as abortion. In May 1989, when the election o f a 
new, democratic parliament was imminent, Primate Glemp declared that ‘abortion cannot be 
an object o f political games nor the basis for judging parliamentary candidates’ (Prymas 1989). 
As demonstrated in Chapter 4, during the debate on abortion legislation between 1989 and 1991 
the PRCC was actively involved in the policy-making process, intervening with the government 
and parliament to demand a strict anti-abortion law. A t the same time, the Church categorically
opposed a referendum on the matter, deeming it a fundamental issue that could not be decided 
by a popular vote (PO 1991b).
Due to the legacy o f praetorianism, a syndrome by which the PRCC became the most 
significant non-state organisation channelling political dissent during the communist years, the 
Church remained an active political actor even when this was no longer a prerequisite of a 
functioning democracy. The Church still acted as a censor of the government’s activities, and 
actively intervened in key policy areas that it saw as strategic, often undermining the state’s 
legitimacy to act. During the constitutional debate in the 1990s, the Church presented itself as 
a voice o f the nation—an attitude typical o f symbolic praetorianism—and insisted on active 
participation in the process of defining core values and rules governing the state. By publishing 
its ‘Position o f the Conference of the Episcopate of Poland on the Axiological Premises o f the 
New Constitution’ (Stanowisko 1990) before the public consultation process on a new 
constitution had started, the PRCC positioned itself in the middle of a key political process. 
Later on, it became involved in shaping some o f the new constitution’s passages, notably the 
preamble, defending the views o f a ‘Christian, national majority’ against the purported threat 
from minority communities, thus engaging in institutional praetorianism again (Michalik, in 
Zubrzycki 2001:638).
In  a similar fashion, the Church fell into a pattern o f path dependency. The PRCC’s 
actions and statements on a number o f key public matters in post-1989 Poland show that its 
institutional behaviour follows patterns developed in the communist era. Pickel (2011) suggests 
that cultural developments can determine the degree of secularisation in Central-Eastern 
European countries. And indeed, the historical legacy o f the communist era influences the 
current behaviour of the PRCC, restricted and shaped by the relations with the state for over 
forty years. As the PRCC saw itself as a defender o f morality during the communist years vis-a- 
vis a ‘demoralised’ communist state, it also expected to play the same role in post-1989 Poland.
282
The Church leadership had already engaged in political activity during the 1980s, and 
the first democratic elections merely accelerated this process. Although the country’s rulers and 
society vowed to transform Poland into a Western liberal democracy and build a civil society, 
the Church’s vision was not entirely compatible with these concepts. The account o f the 
Church’s involvement in the first elections between 1989 and 1993 presented in Chapter 4 
demonstrates that political neutrality was not on the PRCC’s agenda during these years. Quite 
the opposite—the Church now had not only the motive and means to participate in political 
processes, but also the opportunity to work directly with the state and political organisations. 
Cases o f active campaigning by priests and the regular use of Church premises for political 
purposes were common. N ot only did the Polish Church get directly involved in elections, but 
it also made sure its policies were embraced by the government as a result o f direct co-operation 
between Church and state institutions. Advocating restrictive abortion legislation and 
broadcasting laws, and rushing religious education into schools are just a few examples o f how 
efficient and persistent the Church was in pursuing its agenda. Those policy areas also show 
how accommodating the subsequent post-1989 Polish governments have been in terms o f 
satisfying the key demands o f the PRCC’s behaviour, showing that in the first year o f democratic 
transformation, although it agreed with the basic direction o f democratic change, it wanted it to 
be based on Christian values and the social teachings o f the Catholic Church as the dominant 
faith.
The most controversial elements of the Church’s political activity, however, were not 
the policies themselves but the ways in which they were introduced. The Church, in co­
operation with the authorities, eagerly bypassed any consultation processes and marginalised 
other social institutions, including minority religious groups and other stakeholders. While 
Primate Glemp was a regular guest in government and parliament offices, only two out o f seven 
Polish prime ministers met with representatives of minority religions between 1989 and 1993 
(Szarek 1993:233). Issues such as religious education or abortion law were decided almost
exclusively in co-operation between the PRCC and the government. This further confirmed the 
Church’s unwelcoming attitude towards democratic bargaining principles in liberal democracies. 
Even if  the PRCC sometimes presented itself as a civil society organisation, it did so only to 
show that ‘it knew better what civil society’s needs are, and was there to help achieve them 
(Borowik 2008).
The PRCC strove to maximise its institutional strength by securing a privileged status— 
not just through good relations with politicians—and by pursuing its policy plans, a pattern of 
behaviour typical of big and strong institutions eager to maintain high social authority. The 
Church’s exceptional status in society was confirmed by the Concordat in 1993, making 
Catholicism primus inter pares in Poland’s religious landscape. The creation of the Property 
Commission and the subsequent return o f vast amounts o f land and real estate—including the 
confiscation o f public property such as hospitals and universities—have shown that the Church’s 
plans are based on maximising its potential at almost all costs.
All o f the above processes have become o f great significance for the future o f the young 
Polish democracy. The Church’s continuous involvement in politics, and the politicians’ 
eagerness to embrace the PRCC’s political activity, have hugely influenced the slow 
development o f Poland’s civil society. The PRCC came close to becoming a monopolist in many 
important government consultations on policy issues: indeed, many religious minorities have 
been effectively marginalised. In the early years o f transformation, the weak Polish state was 
unable to respond to attempts at limiting democratic pluralism. Evidence from different policy 
areas shows that lack o f participation and exclusion o f different social groups remains one o f 
the main weaknesses o f Polish democracy—and a weakness that the PRCC has aggravated.
This has also had a long-lasting impact on Poland’s secularisation. Certain processes that 
would otherwise have taken place were virtually ‘frozen’ by the PRCC’s rapid and total seizure 
o f public life, including enforcing religious education, insisting on Catholic-friendly
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broadcasting and applying a restrictive abortion law on a society that would otherwise be 
reluctant to embrace those policies.
Since 1993, a significant change in the Church’s involvement in politics and the 
politicians’ stance towards religion can be noted. The gradual normalisation o f the reform 
processes and stabilisation of Poland’s political institutions have transformed the relationship 
between Church and state, and caused the two spheres to become more separate. The return of 
the post-communists to power in 1993 also contributed to the government adopting a more 
reserved position towards religion. Most o f the mechanisms developed in the first four years o f 
transition, however, as well as key policies decided then, remained in place, and influenced the 
political and social landscape of the country for years to come, thus reinforcing path 
dependency.
Sustained republicisation
After the first years of transformation (1989-1993), symbolically completed by the introduction 
o f a new provisional constitution and the signing o f the Concordat, the Church remained active 
in key areas o f government policy and public debate, including the construction o f Poland’s new 
constitutional order, its economic and social modernisation and in strategic areas o f foreign 
policy, such as integration with the European Union. What is more, the PRCC became a vigilant 
guardian o f the status quo in policy areas, where it secured significant gains between 1989 and 
1993.
By 1993, Poland had one of the most restrictive abortion regimes in Europe in place. 
All attempts at revising the law in this area were challenged by the Church. The PRCC granted 
itself the right to represent the will o f the people, and in doing so bypassed consultation 
procedures characteristic of liberal democracies. The issue o f including religious education
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classes in the state education system was approached in a similar manner. Once the PRCC 
secured a decision favourable to its policy goals, which happened in 1990-91, it refused to re­
open the issue, and used its bargaining power with governments and political actors to silence 
any further debate.
Although the Church defended its behaviour and policies implemented in the first years 
o f transformation, a certain discourse shift can be observed. First o f all, Church hierarchs were 
less prominent in their public statements on political issues, and usually resorted to calls for 
calming the public debate, using this argument as a tool for silencing political opponents, 
particularly in areas where the PRCC had previously secured strategic gains. Second, the PRCC 
learnt to borrow selectively from the vocabulary of civil society organisations, wherever it saw 
that these could benefit its actions. And so, when defending the presence o f RE classes in 1993, 
the PRCC framed it as a human rights issue that the Church was raising because it had an interest 
in defending human rights. Furthermore, when the Church’s public activity was challenged, the 
PRCC presented itself as one o f many social actors or civil society organisations, thus having 
the right to voice its concerns in the public square.
Conversely, on matters pertaining to national identity and statehood, the PRCC did not 
change the stance it presented in the first years of democratic transition, and relied on its self- 
proclaimed unique status. It consistently portrayed itself, and acted, as the symbolic 
representative o f the nation on matters pertaining to statehood and identity. During the 
constitutional debate, it fiercely defended the ethnic concept o f nation, as opposed to its 
modern, civic understanding, and actively lobbied for a firm place for religious values to be 
embedded within the new constitution. This was justified by the fact that Poland was a country 
with a majority Catholic population and a strong religious tradition, thus making the Church a 
legitimate (and unique) actor in public life. Although the PRCC’s institutional praetorianism all 
but ceased in late 1990s, its symbolic praetorianism remains vibrant.
286
Additionally, the PRCC showed little regard for pluralism, neither in allowing other 
societal actors to be involved in public life nor in engaging with other religious communities 
and organisations. In matters pertaining to intercultural dialogue, and difficult issues in national 
history—often buried by communists and now re-examined—it frequently sided with radical and 
extreme right-wing groups. The prevalence of such elements within the PRCC was strengthened 
by the fact that the biggest Catholic media consortium in the country, the Radio Maryja Group, 
presented conservative, if not xenophobic, views and opinions, constandy stirring public 
controversy. Despite the fact that the PRCC is a hierarchical and centrally managed institution, 
it has not succeeded in bringing Radio Maryja into line with the official Church policy on such 
key issues as anti-Semitism, xenophobia or European integration, nor into direct involvement 
in politics in general.
The PRCC’s continued active involvement in Poland’s political life was facilitated by the 
fact that political parties and groups, as well as state officials, still eagerly co-operated with the 
Church on a range o f matters, from government policy-making, to campaigning to direct 
support o f the PRCC’s interests and policies. The coming to power o f a conservative, right- 
wing coalition o f PiS, SO and LPR in 2005 showed that the unwritten alliance between the 
PRCC and political parties and government operates independendy from voter preferences and 
public opinion, and has the potential to instandy change the character o f politics and influence 
the course o f the secularisation o f public life.
The two first decades o f the Third Polish Republic (1989-2007) were marked by a close 
relationship between the Catholic Church and all democratic governments, albeit with different 
degrees o f intensity. Moreover, the Church and its allies, including religious media, continuously 
maintained a high public profile and attempted to influence public life. The PRCC and its 
supporters continued their attempts to monopolise public space in certain areas perceived as 
strategic by the Church, at the cost o f other civil society organisations and religious groups. This 
state o f religious republicisation, alongside the secularisation o f the private lives o f the majority
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of society (WVS 2012), remained a characteristic and stable feature o f Polish public life during 
the first two decades o f democratic transformation.
Understanding religious change: secularisation and republicisation
The overwhelming body of research into religious change in today’s societies indicates that the 
process is the primary result o f independent, albeit historically warranted, social processes, 
including modernisation, differentiation, rationalisation and individualisation (Tschannen 1991; 
Norris and Inglehart 2011). For most Western European countries that were the basis for the 
original secularisation thesis, those processes have gradually led to increased secularisation and 
the declining social authority o f religion. All o f those processes can be identified in post­
communist Polish society, and yet religion maintains high public visibility and remains salient in 
Poland’s political life-a phenomenon that is to the subject of many studies by sociologists of 
religion both in Poland and abroad (Borowik 2008; Norris and Inglehart 2006).
After the first two decades o f democratic transformation, Poland became a largely 
modernised European state with a rapidly weakening individual religiosity,12 a phenomenon that 
the classic secularisation theories are not capable o f explaining. The case study presented in this 
thesis shows that secularisation and republicisation can occur jointly, thus making it necessary 
to broaden the range o f indicators of religious change. Rather than analysing macro-social 
processes or individual-level religiosity, our attention should be turned to individual and 
institutional actors as well as the historical and cultural context. Instead o f looking at 
secularisation as a one-way, linear process, the Polish experience suggests that secularisation 
should be understood as a multi-layered process that is neither irreversible nor linear. My
12 Albeit still among the highest in Europe in terms o f church attendance (WVS 2012).
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research into Polish political life between 2005 and 2007 has demonstrated that political 
secularisation can be reversed in specific areas identified by Moyser (1991), including 
constitutional, institutional and agenda secularisation.
My thesis argues against an all-encompassing definition o f secularisation that includes 
both individual and social factors. My research into Polish public life in the last twenty years has 
shown that religion maintains a high public profile, despite falling levels o f individual religiosity. 
It is my contention that the main reasons for this have to do with the structure o f Polish 
democratic polity (state, political society and civil society). The Polish Roman Catholic Church 
has emerged from the communist era as the single most significant unreformed social actor (as 
opposed to the key state actors—government, parliament, police and the army, amongst others 
all o f which had to be either abolished or reformed—and political society actors, such as political 
parties—both PZPR and its satellite parties were dissolved). This has allowed the Church to enter 
the public sphere as a strong actor in the conditions o f rapid reform o f many strategic policy 
areas, under the aegis o f the PRCC. As outlined in Chapter 4, the Church engaged in policy­
making and became a regular partner of the government and parliament, and a frequent broker 
between main state actors, including Poland’s president and others. O n the other hand, political 
figures were openly embracing the Church, and often referring to the arsenal of religious 
arguments in support o f their policies and actions in areas such as education, reproductive rights, 
mass-media and foreign policy. The efficient collaboration o f key actors within the polity 
triangle (state, political society and civil society) with religious institutions resulted in a very rapid 
rise o f religion’s profile in public life. Between 1989 and 1993, the Church managed to secure 
key concessions in the priority areas o f its interest.
The Church’s behaviour, and the collaboration of state and political actors in this 
respect, can be explained through the instruments provided by Social Movement Theory, 
notably motive, means and opportunity (Mantilla 2010). The PRCC’s main motive was securing 
its institutional interests and maintaining its position within the society. The Church’s main
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interests included retaining its material status (e.g. by reclaiming property seized by communist 
authorities), as well as maintaining social control through nation-wide instruments such as 
religious education in schools. All o f the above have been secured due to concessions received 
from the state between 1989 and 1991. The Church possessed the means to realise its potential 
even before 1989, but the democratic transformation rapidly enhanced its means portfolio, 
including the possibility to operate freely as a religious and charitable organisation within a 
democratic state. Last but not least, new opportunities have arisen since the democratic elections 
and coming to power o f the Solidarity movement, as the Church then had direct access to 
politicians and state institutions. Furthermore, the unique role the Church has played in systemic 
change, including brokerage between the communists and opposition, allowed it to claim unique 
status in the new reality, often bypassing or side-lining other social actors. The evidence o f the 
high importance o f institutional and political actors in the course o f secularisation in Poland 
sustains Herbert’s republicisation thesis. The social authority o f religion in Poland remains high 
due to a combination of institutional and informal connections between religious actors and 
political institutions and groups, and religion has de-differentiated itself into a range o f secular 
spheres, including education, media and politics, sustaining religion’s high public profile.
By securing its key interests in the early period of transformation, and by maintaining a 
close relationship with political actors, the Church and pro-Church groups helped maintain a 
status quo in matters pertaining to religion in public life and church-state relations. Despite a 
relative normalisation of the relations between religion and politics, including a less visible public 
profile o f the Church in the 1990s, religion remained a contentious issue in Polish politics, and 
was an important part o f key policy-making discussions, such as the debate on European 
integration and family planning. My analysis o f the activities o f the Law and Justice government 
(2005-2007) using Moyser’s five-step model o f political secularisation has shown that many 
specific secularisation processes can quickly be stopped or reversed. While this is not a 
refutation o f a broad secularisation thesis, it does suggest that secularisation is not a
straightforward story, and that republicisation can occur in parallel. Over the short period of 
the PiS right-wing government, the state became an active supporter o f the Church, including 
financial donations for supporting Church infrastructure, implemented pro-Church reforms in 
education and family policies, and actively co-operated with religious media such as the Radio 
Maryja Group. PiS also tabled a proposal for a new Polish constitution that would officially 
recognise the country’s Christian heritage and raise the profile o f the PRCC in relations with the 
state (see Chapter 5).
All o f the evidence presented above supports my argument that political and religious 
actors operating in a flexible institutional environment (most o f Poland’s political institutions 
have been either reformed, abolished or brought to life within the last 23 years) have the 
potential to influence the course o f secularisation and contribute to sustained religious authority 
over society, regardless of individual religiosity.
In addition, this thesis has found that the dynamics of church-state relations and the 
overall relationship o f religion and politics in contemporary Poland are highly dependent on 
historical and cultural factors. Although Poland is now a liberal democracy with a relatively 
stable political system, its past is very significant for the relationship between religion and 
politics. My research into the historical and cultural background to Poland’s religious identity 
and the place o f religion in the second half o f the 20th century (Chapter 3) points to the fact that 
at the end o f the communist period in Poland, religion was seen as a largely positive force, 
particularly in the face o f foreign domination: both historically, during the partition period (19th 
and early 20th centuries), and contemporarily as a result o f the communist rule imposed by the 
Soviet Union. Most researchers have focused on the Church’s role as an opposition force 
(Gowin 2001; Zaryn 2003) and overlooked the PRCC’s attempts at securing its own interests, 
often over the heads o f other religious organisations and opposition groups (D^bowski 2008; 
Agnosiewicz 2008). Criticising the Church for its collaboration with communist authorities is a 
taboo in Poland’s public life—and part o f a wider taboo on criticising the Church and religion.
Critiques o f the PRCC and its actions both before and after 1989 remained rare in the first two 
decades o f democratic government. This fact was acknowledged by Church officials themselves, 
as well as by Catholic media (Bilewicz 2010; Turnau 2012). Poland’s blasphemy laws are a 
constant source o f controversy, and the Church and its allies are often accused o f stifling 
criticism under the guise o f defending religion rather than the Church as an institution 
(Mytkowska 2012).
Its positive image in society and within most o f the political establishment has allowed 
the PRCC to become an active political player in the new reality after the fall o f communism. 
W hat is more, the image of the PRCC as a much-needed censor of the government’s activities 
(as it was in communist times) remained, and was used both by the Church and its allies as a 
justification for the Church’s continued presence in the public sphere. In Chapter 4 ,1 examined 
the relationship between religion and politics and church-state relations in the first period of 
democratic transformation (1989-1993). This was done mostly through the focal issues of 
educational reform, reproductive rights and the activities o f the Ombudsman. The Church’s 
behaviour in the new democratic reality was almost identical to its pre-1989 activity in the way 
that the PRCC saw itself as a representative of the nation vs. the government’s ‘external’ 
intervention (Sabbat-Swidlicka 1993:20). The PRCC also censored the government’s policy­
making attempts, on some occasions refusing to recognise the democratic process and insisting 
that its viewpoint be acknowledged as non-negotiable, as was the case with the abortion law 
(Prymas 1989). W hat is more, any attempts at discrediting or weakening the Church’s position 
were framed as anti-democratic, and the PRCC’s allies contended that the Church’s 
independence and activity are indispensable in the democratic reality, as the Church has the 
right to hold the government to account (but on the other hand, the government has no 
authority over the Church) (Giertych 2001). Such instances o f path dependency (see Mahoney
2000), where an institutional actor (in this case the PRCC or political actors) behave in a certain 
way merely because o f historical precedent (e.g. the Church being a censor of the government,
a true representative o f the people and an institution whose independence is a matter o f national 
survival) had a profound impact on religion’s continued republicisation.
The evidence o f the path-dependency o f religious and political actors in post­
communist Poland calls for a more careful consideration o f cultural and religious factors—in line 
with the suggestion made by a number o f authors researching the secularisation o f CEE states 
that there needs to be a more nuanced, contextualised secularisation theory (Pickel 2009). This 
direction o f research into religious change, considering the cultural and religious legacy of 
societies that may have even secularised on the level o f individual religiosity and belonging, also 
corresponds with Norris and Inglehart’s (2011) cultural traditions axiom, which suggests that 
worldviews originally linked with religious traditions are transmitted even in secular societies.
Based on an analysis o f the relationship between religion and politics in Poland, this 
thesis argues that the continued public presence o f religion is due to historical and cultural 
factors, notably the legacy of the communist era, which enabled the institutionalisation of a 
position o f influence for the Polish Roman Catholic Church that was consolidated during the 
early post-communist period (1989-1993). It is the historical legacy o f the Catholic Church, and 
the institutional interests o f both the Church and key actors within the democratising polity, 
which preserve the status quo and sustain the republicisation of religion in Poland.
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